Judgment rendered October 2, 2024. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 55,817-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
TREYDARRIUS WRIGHT Appellant
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 386,656
Honorable John D. Mosely, Jr., Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Edward Kelly Bauman
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
ALEX L. PORUBSKY CHEYENNE YVETTE WILSON COURTNEY RAY Assistant District Attorneys
Before STONE, ROBINSON, and HUNTER, JJ. HUNTER, J.
Defendant, Treydarrius Wright, was charged by amended bill of
information with second degree rape, in violation of La. R.S. 14:42.1(A)(2).
Following a trial, a unanimous jury found defendant guilty as charged. He
was sentenced to serve 35 years at hard labor without the benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS
On July 30, 2021, 20-year-old M.G.1 was shopping at a mall in
Bossier City, Louisiana when she encountered defendant, Treydarrius
Wright. Defendant approached M.G., called her by her first name, and
claimed he knew her “from school.” Although M.G. did not recognize
defendant, she engaged in a conversation with him. Defendant told M.G. his
name was “Jay,” he was 22 years old, and he was originally from the State
of California.2 Defendant and M.G. exchanged telephone numbers and
traded messages throughout the day; they made plans to meet later in the
day.
Defendant picked M.G. up from her apartment at approximately 5:00
p.m. They first went to Party Central Family Fun Center in Bossier, where
they ate and played games. They later attended a party at a biker club.
While at the party, defendant accused M.G. of acting standoffish and “too
boujee” because she preferred to sit alone. M.G. indicated she was ready to
leave. However, during the ride home, M.G. changed her mind and agreed
1 Since M.G. was the victim of a sex crime, she and her family members will be referred to by their initials. See, La. R.S. 46:1844(W). 2 Defendant’s actual nickname is “Trey,” he was 25 years old, and he is not from California. to accompany defendant to a liquor store in Shreveport where he purchased
a bottle of Patrón (tequila).
After leaving the store, defendant drove M.G. to the home of his half-
brother, Shamareio Bryant. When they arrived, M.G. discovered she was
acquainted with Bryant because they had attended middle school together
and had dated in the past.3 Shortly after arriving at Bryant’s home,
defendant entered the bathroom, and witnesses testified they could hear
“tapping” or “banging” noises coming from the bathroom. One of the
guests, Jakhair Perrow, went to investigate the noise, and he observed
defendant using a hammer to crush a “large pill.” When defendant emerged
from the bathroom, he began pouring shots of tequila for everyone at the
house.
M.G. testified when defendant gave her the shot, “something told” her
to refuse the drink, and she attempted to pour it out. However, defendant
saw her trying to pour out the drink and accused her of “trying to fake out.”
Upon defendant’s insistence, M.G. drank the shot of tequila. M.G. testified
she immediately began to experience dizziness and light-headedness, “like
the world started spinning.” She also stated she became nauseous and “felt
really weak.” M.G. testified she drinks alcohol occasionally, and she had
never experienced such a reaction after consuming alcohol.
Thereafter, defendant and M.G., accompanied by Bryant, returned to
the biker club. By the time they arrived at the club, M.G. had difficulty
walking unassisted and stated she did not “feel right.” M.G. was unable to
Present at Bryant’s house were Bryant, Jakhair Perrow, Tyler Stewart, and two 3
women identified only by their first names, DeErica and Keria.
2 recall anything after arriving at the biker club. She stated, “I just remember
us walking up [to the biker club], and I don’t remember much after that. ***
I just remember waking up the next morning.”
M.G. shared an apartment with her younger sister, MG-2. MG-2
testified defendant and M.G. arrived at the apartment between 12:00 a.m.
and 1:00 a.m. on July 31, 2021. MG-2 also testified defendant told her his
name was “Jay,” and he was carrying M.G. over his shoulder. MG-2
described M.G.’s condition as “limp,” “unresponsive, and “blacked out,”
and she stated defendant “started panicking” when she inquired about her
sister’s condition. According to MG-2, defendant told her he believed
“somebody laced” M.G.’s drink. Defendant then ran down the stairs and
left. MG-2 was unable to awaken M.G., so called her mother via Face-
Time.4
When M.G. awakened the following day, she texted defendant and
asked what happened the previous night. Defendant responded by telling
M.G. she had gotten “really drunk,” and he had taken her home. M.G.
testified seconds after she received the text message from defendant, she
received a telephone call from Bryant, who informed her he had received a
text message from defendant. Bryant sent a screenshot of defendant’s text
message to M.G., which provided as follows:
I’m going to call you. You need to say you went to Party Central with a girl. You had my truck and had sex in the
4 C.B., M.G.’s mother, also testified. She stated she was at the apartment before M.G. left for her date with M.G., and M.G. was behaving normally. Later that night, one of her daughters called her via FaceTime, and she could see M.G. “was not responsive” and was “just limp.” C.B. testified she instructed her daughter to call 9-1-1.
3 [console], and be like you had my truck, and I was ducked off at your crib.[ 5]
After receiving the text message from Bryant, M.G. suspected
defendant had engaged in sexual intercourse with her while she was
unresponsive. M.G. testified she reached out to defendant, accused him of
lying to her and asked him if he had raped her or “did something without my
consent.” Defendant denied doing so.
M.G. presented to Ochsner-LSU Health Medical Center in
Shreveport, where the hospital personnel notified the Shreveport Police
Department (“SPD”). M.G. was examined by a sexual assault nurse
examiner (“SANE”), who collected biological evidence using a physical
evidence recovery kit (“PERK”). The nurse obtained swab samples from
M.G.’s external genitalia, vaginal, perineal, anal and cervical areas.
Subsequent testing for deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) revealed the semen
extracted during M.G.’s sexual assault examination matched defendant’s
DNA. The nurse also drew blood for toxicology testing which later revealed
M.G. had Clonazolam, a benzodiazepine, and carboxy tetrahydrocannabinol,
a metabolite of THC (the active component of marijuana), in her system.
M.G. was also interviewed by police officers, and she identified
defendant as the person she believed had sexually assaulted her. M.G. was
provided a photographic lineup; she selected defendant from the array of
photographs as the person she had met and gone out with on July 30, 2021.
Months later, defendant was interviewed by officers from the SPD.
After being informed of his Miranda rights, defendant signed a waiver of
5 M.G. later provided the screenshot of the text message to the Shreveport Police Department.
4 rights form. Defendant admitted he met M.G. at the mall, picked her up
from her home, took her to his half-brother’s house, and poured tequila shots
for those gathered at the house. Defendant also stated M.G. consumed only
one shot of tequila. He denied crushing any pills at Bryant’s house, putting
drugs in M.G.’s drink, and engaging in sexual intercourse with her.
Defendant claimed he sent the text message to Bryant because he was
married, and his wife had found a box of condoms in his truck.6
Defendant was arrested and initially charged with mingling harmful
substances, in violation of La. R.S. 14:38.1. The bill of information was
later amended to charge defendant with mingling harmful substances and
second degree rape, a violation of La. R.S. 14:42.1(A)(2). Thereafter, the
bill was amended again to charge defendant with second degree rape.
After hearing the testimony and reviewing the evidence, a unanimous
jury found defendant guilty as charged. The trial court denied defendant’s
motions for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and new trial. He was
sentenced to serve 35 years at hard labor without the benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence. The trial court also ordered defendant
to register as a sex offender within 10 days of his release from prison.
Defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider sentence but did not state any
specific reasons for the motion. The trial court denied the motion to
reconsider sentence.
Defendant appeals.
6 Defendant’s interview with police officers was videotaped. The video recording was played for the jury during the trial.
5 DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction for second degree rape. He argues none of the witnesses saw him
place any narcotic, anesthetic agent, or controlled dangerous substance in
M.G.’s shot of tequila. He also maintains M.G. was unable to recall
anything that happened after she left the biker club; therefore, according to
defendant, it is possible M.G. voluntarily consumed drugs that night but
does not recall doing so. Defendant also argues M.G. may have also
consented to engaging in sexual intercourse with him, but due to consuming
drugs, she is unable to recall the act. Therefore, defendant argues his
conviction should be reversed.
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court must
consider whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.
Leger, 17-2084 (La. 6/26/19), 284 So. 3d 609; State v. Frost, 53,312 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 3/4/20), 293 So. 3d 708, writ denied, 20-00628 (La. 11/18/20),
304 So. 3d 416. The Jackson standard does not provide the appellate court
with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of
the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517.
The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or
reweigh evidence, and accords great deference to the trier of fact’s decision
to accept or reject witness testimony in whole or in part. State v. McFarlin,
54,754 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/25/23), 354 So. 3d 888, writ denied, 23-00261 (La.
6 10/17/23), 371 So. 3d 1078; State v. Frost, supra. Where there is conflicting
testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a
determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the issue is the weight of
the evidence, not its sufficiency. In the absence of internal contradiction or
irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one witness’s testimony, if
believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient support for a requisite factual
conclusion. State v. McFarlin, supra; State v. Gullette, 43,032 (La. App. 2
Cir. 2/13/08), 975 So. 2d 753. This principle is equally applicable to victims
of sexual assault; such testimony alone is sufficient even when the state
offers no medical, scientific or physical evidence to prove the commission of
the offense by the defendant. State v. McFarlin, supra; State ex rel. P.R.R.,
Jr., 45,405 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/19/10), 36 So. 3d 1138.
Second degree rape occurs when the oral or vaginal sexual intercourse
is deemed to be without the lawful consent of the victim because it is
committed when the victim is incapable of resisting or of understanding the
nature of the act by reason of stupor or abnormal condition of the mind
produced by a narcotic or anesthetic agent or other controlled dangerous
substance administered by the offender and without the knowledge of the
victim. La. R.S. 14:42.1(A)(2).
During the trial, M.G. testified as to the events of July 30-31, 2021.
She stated she had never heard of Clonazolam, she did not knowingly
consume the drug, and she did not agree to take any substances on July 30,
2021. She also stated she was not aware anything other than Patrón was in
the shot she drank, and she did not consent to be given anything other than a
shot of Patrón. Further, M.G. testified she did not consent to engaging in
7 sexual intercourse with defendant. She also stated she did not knowingly
take any prescription medications or consume any recreational drugs in July
2021. She testified when she drank the shot of Patrón defendant handed to
her, she believed it contained only tequila.
Shamareio Bryant testified defendant called him on the night of the
incident and told him he was bringing a woman to his house. According to
Bryant, when defendant and M.G. arrived at his house, he saw defendant go
into the bathroom. Shortly thereafter, Bryant heard a tapping noise coming
from the bathroom, and his cousin, Jakhair Perrow, told him he saw
defendant in the bathroom crushing a large pill with a hammer. When he
emerged from the bathroom, defendant poured everyone a shot of tequila.
Bryant stated he and Perrow did not drink the shot.
Bryant also testified as to their excursion to the biker club. He stated
although it was cold inside the club, M.G. was sweating and appeared to be
experiencing memory loss. Bryant testified he told defendant he needed to
take M.G. home. He stated when they left the club, defendant became angry
because M.G. kept calling Bryant’s name and asking Bryant to help her.
Bryant also testified defendant dropped him off at home, and when they
arrived at his house, defendant shoved him and asked, “How am I going to
f**k her now? The only thing she know[s] is Shamareio.” Bryant also stated
defendant left with M.G. in his vehicle, and told him he would be back in 30
minutes; however, defendant did not return until “two or three hours” later.
Bryant stated the following morning, he received text messages from
defendant, defendant’s wife, and M.G.’s sister. He acknowledged the text
8 message defendant sent him instructing him (Bryant) to lie for him
(defendant).
Jakhair Perrow testified he was at Bryant’s home on July 30, 2021.
He stated defendant entered the house, greeted Bryant, and went into the
bathroom. Perrow also testified he heard a “loud banging” coming from the
bathroom, so he went to investigate. He stated he “picked the lock” to the
bathroom door, and he saw defendant “beating on an oversized pill” with a
hammer. According to Perrow, when defendant exited the bathroom, he
“was trying to pour everybody shots.” Perrow stated he “threw [the shot] to
the side” because he did not “know what was in it” due to what he had
observed defendant doing in the bathroom. Perrow also testified M.G. did
not want to drink the shot prepared by defendant, but defendant “kept trying
to put pressure on her to take it, and she finally took it.” Perrow reiterated
he saw defendant crushing a pill with a hammer. However, he admitted he
did not know what happened to the pill thereafter.
Tyler Stewart testified he was also present at Bryant’s house on the
night of July 30, 2021. He stated defendant and M.G. arrived at the house,
and defendant instructed him to call him “Jay.” Stewart also stated after
defendant went into the bathroom, he heard a “beating” sound, and Perrow
told him defendant was “beating on something.” He also stated when
defendant exited the bathroom, he “told us to take a shot.” He testified he
saw defendant give M.G. a shot, and he saw her drink it. Stewart further
stated M.G. started “wiggling” soon after she consumed the drink, and
defendant “leaned over to us and said he got her – he got her something.”
9 Stewart testified after Perrow told him what he had witnessed defendant
doing in the bathroom, he inferred defendant had laced M.G.’s drink.
Olivia Jones testified as an expert in forensic sexual assault
examination. She stated she was called to Ochsner LSU-Shreveport to
examine M.G. on July 31, 2021. Jones testified she collected vaginal swabs,
cervical swabs, vaginal washings, external genitalia swabs, perineal swabs,
and anal swabs from M.G. during the examination. She also drew blood and
collected a urine sample for toxicology testing.7 Jones further stated M.G.’s
physical examination did not reveal any overt signs of injury, such as
vaginal tears or abrasions, and she would not expect to observe vaginal
tearing on adult females who are sexually active.
Kari Dicken, a forensic DNA analyst for the North Louisiana Crime
Laboratory in Shreveport, testified as an expert in forensic DNA analysis.
She testified she examined the forensic examination swabs taken from M.G.
during the sexual assault examination, in addition to the reference sample
obtained from defendant, and she was able to isolate sperm DNA taken from
the swabs. She determined the DNA on the swabs belonged to M.G. and
defendant.8 Dicken also testified the semen was likely put into M.G.’s
7 Corporal David Karam, a sex crimes detective, took possession of the PERK and all other evidence, including the panties M.G. was wearing the night of the incident. He transported the items to the sex crimes unit. 8 Dicken testified the probability of another person with the same male DNA profile consistent with that taken from M.G.’s external genitalia swab would be approximately one in 3.18 quadrillion (one million billion); the probability of finding the same DNA as defendant’s DNA obtained from M.G.’s perineal swab would be one in 11.5 quintillion (one billion billion); the probability of finding the same DNA as defendant’s DNA obtained from M.G.’s vaginal swab would be one in 3.46 trillion (one thousand billion); the probability of finding the same DNA as defendant’s DNA obtained from M.G.’s cervical swab would be one in 10.5 quadrillion (one million billion); and the probability of finding the same DNA as defendant’s DNA obtained from M.G.’s vaginal washings swab would be one in 17.9 quadrillion (one million billion). Dicken was unable to interpret the DNA obtained from the anal swab.
10 vagina “from the assault or from the sexual activity.” During cross-
examination, Dicken admitted she did not know when defendant’s DNA was
placed in M.G., and she did not know whether defendant and M.G. engaged
in consensual sexual intercourse.
Emily Raley, a forensic scientist in the toxicology section of the North
Louisiana Crime Laboratory, testified as an expert in the field of forensic
toxicology. Raley testified she analyzed the blood and urine samples
obtained from M.G. She stated the blood testing detected the presence of
Clonazolam, and the urine testing detected the presence of carboxy
tetrahydrocannabinol, a metabolite of THC (the active component in
marijuana). According to Raley, the Clonazolam, a Schedule I controlled
dangerous substance, is known as a “designer benzodiazepine.” She stated
the drug has not been approved for medical use, is not used in hospitals or
prescribed by physicians, is geared toward illicit black-market dealings, and
is typically purchased online. Raley also testified Clonazolam suppresses
the central nervous system and causes sleepiness, sedation, slurred speech,
amnesia, respiratory depression, coma, and loss of consciousness. She
stated it is unknown how much Clonazolam M.G. ingested. She further
testified because Clonazolam is a street drug and not approved for use, little
is known about its concentration or how long it remains in a person’s system
after use.
Corporal David Karam, of the SPD, testified he was employed as a
sex crimes detective on July 31, 2021, and he was responsible for
investigating sexual assault cases. He stated he took possession of the
PERK, toxicology kit, and M.G.’s clothing; he transported the items to the
11 sex crimes bureau. Cpl. Karam also testified he requested a photographic
lineup to present to M.G.9 He further stated he interviewed defendant on
December 8, 2021.10 Cpl. Karam stated during the interview, defendant’s
account of the events of July 30-31, 2021, was the similar to the accounts
provided by M.G. and other witnesses. Cpl. Karam also stated defendant
admitted to sending the text message to Bryant, instructing Bryant to say he
went to Party Central with a girl and engaged in sexual intercourse with the
girl in defendant’s truck. However, defendant denied having sexual
intercourse with M.G., and he denied lacing M.G.’s drink with a drug. Cpl.
Karam stated defendant was charged with second degree rape based upon
the statements provided by witnesses and the results of the PERK and
toxicology.
The record shows the State presented evidence to establish defendant
was seen crushing a “large pill” with a hammer, and shortly thereafter, he
poured M.G. a shot of Patrón. M.G. drank the shot and immediately began
feeling unwell. M.G. does not remember much of what occurred after she
took the shot of Patrón. Bryant testified M.G. was unable to walk without
assistance by the time they left the biker club, and MG-2 testified M.G. was
unconscious when defendant brought her home. Based on the evidence, the
jury apparently inferred defendant placed the Clonazolam into M.G.’s drink
and later took advantage of her apparent stupor by engaging in sexual
intercourse with her without her consent, as she was prevented from
9 Cpl. Karam testified every photographic lineup is sent to the Louisiana State Analytical Fusion Center, which compiles lineups containing a photograph of the suspect, as well as “filler photographs” of persons of similar race, sex, build, skin tone, and facial features. 10 The relevant portions of the recorded interview was played for the jury.
12 resisting these acts by defendant’s action of lacing M.G.’s drink with the
drug. The jury considered the physical evidence, heard the testimony and
weighed the credibility of the witnesses. In reaching its verdict, the jury
reasonably found the testimony of M.G., Bryant, Perrow, Stewart, and MG-2
to be more credible than defendant’s version of the events. Considering the
evidence presented in a light most favorable to the State, we conclude the
record supports the jury’s determination the State proved defendant’s guilt
of second degree rape beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant also contends the sentence imposed, 35 years without the
benefit of probation, parole, of suspension of sentence, is constitutionally
excessive under the facts of this case. He argues as follows: the sentencing
range for second degree rape is five to 40 years, and the 35-year sentence is
a near-maximum sentence; the trial court failed to articulate any mitigating
factors; the court failed to consider defendant did not have any prior sex-
related offenses; and the court did not order a PSI and did not mention any
factors, such as defendant’s background, personal life, education, family, or
other relevant factors.
We note defense counsel made an oral objection to the sentence at the
hearing and filed a motion to reconsider sentence. However, neither
included specific grounds. In the motion to reconsider sentence, defendant
did not argue that the trial court failed to provide a factual basis to justify the
35-year sentence, and he did not argue the trial court failed to consider none
of his prior criminal offenses were sex offenses.
Ordinarily, appellate review of sentences for excessiveness utilizes a
two-step process. However, when the motion to reconsider sentence raised
13 only a claim of constitutional excessiveness, a defendant is relegated to
review of the sentence on that ground alone. La. C. Cr. P. art. 881.1(E);
State v. Mims, 619 So. 2d 1059 (La. 1993); State v. Parfait, 52,857 (La. App.
2 Cir. 8/14/19), 278 So. 2d 455, writ denied, 19-01659 (La. 12/10/19), 285
So. 3d 489; State v. Williams, 51,667 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 245 So. 3d
131.
A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20 if it is grossly out of
proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a
purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Dorthey,
623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Lindsey, 50,324 (La. App. 2 Cir.
2/24/16), 189 So. 3d 1104. A sentence is considered grossly
disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of
the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. Id. The trial court
has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within the statutory limits,
and such sentences should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of an
abuse of discretion. State v. Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7;
State v. Allen, 49,642 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/15), 162 So. 3d 519, writ denied,
15-0608 (La. 1/25/16), 184 So. 3d 1289.
The maximum and minimum sentences for second degree rape are set
forth in La. R.S. 14:42.1(B). The sentencing range for second degree rape is
five to 40 years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or
suspension of sentence.
In the instant case, the trial court did not order a PSI. Prior to
imposing defendant’s sentence, the court stated:
So [the] Court also looks at the criminal history of the defendant as well as the number of pending charges. Defendant
14 has a history of criminal activity and that – that it shows a pattern of criminal – continuous criminal activities. The Court also having considered Article 893 – the provisions of Article 893 as well as the provisions of Article 894[.1], a lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the offense; therefore, Court will sentence the defendant to 35 years hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence to run concurrently with any other sentence he’s required to serve. Credit is given for time served. ***
The evidence established defendant, posing as “Jay” from California,
invited M.G. out on a date. Defendant, armed with Clonazolam, crushed the
pill, placed the drug in a shot of Patrón, and served the drink to M.G. After
M.G. became so incapacitated that she was falling asleep and unable to walk
without assistance, defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with her without
her knowledge or consent. Defendant was fully aware M.G. was particularly
vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to her incapacitated state. The
sentencing judge stated he considered the facts of the case, as well as
defendant’s criminal history. The court noted it had considered the factors
set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, and a lesser sentence would deprecate the
seriousness of the offense. Based on this record, we find the sentence
imposed is not grossly disproportionate to the severity of offense and does
not shock the sense of justice. Consequently, we find the a 35-year sentence
imposed is not constitutionally excessive.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction and
sentence.
AFFIRMED.