Judgment rendered April 9, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,201-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
TRADAVION DEANTHONY Appellant HUGHES
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 380,133
Honorable Ramona L. Emanuel, Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Chad M. Ikerd
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
SENAE DENEAL HALL ERIC MATTHEW WHITEHEAD FERNANDO BERNARD GRIDER, JR. Assistant District Attorneys
Before STONE, STEPHENS, and MARCOTTE, JJ. MARCOTTE, J.
This criminal appeal arises from the First Judicial District Court,
Parish of Caddo, the Honorable Ramona Emanuel presiding. Defendant
Tradavion Hughes (“Hughes”) was convicted of second-degree murder and
sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefits. He now
appeals his conviction and sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 25, 2021, Hughes was charged by bill of indictment with
the second-degree murder of Eric Brownlee, Jr. (“Brownlee”), in violation of
La. R.S. 14:30.1. The offense occurred on December 6, 2020. Hughes pled
not guilty.
From October 30 to November 1, 2023, a trial was held where the
following evidence was adduced. Nakia Hall (“Hall”) testified that she was
engaged to Brownlee on the date of his death; they had been dating for eight
years. In the early hours of December 6, 2020, she and Brownlee stopped at
the Clark Gas Station on Jewella Avenue in Shreveport, Louisiana. Hall
entered the gas station’s store to buy lottery tickets and returned to their car,
which was parked at the gas pumps to the right of the store. Brownlee stood
outside the entrance to the store to speak with some people he knew. Hall
stated that she saw Brownlee “being jumped on” by four or five people, and
she tried to intervene. She got out of the car and started shouting for them to
stop; she then drew a handgun.
Hall testified that she was tackled by someone, kicked, and then her
gun was taken. The state entered still photographs from the gas station’s
surveillance videos into evidence. Hall said the photos depicted her entering
the store, the person who shot Brownlee, and her and Brownlee in a physical altercation with others. Hall identified Hughes as the person who shot
Brownlee. Hall stated that she did not see what started the fight.
Corporal Jonathan Varnell (“Cpl. Varnell”) testified that he was
employed by the Shreveport Police Department (“SPD”) in its Crime Scene
Investigation Unit as a detective. He responded to a shooting at the Clark
Gas Station on December 6, 2020. Several photos of the crime scene were
admitted. They depicted Brownlee’s car parked at a gas pump located on
the right side of the gas station’s store entrance. The photos also showed
that, in front of the doors to the gas station, there was blood, expended 9 mm
projectile casings, and one projectile. The gas station surveillance videos
were admitted and played for the jury.1 One surveillance video was
recorded by a camera located inside the store and showed the double glass
doors at the entryway to the store and the outside area in front of the store.
The second surveillance video was recorded by a camera located outside the
store and showed the outside area in front of the store and some of the gas
pumps to the right of the store. The videos presented the altercation and
shooting which occurred outside at the front of the store.
Hughes entered the store with the handle of a handgun sticking out of
the right pocket of his pants. He exited the store and stood near the entrance
beside a silver truck, conversing with others. Brownlee, who was standing
near the truck, approached him and reached for the gun in Hughes’ pocket.
Hughes, Fredis Vercher (“Vercher”), and a third man (later identified as
“Ray” or “Juan”) then jumped on Brownlee. They beat him and attempted
to take the gun away. Hall approached the four men, tried to intervene, and
1 Akram Abdalla testified that he was not present when Brownlee was shot, but he provided the gas station’s video surveillance footage of the shooting to SPD. 2 then pulled out a handgun from under her shirt near her waist. Ray/Juan
tackled her, and the two grappled for her gun. After several seconds,
Hughes left the altercation with Brownlee and ran to where Hall was
struggling with Ray/Juan. Hughes kicked Hall several times and took her
gun. He returned to Vercher and Brownlee, who were on the ground in front
of the doors to the store; the pair were still wrestling over Hughes’ gun.
Hughes cocked Hall’s gun.
Hughes leaned over the pair on the ground, speaking to Brownlee.
Hall returned to assist Brownlee and tried to get her gun from Hughes.
Ray/Juan pulled her by her hair away from Brownlee. Hall broke away from
the group, Hughes then shot Brownlee in his leg, and Hall entered the store.
Hughes stood by Brownlee and Vercher, who were still grappling on the
ground; Ray/Juan also stood near Brownlee and Vercher, but he was bent
over the pair. Two seconds after Hall re-entered the store, Hughes reached
between Vercher and Brownlee and appeared to fire the gun a second time.
Brownlee sustained a gunshot wound to his lip, and his mouth appeared
bloody in the video after Hughes fired a second shot. Vercher pulled the gun
away from Brownlee, it slid along the pavement, and stopped in front of the
truck’s back tire, which was several feet away from Brownlee. Vercher
retrieved the gun, and he and Ray/Juan exited the area displayed by the
videos.
Brownlee sat up and raised his hands, which were empty, and
exchanged words with Hughes for 9 to 10 seconds. While standing over
Brownlee, who remained seated on the ground, talking and gesturing with
his hands, Hughes shot him in the left cheek at point blank range. Brownlee
3 fell to the ground and did not move again. Hughes left the scene. The
altercation lasted 1 minute and 23 seconds.
Cpl. Varnell testified that he received Hughes’ name through a Crime
Stoppers’ tip. He interviewed Hughes and provided the following summary
of Hughes’ statement (verbatim):
He advised that he was there at the store for a period of time. He went and bought some cigarettes. Eric [Brownlee] was there. He stated that when he started handing out cigarettes, Eric tried to grab his gun. So him, who he called Fred [Vercher], and Ray went to Eric to try to get the gun back. That’s when his Ms. Hall came [and] introduced her weapon to the incident. Ray went and engaged her. Mr. Hughes stated he left the initial encounter with Eric and went to Ms. Hall, kicked her a few times, was able to get the gun from her, went back to Eric where he shot him in the leg, shot him once again. And then prior to the final shot, he stated that Eric said if he didn’t kill him that he would kill him later and that’s when he shot and killed him.
The video of Hughes’ statement was as Cpl. Varnell described.
Hughes also said that his father was shot and killed during a robbery a
couple of years prior, and he was very scared when Brownlee told him that
he was going to kill him. Cpl. Varnell said that another Crime Stoppers’ tip
led them to Vercher. Cpl. Varnell attempted to interview Vercher through
his attorney but was unsuccessful. Cpl. Varnell said that the murder weapon
was not recovered.
Dr. James Traylor (“Dr. Traylor”) was accepted as an expert in
forensic pathology and stated that he performed the autopsy on Brownlee.
He testified that Brownlee’s manner of death was homicide, and his cause of
death was two gunshot wounds to his face. The first shot to Brownlee’s face
entered at the left corner of his mouth at his upper lip, breaking a tooth and
exited at the right side of his chin. The bullet re-entered his body near his
right clavicle. The second shot to Brownlee’s face, the final shot that 4 Hughes fired, which was fatal, entered just below Brownlee’s left eye, exited
beneath the right side of his chin, and re-entered his body just below his
right clavicle, hitting his right subclavian artery. Hughes’ first and second
shots to Brownlee’s face exited at nearly the same place on his chin and re-
entered his body at the same place below his clavicle. Dr. Traylor estimated
that the bullets were fired approximately 6 to 18 inches from Brownlee’s
face, based upon the presence of gunpowder particles on the victim.
Dr. Traylor noted that Brownlee had abrasions on his right hand. He
also stated that he did not notice a wound to Brownlee’s leg during the
autopsy. However, photos taken by police at the hospital just after Brownlee
died showed a wound to his left leg.
On cross-examination, Dr. Traylor stated that Brownlee was alive
when he got to the hospital where hospital staff performed procedures to
preserve his life. He testified that Brownlee was given therapeutic levels of
ketamine and fentanyl during that treatment, which explains why his
toxicology screening showed the presence of those substances. The state
rested.
Vercher testified that he knew both the victim and defendant. He
stated that he went to the Clark Gas Station on the night of Brownlee’s death
to purchase snacks. He was at the store for about 45 minutes. He saw
Brownlee take Hughes’ gun and attempted to intercede to break up the fight.
Vercher stated that a woman “popped out” with a gun and pointed it at them.
He said that someone tried to grab the firearm from her. He testified that, at
that point, he was on the ground, and he could not get up because Brownlee
had his leg pinned. Vercher said that he heard maybe two gunshots. He
5 stated that when the first gunshot was fired, Brownlee did not react like he
had been shot.
On cross-examination, Vercher affirmed that SPD arranged to
interview him, but he did not show up. When questioned about whether he
retrieved the firearm from under his truck, Vercher said he did not recall.
Following a colloquy, Hughes elected not to testify in his own
defense. The defense rested. The trial court read its charge to the jury,
which included instructions as to self-defense, the aggressor doctrine, and
the definitions of second-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent
homicide. The jury began its deliberations but returned to the courtroom to
ask the court to recite the legal definition of manslaughter. The court
complied, and the jury continued to deliberate. The jury returned a verdict
of guilty as charged. The jury was polled, and the verdict was unanimous.
Hughes filed pro se motions for a post-verdict judgment of acquittal
and for a new trial. He filed counseled motions to request deviation from the
mandatory life sentence, for a post-verdict judgment of acquittal, and for a
new trial. On January 10, 2024, Hughes was before the court for sentencing.
The trial court denied his motions. The trial court asked Hughes if he was
ready for sentencing, and he stated that he was. The court sentenced Hughes
to life imprisonment without benefits, with credit for time served. The trial
court informed him of his appellate and post-conviction relief time
constraints. Hughes filed a motion to reconsider sentence which was denied.
He now appeals.
6 DISCUSSION
Insufficient Evidence
Hughes first argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove he
was guilty of second-degree murder. Hughes argues that he and those
participating in the fight were not the aggressors, and his killing of Brownlee
was justified. Defendant says that while he was fighting with Hall, his gun
was taken from Brownlee, which he argues the surveillance videos show he
did not see. Hughes states that, once her gun was taken away, Hall returned
to the fight with Brownlee. Hughes maintains that after Brownlee was shot
twice and sat up, he made aggressive hand gestures and told Hughes that he
would kill him later if Hughes did not kill him right then, which gave him a
reasonable belief that Brownlee continued to present a danger to him.
Hughes states that, at that time, he did not know where his gun was, but he
acknowledges that Brownlee did not have a gun in his hands. Hughes asks
this court to find that he acted in self-defense and overturn his conviction.
The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence
claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 01-1658
(La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S. Ct. 1604,
158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004). This standard, now legislatively embodied in La.
C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to
substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder.
State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517; State v. Dotie,
7 43,819 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/09), 1 So. 3d 833, writ denied, 09-0310 (La.
11/6/09), 21 So. 3d 297.
The trier of fact makes credibility determinations and may accept or
reject the testimony of any witness. Id. The appellate court does not assess
credibility or reweigh the evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95),
661 So. 2d 442; State v. Morehead, 55,825 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/23/24), __So.
3d __, 2024 WL 4549403, writ denied, 24-01434 (La. 2/19/25), __ So. 3d
__, 2025 WL 547107. A reviewing court accords great deference to the trier
of fact’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in
part. State v. Jackson, 53,497 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/20/20), 296 So. 3d 1156.
Second-degree murder is the killing of a human being when the
offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S.
14:30.1(A)(1). Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists
when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the
prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S.
14:10(1). Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances
surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant. State v. Walker,
53,975 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/30/21), 321 So. 3d 1154, writ denied, 21-01334
(La. 11/23/21), 328 So. 3d 83. The determination of whether the requisite
intent is present in a criminal case is for the trier of fact, and a review of this
determination is guided by the standards of Jackson v. Virginia. Id. The
shooting of a firearm at close range and aimed at the person is indicative of
specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon the victim. State v.
Cotton, 55,435 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/24), 379 So. 3d 224.
Hughes does not dispute that he killed Brownlee. Instead, he claims
that he acted in self-defense. 8 Louisiana Revised Statute 14:20(A)(1) provides that a homicide is
justifiable:
When committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger.
Factors to consider in determining whether a defendant had a
reasonable belief that the killing was necessary include the excitement and
confusion of the situation, the possibility of using force or violence short of
killing, and the defendant’s knowledge of the assailant’s bad character.
State v. Crow, 52,817 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/26/19), 278 So. 3d 416.
When self-defense is raised as an issue by the defendant, the state has
the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the homicide was not
perpetrated in self-defense. State ex rel. D.P.B., 02-1742 (La. 5/20/03), 846
So. 2d 753; State v. Allen, 50,703 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/16), 200 So. 3d 376,
writ denied, 16-1734 (La. 9/6/17), 224 So. 3d 981. When the defendant
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in a self-defense case, the
question becomes whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that the homicide was not committed in self-defense. State
v. Matthews, 464 So. 2d 298 (La. 1985); State v. Morehead, supra.
In the present case, the court instructed the jury as to self-defense and
the aggressor doctrine. Counsel presented the jury with two versions of the
shooting. The state argued Hughes shot Brownlee without justification. The
defense argued the homicide was committed in self-defense, that is,
Brownlee snatched Hughes’ gun from his pocket which started a fight to get
control of the gun which lasted 90 seconds. The defense further argued that
9 Hughes feared for his life when Brownlee snatched his gun and when Hall
approached with a second gun which she brandished at the group fighting
over Hughes’ gun. The defense said that Hughes shot Brownlee to break up
the fight, but the first two shots did not faze the victim. The defense said
that Brownlee, having been shot twice, sat up, stared at an armed Hughes,
and threatened to kill him if he did not kill him first.
The jury chose to credit the state’s argument rather than defendant’s,
and this court agrees that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that the killing of Brownlee was not committed in self-
defense. The evidence was also sufficient to support Hughes’ second-degree
murder conviction.
There is no question here that Hughes shot and killed Brownlee; he
admitted that he did so in his statement to SPD. The jury was tasked with
considering whether defendant killed the victim because he reasonably
believed that he was in imminent danger of losing his life, and Hughes was
unable to persuade the members of the jury that he acted in self-defense.
Hughes contends, and we agree, that Brownlee was the initial
aggressor in the altercation when he stole Hughes’ handgun from his pocket.
This court’s concern is not about how the dispute began, but how it ended.
Hughes’ argument to this court is that it was Vercher who disarmed
Brownlee while defendant was fighting with Hall; therefore, he did not
know where the gun was when he shot Brownlee a third time. However, the
surveillance videos show that Vercher disarmed Brownlee about 18 seconds
after Hughes rejoined the fight between Vercher and the victim. Ten
seconds after that, Hughes fired his third shot, killing Brownlee.
10 During the 10 seconds prior to Hughes shooting Brownlee a third
time: (1) Brownlee was sitting on the ground with both of his hands raised in
Hughes’ direction; (2) Hughes stood over Brownlee, facing him; (3) the pair
exchanged words; (4) Brownlee’s hands were empty, and he was gesturing
with his hands while he was speaking with Hughes; and (5) Brownlee did
not make any sudden moves toward Hughes or attempt to access a gun.
The surveillance videos show that Hughes was at close range and
aimed the gun at Brownlee’s head when he fired his last shot. Those facts
confirm that Hughes had the requisite specific intent to kill or inflict great
bodily harm to the victim who was unarmed and sitting on the ground. We
find that Hughes did not act in self-defense and the evidence was sufficient
to support his conviction of second-degree murder.
Manslaughter
In the alternative, Hughes argues he should have been found guilty of
the lesser, included offense of manslaughter. He contends that the entire
confrontation lasted 90 seconds, and it was not realistic to believe that a
reasonable person’s blood would have cooled in such a short timeframe and
under such stressful circumstances. He argues that there were two guns that
Brownlee and Hall had control over with unknown intentions during the
struggle and Brownlee did not back down or attempt to disengage from the
fight. He asserts that he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
there was sufficient provocation and lack of time to reflect on the
circumstances and act coolly.
Manslaughter is a homicide which would be either first-degree murder
or second-degree murder, but the offense is committed in sudden passion or
heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an 11 average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not
reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender’s blood
had actually cooled, or that an average person’s blood would have cooled, at
the time the offense was committed. La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1).
“Sudden passion” and “heat of blood,” which distinguish
manslaughter from homicide, are not elements of the offense, but mitigatory
factors exhibiting a degree of culpability less than is present when the
homicide is committed without them. State v. Tompkins, 403 So. 2d 644
(La. 1981); State v. Keen, 55,915 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/20/24), __ So. 3d __,
2024 WL 4830414. Provocative acts held to rise to the level of mitigating
conduct involve physical threats or actions on the part of the victim. State v.
Ramsey, 55,491 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/24), 381 So. 3d 308, writ denied, 24-
00379 (La. 10/1/24), 393 So. 3d 865. Mere words or gestures, however
offensive or insulting, will not reduce homicide from murder to
manslaughter. State v. Smith, 49,839 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/20/15), 166 So. 3d
416, writ denied, 15-1244 (La. 6/3/16), 192 So. 3d 753. Provocation and the
time for cooling are questions for the trier of fact to determine according to
the standard of the average or ordinary person. State v. Jones, 56,042 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 12/18/24), __ So. 3d __, 2024 WL 5150179.
Brownlee’s killing was not the product of a sudden passion or heat of
blood which deprived Hughes of his self-control or cool contemplation.
Brownlee’s verbal threats, if true, were insufficient to reduce Hughes’ crime
to the lesser offense of manslaughter. The jury heard Hughes’ statement to
SPD in which he said that Brownlee threatened him and he was afraid. The
jury did not believe that Brownlee’s alleged last words constituted a
12 provocation that deprived Hughes of his self-control and cool reflection in
firing the final shot that killed Brownlee
At that time, Hughes had already shot Brownlee twice. Brownlee was
sitting on the ground with his empty hands in the air in front of him. Hughes
stood over the victim, who made no further attempt to harm anyone or get a
weapon; they exchanged words for 10 seconds before Hughes shot Brownlee
a third time. When Hughes shot Brownlee a third time, all other people
originally involved in the struggle had fled the immediate vicinity. After
viewing the surveillance video, we believe that 10 seconds is crucial in
concluding that Hughes’ conduct in killing Brownlee constituted second-
degree murder rather than manslaughter. Hughes, while standing over
Brownlee, was able to have a conversation with him and see that he was not
armed. Hughes could have chosen to walk away, but he instead shot
Brownlee a final time, killing him.
The trial transcript reveals that the jury asked the court to provide it
with the definition of manslaughter, deliberated for another 20 minutes, and
then returned a verdict of guilty of second-degree murder. The jury
considered finding Hughes guilty of manslaughter and rejected that verdict.
We cannot say that the jury erred in rendering its verdict. Defendant’s
conviction and sentence are affirmed.
Error Patent
The record was reviewed for errors patent, and one was found. The
record shows that the trial court failed to observe the 24-hour sentencing
delay under La. C. Cr. P. art. 873, and there was no express waiver of the
delays by defendant. But, when asked by the trial court if he was ready for
sentencing, Hughes affirmed that he was. He did not object to the trial 13 court’s failure to observe the delay, and there was no showing of prejudice.
Thus, the trial court’s failure to observe the 24-hour delay was harmless
error. See State v. Carroll, 52,484 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/19), 266 So. 3d
499.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction and
sentence.
AFFIRMED.