Judgment rendered July 16, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,301-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
Versus
TATIANNA JENELL BURNS Appellant
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 377,592
Honorable Donald E. Hathaway, Jr., Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Alex James Washington
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
JASON W. WALTMAN CHRISTOPHER BOWMAN MARGARET E. RICHIE GASKINS Assistant District Attorneys
Before COX, STEPHENS, and ELLENDER, JJ. STEPHENS, J.,
This criminal appeal arises from the First Judicial District Court,
Parish of Caddo, State of Louisiana, the Honorable Donald Hathaway, Jr.,
Judge, presiding. The defendant, Tatianna Jenell Burns (“Burns”), was
indicted by a grand jury for the second degree murder of the minor child,
A.W., a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. Following Burns’ waiver of her right
to trial by jury, a bench trial was held. The trial court found Burns guilty as
charged and sentenced her to life imprisonment at hard labor without the
benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Burns appeals her
conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The victim, A.W., a minor child, was born on December 6, 2018. On
June 6, 2019, the mother of the child, Antoinette Wong, signed a Child Care
Authorization form granting the defendant, Tatianna Burns (Washington),
and her husband, Kevin Washington, the authority to take temporary care of
the child. Their authority over and care for the child began on August 7,
2019. Over the next several months, Burns and Washington developed an
arrangement with Cornell Jackson to care for A.W. for approximately three
days a week while Burns and Washington were at work.
On June 5, 2020, Washington, employed by Loomis Armored, left for
work around 7:00 a.m. while the child was still asleep.1 Later that afternoon,
around 2:00 p.m., Burns brought A.W. to Jackson’s residence as Burns had
to work that afternoon. In Jackson’s original statement to officers, he
indicated that A.W. was asleep when Burns arrived, and that Burns placed
1 Timecards from Loomis Armored confirm that Washington was at work from 7:12 a.m. to 5:45 p.m. the child on the bed or couch before leaving for work. Eventually, Jackson
became concerned about the child’s wellbeing. He ultimately contacted
Burns with his concerns and relayed to Burns his belief that something was
wrong with A.W. Burns returned to Jackson’s residence, and once she
arrived, Burns observed that A.W. was not breathing. Burns stated that she
began CPR on the child.
After allegedly performing CPR, Burns brought A.W. to Willis
Knighton North Hospital. The child, after having been intubated and placed
on a ventilator, was then transferred by ambulance to Willis Knighton South
Hospital where an intensive care unit, pediatric unit, and pediatric specialists
were located. Dr. Minh Tran, a pediatric critical care physician, began
treating A.W. The child was unresponsive and was placed on an epinephrine
drip to keep her heart beating. Dr. Tran diagnosed A.W. with bleeding on
several layers of her brain (subdural hematomas) and swelling of her entire
brain (edema). Because of this swelling, the child’s brain herniated, i.e., her
brain was pushed down through the hole at the base of her skull. The nature
of A.W.’s injuries and the conversation Dr. Tran had with Burns prompted
Dr. Tran to alert law enforcement that A.W.’s injuries may have resulted
from child abuse.
On June 10, 2020, A.W. succumbed to her injuries. Following the
child’s death, Dr. Jin Long performed an autopsy and concluded that A.W.’s
manner of death was homicide, and the cause of death was abusive head
trauma. The SPD officers’ investigation led to the court issuing an arrest
warrant on August 4, 2020. Burns was arrested the next day, August 5,
2020. On November 18, 2020, Burns was indicted by a Caddo Parish grand
jury for one count of second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. 2 On July 8, 2024, Burns filed a handwritten motion to exercise her
right to waive a trial by jury and electing her right to be tried by the judge.
The motion reflected Burns’ desire to knowingly and intelligently waive a
trial by jury and elect to be tried by the judge and indicated that after a
colloquy with the trial court, she desired to irrevocably waive a trial by jury.2
Both counsel for Burns and Burns signed the motion, and the trial court
granted the motion. A bench trial commenced on July 10, 2024.
At trial, Dr. Tran, accepted as an expert in the field of pediatric critical
care, testified that he was A.W.’s doctor at Willis Knighton South on June 5,
2020. When A.W. arrived at the hospital, she was intubated, on a ventilator,
on cardiac support, and on an epinephrine drip to keep her heart beating, but
the child was not responsive. Imaging showed that A.W. had brain bleeds on
several layers of her brain as well as swelling of her whole brain. Dr. Tran
indicated that the herniation and the edema are what ultimately caused
A.W.’s death. Dr. Tran also testified that the injuries that caused this
herniation and swelling resulted from acute injuries, meaning the injuries
had occurred within several days. He clarified that the injuries could not
have existed for six months, and he stated it was highly unlikely that any
child with this level of trauma could act normal.
A.W.’s injuries also included significant hemorrhaging in her eyes.
Dr. Tran stated that repetitive shaking motions can manifest these injuries,
and he informed the court that seizures could not have caused the injuries
that A.W. sustained and suffered. According to Dr. Tran and his notes from
2 Although the colloquy is referenced in the motion, there is no transcript of it found in the record. The minutes reflect that Burns was present with counsel, and the ADA was present as well. 3 treating A.W., he felt compelled to reach out to law enforcement because the
injuries she suffered made him suspect abusive trauma. He indicated that
after speaking with Burns about A.W.’s medical history and activities prior
to the incident, Dr. Tran felt there were gaps in the story that did not add up.
Dr. Jennifer Rodriguez also testified at Burns’ trial as an expert in the
field of child abuse pediatrics. Given A.W.’s injuries, Dr. Rodriguez
concluded that the child suffered from abusive head trauma. In her opinion,
life-saving measures such as CPR would not account for the significant
injuries A.W. sustained. Dr. Rodriguez related that the child could not live
long with injuries like a brain edema. On cross-examination, Dr. Rodriguez
indicated that the injuries could have occurred that same day (June 5, 2020),
but the injuries would have occurred before any alleged seizure activity.
The next medical expert to testify at trial was Dr. John David
Hinrichsen, a private practitioner with a specialty in pediatric
ophthalmology. He informed the court that he examined A.W. on June 6,
2020. A.W.’s pupils were dilated, she was intubated, unresponsive, and on a
ventilator. He stated that he is involved when children suffer subdural
hematomas because eye or retinal hemorrhaging potentially indicates
nonaccidental trauma. According to Dr. Hinrichsen, A.W. had too many
hemorrhages to count in the back of her eye, and there were multiple layers
in the eye. He discussed the various levels of retinal hemorrhages, and he
compared A.W.’s injuries to those she would experience if she were in a car
wreck. Dr. Hinrichsen also explained sheering, and noted that it can be
caused by shaking, i.e., the shaking causes the blood vessels to pull and
bleed in the back of the eye. He indicated that all the hemorrhages present
were recent, occurring within a week or two of June 6, 2020. 4 Sergeant Stevie Gillis with the SPD testified that he was the first
officer to respond to the hospital on June 5, 2020. Sgt. Gillis connected with
Burns and took her statement once he discussed A.W.’s condition with Dr.
Tran. Burns advised Sgt. Gillis that she attempted to give the baby CPR
several times when she was aware that her behavior was strange. Sgt. Gillis
also testified that Burns relayed information about the child’s medical
history, mentioning that she had a history of seizures. Following his
interview with Burns, Sgt. Gillis contacted the on-call detective.
Detective Jennifer Gaddy was employed by the DeSoto Parish
Sheriff’s Office at the time of trial. At the time of A.W.’s incident, Gaddy
served as an investigator in the SPD’s Youth Services Bureau juvenile unit.
Det. Gaddy testified that she made contact with Burns at the hospital and
questioned her about A.W. and the child’s medical history. Burns informed
Det. Gaddy that A.W. had previously had one seizure when she was an
infant. Burns indicated that A.W. had been playing and watching TV earlier
that day but Burns, at one point, observed the child having a seizure. After
consoling the child, Burns told Det. Gaddy that A.W. seemed fine and fell
asleep in the car on the way to Jackson’s home and remained asleep when
Burns left for work.
Detective Stephen Herring testified that he was employed with the
SPD’s Violent Crimes Homicide Unit. Det. Herring indicated that he took
Burns’ recorded statement at the police department, and she signed the
Miranda waiver form prior to questioning. Det. Herring testified that Burns
was the only person who admitted to shaking A.W., but Burns stated it was
done in reaction to the child being unresponsive. He indicated that given the
5 timeline provided by those interviewed in the investigation and the medical
reports, A.W. was only in Burns’ custody when the incident happened.
Other testimony at trial revealed that Burns and her husband had
previous allegations made against them for child abuse. Jackson also
testified at trial. However, he seemed extremely reluctant to do so; his
responses were mainly, “I don’t know nothing about that,” or “I don’t
know.” In the middle of the trial, Burns addressed the court and requested a
continuance; she also stated that she wanted to change lawyers. However,
the trial court denied her requests. At the close of trial and following a 15-
minute recess, the trial court found Burns guilty of second degree murder.
The sentencing hearing took place on July 23, 2024. The court
highlighted the aggravating circumstances and found that Burns’ conduct
during the commission of the of the offense manifested deliberate cruelty to
the victim; she knew or should have known the victim was particularly
vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to extreme youth; she used her
position or status to facilitate the commission of the offense; and the offense
resulted in the victim’s death. The trial court also clearly articulated that
there were no mitigating circumstances for Burns’ actions. The court
sentenced Burns to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence. Burns now appeals her conviction.
DISCUSSION Sufficiency of Evidence
In her first assignment of error, Burns contends that the State failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she caused the death of A.W. She
maintains that while the State had various experts that testified during trial,
not one expert could determine when A.W.’s injuries occurred. Because of
6 this, she suggests that the State failed to rule out the possibility of the child
suffering from these injuries while in the care of the babysitter, Jackson.
On the other hand, the State asserts that it needed to prove that Burns
killed A.W. either (1) intentionally, with the specific intent to kill or to inflict
bodily harm, or (2) unintentionally, while Burns was committing the felony
of cruelty to a juvenile. The State maintains that the child’s injuries were
caused by abusive head trauma rather than by a seizure or by efforts to
resuscitate her. The State argues that the overwhelming amount of
circumstantial evidence was sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to
conclude that Burns shook and killed the child.
The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence
claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.
Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124
S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004). This standard, now legislatively
embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with
a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the
fact finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517; State v.
Dotie, 43,819 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/09), 1 So. 3d 833, writ denied, 09-0310
(La. 11/6/09), 21 So. 3d 297.
The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and
circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of
evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by
viewing that evidence in light most favorable to the prosecution. When the 7 direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence
and inferred from circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a rational
trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty
of every essential element of the crime. State v. Sutton, 436 So. 2d 471 (La.
1983); State v. Norman, 51,258 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/17/17), 222 So. 3d 96, writ
denied, 17-1152 (La. 4/20/18), 240 So. 3d 926.
Direct evidence provides proof of the existence of a fact; for example,
a witness’s testimony that he saw or heard something. State v. Lilly, 468 So.
2d 1154 (La. 1985); State v. Baker, 49,175 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/27/14), 148 So.
3d 217. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred
according to reason and common experience. State v. Broome, 49,004 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 4/9/14), 136 So. 3d 979, writ denied, 14-0990 (La. 1/16/15), 157
So. 3d 1127.
For a case resting essentially upon circumstantial evidence, that
evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La. R.S.
15:438; State v. Christopher, 50,943 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/16/16), 209 So. 3d
255, writ denied, 16-2187 (La. 9/6/17), 224 So. 3d 985. The appellate court
reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
determines whether an alternative hypothesis is sufficiently reasonable that a
rational juror could not have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Calloway, 07-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So. 3d 417; State v. Alexander,
53,449, (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/20), 306 So. 3d 594, writ denied, 20-01449
(La. 6/22/22), 339 So. 3d 642; State v. Garner, 45,474 (La. App. 2 Cir.
8/18/10), 47 So. 3d 584.
8 La. R.S. 14:30.1 defines second degree murder as the killing of a
human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great
bodily harm or when the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of cruelty to juveniles, among other offenses. Cruelty to
juveniles is the intentional or criminally negligent mistreatment or neglect
by anyone seventeen years of age or older of any child under the age of
seventeen whereby unjustifiable pain or suffering is caused to said child.
La. R.S. 14:93(A)(1).
The testimony and evidence adduced at trial indisputably shows that
the child died from non-accidental internal head trauma caused by excessive
shaking. While we agree with Burns’ assertion that there is no evidence
directly linking her to the child’s cause of death, the circumstantial evidence
substantially shows that Burns’s actions resulted in the child’s death.
The medical testimony provided a general time frame in which the
excessive shaking took place, within a week of the child’s death. Most
notably, Dr. Rodriguez opined that while the child’s injuries could have
occurred on June 5, 2020, the injuries would have occurred before any
alleged seizure activity. Furthermore, each doctor agreed that any shaking
that might have occurred while performing CPR would not have caused the
fatal injuries. The judge clearly deduced from this evidence that Burns was
the only person who had contact with the child in the time frame discussed
by the doctors. Similarly, Burns’ story about what happened to the child and
when it occurred continued to change throughout the investigation, moving
from the child hitting her head to the child having a history of seizures and
suffering from one earlier on that date.
9 Despite Burns’ suggestions that Jackson inflicted the injuries, Burns
actually admitted to shaking the child on two occasions: once at home
following the child’s alleged seizure and once when returning to Jackson’s
home after Jackson communicated his concerns to Burns about the child’s
well-being. Little to no evidence suggests that Jackson inflicted the injuries,
and the judge heard Jackson’s testimony and had the chance to assess his
credibility. Evidence was also introduced at trial of a prior incident where a
different child was taken from Burns’ care following a DCFS investigation.
Viewing the evidence in light most favorable to the prosecution, we see no
other reasonable hypothesis in the cause of death of the minor child, and
Burns’ argument that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that she caused the death of A.W. is without merit.
Jury Trial Waiver
Next, Burns asserts that the trial court erred in granting the motion to
waive a jury trial because her right to trial by jury was not knowingly and
intelligently waived. Burns maintains that the court initially set a trial date
for November 2, 2021, but the case was reset several times. Eventually, the
jury trial was set to begin on July 8, 2024, but Burns explains that her
counsel of record handwrote on a sheet of paper “Waiver of Jury Trial.”
Counsel then had Burns sign the document without any prior conversations,
the trial court granted the motion, and a bench trial commenced on
Wednesday, July 10, 2024. Burns urges that these circumstances are
contrary to law and jurisprudence as she was given the waiver on the
morning the trial was to begin, and the waiver was handwritten.
Although Burns argues that her jury trial waiver was invalid, the State
urges that a defendant may waive a trial by jury within 45 days prior to the 10 commencement of trial with the consent of the district attorney. The State
proposes that the purpose of the 45-day time limit is not to protect the
defendant from making a hasty decision, but rather, it is to protect the State
from improper dilatory practices by the defendant.
La. C. Cr. P. art. 780 states:
A. A defendant charged with an offense other than one punishable by death may knowingly and intelligently waive a trial by jury and elect to be tried by the judge.
B. The defendant shall exercise his right to waive trial by jury in accordance with Article I, Section 17 of the Constitution of Louisiana. The waiver shall be by written motion filed in the district court not later than forty-five days prior to the date the case is set for trial. The motion shall be signed by the defendant and shall also be signed by defendant's counsel unless the defendant has waived his right to counsel.
C. With the consent of the district attorney the defendant may waive trial by jury within forty-five days prior to the commencement of trial.
D. A waiver of trial by jury is irrevocable and cannot be withdrawn by the defendant. Not only does La. C. Cr. P. art. 780 require a written waiver, but Louisiana
jurisprudence holds that a defendant’s knowing and intelligent waiver of his
right to a jury trial must be sufficiently demonstrated by the record. State v.
Muller, 351 So. 2d 143 (La. 1977); State v. White, 52,530 (La. App. 2 Cir.
5/8/19), 269 So. 3d 1182; State v. Morris, 49,987 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/30/15),
178 So. 3d 1028; State v. Robinson, 48,819 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/14), 136
So. 3d 302; State v. Hicks, 41,906 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/20/06), 945 So. 2d
959; State v. Davis, 41,180 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/3/06), 942 So. 2d 1196. The
record on appeal must show some manifestation of an effective waiver.
State v. White, supra; State v. Morris, supra. 11 A valid waiver of trial by jury occurs only if the defendant acted
voluntarily and knowingly. State v. Kahey, 436 So. 2d 475 (La. 1983); State
v. White, supra. In making the determination of whether a defendant made a
voluntary and knowing waiver, a trial court is required to determine only
whether the defendant’s waiver was made knowingly and intelligently. State
v. White, supra; State v. Campbell, 42,099 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/20/07), 960 So.
2d 363. The preferred method is for the district court to advise a defendant
of the right to trial by jury in open court before obtaining a waiver, but such
a practice is not statutorily required. State v. White, supra; State v. Robinson,
supra; State v. Campbell, supra. Likewise, it is also preferred, but not
necessary, for the defendant to waive the right to a jury trial personally.
State v. Pierre, 02-2665 (La. 3/28/03), 842 So. 2d 321. Defense counsel may
waive the right on the defendant’s behalf, provided that the defendant’s
decision to do so was made knowingly and intelligently. Id.
While the trial judge must determine if a defendant’s jury trial waiver
is knowing and intelligent, that determination does not require a Boykin-like
colloquy. State v. White, supra; State v. Robinson, supra; State v. Campbell,
supra. Prior to accepting a jury trial waiver, the trial court is not obligated to
conduct a personal colloquy inquiring into a defendant’s educational
background, literacy, and work history. Id. Additionally, nothing in the
statutes or the jurisprudence requires the trial judge to inform a defendant of
the details involving the number of jurors and the votes necessary for a
conviction. Id.
The record contains a handwritten motion signed personally by Burns
and her counsel of record. Similarly, the minutes of the trial court indicate
that the waiver was filed on July 8, 2024, by the defendant in proper person, 12 and it is represented to this Court that Burns, Burns’ counsel, an Assistant
District Attorney, and the trial judge were present in court on that date. The
transcript also references Burns’ decision to waive the right to trial by jury at
the beginning of the proceedings and in the middle of the trial. Similarly,
the District Attorney’s office states on record that it is ready to proceed with
the bench trial. A signed, written waiver is present in the record as required
by La. C.Cr.P. art. 780 as well as several instances in the record manifesting
an effective waiver. Given these reasons, we see no reason to reject Burns’
written jury trial waiver. Therefore, her second assignment of error claiming
that she did not knowingly and voluntarily waive her right to trial by jury is
without merit.
Motion for Continuance
In her final assignment of error, Burns urges that the trial court erred
in denying her motion for a continuance of the trial. Burns maintains that
she requested a continuance believing that the State should have provided
her with an expert report. Burns notes that the trial court granted two of the
State’s continuances, first on November 2, 2021, and next on January 8,
2024, and one of her motions for continuance on January 8, 2024. While the
matter was continued on multiple occasions, Burns suggests that the trial
court’s failure to allow the same number of continuances for both parties
showed specific prejudice to her. The State suggests that the July 3, 2024,
transcript from the continuance hearing indicates that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by denying Burns’ oral motion to continue. According to
the State, Burns was given over five months between notice of the State’s
expert witnesses and her trial date.
13 Upon a written motion at any time, the trial court may grant a
continuance, but only upon a showing that such a motion is in the interest of
justice. La. C. Cr. P. art. 707. The decision whether to grant or refuse a
motion for a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge,
and a reviewing court will not disturb such a determination absent a clear
abuse of discretion. La. C. Cr. P. art. 712; State v. Sanders, 52,632, (La.
App. 2 Cir. 5/22/19), 273 So. 3d 635, writ denied, 19-01106 (La. 7/17/20),
298 So. 3d 169; State v. Sullivan, 52,204 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/15/18), 253 So.
3d 911. Whether a refusal to grant a continuance was justified depends on
the circumstances of the particular case presented. State v. Snyder, 98-1078
(La. 4/14/99), 750 So. 2d 832; State v. Sanders, supra. Generally, a
reviewing court will not reverse a conviction even on a showing of
an improper denial of a motion for a continuance, absent a showing of
specific prejudice. State v. Snyder, supra; State v. Sanders, supra; State v.
Jordan, 50,002 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/12/15), 174 So. 3d 1259, writ denied, 15-
1703 (La. 10/10/16), 207 So. 3d 408.
On July 3, 2024, the trial court held a continuance hearing where
Burns requested a continuance because the State had failed to produce an
expert report. In reply, the State indicated that it provided open file
discovery and highlighted each medical professional it intended to call and
certify as expert witnesses, including Dr. Jin, Dr. Tran, Dr. Hinrichsen, and
Dr. Rodriguez. The State clarified that Dr. Tran, Dr. Hinrichsen, and Dr. Jin
each had documented treatment of the child in the medical records or the
autopsy report. However, Dr. Rodriguez would not have an expert report;
therefore, no report existed to tender to Burns; however, the State relayed
that it filed, signed, and served a La. C. Cr. P. art. 719 notice on January 3, 14 2024, containing Dr. Rodriguez’s CV. The trial court ultimately denied
Burns’ motion for a continuance, reasoning that the State merely had the
burden of proving when the injuries occurred rather than producing an
expert report stating when the injuries occurred.
Throughout the proceedings, the trial court granted several
continuances to both the State and to Burns. The hearing on the continuance
motion at issue took place about one week before the trial was scheduled to
take place. Given that the State had open file discovery, the State had
previously filed a notice for Dr. Rodriguez on January 3, 2024, and the small
amount of time between the continuance hearing and the trial date, we find
that the trial court was well within its broad discretion to deny Burns’
motion. Not only was there no abuse of discretion on behalf of the trial
court, but nothing in the record suggests that this denial showed specific
prejudice towards Burns. Similarly, we find that the trial court was within
its discretion in denying Burns’ oral motion for a continuance that she made
in the middle of the trial. Consequently, Burns’ third assignment of error has
no merit.
CONCLUSION
Finding no errors patent and for the reasons expressed herein,
Tatianna Burns’ conviction for second degree murder is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.