State of Louisiana v. Taniel Cole

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: October 2, 2024
• Docket: 55,857-KA
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered October 2, 2024. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,857-KA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

TANIEL COLE Appellant

Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 377,844

Honorable Christopher T. Victory, Judge

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Edward K. Bauman

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney

SAMUEL S. CRICHTON TOMMY J. JOHNSON Assistant District Attorneys

Before PITMAN, MARCOTTE, and ELLENDER, JJ. ELLENDER, J.

Taniel Cole appeals his sentences on five felony convictions, all

ordered to be served consecutively and totaling 190 years. For the reasons

expressed, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts are adapted from Cole’s earlier appeal, State v. Cole, 55,172

(La. App. 2 Cir. 8/9/23), 370 So. 3d 106.

In August 2020, Cole had an argument with his fiancée, Rotaundra

Lewis, at Ochsner-LSU St. Mary Medical Center, where Lewis’s daughter

was a patient. After Cole left, Lewis asked nurses to keep him out of the

girl’s room, but he came back around 5:00 a.m.

A nurse, Wesley Bray, told Cole that Lewis didn’t want him in the

child’s room, but Cole pulled a gun and forced Bray and two other nurses,

Kelsey Simpson and Cheyanna Alford, into the room and ordered them to lie

on the floor. The commotion caused the father of a patient in the next room,

Mario Davenport, to complain at the nurses’ station; Davenport and the floor

nurse, Katherine Scott, walked down to Lewis’s room. When they saw Cole

was armed, they turned back and ran down the hall. Cole fired at Nurse

Scott but missed. Davenport came at Cole with a knife, but Cole shot him in

the leg.

Cole then chased down Nurse Scott, pulled her to the floor, and held

the gun on her; after she pled for her life, he darted into an elevator and left.

Once outside, however, he spotted another person, Twyla Davis, parking her

Chevy Traverse in an adjacent lot. He ran to the vehicle, pointed the gun in

her face, and ordered her to drive him to Ruston. She complied and they started the trip, but after they heard on the radio that the police were after

him, Cole told her to take him home, to Farmerville, instead. On the way, he

rifled through Davis’s purse, taking her credit cards, ID, $1,800 in cash, and

cellphone.

Once they got to his house, Cole allowed Davis to use the restroom;

he then took the wheel of her SUV and took them to a bank, where he drove

through the ATM line and withdrew some money, and then to a used car lot

in Monroe, where he “test drove” a car and told Davis to follow him. He

warned her to keep quiet, as he now knew exactly where she lived, and then

drove off in the test-drive car. Cole was eventually taken down by “pit

maneuver” in Meridian, Mississippi, and extradited to Caddo Parish.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The state charged Cole with the attempted second degree murder of

Davenport, the second degree kidnappings of Simpson, Bray, Alford, and

Davis, and the armed robbery committed with a firearm of Davis. After a

three-day trial in April 2022, the jury unanimously found him guilty of the

attempted manslaughter of Davenport, and guilty as charged on all other

counts. The district court sentenced him to: 10 years at hard labor for

attempted manslaughter; 20 years at hard labor for the first three second

degree kidnappings, including “at least two years” without benefits; 40 years

at hard labor for the fourth second degree kidnapping, including “at least two

years” without benefits; and 75 years at hard labor for the armed robbery,

without benefits, plus five years for the firearm enhancement. All sentences

were to be served consecutively.

Cole appealed contending the individual sentences were excessive

(especially the 80 years total for armed robbery), the aggregate sentence of 2 190 years was excessive, and the court failed to comply with the guidelines

of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. This court found that the four sentences for

second degree kidnapping were indeterminate, in violation of La. C. Cr. P.

art. 879, because “at least two years” was not a precise number. This court

also found that while the district court seemed to justify each individual

sentence, it did not give any reasons for making them all consecutive, as

required by La. C. Cr. P. art. 883. The convictions were affirmed, the

sentences for second degree kidnapping were vacated, and the whole case

was remanded for resentencing in compliance with Art. 883.

At resentencing, in September 2023, the district court reimposed the

20-year sentences for the second degree kidnappings of Simpson, Bray, and

Alford, but carefully noted that each was subject to five years without

benefits. For the fourth, of Davis, he reimposed the 40-year sentence, but

made it subject to 20 years without benefits.

The court then documented Cole’s criminal history, starting with a

guilty plea to illegal possession of a stolen car, in Orleans Parish in 1997,

resulting in a three-year suspended sentence and probation; probation was

revoked later that same year when he pled guilty to unauthorized use of a

motor vehicle and was sentenced to five years in a DPSC boot camp. In

2002, an Orleans Parish jury convicted him of illegal possession of a stolen

auto, and he was sentenced, as a multiple offender, to seven years’ hard

labor. In 2003, in Jefferson Parish, he pled guilty to armed robbery and was

sentenced to 20 years. The district court summed this up as “one of the

more extensive criminal histories I’ve ever seen.”

Turning to the instant offenses, the court described them as “one of

the more egregious things I’ve ever seen.” The court deemed the individual 3 acts not necessarily a single course of conduct but “multiple felonies.” The

court also referred to the psychological harm inflicted on Ms. Davis, the

numerous people threatened at gunpoint, and the apparent failure of all prior

rehabilitative efforts. The court then reinstated all sentences as consecutive.

Cole moved for reconsideration of sentence, which was denied

summarily. He has appealed raising one assignment, that the court erred in

imposing constitutionally excessive sentences, and advancing three issues.

APPLICABLE LAW

A reviewing court applies a two-prong test to determine whether a

sentence is excessive. First, we examine the record to see if the trial court

used the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial court is not

required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance so long as the

record reflects adequate consideration of the guidelines of the article. State

v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. Boehm, 51,229 (La. App. 2 Cir.

4/5/17), 217 So. 3d 596. The court shall state for the record the

considerations taken into account and the factual bases therefor in imposing

sentence. La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 (C). The goal of Art. 894.1 is an

articulation of the factual basis for sentence, not simply a mechanical

compliance with its provisions. State v. Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475 (La. 1982).

The second prong is constitutional excessiveness. A sentence violates

La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of

the offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of

pain and suffering. State v. Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993). A

sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and

punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the

sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166. A 4 trial court has wide discretion to sentence within the statutory limits; absent

a showing of manifest abuse of that discretion, such a sentence will not be

set aside as excessive. On review, an appellate court does not determine

whether another sentence may have been more appropriate, but whether the

trial court abused its discretion. State v. Fruge, 14-1172 (La. 10/14/15), 179

So. 3d 579.

Regarding concurrent and consecutive sentences, La. C. Cr. P. art. 883

provides:

If the defendant is convicted of two or more offenses based on the same act or transaction, or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, the terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently unless the court expressly directs that some or all be served consecutively. Other sentences of imprisonment shall be served consecutively unless the court expressly directs that some or all of them be served concurrently.

The decision to make sentences consecutive rather than concurrent is

within the trial court’s discretion. State v. Farria, 412 So. 2d 577 (La.

1982); State v. Moss, 55,454 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/24), 379 So. 3d 285.

When the court makes a sentence consecutive, it must state the

considerations, which may include the defendant’s criminal history, the

gravity or dangerousness of the offense, the viciousness of the crimes, the

harm done to the victims, whether the defendant constitutes an unusual risk

of danger to the public, the potential for the defendant’s rehabilitation, and

whether the defendant has received a benefit from a plea bargain. State v.

Gant, 54,837 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/11/23), 354 So. 3d 824, and citations

therein.

5 DISCUSSION

As noted, Cole raises three arguments. He first contends the court

erred in finding no mitigating circumstances. He shows that the court did

not order a presentence investigation report, though he does not dispute the

court’s recitation of his criminal history. He then reiterates the assertions of

his motion to reconsider: he has “untreated mental health problems,”

specifically that he did not get along with his stepfather growing up; he

witnessed domestic violence at a young age, was twice sent to inpatient

treatment for depression and suicidal ideation between ages 15 and 16, but

did not receive follow-up treatment or therapy; and he never received the

mental health assessment suggested by a sentencing consultant. He submits

that the court violated Art. 894.1 by failing to consider his untreated mental

health issues.

At the first sentencing hearing, the district court explicitly found that

every factor favoring imprisonment under Art. 894.1 (A) applied: there was

an undue risk that during a period of suspended sentence or probation the

defendant would commit another crime; the defendant was in need of

correctional treatment or a custodial environment that can be provided most

effectively by his commitment to an institution; and a lesser sentence would

deprecate the seriousness of the crime. The court then found that many of

the aggravating factors under Art. 894.1 (B) applied: Cole’s conduct showed

deliberate cruelty in that the victims were innocent bystanders who

“happened to be at the wrong place at the wrong time,” and Cole could have

ended his escapade at any time but, instead, carried it to grotesque lengths;

he created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person; he

used threats of or actual violence against the victims; he committed these 6 offenses to facilitate or conceal other offenses; he used a dangerous weapon;

and he was persistently involved in similar offenses not already considered

in criminal history or as part of a multiple offender adjudication. The court

concluded that no mitigating factors applied, obviously finding that Cole’s

alleged psychological issues did not excuse or justify his conduct. On this

record, the court could easily find that Cole’s psychological history did not

constitute an excuse or justification for his conduct. It certainly did not deter

him from committing this horrible, cascading sequence of criminal acts. The

district court adequately complied with Art. 894.1.

Cole’s second argument is that the court erred in making all sentences

consecutive. Citing Art. 883, he contends the court referred only to the

“criminal history, the gravity and dangerousness of the offense, the

viciousness of the crimes, the harm done to the victims, whether the

defendant constitutes an unusual risk of danger to the public, and the

potential for the defendant’s rehabilitation.” He submits that the record does

not support consecutive sentences; for the armed robbery alone, he received

80 years, and the imposition of more consecutive sentences “was merely

overkill.”

In our earlier opinion, we admonished the district court for imposing

consecutive sentences without giving an “articulated justification or

explanation.” At the second sentencing hearing, the court meticulously

tracked the factors of Art. 883, first relating Cole’s long and troubling

criminal history, outlined earlier. The court then recounted the facts of the

instant crimes, finding them “egregious,” “a series of events,” and “multiple

felonies.” The court also cited the psychological harm to the victim he held

at gunpoint the longest, the impact of holding a gun on several nurses, and of 7 actually shooting a bystander who was trying to help. Then, after exiting the

hospital, instead of fleeing the scene Cole commandeered Ms. Davis and her

SUV, forcing her on an odyssey from Shreveport to Farmerville and then to

Monroe. Finally, the court recognized Cole had already received probation

that was revoked, a multiple offender conviction, and, finally, a long prison

term, for armed robbery.

In our earlier opinion, we stated that the kidnappings related to the

three nurses in the hospital room happened at or around the same time and

would be presumptively concurrent under Art. 883. While the court did not

expressly address this concern, it repeatedly stated that the offenses occurred

in a “public place,” a “hospital,” which should be a haven of safety for

patients and staff. Cole’s conduct shattered that aura of safety. The district

court adequately articulated this and justified the consecutive sentences,

under the standard of State v. Gant, supra. This argument lacks merit.

By his final argument, Cole contends the sentences are excessive. He

concedes that his actions that day cannot be explained or condoned, but

submits he possibly suffered a psychotic episode of some sort after being

barred from Lewis’s daughter’s hospital room, and he did not really want to

hurt anyone. He admits he shot Davenport, but only in the leg and only after

Davenport charged him with a knife. He contends that no other victim

testified to suffering any physical or mental injuries; he never threatened to

hurt the nurses or Davis, whose vehicle he commandeered; and Davis had

several opportunities to flee and seek help, but she never did. On these facts,

he suggests his conduct does not “seem like the actions of a hardened violent

criminal.” He adds that only one of his prior offenses was a crime of

violence. Finally, he argues that incarceration costs of $62.63 a day, or 8 $22,860 a year, constitute a needless imposition of pain and suffering on the

taxpayers of Louisiana.

Some of Cole’s factual assertions may be quickly dismissed. One of

the nurses held at gunpoint, Bray, testified that when he tried to calm Cole

down, Cole replied that “he was going to blow my head off if I didn’t shut

up.” Davis testified that when Cole drove her SUV through the ATM line at

the bank, he warned her not to show the teller the “fear in her face”; after he

left in the car he was “test driving,” she thought about getting away, but was

too afraid to do so. “He’s still got a gun. He’ll shoot me,” she testified. The

district court specifically found that she sustained psychological harm. In

short, Cole could have done his victims much worse, but the contention that

they suffered no harm is disingenuous.

Refuted assertions aside, Cole argues with some cogency that the total

of 190 years seems out of proportion to the gravity of the offenses. On

appellate review, however, the role of the court is not to determine whether

another sentence would have been more appropriate, but whether the trial

court abused its discretion. State v. Fruge, supra; State v. Moss, supra.

While this court may question the deterrent effect of a 190-year sentence as

opposed to, say, an 80-year total sentence for armed robbery concurrent with

the other sentences, we recognize that many things informed the district

court’s sentencing choice. Cole showed a gross disregard for the wishes of

his fiancée and the safety of her daughter; a shocking disrespect for the quiet

and serenity of a hospital; a horrible assault on nurses trying to protect a

patient; he inflicted a gunshot wound on a bystander who tried to help, and

took his final victim, Davis, on a terrifying 100-mile ride. His criminal

history showed an escalation from property crimes to violent crimes, which 9 suspended sentences, probation, and jail time did nothing to deter. Finally,

we must note that for the offenses of conviction, most of the sentences

imposed are only midrange, and the state did not elect to charge Cole as a

multiple offender. Although the total sentence pushes the upper boundaries

for these offenses and this offender, we cannot say the district court abused

its vast discretion. This argument lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed, Taniel Cole’s convictions and sentences

are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.