State of Louisiana v. Steven Oneal Coleaman

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: February 26, 2025
• Docket: 56,093-KA
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered February 26, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,093-KA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

STEVEN ONEAL COLEMAN Appellant

Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 381,874

Honorable John D. Mosely, Jr., Judge

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Douglas Lee Harville

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney

REBECCA ARMAND EDWARDS CHEYENNE YVETTE WILSON JASMINE CARLETTE COOPER Assistant District Attorneys

Before STEPHENS, THOMPSON, and ROBINSON, JJ. ROBINSON, J.

Steven Oneal Coleman (“Coleman”) was charged by bill of

information on April 1, 2021, with one count of aggravated second degree

battery in violation of La. R.S. 14:34.7, stemming from an incident on

February 8, 2021. Coleman pled not guilty and waived formal arraignment.

A jury trial was held on November 14, 2023, and Coleman was convicted by

a unanimous guilty verdict. Motions for post verdict judgment of acquittal

and for a new trial were filed on January 25, 2024, the date of the sentencing

hearing, and were heard and denied in open court. Coleman was then

sentenced at the hearing to 15 years’ imprisonment at hard labor. Coleman

filed a motion to reconsider on March 13, 2024, which was denied on March

19, 2024, without a hearing. Coleman appeals his conviction and sentence.

For the following reasons, Coleman’s conviction and sentence are

AFFIRMED.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Coleman and Alahna Blaylock (“Blaylock”) had been acquainted for

several years, after meeting on Facebook as teenagers. Coleman went to

Blaylock’s apartment the evening of February 8, 2021. Coleman and

Blaylock got into an argument after Blaylock received some calls from a

male acquaintance and Blaylock asked Coleman to leave. Blaylock walked

Coleman to her door, locked it behind him when he left, and turned her back.

Blaylock then heard Coleman say “bitch” as she was walking toward her

son’s bedroom, then heard gunshots. Blaylock stated in her interview with a

detective at the hospital that she heard three gunshots but later testified that

she heard two gunshots. It is uncertain exactly how much time passed from

when the door was closed and the shots were fired. Blaylock did not realize she had been shot until she fell to the floor. She was able to open the door to

look outside for Coleman’s vehicle, but did not see anything. She returned

to the apartment, crawled to check on her infant son, and got her phone to

call her mother and police. Blaylock was taken by ambulance to the hospital

and underwent emergency surgery for injuries resulting from the gunshot

entering her back and exiting through her abdomen. As a result of the

gunshot, she has ongoing nerve issues and must use a colostomy bag.

While on the scene, police recovered two shell casings on the upstairs

breezeway outside Blaylock’s apartment, identified as 357-S types. Patrol

was called back to the scene later that day when a third casing was found

inside the apartment.

Coleman did not testify during trial or at sentencing. The jury

returned a unanimous verdict finding Coleman guilty as charged. The trial

court denied Coleman’s motions for a new trial and for post verdict

judgment of acquittal during the sentencing hearing. Blaylock testified that

Coleman’s actions changed her life and damaged her son’s life, and that

Coleman had shown no remorse or sympathy. The court sentenced Coleman

to 15 years at hard labor, the minimum required by La. C. Cr. P. art.

893.3(D), to be served concurrent with any other he may be required to

serve, and with credit for time served. The court particularly considered the

facts that Coleman shot and caused permanent injury to Blaylock, as well as

La. C. Cr. P. art. 893.3 and 894. On March 19, 2024, the court denied an

untimely motion to reconsider sentence, which only alleged excessiveness of

the sentence. The motion for appeal was granted March 27, 2024.

2 DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of Evidence

Coleman claims that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt who shot Blaylock and whether the shots were fired at Blaylock or her

apartment; therefore, it failed to prove Coleman or anyone acted with

specific intent to cause serious bodily injury to Blaylock. Coleman argues

that the evidence introduced at trial, when viewed under the standard set

forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781. 61 L.Ed.2d 560

(1979), was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was

guilty of aggravated second degree battery. He asserts that, although it is

possible that he fired at Blaylock through her closed apartment door, there

are too many unanswered questions for any reasonable juror to have found

the State proved Coleman was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Coleman points out several issues that he claims create reasonable

doubt. First, although Blaylock had known Coleman for years, she did not

testify she had ever seen him with a gun or that he had ever threatened her

before or on that night. Also, Blaylock could not see where Coleman was on

the landing outside her apartment or whether anyone else was there when

she heard Coleman say “bitch” after he had left and the door was closed.

Further, Coleman notes that there was no testimony or evidence that police

spoke with or investigated neighbors who may have witnessed or heard any

of the events that took place that evening. There were no photographs of the

door to show what angle the bullet entered the apartment or where the two

shell casings were found on the landing. There was also no specific

identification of the third shell casing that was found inside the apartment

after the initial investigation of the scene. Coleman also raises questions 3 such as whether Blaylock’s ability to perceive and remember the events was

affected by her admitted smoking that evening, although the record does not

indicate what substance was smoked or to what extent. He also notes that

Blaylock had received several phone calls from another man while Coleman

was with her and suggests that this man could have been involved in the

shooting in some way.

An appellate court neither assesses credibility nor reweighs evidence

and great deference must be given to the trier of fact’s decision to accept or

reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Smith, 94-3116

(La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442; State v. Myrick, 54,606 (La. App. 2 Cir.

9/21/22), 349 So. 3d 92; State v. Eason, 43,788 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/25/09), 3

So. 3d 685, writ denied, 09-0725 (La. 12/11/09), 23 So. 3d 913; State v.

Carr, 55,692 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/24), 387 So. 3d 886. The jury’s

reasonable credibility determination is not to be second-guessed on a

Jackson sufficiency of the evidence review. State v. Marshall, 04-3139 (La.

11/29/06), 943 So. 2d 362, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 905, 128 S. Ct. 239, 169 L.

Ed. 2d 179 (2007). Further, in the absence of internal contradiction or

irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one witness’s testimony, if

believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient support for a requisite factual

conclusion. State v. Fussell, 55,497 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/24), 381 So. 3d

899; Myrick, supra.

Aggravated second degree battery is a specific intent crime. State v.

Sullivan, 49,183 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/13/14), 146 So. 3d 952; State v.

Harrison, 46,325 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/18/11), 69 So. 3d 581. Specific

criminal intent is that state of mind existing when the circumstances indicate

that the offender actively desires the prescribed criminal consequences to 4 follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1). Specific intent can form

in an instant, and it may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the

offense and the actions of the defendant. Harrison, supra; State v. Linnear,

44,830 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/9/09), 26 So. 3d 303. The determination of

whether the requisite intent is present is a question for the trier of fact. State

v. Frost, 53,312 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/4/20), 293 So. 3d 708, writ denied, 20-

00628 (La. 11/18/20), 304 So. 3d 416.

Blaylock testified regarding her account of the events, which was

consistent with statements she made during her interview with the detective

while in the hospital, other than her statement as to whether she heard two

versus three shots fired. There was no contradiction in her testimony with

the physical evidence, particularly as to the two casings found on the

breezeway and the trail of blood.

Blaylock had known Coleman for several years, so she would have

recognized his voice on the other side of her door calling out “bitch” just

after she made him leave her apartment following an argument. Coleman

would have known that Blaylock was still near the door when he fired the

shots into her apartment. It was also apparent from Blaylock’s testimony

that the events happened quickly. Further, nothing in Blaylock’s testimony

indicated that any other people were around at the time or that there was any

delay in the shooting from when she closed the door.

Blaylock’s testimony was sufficient to support the factual conclusion

that Coleman was the shooter and that he had the specific intent to inflict

serious bodily injury when he shot in the direction of her apartment

immediately after being made to leave following an argument. Based on her

account, the possibility that someone else could have shot into her apartment 5 immediately after she shut the door on Coleman following an argument and

heard him utter “bitch” is not rational. The jury found Blaylock’s testimony

to be credible, and there is no basis to disturb that determination.

Sentencing Error

Coleman argues that the trial court erred when it concluded the jury

found that Coleman “used or discharged” a firearm in the commission of a

crime and resultingly applied the sentencing enhancement provision of La.

C. Cr. P. art. 893.3(D) of a mandatory sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment at

hard labor. He claims that the jury only found that he “possessed or used” a

firearm in the commission of a crime, as referenced in the responsive verdict

form. As such, he should only be sentenced in accordance with La. C. Cr. P.

art. 893.3(A), a range of 2 to 15 years’ imprisonment.

Coleman also asserts that the trial court erred when it found it was

required to impose a hard labor sentence, referring to a provision in La. C.

Cr. P. art. 893.3(F) that the sentence imposed pursuant to the article “shall be

imposed in the same manner as provided in the felony for which the

defendant was convicted.” He therefore argues that, because second degree

aggravated battery carries a sentence with or without hard labor, the trial

court was not required to impose a hard labor sentence.

La. C. Cr. P. art. 881.2(A)(1) provides:

The defendant may appeal or seek review of a sentence based on any ground asserted in a motion to reconsider sentence. The defendant also may seek review of a sentence which exceeds the maximum sentence authorized by the statute under which the defendant was convicted and any applicable statutory enhancement provisions.

This article precludes a defendant from presenting arguments on appeal that

were not presented to the trial court so as to allow that court to correct any

6 deficiency. State v. Felder, 36,228 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/14/02), 823 So. 2d

1107; State v. Brantley, 28,542 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/21/96), 679 So. 2d 472.

Coleman did not assert any of the above sentencing errors in his

motion to reconsider sentence, but only a general claim of excessiveness,

and he does not argue constitutional excessiveness in his appeal. Coleman’s

argument regarding the trial court’s sentencing error was not properly

preserved for review in accordance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 881.2(A)(1)

because he failed to include it in his motion to reconsider sentence;

therefore, there is no sentencing issue properly before the court for review.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated hereinabove, Coleman’s conviction and

sentence are affirmed.