Judgment rendered February 25, 2026. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,776-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
STEVE DEROZAL WILLIAMS Appellant
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 358,612
Honorable Ramona L. Emanuel, Judge
LOUISIANA APPEALS AND WRIT SERVICE Counsel for Appellant By: Remy V. Starns Justin C. Harrell
JAMES EDWARD STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
REBECCA ARMAND EDWARDS MARGARET E. RICHIE GASKINS Assistant District Attorneys
Before PITMAN, STONE, and MARCOTTE, JJ. MARCOTTE, J.
This criminal appeal arises from the First Judicial District Court,
Parish of Caddo, the Honorable Ramona Emanuel presiding. Defendant
Steve Williams (“Steve”) was convicted of second-degree murder and
sentenced to life at hard labor without benefits. He now appeals his
conviction and sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 15, 2018, Steve was charged by bill of indictment with the
second-degree murder of Terry Brown (“Mr. Brown”), in violation of La.
R.S. 14:30.1. The offense occurred on June 7, 2018. Steve pled not guilty.
On December 7-11, 2021, a trial was held where the following
evidence was adduced. Tamika Williams (“Tamika”) testified that in 2018,
she had been married to Steve for 24 years, and they had been together for
27. Together, they had three boys, a family home with a pool, and they had
just welcomed their first grandchild. They often took trips together and had
an active social life. However, Steve underwent a total hip replacement
surgery, and complications in his recovery from that surgery curtailed the
social life and travel previously enjoyed by the couple.
In February 2017, Tamika said she met Mr. Brown on Facebook and
began messaging with him. She was frustrated by the lifestyle changes
wrought by Steve’s health decline and confided in Mr. Brown that her
marriage was crumbling. The friendship between the two turned intimate
around December 2017.
At the time, Tamika said she was working as a private sitter for an
elderly woman on Pebble Beach Drive in Shreveport. Mr. Brown would
often bring her lunch where they would discuss their plans to be together. A barber by trade, Mr. Brown would also on occasion cut Tamika’s hair. In
addition to her intimate relationship with Mr. Brown, Tamika remained
intimate with Steve.
Steve discovered Tamika’s affair with Mr. Brown in January 2018. In
March 2018, Steve and Tamika were in Steve’s vehicle discussing their
relationship and her affair with Mr. Brown. At some point during the
discussion, either Mr. Brown called Tamika or Tamika called the victim.
Immediately after the incident, Tamika told police that Steve had become
very upset and told Mr. Brown to meet him somewhere. During her
testimony at trial, Tamika claimed that the victim said he was coming over
to the Williams family residence to harm them. Immediately after the
incident, Tamika told police that, as she and her husband arrived home and
were walking inside, she heard a gun click, saw Steve pull a gun, heard a
gunshot, and fled the home because she wanted to hide from her husband.
At trial, Tamika testified that, when she and her husband arrived home, she
heard a sound like metal hitting the ground, heard a gunshot, and then fled
because Mr. Brown had been threatening her husband and she was afraid
that Mr. Brown had come to the Williams family residence. As a result of
this incident, Steve was arrested for discharging a firearm.
Following this incident, Tamika left the marital home to live with Mr.
Brown in his apartment. On the morning she left him, Steve, who testified
in his own defense, said that he drove his wife to work to drop her off and
found Mr. Brown there waiting on her. Steve testified that he confronted
Mr. Brown stating, “Why are you doing this?” He said that Mr. Brown
responded by brandishing a baseball bat he retrieved from his vehicle. Steve
said that he was frightened for his safety and quickly left the scene. He also 2 said that he started carrying a handgun after this incident. Steve further
testified that Mr. Brown’s harassment of him grew serious enough that he
made a police report.
During this time, Mr. Brown would drop Tamika off and pick her up
from work, but Steve would still sometimes bring her lunch and beg her to
come home. Tamika eventually relented and returned to the marital home.
She couldn’t let Mr. Brown go, however, and continued to talk with and see
him. She also continued to sleep with both men. Tamika eventually moved
back in with Mr. Brown.
In April 2018, she also announced to both men that she was pregnant
and did not know which man was the father. Tamika testified at trial that
she never had a partial hysterectomy and that she had a menstrual cycle, had
been pregnant in April 2018, and had miscarried that pregnancy. However,
her family doctor testified at trial that Tamika’s uterus had been surgically
removed prior to 2018 and that she was physically incapable of carrying a
pregnancy or having a menstrual cycle.
In May 2018, Steve had enough and told Tamika that she needed to
choose which man she wanted to be with. Tamika decided to move back
home yet again, and she told Mr. Brown that they were done. Mr. Brown
requested his apartment key back. Tamika said that she and Steve met Mr.
Brown and Steve returned his apartment key to him. The two men shook
hands and appeared to bury the hatchet. Tamika, however, continued to see
and sleep with both men.
On June 6, 2018, Steve dropped his wife off at work at the home on
Pebble Beach Drive and when he returned to pick her up, he noticed that she
had a fresh haircut. At that point, Tamika admitted that Mr. Brown had 3 come to see her and cut her hair that day. Steve became enraged. He called
Mr. Brown, threatened him with bodily harm, and told him that he was
“coming to get [him]” with a firearm. Mr. Brown called 911 and reported
the incident. He later met SPD officers, who escorted him to his apartment
and stayed with him for some time, but Steve never showed up.
The following day, June 7, 2018, Steve again brought Tamika to
work. He told her that he would be back later to pick her up. Expert
analysis of cell phone records indicates that, after dropping his wife off at
work, Steve spent the morning driving around the neighborhood while
making phone calls and never left the neighborhood prior to the homicide.
Steve called Tamika’s brother, Roderick Jefferson, that morning. Mr.
Jefferson testified that Steve told him that he thought he had seen Mr.
Brown’s car in the neighborhood after he dropped off Tamika. Steve
returned to the house at Pebble Beach Drive later that morning, and he saw
Mr. Brown’s car. Steve also saw Tamika and Mr. Brown outside the
residence standing together.
Immediately after the homicide, Tamika told police that Steve was
holding a gun when he exited the truck. However, she testified at trial that
Steve was not holding a gun when he exited the truck and, instead, held his
hands in the air. Immediately after the homicide, Tamika told police that
Steve walked toward Mr. Brown holding the gun, Mr. Brown began running
away in the opposite direction, and Steve began chasing and shooting at Mr.
Brown as Mr. Brown tried to escape.
SPD officers who responded to the scene confirmed that Tamika told
them that Steve had “chased (the victim) around the yard, shot three to four
times, stood over him and shot again.” Neighbors called 911 and emergency 4 medical personnel arrived and transported the victim to the hospital. Mr.
Brown, however, succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced dead
shortly after arriving at the hospital.
According to Tamika’s trial testimony of the events that day, Mr.
Brown “called out with his name and told [Steve] that it ends today,” before
“proceeding to run to the passenger side of his truck” as if attempting to
retrieve something. She said that only then did Steve “reach into the vehicle
and get the gun out the truck and start shooting as Terry Brown was running
toward him.” However, in four different interviews with various law
enforcement personnel soon after the incident, Tamika’s story was
consistent that Steve immediately got out of the truck with a gun, advanced
on Mr. Brown and started shooting him.
In Steve’s description of the events that day, he said that “[Mr.
Brown] pushed [Tamika] and charged me. I don’t know if he was just
pushing her like that, and he charged me and that’s when I came out with the
gun and I shot him.”
Tameca Plater, Mr. Brown’s sister, testified that she learned of her
brother’s romance with a married woman when she came to visit him in
October 2017. Ms. Plater stated that Mr. Brown had been told by Tamika
that she was pregnant, which she found hard to believe since her brother had
a vasectomy. She also said that her brother told her in June 2018 that his
relationship with Tamika was over and that the only contact between them
going forward would be for the sake of the baby. Ms. Plater further testified
that she was surprised to hear about her brother’s murder because about two
weeks before the incident, her brother told her that he and Steve had
resolved their differences and they shook hands. 5 Chandra Craig, who was on the porch of her mother’s house near
where the incident occurred, testified that she saw Steve drive up to the
house where Tamika was working. She said that she observed Steve park in
front of the house and exit his vehicle in a “zombie-like” fashion with a gun
in his hand. She then ran inside her mother’s house and heard multiple
gunshots. When she looked back over to where the gunshots came from, she
saw Mr. Brown stumble and fall to the ground near his truck. She said that
he had been shot.
Charles Ball was performing lawn service at Ms. Craig’s mother’s
house when he heard four to five gunshots coming from the house on Pebble
Beach Drive. He then called 911. A recording of his 911 call was played
for the jury, and Mr. Ball verified that it was the call he made. He said that
he approached Mr. Brown, attempted to render aid to him, and could hear
him say “don’t let me die.” He said he asked Tamika how many times the
victim had been shot, and she responded, “he unloaded the clip.”
Detective Kenneth Thompson (“Det. Thompson”) was a homicide
detective with the Shreveport Police Department (“SPD”) at the time of the
shooting. He responded to and observed the crime scene. Det. Thompson
testified that he interviewed Tamika after the incident, and she told him that
her estranged husband shot Mr. Brown. A recording of the interview was
played for the jury, and Det. Thompson confirmed that it was authentic.
Det. Thompson also interviewed Steve and that interview was recorded and
played for the jury as well. Det. Thompson also obtained search warrants
for the phone records of both Steve and Tamika.
SPD Sergeant Richard McDonald (“Sgt. McDonald”) testified that he
spoke with Tamika upon arriving at the scene, and she told him that her 6 husband chased her boyfriend around a vehicle in the front yard and shot
him several times before fleeing in a white Chevrolet Colorado. Sgt.
McDonald made a video recording of his interaction with Tamika, and that
video was played for the jury.
SPD Sergeant Brad Sotak (“Sgt. Sotak”) testified that he interviewed
Tamika after the incident. He was surprised by her demeanor because she
“didn’t seem very upset” and appeared “kind of ambivalent” to what was
going on. Sgt. Sotak’s interaction with Tamika was recorded and a copy
was played for the jury.
SPD Corporal Amber Futch (“Cpl. Futch”), a crime scene
investigator, testified that she took photographs of Mr. Brown from the
hospital documenting his injuries. She also took photographs of Steve’s
truck once he turned himself in at the police station. The photographs were
shown to the jury. Cpl. Futch also said that she test-fired the 9-millimeter
handgun used by Steve and noted that it was functional and had no problem
ejecting shells.
Detective Marlon Clark (“Det. Clark”), an SPD homicide detective,
testified that he was able to locate five shell casings from the area where Mr.
Brown was shot. He also interviewed Steve later that day, and a recording
of that interview was published to the jury. In the interview, Steve said that
he saw Mr. Brown hugging Tamika, which is why he ran at him and shot
him. Steve also said that he never saw Mr. Brown with a weapon of any
kind. On cross-examination, Det. Clark conceded that Steve also told him
that Mr. Brown had threatened him once before.
James Traylor is a medical doctor and forensic pathologist who
performed the autopsy on Mr. Brown. He testified that Mr. Brown was shot 7 six times, five of which were perforating and one of which penetrated his
lung and became lodged there. He said that the various locations of the
gunshot wounds were on Mr. Brown’s back, side, and hand. He also noted
that the gunshot wounds on Mr. Brown’s back were entry wounds. Dr.
Traylor testified that none of the wounds corroborate the idea that Mr.
Brown was charging at Steve when Steve shot him.
Corporal Robert Cerami (“Cpl. Cerami”), an SPD certified crime-
scene reconstructionist, took photographs of the crime scene which were
shown to the jury. One photograph included a baseball bat, which Cpl.
Cerami said was taken from behind the driver’s seat of Mr. Brown’s car. He
also collected the 9-millimeter handgun from inside the glove box of Steve’s
truck and confirmed that it was the same gun used in the shooting. Cpl.
Cerami also testified that the most likely explanation for what happened on
the day of the incident is that Steve pulled up alongside the curb in front of
the residence, exited his truck, and advanced toward the garage. Steve then
shot once at the victim, which was likely the bullet that struck Mr. Brown in
the hand. Mr. Brown then turned and began to run toward the driver’s side
of the car and the front lawn grass. Steve then shot Mr. Brown three more
times in the back from a distance and then two final times as he stood
directly over him.
A 9-millimeter Taurus handgun was recovered from Steve’s vehicle,
along with an empty magazine. The gun was empty and had no projectile
loaded into it. All of the shell casings recovered from the scene were fired
by a 9-millimeter weapon. An ATF report on the Taurus handgun indicated
that it had been purchased by Steve’s son approximately 19 days prior to the
homicide. 8 Jimmie Bates, Tamika’s hairdresser, testified regarding a telephone
call that she overheard between Steve and Mr. Brown in which Mr. Brown
told Steve something to the effect of “you better hope I don’t beat you up on
the streets.”
The 12-member jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict. On March
15, 2022, the trial court denied Steve’s motion for a new trial and motion for
post-verdict judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to life in prison
without benefits. The trial court informed Steve of his appellate and post-
conviction relief time restraints.
Steve now appeals.
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Steve argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he
was guilty of second-degree murder. He contends that “after months of
escalating rhetoric, including threats, harassment, a police report, and one
particularly terse exchange with [Mr. Brown] brandishing a baseball bat,
[he] was living in fear.” Steve claims that on the day of the incident, he
exited his vehicle with his hands in the air and the firearm in his pocket. He
says that he only opened fire after Mr. Brown charged toward him telling
him, “it ends today” and “don’t let me make it in the truck” where a baseball
bat was stowed behind the seat. Steve argues that these facts present a
straightforward case of self-defense. He asserts that his decision to shoot
Mr. Brown was not malicious but rather a direct response to an imminent
threat to his life.
Even taking the state’s view of the facts, Steve contends that the
evidence does not support the specific intent required for second-degree 9 murder. He claims that the record shows “a volatile love triangle marked by
months of escalating strain, harassment, threats, and physical intimidation.”
Steve argues that these conditions are recognized by Louisiana law as
capable of producing the “sudden passion or heat of blood” that mitigates a
homicide to manslaughter. He states that he was reacting to a situation “in
the grip of fear, provocation, and intense emotional disturbance.” Steve
argues that, at most, the evidence supports manslaughter rather than the
deliberate and unprovoked killing necessary to sustain a conviction for
second-degree murder.
The state argues that the evidence presented was clearly sufficient for
the jury to have reached a verdict of second-degree murder because Steve
had the specific intent to kill Mr. Brown. The state contends that nothing in
the evidence suggests Steve acted in self-defense or in a sudden passion.
Based on the evidence, a rational juror could have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Steve committed the second-degree murder of Mr.
Brown.
The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence
claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.
Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124
S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004). This standard, now codified in La. C.
Cr. P. art. 821, does not afford the appellate court with a means to substitute
its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v.
10 Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517; State v. Johnson, 55,254
(La. App. 2 Cir. 8/9/23), 370 So. 3d 91.
Appellate courts neither assess the credibility of witnesses nor
reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442.
Rather, the reviewing court affords great deference to the jury’s decision to
accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v.
Gilliam, 36,118 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/30/02), 827 So. 2d 508, writ denied, 02-
3090 (La. 11/14/03), 858 So. 2d 422. Where there is conflicting testimony
concerning factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a
determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the
weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Allen, 36,180 (La. App.
2 Cir. 9/18/02), 828 So. 2d 622, writs denied, 02-2595 (La. 3/28/03), 840 So.
2d 566, 02-2997 (La. 6/27/03), 847 So. 2d 1255, cert denied, 540 U.S. 1185,
124 S. Ct. 1404, 158 L. Ed 2d 90 (2004).
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in a self-
defense case involving a homicide, the question becomes whether, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was
not committed in self-defense. State v. Jackson, 55,312 (La. App. 2 Cir.
11/15/23), 374 So. 3d 354. A homicide is justifiable when committed in
self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger
of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is
necessary to save himself from that danger or when committed for the
purpose of preventing a violent or forcible felony involving danger to life or
of great bodily harm by one who reasonably believes that such an offense is
about to be committed and that such action is necessary for its prevention. 11 La. R.S. 14:20 (A)(1) and (2). The circumstances must be sufficient to
excite the fear of a reasonable person that there would be serious danger to
his own life or person if he attempted to prevent the felony without the
killing. La. R.S. 14:20(A)(2). A person who is the aggressor or who brings
on a difficulty cannot claim the right of self-defense unless he withdraws
from the conflict in good faith and in such a manner that his adversary
knows or should know that he desires to withdraw and discontinue the
conflict. La. R.S. 14:21.
Manslaughter is defined as a homicide which would be murder under
either La. R.S. 14:30 (first degree murder) or La. R.S. 14:30.1 (second
degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of
blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average
person of his self-control and cool reflection. La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1).
Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds
that the offender’s blood had actually cooled, or that an average person’s
blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed. Id.
Manslaughter is also a homicide committed without any intent to cause
death or great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:31(A)(2).
For murder to be reduced to manslaughter, the following must be
proved: (1) the homicide was committed in sudden passion or heat of blood;
(2) that sudden passion or heat of blood was immediately caused by
provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and
cool reflection; (3) the defendant’s blood did not cool between the
provocation and the killing; and (4) an average person’s blood would not
have cooled between the provocation and the killing. State v. Johnson,
supra. 12 In any criminal proceeding in which the justification of self-defense is
raised pursuant to La. R. S. 14:19 or 20, the state shall have the burden to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-
defense. La. C. Cr. P. art. 390(A).
When the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in such
a case, the question becomes whether, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not committed in self-
defense. State v. Matthews, 464 So. 2d 298 (La. 1985); State v. Cook,
46,843 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/25/12), 86 So. 3d 672, writ denied, 12-0640 (La.
6/22/12), 91 So. 3d 969.
Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the
offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S.
14:30.1(A). Specific criminal intent is that state of mind that exists when the
circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed
criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10.
Specific intent need not be proven as a fact; it may be inferred from the
circumstances of the transaction and the actions of the defendant. State v.
Graham, 420 So. 2d 1126 (La. 1982). Specific intent to kill may be inferred
from a defendant’s act of pointing a gun and firing at a person. State v.
Seals, 95-0305 (La. 11/25/96), 684 So. 2d 368. It may also be inferred from
the extent and severity of the victim’s injuries and the defendant’s use of a
deadly weapon to produce those injuries. State v. Jackson, supra.
We find that there was sufficient evidence to support Steve’s
conviction for second-degree murder. At trial, the credible testimony of a
disinterested eyewitness proved that Steve exited his vehicle holding a 13 weapon and was therefore the aggressor in the confrontation. Moreover,
Tamika’s initial statements to the police indicated that Steve walked toward
the victim holding the gun, the victim began running away in the opposite
direction, and Steve began chasing and shooting at the victim as the victim
tried to escape. We also note that Steve himself admitted to police that Mr.
Brown was unarmed at the time of the homicide. Accordingly, we find that
the jury was well within its discretion to reject the self-serving testimony of
Steve and his wife that he acted in self-defense.
Steve’s manslaughter argument is similarly unpersuasive. The facts at
trial showed that Mr. Brown was shot six times, but two of those shots were
inflicted after he had already fallen to the ground. Thus, even if Steve had
been enraged at the time of the homicide, once Mr. Brown fell down, Steve
had an opportunity to cool off and stop shooting. Instead, he approached the
wounded victim, stood over his body, and fired two more rounds until the
clip was empty. In our view, the evidence showed premeditation rather than
immediate provocation. Accordingly, we do not find that the mitigatory
factors of sudden passion or heat of blood necessary for manslaughter were
present.
This assignment of error is without merit.
Admissibility of Character Evidence
Steve argues that the trial court erred in prohibiting him from
admitting evidence of Mr. Brown’s “violent character and criminal past” to
demonstrate his “reasonable subjective fear” of Mr. Brown. Steve claims
that his and Tamika’s testimony about Mr. Brown charging at him was
enough to meet the “overt act” requirement of La. C.E. 404(A)(2)(a) such
that evidence of pertinent character traits of Mr. Brown should have been 14 admissible. Despite meeting the “overt act” requirement, Steve complains
that the trial court repeatedly prohibited him from exploring Mr. Brown’s
criminal history and past instances of violence, including potential sexual
assault. He also notes that the court repeatedly prohibited Tamika from
describing Mr. Brown’s threats against Steve. Steve claims that “by
foreclosing the very character evidence the overt act unlocked, the court
deprived the jury of critical context necessary to assess [his] state of mind
and to determine the true aggressor.”
The state argues that the trial court correctly prohibited Steve from
introducing evidence of Mr. Brown’s character. The state asserts that
Louisiana courts have consistently held that the evidence of an overt act
presented by a defendant must be “appreciable evidence,” and a defendant’s
self-serving testimony that is sufficiently contradicted by other evidence
does not constitute “appreciable evidence” of an overt act.
Both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article I, § 16 of the Louisiana Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant
the right to present a defense. State v. Van Winkle, 94-0947 (La. 6/30/95),
658 So. 2d 198. However, this right does not require the trial court to permit
the introduction of evidence that is irrelevant or has so little probative value
that it is substantially outweighed by other legitimate considerations in the
administration of justice. La. C.E. art. 403; State v. Mosby, 595 So. 2d 1135
(La. 1992); State v. Johnson, 41,428 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/06), 940 So. 2d
711, writ denied, 06-2615 (La. 5/18/07), 957 So. 2d 150.
Although evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his character is
generally inadmissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, it may be introduced to support a plea of 15 self-defense. State v. Burton, 19-01079 (La. 6/30/21), 320 So. 3d 1117.
This type of evidence is admissible in support of a plea of self-defense in a
murder prosecution for two distinct purposes: (1) to show defendant’s
reasonable apprehension of danger which would justify his conduct; and (2)
to help determine who was the aggressor in the conflict. State v. Lee, 331
So. 2d 455 (La. 1975). Evidence of the decedent’s dangerous character or of
his threats against the accused may be admissible in support of his plea of
self-defense, provided that the accused first produces evidence that the
decedent had made a hostile demonstration or overt act against the accused
at the time of the incident. Id. An overt act is any act of the deceased that
manifests to the mind of a reasonable person a present intention on his part
to kill defendant or do him great bodily harm. Id., quoting State v. Brown,
172 La. 121, 133 So. 383 (1931). A defendant’s unsupported, self-serving
testimony that is sufficiently contradicted by other evidence does not
constitute appreciable evidence of an overt act or hostile demonstration on
the part of the victim. State v. Kennell, 54,577 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/22),
342 So. 3d 437.
In this case, Steve failed to present appreciable evidence that Mr.
Brown made a hostile demonstration or overt act against him that would
then allow him to introduce evidence of Mr. Brown’s character. The only
evidence available to prove a hostile demonstration or overt act was Steve’s
unsupported and self-serving statement that Mr. Brown came running
toward him. However, this testimony was contradicted by forensic
pathologist Dr. Traylor, who testified that none of the victim’s wounds were
consistent with a scenario in which the victim was running toward Steve and
16 that two of the bullet wounds were inflicted while the victim was already
lying prone on the ground.
We also note that, in his own statement to police, Steve admitted that
Mr. Brown was unarmed. Thus, even if Steve’s statement about Mr. Brown
advancing on him was true, this would not qualify as an “overt act” because
it would not cause a reasonable person to believe that an unarmed Mr.
Brown intended to kill him or do him great bodily harm. The trial court did
not err in determining that Steve could not introduce evidence of Mr.
Brown’s behavior because he failed to demonstrate that Mr. Brown made a
hostile demonstration or overt act against him at the time of the incident.
This assignment of error lacks merit.
Recording and Transcription of Bench Conferences
Steve also argues that his due process rights were violated by the
failure to record and transcribe bench conferences and sidebars relevant to
the trial court’s rulings regarding the admission of Mr. Brown’s criminal
past. Steve notes that of the twelve bench conferences during the trial, three
related to Mr. Brown’s character and prior bad acts, the state’s Rule 404
objections, and the court’s rulings. Steve complains that since these
conferences were not memorialized, reversal is mandated because “the
record is so incomplete that the appellate court cannot ascertain the basis of
the lower court’s ruling.” He contends that this restriction on his right to
demonstrate Mr. Brown’s prior bad acts to the jury “robbed him of both the
opportunity to establish that [Mr. Brown] was the first aggressor and to
explain [his] subjective fear of the victim.”
At the outset, we note the well-settled law that a defendant must make
a contemporaneous objection in order to preserve the error for direct review. 17 La. C. Cr. P. art. 841; State v. McLaughlin, 54,874 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/1/23),
357 So. 3d 551, writ denied, 23-00459 (La. 9/26/23), 370 So. 3d 472.
Here, Steve’s trial counsel never contemporaneously objected to the
trial court handling these evidentiary matters in bench conferences and
sidebars. Steve’s trial counsel also never made a proffer of that evidence
outside the presence of the jury in order to preserve the substance of that
evidence for appeal. Accordingly, Steve has waived the right to complain of
such errors on appeal.
However, even if this issue had been preserved for appellate review,
the Louisiana Supreme Court “has never articulated a per se rule either
requiring the recording of bench conferences or exempting them from the
scope of La. C. Cr. P. art. 843.” State v. Deruise, 98-0541, p. 14 (La.
4/3/01), 802 So. 2d 1224, 1236. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that,
when a defendant fails to show any specific prejudice from the failure to
record bench conferences and sidebars, the failure of the court reporter to
record their substance does not constitute reversible error. Id. at 1237.
Here, Steve was permitted to testify that he feared Mr. Brown and
about how Mr. Brown threatened him on multiple occasions. Steve was also
allowed to testify that Mr. Brown verbally threatened to “whip [Steve’s]
ass.” Steve and his wife were both allowed to testify that Mr. Brown had
previously threatened Steve with a baseball bat. Steve’s wife was also
allowed to testify that she “heard Terry Brown speak of bodily harm several
times toward my husband.”
In short, Steve was permitted to introduce other evidence establishing
his state of mind and alleged fear of Mr. Brown at the time of the homicide.
Thus, Steve suffered no prejudice from the failure to record bench 18 conferences and sidebars related to evidence of Mr. Brown’s character, and
the failure to record them does not constitute reversible error.
Sentencing Delay
Finally, Steve argues that the trial court erred in failing to observe the
24-hour sentencing delay the law requires. At the post-verdict hearing on
March 15, 2022, the trial court denied his motion for a new trial and motion
for judgment of acquittal. Steve notes that at that point the trial court was
required under La. C. Cr. P. art. 873 to either delay sentencing for 24 hours
or seek his waiver of the delay. Since the trial court did neither, Steve
argues that the trial court committed reversible error requiring this court to
vacate his sentence and remand the matter for resentencing.
It is undisputed that the trial court failed to follow the sentencing
delay required by La. C. Cr. P. art. 873. However, that failure is subject to a
harmless error analysis. State v. Bodine, 52,205 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/26/18),
257 So. 3d 249, writ denied, 18-1756 (La. 3/25/19), 267 So. 3d 597. This
court has consistently held that “vacating a sentence for the failure to
observe the 24-hour delay is not required if the error is harmless and no
prejudice is shown.” Id.
Here, we note that Steve was convicted of second-degree murder,
which carries a mandatory life sentence. Thus, while the language in La. C.
Cr. P. art. 873 is mandatory, when the sentence given is statutorily required,
then the trial court’s failure to observe the 24-hour period can be considered
harmless error as the trial court had no discretion in the sentence imposed.
State v. Palmer, 56,313 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/16/25), 416 So. 3d 863. Delay or
no delay, the sentence the judge was required to impose would have been the
same. State v. Seals, supra. 19 We also note that there was sufficient delay between the conviction
and the sentence. In State v. Austin, 49,601 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/16/14), 146
So. 3d 716, this court determined that the trial court’s failure to observe the
24-hour delay was harmless because over two months passed between the
conviction and sentence and because the trial court had ample time to fully
consider the sentence to be imposed. See also State v. Bodine, supra,
(holding that “a court’s failure to observe the 24-hour delay is harmless
where sufficient delay has occurred between the date of the conviction and
the date of sentencing, where there is no indication that the sentence was
hurriedly imposed, and where the sentence imposed is mandatory.”).
Here, the trial court had three months and four days within which to
fully consider Steve’s sentence, and the trial court heard extensive
arguments from both sides on his motion for a new trial prior to ruling on
that motion and sentencing him. Thus, there is no evidence that the sentence
was hastily imposed nor is there any evidence of prejudice.
For these reasons, despite the trial court’s failure to adhere to the
requirements of La. C. Cr. P. art. 873, we affirm the mandatory life sentence
without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence imposed by the trial
court.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed, Steve’s conviction and sentence are
affirmed.