Judgment rendered May 20, 2026. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,768-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
SHAQUILLE WONYAE Appellant BRADFORD
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 403,631
Honorable Christopher T. Victory, Judge
LOUISIANA APPEALS AND WRIT Counsel for Appellant SERVICE By: Remy V. Starns Summer Vicknair
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
COURTNEY N. RAY ALEXANDRA L. PORUBSKY Assistant District Attorneys
Before PITMAN, STONE, and STEPHENS, JJ. PITMAN, C. J.
Defendant Shaquille Wonyae Bradford was convicted by a jury of
aggravated second degree battery and then was adjudicated a second felony
offender. He was sentenced to 25 years at hard labor without benefit of
probation or suspension of sentence. Defendant appeals his conviction and
sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm with instructions.
FACTS
In September 2024, Defendant was charged with possession of a
firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a convicted felon, a violation of
La. R.S. 14:95.1, and aggravated second degree battery, a violation of La.
R.S. 14:34.7, in that he committed a battery with a dangerous weapon
inflicting serious bodily injury upon the person of Olivia Hill in August
2024 in Caddo Parish.
A jury trial was held at which the following evidence was adduced.
Officers with the Shreveport Police Department (“SPD”) were
dispatched to the 1800 block of Acorn Street on the night of August 15,
2024, in response to an assault with a firearm. Cpl. Roderick Carter testified
that he went to the scene around midnight and saw three houses
approximately ten feet apart from each other. When he arrived, the victim,
later identified as Olivia Hill, ran out of the house telling the police to hurry
and that “he was inside the house.” Cpl. Carter did not initially observe any
of Hill’s injuries but did see dark-colored stains, which appeared to be
blood, on her white shirt. Her attacker, later identified in open court as
Defendant, emerged from the house that Hill had just left and fled on foot.
Cpl. Carter observed the attacker holding a firearm in the air in his left hand as he ran away. Cpl. Carter and other officers gave chase and arrested
Defendant shortly thereafter.
Defendant did not have the firearm in his possession when he was
apprehended, so Cpl. Carter instructed other officers to search for it. A
firearm was located and seized as evidence by Officer Marquis Loveless,
who had also seen Hill run out of her house followed closely by Defendant,
who was holding the firearm in his left hand. The firearm was located along
the driveway between the houses at 1800 and 1804 Acorn Street.
Olivia Hill testified that Defendant had come to her house the night
before and asked her to have sex with him, which she refused. The next
night, she heard a commotion outside her father’s house; and, when she went
out, she saw Defendant pointing a gun at her brother. She stated she asked
what was going on, and Defendant asked her to light his cigarette. When
she obliged, he struck her on the back of the head with the gun and then hit
her in the face with it. She testified that the laceration on the back of her
head was deep, but she did not seek immediate medical attention beyond that
administered by the emergency medical technicians (“EMTs”) who were
called to the scene because she was afraid and because she did not want to
leave her wheelchair-bound father. She also testified that after the incident,
she began experiencing seizures and that a physician told her the seizures
resulted from the blow to her head.
Ofc. Loveless’ body-camera footage and still photographs taken from
it depict lacerations to the front and back of Hill’s head and face,
corroborating her initial statement to police and the trial testimony.
Ofc. Loveless described seeing deep, bleeding lacerations behind her left ear
and her cheekbone. 2 Sgt. John Madjerick, an expert in the field of fingerprint identification
and comparison, obtained Defendant’s fingerprints at trial and confirmed
that he was the same Shaquille Bradford previously convicted of possession
of Schedule II CDS, less than two grams, on July 3, 2019.
The jury found Defendant guilty of aggravated second degree battery
but acquitted him on the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon.
Defendant filed a motion in arrest of judgment and argued that the
acquittal on the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon
negated the finding that he had been convicted of aggravated second degree
battery while using the firearm. This motion was heard on the day of
sentencing and was denied.
A habitual offender bill was filed pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1, which
was based on the predicate crime of domestic abuse battery with child
endangerment, Docket No. 366478, Caddo Parish, to which Defendant pled
guilty on August 8, 2019. Defendant was sentenced to 18 months’ hard
labor suspended, 1 year active supervised probation, which was extended for
6 months on September 8, 2020. His probation ended March 8, 2021. After
the state provided proof of this prior conviction, Defendant was adjudicated
a second felony habitual offender
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted that the sentencing
range for aggravated second degree battery is a fine of not more than
$10,000 or imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for not more than
15 years, or both. As a second felony habitual offender, Defendant faced a
sentencing range of “not less than one-third the longest term and not more
3 than twice the longest terms prescribed for a first conviction,” or 5 to
30 years. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1).
The trial court reviewed all the sentencing factors in La. C. Cr. P.
art. 894.1 and found that Defendant had a lengthy criminal history, including
the conviction for domestic violence in 2019. It noted that the crime of
which he was convicted was a violent battery committed with a firearm. It
found him in need of correctional treatment and that a lesser sentence would
deprecate the seriousness of the crime. It found no mitigating factors.
Defendant was sentenced to 25 years at hard labor without benefit of
probation or suspension of sentence.1 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider
sentence, which was denied. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of
aggravated second degree battery because the state’s theory of prosecution
rested on the allegation that the dangerous weapon used was a firearm.
Defendant claims the jury expressly rejected that factual premise when it
acquitted him of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He argues
that the acquittal on that charge reflects that the state failed to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that he possessed or exercised control over the firearm
allegedly used in the battery offense. He also argues that the conviction
should be reversed because the state failed to prove an essential element of
the case. He also asserts that no rational juror could simultaneously
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Judgment rendered May 20, 2026. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,768-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
SHAQUILLE WONYAE Appellant BRADFORD
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 403,631
Honorable Christopher T. Victory, Judge
LOUISIANA APPEALS AND WRIT Counsel for Appellant SERVICE By: Remy V. Starns Summer Vicknair
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
COURTNEY N. RAY ALEXANDRA L. PORUBSKY Assistant District Attorneys
Before PITMAN, STONE, and STEPHENS, JJ. PITMAN, C. J.
Defendant Shaquille Wonyae Bradford was convicted by a jury of
aggravated second degree battery and then was adjudicated a second felony
offender. He was sentenced to 25 years at hard labor without benefit of
probation or suspension of sentence. Defendant appeals his conviction and
sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm with instructions.
FACTS
In September 2024, Defendant was charged with possession of a
firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a convicted felon, a violation of
La. R.S. 14:95.1, and aggravated second degree battery, a violation of La.
R.S. 14:34.7, in that he committed a battery with a dangerous weapon
inflicting serious bodily injury upon the person of Olivia Hill in August
2024 in Caddo Parish.
A jury trial was held at which the following evidence was adduced.
Officers with the Shreveport Police Department (“SPD”) were
dispatched to the 1800 block of Acorn Street on the night of August 15,
2024, in response to an assault with a firearm. Cpl. Roderick Carter testified
that he went to the scene around midnight and saw three houses
approximately ten feet apart from each other. When he arrived, the victim,
later identified as Olivia Hill, ran out of the house telling the police to hurry
and that “he was inside the house.” Cpl. Carter did not initially observe any
of Hill’s injuries but did see dark-colored stains, which appeared to be
blood, on her white shirt. Her attacker, later identified in open court as
Defendant, emerged from the house that Hill had just left and fled on foot.
Cpl. Carter observed the attacker holding a firearm in the air in his left hand as he ran away. Cpl. Carter and other officers gave chase and arrested
Defendant shortly thereafter.
Defendant did not have the firearm in his possession when he was
apprehended, so Cpl. Carter instructed other officers to search for it. A
firearm was located and seized as evidence by Officer Marquis Loveless,
who had also seen Hill run out of her house followed closely by Defendant,
who was holding the firearm in his left hand. The firearm was located along
the driveway between the houses at 1800 and 1804 Acorn Street.
Olivia Hill testified that Defendant had come to her house the night
before and asked her to have sex with him, which she refused. The next
night, she heard a commotion outside her father’s house; and, when she went
out, she saw Defendant pointing a gun at her brother. She stated she asked
what was going on, and Defendant asked her to light his cigarette. When
she obliged, he struck her on the back of the head with the gun and then hit
her in the face with it. She testified that the laceration on the back of her
head was deep, but she did not seek immediate medical attention beyond that
administered by the emergency medical technicians (“EMTs”) who were
called to the scene because she was afraid and because she did not want to
leave her wheelchair-bound father. She also testified that after the incident,
she began experiencing seizures and that a physician told her the seizures
resulted from the blow to her head.
Ofc. Loveless’ body-camera footage and still photographs taken from
it depict lacerations to the front and back of Hill’s head and face,
corroborating her initial statement to police and the trial testimony.
Ofc. Loveless described seeing deep, bleeding lacerations behind her left ear
and her cheekbone. 2 Sgt. John Madjerick, an expert in the field of fingerprint identification
and comparison, obtained Defendant’s fingerprints at trial and confirmed
that he was the same Shaquille Bradford previously convicted of possession
of Schedule II CDS, less than two grams, on July 3, 2019.
The jury found Defendant guilty of aggravated second degree battery
but acquitted him on the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon.
Defendant filed a motion in arrest of judgment and argued that the
acquittal on the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon
negated the finding that he had been convicted of aggravated second degree
battery while using the firearm. This motion was heard on the day of
sentencing and was denied.
A habitual offender bill was filed pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1, which
was based on the predicate crime of domestic abuse battery with child
endangerment, Docket No. 366478, Caddo Parish, to which Defendant pled
guilty on August 8, 2019. Defendant was sentenced to 18 months’ hard
labor suspended, 1 year active supervised probation, which was extended for
6 months on September 8, 2020. His probation ended March 8, 2021. After
the state provided proof of this prior conviction, Defendant was adjudicated
a second felony habitual offender
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted that the sentencing
range for aggravated second degree battery is a fine of not more than
$10,000 or imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for not more than
15 years, or both. As a second felony habitual offender, Defendant faced a
sentencing range of “not less than one-third the longest term and not more
3 than twice the longest terms prescribed for a first conviction,” or 5 to
30 years. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1).
The trial court reviewed all the sentencing factors in La. C. Cr. P.
art. 894.1 and found that Defendant had a lengthy criminal history, including
the conviction for domestic violence in 2019. It noted that the crime of
which he was convicted was a violent battery committed with a firearm. It
found him in need of correctional treatment and that a lesser sentence would
deprecate the seriousness of the crime. It found no mitigating factors.
Defendant was sentenced to 25 years at hard labor without benefit of
probation or suspension of sentence.1 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider
sentence, which was denied. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of
aggravated second degree battery because the state’s theory of prosecution
rested on the allegation that the dangerous weapon used was a firearm.
Defendant claims the jury expressly rejected that factual premise when it
acquitted him of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He argues
that the acquittal on that charge reflects that the state failed to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that he possessed or exercised control over the firearm
allegedly used in the battery offense. He also argues that the conviction
should be reversed because the state failed to prove an essential element of
the case. He also asserts that no rational juror could simultaneously
1 The minutes reflect that the sentence of 25 years is to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, but neither the aggravated battery statute nor the habitual offender statute carry a parole restriction. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). 4 conclude that he did not possess the firearm yet used that same firearm as a
dangerous weapon to commit an aggravated battery; and for these reasons,
the evidence was insufficient and the verdict is legally inconsistent and
should be reversed.
The state argues that Defendant’s acquittal on the charge of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon does not negate its case, which
proved his guilt of aggravated second degree battery beyond a reasonable
doubt. The jury evaluated the two charges individually, and all the elements
of aggravated second degree battery were proven, i.e., that he committed a
battery with a dangerous weapon while intentionally inflicting serious bodily
injury.
The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence
claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Hearold,
603 So. 2d 731 (La. 1992); State v. Smith, 47,983 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/15/13),
116 So. 3d 884. See also La. C. Cr. P. art. 821. The trier of fact makes
credibility determinations and may accept or reject the testimony of any
witness. State v. Casey, 99-0023 (La. 1/26/00), 775 So. 2d 1022, cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S. Ct. 104, 148 L. Ed. 2d 62 (2000). The
appellate court does not assess credibility or reweigh the evidence. State v.
Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442. A reviewing court accords
great deference to a jury’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of a
witness in whole or in part. State v. Gilliam, 36,118 (La. App. 2 Cir.
5 8/30/02), 827 So. 2d 508, writ denied, 02-3090 (La. 11/14/03), 858 So. 2d
422.
Aggravated second degree battery is a battery committed with a
dangerous weapon when the offender intentionally inflicts serious bodily
injury. La. R.S. 14:34.7(A). La. R.S. 14:2(A)(3) defines a dangerous
weapon as “any gas, liquid or other substance or instrumentality, which, in
the manner used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily
harm.” State v. Banks, 48,868 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/14), 134 So. 3d 1235,
1243, writ denied, 14-0671 (La. 12/8/14), 153 So. 3d 432.
Whether a weapon is dangerous is a factual question for the jury to
determine upon considering not only the character of the weapon, but by
whom, upon whom and in what manner it was used. State v. McClure,
34,880 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/22/01), 793 So. 2d 454. The term “dangerous
weapon” is not limited to those instrumentalities which are inherently
dangerous but includes any instrumentality “which in the manner used, is
calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm.” Id., quoting La.
R.S. 14:2(A)(3).
Serious bodily injury is defined as injury which involves, inter alia,
extreme physical pain or protracted and obvious disfigurement. La.
R.S. 14:34.7; State v. Sullivan, 49,183 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/13/14), 146 So. 3d
952. The injuries inflicted need not be permanent. Id.
Hill testified that Defendant hit her in the back of the head and in the
face with the gun he was holding in his hand. Although he did not fire the
gun, it still constituted a dangerous weapon calculated to produce great
bodily harm and caused deep lacerations to her head, both behind her ear
and to her cheekbone, resulting in extreme physical pain. Her decision not 6 to seek further medical attention that night beyond that provided by the
EMTs does not indicate the lack of a serious injury. She ultimately did seek
further attention and was told the occurrence of seizures after the incident
could be attributed to the battery. The responding police officer witnessed
blood on her white shirt and later saw the lacerations. The evidence
sufficiently proves each element of the crime of aggravated second degree
battery. This assignment of error is without merit.
Consistency of the Verdict
Defendant contends that the jury’s verdict is inconsistent because it
acquitted him on the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon
but found him guilty of aggravated second degree battery. The elements of
each crime are different, and a reasonable jury could listen to the evidence
presented and reach the conclusion that Defendant struck Hill with a gun, a
dangerous weapon he held in his hand, and still find the state failed to prove
he was a felon in possession of a firearm. For this reason, this assignment of
error is without merit.
Excessive Sentence
Defendant argues that the sentence of 25 years at hard labor, near the
maximum allowed, is excessive under the circumstances of this case.
Because Defendant was charged with being a second felony offender, he
faced a sentencing range of 5 to 30 years after conviction of aggravated
second degree battery and as a habitual offender. Defendant claims the trial
court did not accurately articulate the aggravating factors and failed to
meaningfully consider mitigating circumstances or justify why such a
lengthy sentence was necessary. Given the facts of the offense and his
criminal history, he argues the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the 7 offense and represents an abuse of discretion. He contends that the
excessive sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of
punishment and is a purposeless imposition of pain and suffering.
The state argues that the sentence was entirely appropriate for the
crime of which Defendant was found guilty and as enhanced by virtue of his
status as a habitual offender. It contends that Defendant has persistently
engaged in violent criminal acts and flouted police intervention his entire
adult life. He has not understood the seriousness of his crimes, and the trial
court did not believe he would in the future. The state contends that the trial
court did not impose the sentence in an arbitrary or capricious manner, and it
does not shock the conscience.
When reviewing an excessive sentence claim, the appellate court uses
a two-prong test. First, the trial record must demonstrate that the trial court
complied with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial court is not required to list
every aggravating and mitigating circumstance, but the record must reflect
that the trial court adequately considered the guidelines of La. C. Cr. P.
art. 894.1. State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. Banks, supra.
The trial court should consider the defendant’s personal history and prior
criminal record, the seriousness of the offense, the likelihood that the
defendant will commit another crime and the defendant’s potential for
rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1981). The trial court is
not required to assign any particular weight to any specific matters at
sentencing. State v. Quiambao, 36,587 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/11/02),
833 So. 2d 1103, writ denied, 03-0477 (La. 5/16/03), 843 So. 2d 1130.
When the record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the sentence
imposed, remand is unnecessary, even where there has not been full 8 compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State v. Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475
(La. 1982); State v. Banks, supra.
Second, the appellate court must determine if the sentence is
constitutionally excessive. A sentence is excessive and violates La. Const.
art. 1, § 20, if it is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime or is
nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering. State v. Bonanno, 384 So. 2d 355 (La. 1980); State v. Banks,
supra. A sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and
punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the
sense of justice. Id. A trial court has wide discretion in imposing a sentence
within the statutory limits, and a sentence should not be set aside absent a
showing of abuse of discretion. Id.
Whoever commits the crime of aggravated second degree battery shall
be fined not more than ten thousand dollars or imprisoned, with or without
hard labor, for not more than 15 years, or both. La. R.S. 14:34.7(C). La.
R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1) provides that the sentencing range for habitual offenses
is “not less than one-third the longest term and not more than twice the
longest terms prescribed for a first conviction,” or 5 to 30 years in this case.
The trial court adequately addressed all issues related to La. C. Cr. P.
art. 894.1 and found that Defendant had a lengthy history of engaging in
violence against women and children. It noted that Defendant did not seem
to understand the seriousness of his crimes and that he needed to be
incarcerated to prevent further bad actions. It could not find any mitigating
factors which would warrant consideration; and, thus, it exercised its
discretion in sentencing Defendant to 25 years at hard labor. We do not find
this sentence excessive. This assignment of error is without merit. 9 Error Patent
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to
25 years at hard labor “without the benefit of probation or suspension of
sentence.” However, the minutes state his sentence was to be served without
benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Consequently, we
order that the trial court minutes be amended to reflect that the sentence was
imposed without any restriction on parole eligibility.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the conviction and sentence
of Defendant Shaquille Wonyae Bradford.
AFFIRMED, WITH INSTRUCTIONS FOR CORRECTION OF
MINUTES.