Judgment rendered August 27, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,408-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
Versus
SELMA THOMAS MANGHAM Appellant
Appealed from the Thirty-Ninth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Red River, Louisiana Trial Court No. 141,615
Honorable James H. Boddie, Jr., Ad Hoc, Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Christopher A. Aberle
JULIE C. JONES Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
R. BENNETT LANGFORD, III Assistant District Attorney
Before STEPHENS, THOMPSON, and MARCOTTE, JJ. STEPHENS, J.,
This criminal appeal arises from the 39th Judicial District, Parish of
Red River, State of Louisiana, the Honorable James H. Boddie, Jr., Judge,
presiding ad hoc. On August 2, 2024, a unanimous jury convicted the
defendant, Selma Thomas Mangham (“Mangham”), of sexual battery of a
victim under the age of thirteen, a violation of La. R.S. 14:43.1(A)(2) and
(C)(2); molestation of a juvenile under the age of thirteen, a violation of La.
R.S. 14:81.2(A)(1) and (D)(1); and indecent behavior with a juvenile under
the age of thirteen, a violation of La. R.S. 14:81(H)(2). The trial court
sentenced Mangham to a total of 30 years on the three convictions without
the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, with credit for
time served. Mangham appeals, urging that his trial counsel failed to request
a downward departure from the mandatory minimum sentences, and his
sentence is excessive under the circumstances. For the reasons stated below,
we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 18, 2021, the defendant, Selma Thomas Mangham, was
charged by bill of information (which was amended on July 31, 2024) with
sexual battery upon A.K., D.O.B. 10/27/2011, when the victim is under the
age of thirteen, molestation of a juvenile when the victim is under the age of
thirteen, and indecent behavior with a juvenile under the age of thirteen.
The State alleged that each crime took place between February 17, 2019, and
August 17, 2021. Facebook Messenger screenshots contained in the record
show that Katie Mangham, the mother of the minor children M.S. and S.P,
found out about Mangham touching the young girls and reported the incident
to the Red River Parish Sheriff’s Office. An arrest warrant was signed by a judge on August 12, 2021, and on August 13, 2021, Mangham was arrested.
Following investigation into the matter and Mangham’s arrest, the State
charged Mangham for the alleged acts he committed against A.K.1 On June
6, 2022, the State filed a notice that it intended to use evidence from other
crimes to prove Mangham’s propensity to engage in sexually assaultive
behavior and his lustful disposition towards children at Mangham’s trial.2
La. C.E. art. 412.2. A jury trial commenced on July 30, 2024.
Detective Darren Keel, an investigator with the Red River Parish
Sheriff’s Office, testified that he was involved in the investigation into the
claims against Mangham. At the time of this investigation, there were two
alleged victims, M.S. and S.P. Following the victims’ interviews at the
Gingerbread House, Mangham was arrested on August 13, 2021. After
Mangham’s arrest and interview with the officers, another victim, K.C.,
came forward. K.C. then participated in an interview at the Gingerbread
House. Thereafter, two more victims came forward, I.K. and A.K., and they
were interviewed at the Gingerbread House as well.
Jordan Hughes, a forensic interviewer at the Gingerbread House,
testified as an expert witness at trial. Ms. Hughes conducted interviews of
the victims involved in this matter. Ms. Hughes testified that A.K. was nine
years old at the time of the interview, and I.K. was ten years old. Although
I.K. initially was not willing to talk, I.K. eventually revealed that she had
been touched by Mangham or “Poppa.” On the same day, Ms. Hughes
1 Notwithstanding allegations against Mangham involving other young girls, the bill of information indicates that Mangham was charged with instances only relating to A.K. 2 While Mangham was only charged with instances related to A.K., the State introduced into evidence the Gingerbread House interviews of M.S., S.P., K.C., and I.K.; these children also testified at trial. 2 interviewed I.K.’s sister, A.K., who was more receptive to speaking with the
interviewer. Ms. Hughes testified that she also interviewed M.S., S.P., and
K.C.
During her interviews with M.S. and S.P., both children made
disclosures to Ms. Hughes. M.S. indicated that Mangham touched her
private part on top of and under her clothes. Ms. Hughes testified that M.S.
demonstrated the touching. Similarly, S.P. disclosed that Mangham touched
her lower stomach, breast, and private part areas on top of and under her
clothes. Ms. Hughes indicated to the court that during K.C.’s interview, the
child was nervous but ultimately made a disclosure to Ms. Hughes,
indicating that Mangham or “Poppa Tom” tried to take K.C.’s clothes off
more than one time. K.C. also told Ms. Hughes that Mangham touched her
private area by rubbing his finger all through her parts. Ultimately, Ms.
Hughes testified that the statements given by the children were, in her
opinion, consistent.
A.K. testified at trial, and she watched her Gingerbread House
interview in court. She indicated that she remembered the interview, she
told the truth, and she added that she had told her MawMaw that Mangham
had showed her his private parts. However, A.K. stated that MawMaw did
not believe her and told her that she should not say things like that because
Mangham could get in trouble. A.K. testified that she would go to
Mangham’s house three to four times a week, and every time she was there
Mangham would touch her when she was near him or sitting next to him on
his armchair. A.K. stated that the touching began when she was around
seven years old and stopped when she was about nine years old. When A.K.
would ask Mangham to stop, A.K. testified that he would apologize but then 3 start again after a little bit. A.K. told the court that Mangham would cover
them with a blanket when the touching occurred. She also relayed an
instance where Mangham removed the blanket and showed A.K. his private
parts while smiling at her.
M.S., A.K. and I.K.’s cousin, also testified at trial, watched her
Gingerbread House interview, and indicated that she remembered the video
and that everything she said during the interview was true. M.S. stated that
she would go to Mangham’s house multiple times a week, and he would
touch her while they were in his armchair with a blanket covering them. She
relayed the instances when Mangham touched her under her clothes, and she
indicated that she was scared when he touched her and that it would hurt.
Similarly, S.P., M.S.’s sister and A.K. and I.K.’s cousin, testified at
trial and communicated that everything she said in her Gingerbread House
interview was true. S.P. indicated that she went to Mangham’s house almost
every weekend, and he would touch her most weekends for about two years.
She testified that the touching would occur when she sat with him in his
chair. S.P. stated that she did not like it at all when Mangham touched her
and that it made her very uncomfortable.
K.C., 15 years old at the time of trial, testified that everything she said
in her Gingerbread House interview was true. K.C. stated that Mangham
threatened her a lot, stating that she would not be coming home for dinner,
and she indicated that Mangham threatened to shoot her with his gun a lot of
times. K.C. testified that she would go to Mangham’s house about twice a
month, and he would try to touch her and pull her pants down during those
visits. This went on for about two years, according to K.C. She stated that
she would be terrified each time. 4 Lastly, I.K. testified at trial and indicated that everything she said in
her Gingerbread House interview and wrote down in the interview was true.
I.K. stated that she and her sister, A.K., would visit Mangham’s house on
weekends and holidays. Almost every time she went to Mangham’s house,
he would touch her while they sat in the armchair together. She testified that
she did not like when Mangham would touch her, but she would continue to
sit with him when he asked because she was worried her parents would get
mad at her for declining Mangham’s offer to sit with him.
Brenda Mangham, Mangham’s wife, testified at trial that she and
Mangham have been married for 53 years and have three children together.
Apart from their three children, Ms. Mangham indicated that she and her
husband have raised 68 children over the years. None of the children,
according to Ms. Mangham, complained that Mangham was inappropriate
towards them. She testified that Mangham was a modest person and
instructed children on numerous occasions to put clothes on if he felt they
were dressed immodestly. Ms. Mangham stated that the grandchildren
would sit on the arms of Mangham’s chair and never on his lap due to the
size of his belly and sensitive spots on his legs. She also denied ever having
a conversation with A.K. about Mangham exposing himself to her.
Following testimony from friends and family of Mangham about his
reputation in the community as an honest person and his treatment of
children, the State and the defense made their closing arguments, and the
trial court gave the jury instructions. Ultimately, on August 2, 2024, the jury
unanimously voted to convict Mangham as charged on all three counts.
Mangham filed a motion for new trial and a motion for post-verdict
judgment of acquittal on October 7, 2024. 5 At the hearing held on October 10, 2024, the trial court denied
Mangham’s motions for new trial and post-verdict judgment of acquittal.
During the sentencing portion of the hearing, the trial court emphasized that
the legislature deems the crimes for which Mangham was found guilty to be
heinous and egregious offenses and noted that Mangham’s counsel, being
able and capable, had explained the range of sentencing for the crimes. The
trial court stated that Mangham took away the innocence of the young girls
involved in the trial and found all the girls who testified to be credible. It
noted one mitigating factor, which was that Mangham was a first felony
offender.3 The trial court then sentenced Mangham to 25 years at hard labor
to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of
sentence on count one, sexual battery on a victim under the age of thirteen.
For the crime of molestation of a juvenile under the age of thirteen, the trial
court imposed a 25-year-hard labor sentence without the benefit of
probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The trial court ordered that
these two sentences be served concurrently “with the exception of five years
of that sentence.” Regarding count three, indecent behavior with juveniles,
the trial court sentenced Mangham to ten years at hard labor, to be served
without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. In total,
the trial court stated that Mangham would have a 30-year-sentence with
credit for time served. Mangham filed the instant appeal.
3 There was a PSI in this matter; the transcript reflects the trial court’s instructions that the PSI be filed into and made a part of the record.
6 DISCUSSION
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In his first assignment of error, Mangham claims that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to request a downward departure from the
mandatory minimum sentences due to Mangham’s advanced age and health
problems. Similarly, Mangham maintains that his attorney failed to file a
motion to reconsider the sentences and raise the issue that they are excessive
under the circumstances. Mangham argues that there was no strategic
reason for his trial counsel not to request a downward departure or file a
motion to reconsider sentence. This performance was deficient, according to
Mangham, which resulted in prejudice towards Mangham because this
failure prevented the trial court from reviewing whether Mangham was
“exceptional” and/or whether his circumstances warranted a departure from
the mandatory minimum sentence. Mangham also maintains that he was
prejudiced by his trial attorney’s failure to preserve the issue of
excessiveness for appeal.
In reply, the State articulates that Mangham must first show that his
attorney’s performance was deficient, and second, that this deficiency
prejudiced the outcome of the case. The State maintains that counsel’s
failure to request a downward departure does not equate to deficient
performance. Furthermore, the State contends that there is no reasonable
probability that Mangham’s sentence would have been different had trial
counsel filed a motion to reconsider sentence or requested a downward
departure. Even if this Court finds that trial counsel’s decision to not request
a downward deviation amounted to deficient performance, the State urges
7 that Mangham still failed to make any showing that such performance
prejudiced the outcome of the case.
The Supreme Court set out the two-prong test for a defendant
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984): that counsel’s
performance was deficient; and the deficiency prejudiced his defense. State
v. Hilliard, 52,652 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/14/19), 278 So. 3d 1065, writ
denied, 19-01701 (La. 7/24/20), 299 So. 3d 68. Both the Louisiana and
federal constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant’s right to the effective
assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. Amend. VI; La. Const. art. I, § 13;
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963);
State v. Brooks, 94-2438 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 1333; State v. Bayles,
53,696 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/17/21), 329 So. 3d 1149. Under the standard for
ineffective assistance of counsel set out in Strickland v. Washington, supra,
adopted by Louisiana’s Supreme Court in State v. Washington, 491 So. 2d
1337 (La. 1986), a reviewing court must reverse a conviction if the
defendant establishes that counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and
counsel’s inadequate performance prejudiced the defendant to the extent that
the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict suspect. State v. Ball, 19-01674
(La. 11/24/20), 305 So. 3d 90; State v. Bayles, supra.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are more properly raised in
an application for post-conviction relief in the trial court because this
provides the opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing under La. C. Cr. P.
art. 930. State v. McGee, 18-1052 (La. 2/25/19), 264 So. 3d 445; State v.
Ward, 53,969, (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/30/21), 324 So. 3d 231. When the record 8 is sufficient, however, allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
may be resolved on direct appeal in the interest of judicial economy. Id.
To support his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective, Mangham
first claims that his counsel failed to request a downward departure from the
statutory minimum sentence and that a downward departure is warranted due
to his age and health. A defendant may attempt to rebut the presumption
that a mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional, but he must “clearly
and convincingly show that he is exceptional which in this context means
that because of unusual circumstances this defendant is a victim of the
legislature’s failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the
culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances
of the case.” State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So. 2d 672, 676,
citing State v. Young, 94-1636, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/26/95), 663 So.
2d 525, 528 (Plotkin, J., concurring), writ denied, 95-3010 (La. 3/22/96),
669 So. 2d 1223; State v. Parker, 54,947 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/1/23), 358 So.
3d 220, writ denied, 23-00417 (La. 10/3/23), 370 So. 3d 1073; State v.
Combs, 56,232 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/9/25), 410 So. 3d 405.
Next, Mangham argues that his counsel was ineffective by failing to
file a motion to reconsider sentence. However, the mere failure to file a
motion to reconsider is not, in and of itself, error. A basis for ineffective
assistance of counsel may be found only if a defendant can show a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, his sentence would have
been different. State v. Jackson, 52,606 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So.
3d 1217, writ denied, 19-00699 (La. 10/15/19), 280 So. 3d 560, and writ
denied, 19-00797 (La. 1/28/20), 291 So. 3d 1056.
9 Mangham must establish that his trial counsel’s performance was
deficient, and this deficiency prejudiced his defense. Mangham claims that
his counsel’s failure to request a downward departure from the minimum
sentence was deficient and precluded the trial court from considering
Mangham’s age and health, as well as the legislature’s failure to assign
sentences which contemplate that some elderly people experience dramatic
changes in behavior and are thus less culpable than they would be otherwise.
Mangham claims that this preclusion resulted in prejudice to him, which
continued as his counsel failed to preserve the issues of excessiveness for
appeal by not filing a motion to reconsider Mangham’s sentences. We
disagree.
Mangham’s argument is full of sound and fury, signifying nothing as
it relates to his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Despite
Mangham’s claims, nothing in the record supports a finding that trial
counsel’s performance was deficient. Following the jury’s verdict,
Mangham’s attorney filed motions for new trial and post-verdict judgment
of acquittal, arguing on behalf of his client that the evidence presented at
trial failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mangham committed the
alleged crimes. The trial court at the sentencing hearing even acknowledged
counsel’s performance by stating that Mangham was represented by an
“abled and capable” attorney.
Likewise, the trial court clearly considered Mangham’s age during
sentencing. The court noted that Mangham was a 73-year-old first felony
offender with no prior criminal record. The court said that it found the
evidence to be overwhelming in this case, and opined that the legislature
deemed the crimes to be heinous and egregious offenses due to the penalties 10 associated with each crime. The trial court ultimately ordered the minimum
sentences (25 years) for counts one and two and ordered that the sentences
be served concurrently. The trial court’s decision to order concurrent
minimum sentences for both counts indicates that it considered the totality of
Mangham’s circumstances, including his age. Nothing supports Mangham’s
contention that a request for a downward departure from the statutory
minimum would have changed Mangham’s sentence. Furthermore,
Mangham’s claims that the legislature failed to contemplate elderly people’s
changes in behavior and culpability is unsupported.
Lastly, Mangham is unable to show a reasonable probability that his
sentence would have been different if his trial counsel had filed a motion to
reconsider sentence. Given the trial court’s detailed reasoning at the
sentencing hearing, it is highly unlikely that Mangham’s sentence would
have been different, especially considering he was already ordered to serve
the minimum sentences for counts one and two, and each sentence was
ordered to run concurrently. Ultimately, Mangham has failed to meet the
Strickland standard as he could not establish that his counsel’s performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms, and that his attorney’s inadequate performance
prejudiced the defendant to the extent that the trial was rendered unfair and
the verdict suspect. For these reasons, Mangham’s first assignment of error
is without merit.
Excessive Sentence
In his second assignment of error, Mangham asserts that his sentences
are excessive under the circumstances as they amount to a virtual life
sentence considering his advanced age and health. Alternatively, he urges 11 that, if this Court determines its review of Mangham’s excessive sentence
claim is limited to a bare claim of constitutional excessiveness, this Court
should set his sentences aside and remand this case for resentencing as the
sentences are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offenses and
shocking to the sense of justice due to Mangham’s age and health and the
fact that he is a first felony offender.
On the other hand, the State asserts that Mangham’s sentences for his
three offenses involving a juvenile under the age 13 are not excessive under
the circumstances. Although Mangham argues that his 30-year sentence is a
“virtual” life sentence, the State maintains that any defendant charged with
these offenses faces the possibility of a “virtual” life sentence given that the
maximum sentence is 99 years. The State urges that the legislature clearly
contemplated the possibility of “virtual” life sentences in drafting the
sentencing provisions.
Because we have determined that the failure to file a motion to
reconsider sentence was not considered ineffective assistance on behalf of
Mangham’s trial counsel, our review is limited to the bare claim of
constitutional excessiveness. State v. Mims, 619 So. 2d 1059 (La. 1993);
State v. Passaniti, 49,075 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/27/14), 144 So. 3d 1220, writ
denied, 14-1612 (La. 3/6/15), 161 So. 3d 14; State v. Smith, 46,343 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 6/22/11), 71 So. 3d 485, writ denied, 11-1646 (La. 1/13/12), 77
So. 3d 950. Under constitutional review, a sentence can be excessive, even
when it falls within statutory guidelines, if the punishment is so grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime that it shocks the sense of
justice and serves no purpose other than to inflict pain and suffering. State
v. Anderson, 55,550 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/24), 383 So. 3d 1081, writ denied, 12 24-00779 (La. 10/23/24), 395 So. 3d 249, cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1473, 221
L. Ed. 2d 586 (2025); State v. Smith, 01-2574 (La. 1/14/03), 839 So. 2d 1.
The relevant provisions are:
• Whoever commits the crime of sexual battery on a victim under the age of thirteen years when the offender is seventeen years of age or older shall be punished by imprisonment at hard labor for not less than twenty-five years nor more than ninety-nine years. At least twenty-five years of the sentence imposed shall be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:43.1(C)(2).
• Whoever commits the crime of molestation of a juvenile when the victim is under the age of thirteen years shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than twenty-five years nor more than ninety-nine years. At least twenty-five years of the sentence imposed shall be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:81.2(D)(1).
• Whoever commits the crime of indecent behavior with juveniles on a victim under the age of thirteen when the offender is seventeen years of age or older, shall be punished by imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two nor more than twenty-five years. At least two years of the sentence imposed shall be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:81(H)(2).
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered a 25-year sentence at
hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for
the conviction of sexual battery on a victim under the age of thirteen years
old. For the conviction of molestation of a juvenile, the court stated that
Mangham would be imprisoned for 25 years at hard labor without the
benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The court then stated
that these sentences were to be served “concurrently with the exception of
five years of that sentence.” The court then ordered a ten-year sentence at
hard labor without probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for
Mangham’s indecent behavior with a juvenile, and the court stated that the
13 ten-year sentence would be served concurrently. The trial court concluded
the order by stating, “You have a total of 30 years to serve without the
benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.”
While we acknowledge that the verbiage used by the trial court
relating to the 25-year sentencing in count two is unclear, the trial court’s
statement that Mangham was to serve a total of 30 years at hard labor
without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence resolves
any uncertainty about Mangham’s sentence. We agree with the trial court’s
assessment that Mangham took away the young victim’s innocence and
inflicted emotional trauma on not only the victim in this case, but the other
young girls who testified at trial. Considering the potential sentencing
exposure as well as the facts and evidence presented at trial, Mangham’s 30-
year sentence is neither grossly disproportionate to the severity of his crimes
nor shocking to our sense of justice. Consequently, Mangham’s second
assignment of error is without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the convictions and sentences of the
defendant, Selma Thomas Mangham, are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.