State of Louisiana v. Ronnie Glenn Milstead

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: April 5, 2023
• Docket: 54,952-KA
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered April 5, 2023. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.

No. 54,952-KA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

RONNIE GLENN MILSTEAD Appellant

Appealed from the Eighth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Winn, Louisiana Trial Court No. 44919

Honorable Anastasia Stacy Winn, Judge

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Peggy J. Sullivan

RICHARD CHRISTOPHER NEVILS Counsel for Appellee District Attorney

STEVEN D. CREWS COLE B. SMITH Assistant District Attorneys

Before STONE, ROBINSON, and HUNTER, JJ. STONE, J.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This criminal appeal arises from the Eighth Judicial District Court, the

Honorable Anastasia Wiley presiding. The defendant-appellant, Ronnie G.

Milstead (“Milstead”), was caught on video having sex with a dog that lived

in his household. After a jury trial, he was convicted of one count of sexual

abuse of an animal in violation of La. R.S. 14:89.3 and was sentenced the

maximum term allowed under that statute – five years of incarceration. The

trial court ordered that the sentence be served without hard labor. At

sentencing, the trial court indicated that it had studied the presentence

investigation report, and specifically noted that there were the following

additional charges pending against Milstead: (1) first-degree rape (victim

under 13 years of age); and (2) crime against nature (sexual intercourse with

a close biological relative). The trial court also noted that the canine victim

was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance. In this appeal,

Milstead asserts that his maximum-length sentence is constitutionally

excessive.

DISCUSSION

La. R.S. 14:89.3(D)(1)(A), the penalty provision under which

Milstead was sentenced, states:

[W]hoever commits the offense of sexual abuse of an animal shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars, imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than five years, or both.

An excessive sentence claim is reviewed by examining whether the

trial court adequately considered the guidelines established in La. C. Cr. P.

art. 894.1, and whether the sentence is constitutionally excessive. State v. Vanhorn, 52,583 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 357, writ denied, 19-

00745 (La. 11/19/19), 282 So. 3d 1065; State v. Wing, 51,857 (La. App. 2

Cir. 2/28/18), 246 So. 3d 711. First, the record must show that the trial

court took cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The

articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of La. C. Cr. P. art.

894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. The trial

court is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance so

long as the record reflects that it adequately considered the guidelines of the

article. State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. Croskey, 53,505

(La. App. 2 Cir. 5/20/20), 296 So. 3d 1151. The important elements which

should be considered are the defendant’s personal history (age, family ties,

marital status, health, and employment record), prior criminal record,

seriousness of offense, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones,

398 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1981); Croskey, supra. There is no requirement that

specific matters be given any particular weight at sentencing. Croskey,

supra.

Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is

constitutionally excessive. Id. Constitutional review turns upon whether

the sentence is illegal, grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense,

or shocking to the sense of justice. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20

if it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing

more than the purposeless infliction of pain and suffering. A sentence is

grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in

light of the harm to society, it shocks the sense of justice. Id.; State v. Baker,

51,933 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/11/18), 247 So. 3d 990, writ denied, 18-0858 (La.

2 12/3/18), 257 So. 3d 195, and writ denied, 18-0833 (La. 12/3/18), 257 So. 3d

196.

The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within the statutory limits, and sentences should not be set aside as

excessive in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. Vanhorn, supra. A

trial judge is in the best position to consider the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances of a particular case, and, therefore, is given broad discretion

in sentencing. Croskey, supra. Absent specific authority, it is not the role of

an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court

as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence. Vanhorn, supra.

As a general rule, maximum sentences are appropriate in cases

involving the most serious violation of the law and the worst type of

offender. State v. Jarrett, 37, 928 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/10/03), 862 So.2d 440.

It is well established that the sentencing court may consider other

charges pending against the defendant at the time of sentencing. La. C.Cr.P.

art. 875; State v. Hatter, 338 So. 2d 100 (La. 1976) (“[I]t is clear that a trial

judge may consider evidence of other offenses in determining sentence”);

State v. Anderson, 30,060 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/29/97), 702 So.2d 40 (“For

purposes of sentencing, the court may draw from sources beyond mere

convictions…The court may consider prior arrests, and suspicions of

criminal activity without actual proof the defendant committed the other

offenses”). Recently, in State v. Dale, 53,736 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 309

So. 3d 1031, this court stated:

In selecting a proper sentence for a criminal defendant, a trial judge is not limited to considering only prior convictions and may review all evidence of prior criminal activity. When evaluating a defendant’s criminal history,

3 trial courts may consider evidence at sentencing that would otherwise be inadmissible at trial. For example, the trial court may consider records of prior arrests, hearsay evidence of suspected criminal activity, conviction records, and evidence of uncharged offenses or offenses that were nolle prossed. (Internal citations omitted).

State v. Dale, supra, at n.3.

The defendant’s maximum sentence is within constitutional bounds

and is supported by the record. The record reflects that the trial court

adequately considered the La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 sentencing factors. The

trial court, in sentencing Milstead for having sexual intercourse with a dog,

was entitled to place substantial weight on Milstead’s pending charges of

first degree rape and crime against nature. These other charges support a

finding that Milstead is the worst type of offender—a pervert among

perverts— for purposes of sentencing in this case. Milstead’s assignment of

error lacks merit and is rejected.

CONCLUSION

Ronnie Glenn Milstead’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.