State of Louisiana v. Rickarin Johnson

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: April 9, 2025
• Docket: 56,143-KW 56,144-KW 56,145-KW 56,146-KW 56,147-KW 56,148-KW 56,149-KW (Consolidated Cases)
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered April 9, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,143-KW No. 56,144-KW No. 56,145-KW No. 56,146-KW No. 56,147-KW No. 56,148-KW No. 56,149-KW (Consolidated Cases)

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Respondent

versus

RICKARIN ARSHALL JOHNSON Applicant

On Application for Writs from the Third Judicial District Court for the Parish of Lincoln, Louisiana Trial Court Nos. 74,372; 74,404; 74,420; 74,437; 74,438; 76,665; 79,318

Honorable Thomas W. Rogers, Judge

JOHN D. AND ERIC G. JOHNSON FIRM Counsel for Applicant By: Eric G. Johnson Rachel W. Bays

JOHN F.K. BELTON Counsel for Respondent District Attorney

SARAH E. WILKERSON Assistant District Attorney

Before STONE, STEPHENS, and ELLENDER, JJ. ELLENDER, J.

Rickarin Johnson (“Johnson”) sought supervisory review of the trial

court’s denial of his pretrial motion to enforce a plea agreement, and this

court granted his writ application to docket for a more detailed review. We

now recall the writ, deny, and affirm the trial court’s ruling.

FACTS

Johnson is charged with second degree murder, two counts of

possession with intent to distribute a schedule I controlled dangerous

substance (marijuana and ecstasy), assault by drive-by shooting, a convicted

felon in possession of a firearm, public intimidation, simple criminal damage

to property, obscenity, and 10 counts of second degree rape. Johnson was

initially arrested on an outstanding warrant for second degree murder in

April 2020, and, since his arrest, he has been incarcerated at the Lincoln

Parish Detention Center.

In February 2024, the state read into the record a plea offer that, had

Johnson accepted it, would have resolved and disposed of all the above

charges, and resulted in a total sentence of 70 years at hard labor; he rejected

the offer. Trial was then set for July 22 on the charges of public intimidation

and obscenity, which are alleged to have occurred while Johnson was in

custody at the Lincoln Parish Detention Center on June 9, 2020, and

December 30, 2021, respectively. The remaining charges were not set for

trial, at least in part because of what appears to be the state’s inability to

procure discovery from law enforcement officers responsible for

investigating those remaining charges. On July 18, 2024, the state tendered a written plea offer to Johnson

containing the following proposed plea agreement: in exchange for

Johnson’s guilty plea to assault by drive-by shooting, public intimidation,

and obscenity, he would receive consecutive hard labor sentences of three

years, one year, and two years, respectively, for a total of six years at hard

labor; all of the remaining outstanding charges would be nolle prossed. At

the bottom of the written offer was the following: “Subject to change if

additional information is received. This offer may be withdrawn at any time

prior to a plea of guilty being entered.”

On July 19, Johnson’s counsel reviewed the plea offer with him.

Johnson dated, initialed, and signed the plea agreement and guilty plea forms

acknowledging the prescriptive period in which he could file for post

conviction relief, acknowledging the rights he would be waiving in pleading

guilty, and waiving a judicial determination of financial hardship and ability

to pay hearing. That same day, Johnson appeared in court to enter his guilty

plea and be sentenced. Despite Johnson’s appearance to plead guilty per the

state’s offer, the prosecution announced it was not ready to go forward at

that time as one of the case detectives was dissatisfied with the plea offer.

To give the state additional time to smooth things over with the investigating

officer, all parties agreed to continue the trial to September 30. As the state

assured Johnson and his counsel the offer was still “on the table,” Johnson

agreed to release the potential jurors summonsed for trial, and the trial date

of July 22 was maintained as a status conference date. It appears all parties

believed there would be no issue with Johnson reciting the agreed-upon plea

on the record on that date.

2 On July 22, the state withdrew its July 18 plea offer and, over the

defense’s objections, the trial court maintained the trial date of September

30, and set another pretrial hearing for August 20. At the pretrial hearing,

Johnson filed a motion to enforce the plea agreement, asking the trial court

to order the state to comply with the plea offer made on July 18 and accepted

by Johnson the following day. The motion was set for hearing on September

19. On that date, Johnson made an offer to the state to serve a 12-year

sentence, which the state agreed to consider. The hearing on the motion to

enforce was continued until the next day.

On September 20, the state made a counteroffer, informing Johnson

the lowest total sentence it could accept would be 40 years. Johnson

declined, and the hearing on Johnson’s motion to enforce went forward. The

state stipulated to the facts contained in Johnson’s motion, but contended

Johnson could not show he gave up any fundamental rights by relying

detrimentally on the July 18 plea offer, an essential element of enforcing the

bargain. The state noted Johnson did not give up the right to a jury trial, as

the trial by jury was reset by agreement for September. Johnson, on the

other hand, argued that in relying on the state’s plea offer, he had given up

the right to be tried on July 22, and he argued he never would have done so

had the state not assured him its plea offer was still available to him,

pointing out that he had been incarcerated pending trial for over four years at

that time.

The trial court denied Johnson’s motion, stating Johnson could have

objected to the continuance of his trial, but did not. Further, the trial court

held that because Johnson could have still rejected the July 18 plea offer at

3 any time prior to the entry of his guilty plea, no firm contract existed

between the state and Johnson as to the plea agreement. Johnson objected to

the ruling and requested a stay of the proceedings to seek supervisory

review. The trial court denied the request for a stay. Johnson filed a writ

application with this court, and that writ application was granted to docket.

DISCUSSION

Johnson argues the trial court erred in finding no contract existed

between himself and the state, and he contends a contract he relied upon to

his detriment was formed between the two. Johnson states he gave up his

right to be tried by a jury on July 22, based on the state’s representations to

him. Johnson asserts the state’s written plea offer and his signed plea forms

prove the requisite offer and acceptance to establish the existence of a

contract as well as his willingness to perform his part of the agreement. He

asks this court to enforce the July 18 plea agreement.

The state counters it was free to withdraw its plea offer at any time

before Johnson entered his guilty plea on the record, and it contends Johnson

cannot demand specific performance of the plea agreement unless he can

prove he detrimentally relied on the state’s offer, and in doing so,

relinquished a fundamental right, or he proves the state engaged in devious

practices. State v. Caminita, 411 So. 2d 13 (La. 1982). The state contends

because Johnson never entered his guilty plea, he failed to establish

detrimental reliance or that he relinquished a fundamental right. Both

parties agree the state did not engage in devious practices. The state argues

Johnson did not give up his fundamental right to trial by a jury as that right

does not entitle him to trial on a specific day with a jury chosen from a

4 specific pool of prospective jurors. The state points to Johnson’s agreement

to continue the trial, as well as the fact the offer had not been entered on the

record or approved by the trial court when it was withdrawn, as support for

its arguments.

A plea agreement is a contract between the state and a criminal

defendant. State v. Ward, 53,969 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/30/21), 324 So. 3d 231.

As such, in determining the validity of plea agreements, Louisiana courts

generally refer to rules of contract law, while recognizing at the same time

that a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to fairness may be broader

than his or her rights under contract law. State v. Young, 51,175 (La. App. 2

Cir. 2/15/17), 215 So. 3d 906, writ denied, 17-0472 (La. 11/13/17), 230 So.

3d 204, citing State v. Givens, 99-3518 (La. 1/17/01), 776 So. 2d 443. The

party demanding performance of a contract has the burden of proving its

existence. State v. Louis, 94-0761 (La. 11/30/94), 645 So. 2d 1144.

Contracts have the effect of law for the parties and must be performed

in good faith. La. C.C. art. 1983. A party has an implied obligation to make

a good faith effort to fulfill the conditions of a contract. Young, supra, citing

Bloom’s Inc. v. Performance Fuels, L.L.C., 44,259 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/1/09),

16 So. 3d 476, writ denied, 09-2003 (La. 11/20/09), 25 So. 3d 800. When

there are reciprocal obligations, the obligor of one may not be put in default

unless the obligor of the other has performed or is ready to perform his own

obligation. La. C.C. art. 1993. Also, a party to a commutative contract may

refuse to perform his obligation if the other has failed to perform. La. C.C.

art. 2022.

5 Absent any showing of detrimental reliance prejudicial to the

substantial rights of the accused, or evidence of devious practice by the

government such as bad-faith negotiation designed to psychologically probe

the defense or gain some other improper advantage, the government remains

free to withdraw from a plea agreement up to the time the plea is entered.

State v. Karey, 16-0377 (La. 6/29/17), 232 So. 3d 1186; Caminita, supra.

When a plea bargain is breached, the defendant has the options of

specific performance or to withdraw the guilty plea. State v. Bouwell,

45,635 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/22/10), 48 So. 3d 335; State v. Davis, 41,430 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 11/1/06), 942 So. 2d 652; State v. Byrnside, 34,948 (La. App. 2

Cir. 8/22/01), 795 So. 2d 435. A defendant may demand specific

performance of the state’s promise if he can show that the parties reached an

agreement, that he performed his part of the agreement, and that in doing so,

he relinquished a fundamental right. Ward, supra.

The state made a written offer to Johnson, he accepted the offer in

writing, and he appeared in court prepared and willing to enter his guilty

plea on the record under the terms outlined. Johnson argues he had a

fundamental right to be tried by jury on July 22, and he argues he never

would have agreed to release the jury venire had he been aware there was

even a possibility the state would withdraw its plea offer. However, the

terms of the agreement reached included not only the conditions of the plea

agreement, but also the state’s express reservation of its right to withdraw

the offer at any time prior to Johnson’s actual plea of guilty. The terms of

the agreement plainly allowed the state to withdraw its offer, regardless of

Johnson’s assertions to the contrary.

6 Even if the agreement reached had not included the state’s reservation

of its right to withdraw from the agreement, the controlling jurisprudence

protects the right of either party to withdraw from the plea agreement prior

to the entry of the agreed-upon guilty plea on the record. Karey, supra. For

Johnson to demand and obtain specific performance of the plea agreement,

his guilty plea would have to have been entered on the record, the trial court

would have to have approved the offer and accepted his plea as knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary, and he would have to show he was deprived of a

fundamental right when he relied to his detriment on the state’s plea offer.

Ward, supra. Johnson cannot prove he formally entered the agreed-upon

guilty plea on the record because he was not given the opportunity to do so.

Further, while Johnson does have the right to be tried by a jury, there is no

fundamental right to be tried by jurors selected from a specific jury venire or

on a specific date. While Johnson’s frustration is understandable, especially

in light of the state’s apparent inability to obtain cooperation from the

investigating officer(s) purported to be in possession of the outstanding

discovery that would presumably allow all of his cases to be tried, the record

in this case does not support Johnson’s arguments.

Johnson has been in jail pending trial since April 2020, with discovery

remaining incomplete for several charges which were not scheduled for trial

on July 22. It is evident that even if Johnson had gone to trial on July 22, the

charges of second degree murder, possession with intent to distribute, assault

by drive-by shooting, convicted felon in possession of a firearm, simple

criminal damage to property, and second degree rape would have remained

outstanding. Johnson would have remained in jail pending trial on those

7 charges even if he had exercised his right to be tried for public intimidation

and obscenity on July 22, making the continuance of his trial date immaterial

to his continued incarceration.

For the reasons stated above, we find Johnson’s assignments of error

to be without merit.

CONCLUSION

The writ previously issued is recalled and the application is denied.

The trial court’s ruling denying Johnson’s motion to enforce the plea

agreement reached on July 19, 2024, is affirmed.

WRIT RECALLED AND DENIED; RULING AFFIRMED.