Judgment rendered August 13, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
***** ON REMAND *****
No. 55,952-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
Versus
REGINALD RUFFINS Appellant
***** On Remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court
Originally Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 390,262
Honorable Donald Edgar Hathaway, Jr., Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Peggy J. Sullivan
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
JASON W. WALTMAN REBECCA A. EDWARDS COURTNEY RAY Assistant District Attorneys
Before STEPHENS, THOMPSON, and ELLENDER, JJ. STEPHENS, J.
This case is on remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court for this
Court to address two claims that were pretermitted by this Court previously.
See, State v. Ruffins, 24-01512 (La. 6/25/25), ___ So. 3d ___, 2025 WL
17878821 (which reversed and remanded this Court’s judgment in State v.
Ruffins, 55,952 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/20/24), 401 So. 3d 9032). For the reasons
set forth below, we affirm Ruffins’ convictions and 20-year sentence as a
habitual offender.
DISCUSSION
Admission of Other Crimes Evidence
Prior to Ruffins’ trial, the State filed a 404(B) notice informing the
defense of its intent to introduce evidence at trial of two prior offenses—the
defendant’s 2006 conviction for false personation of a peace officer and his
2016 conviction in Texas for impersonating a public servant. A hearing was
held on March 7, 2023, and the trial court found the other crimes evidence to
be admissible to establish motive, intent, plan, preparation, knowledge, and
absence of mistake or accident.
According to Ruffins, the trial court erred in allowing the introduction
of this other crimes evidence, as introduction of evidence of his prior
convictions did not satisfy one of the exceptions set forth for the admission
of other crimes evidence. Also, Ruffins received a first offender pardon for
the 2006 conviction, and the prejudicial effect significantly outweighed any
probative value of this evidence.
1 Attached hereto as” Exhibit A.” 2 Attached hereto as “Exhibit B.” On the other hand, the State argues that there was no abuse of the trial
court’s discretion in its determination that the evidence of the prior
convictions was admissible. The two prior convictions were relevant to
prove that Ruffins had the requisite specific intent to commit the crime as
well as his preparation, plan, motive, opportunity, and absence of mistake as
found by the trial court.
Applicable Legal Principles
Generally, courts may not admit evidence of other crimes to show the
defendant is a person of bad character who has acted in conformity with his
bad character. La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1); State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La.
1973). However, the State may introduce evidence of other crimes if the
prosecutor establishes an independent and relevant reason. La. C.E. art.
404(B)(1); State v. Miner, 17-1586, p. 1 (La. 1/14/18), 232 So. 3d 551, 552.
This evidence must have substantial relevance independent from showing
the defendant’s general criminal character in that it tends to prove a material
fact genuinely at issue. State v. Jones, 17-00658, p. 10 (La. 10/22/19), 285
So. 3d 1074, 1080; State v. Lee, 05-2098, p. 44 (La. 1/16/08), 976 So. 2d
109, 139, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 824, 129 S. Ct. 143, 172 L. Ed. 2d 93
(2008); State v. Moore, 440 So. 2d 134, 137 (La. 1983). The probative value
of the other crimes evidence must outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice.
La. C.E. art. 403.
A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of other crimes evidence will
not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Scales, 93-03 (La.
5/22/95), 655 So. 2d 1326, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1050, 116 S. Ct. 716, 133
L. Ed. 2d 670 (1996); State v. Caston, 43,565 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/24/08), 996
So. 2d 480. 2 Analysis
We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
the other crimes evidence in this case—a 2006 conviction for false
personation of a peace officer in Louisiana and a 2016 conviction in Texas
for impersonating a public servant—met the requirements of La. C.E. art.
404(B).
This evidence was relevant to prove a material fact at issue, i.e.,
whether Ruffins had the specific intent to intentionally impersonate a police
officer when he met with Ms. Kennedy in an attempt to obtain a security
contract with the Cooper Road Plaza Apartments. It further showed that the
defendant knew what he was doing in claiming to be an SPD officer,
wearing clothing and gear similar to that worn by police officers, and in
outfitting his vehicle with lights and other equipment that a police vehicle
would have. The prior convictions were also relevant to show preparation,
plan, motive, opportunity, and absence of mistake as found by the trial court.
This assignment of error is without merit.
Constitutionality of Habitual Offender Sentence
In his third assignment of error, while he acknowledges that he
received the mandatory minimum as a fourth felony offender, Ruffins asserts
that the trial court imposed an unconstitutionally harsh and excessive
sentence under the facts and circumstances of this case.
The State contends that, since Ruffins failed to file a motion to
reconsider sentence, on appeal, he is limited to a review for a bare claim of
constitutional excessiveness.
3 Applicable Legal Principles
When a defendant fails to make a motion to reconsider sentence, the
appellate court’s review of the sentence is limited to a bare claim of
constitutional excessiveness. State v. Cooksey, 53,660 (La. App. 2 Cir.
5/26/21), 316 So. 3d 1284, writ denied, 21-00901 (La. 10/12/21), 325 So. 3d
1074; State v. Benson, 53,578 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/10/20), 305 So. 3d 135.
Since the habitual offender law is constitutional in its entirety, the
minimum sentences it imposes upon recidivists are also presumed to be
constitutional. State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So. 2d 672; State
v. Miller, 54,897 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/11/23), 355 So. 3d 1165, writ denied, 23-
00200 (La. 12/5/23), 373 So. 3d 713; State v. Gay, 34,371 (La. App. 2 Cir.
4/4/01), 784 So. 2d 714. While the Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized
that courts have the power to declare a mandatory minimum sentence
excessive under La. Const. art. I, § 20, our highest court has cautioned that
this power should only be exercised in rare cases and only when the court is
firmly convinced that the minimum sentence is excessive. State v. Johnson,
supra at 676-77; State v. Boyd, 54,950 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/5/23), 360 So. 3d
1264; State v. Ponsell, 33,543 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/23/00),
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Judgment rendered August 13, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
***** ON REMAND *****
No. 55,952-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
Versus
REGINALD RUFFINS Appellant
***** On Remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court
Originally Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 390,262
Honorable Donald Edgar Hathaway, Jr., Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Peggy J. Sullivan
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
JASON W. WALTMAN REBECCA A. EDWARDS COURTNEY RAY Assistant District Attorneys
Before STEPHENS, THOMPSON, and ELLENDER, JJ. STEPHENS, J.
This case is on remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court for this
Court to address two claims that were pretermitted by this Court previously.
See, State v. Ruffins, 24-01512 (La. 6/25/25), ___ So. 3d ___, 2025 WL
17878821 (which reversed and remanded this Court’s judgment in State v.
Ruffins, 55,952 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/20/24), 401 So. 3d 9032). For the reasons
set forth below, we affirm Ruffins’ convictions and 20-year sentence as a
habitual offender.
DISCUSSION
Admission of Other Crimes Evidence
Prior to Ruffins’ trial, the State filed a 404(B) notice informing the
defense of its intent to introduce evidence at trial of two prior offenses—the
defendant’s 2006 conviction for false personation of a peace officer and his
2016 conviction in Texas for impersonating a public servant. A hearing was
held on March 7, 2023, and the trial court found the other crimes evidence to
be admissible to establish motive, intent, plan, preparation, knowledge, and
absence of mistake or accident.
According to Ruffins, the trial court erred in allowing the introduction
of this other crimes evidence, as introduction of evidence of his prior
convictions did not satisfy one of the exceptions set forth for the admission
of other crimes evidence. Also, Ruffins received a first offender pardon for
the 2006 conviction, and the prejudicial effect significantly outweighed any
probative value of this evidence.
1 Attached hereto as” Exhibit A.” 2 Attached hereto as “Exhibit B.” On the other hand, the State argues that there was no abuse of the trial
court’s discretion in its determination that the evidence of the prior
convictions was admissible. The two prior convictions were relevant to
prove that Ruffins had the requisite specific intent to commit the crime as
well as his preparation, plan, motive, opportunity, and absence of mistake as
found by the trial court.
Applicable Legal Principles
Generally, courts may not admit evidence of other crimes to show the
defendant is a person of bad character who has acted in conformity with his
bad character. La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1); State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La.
1973). However, the State may introduce evidence of other crimes if the
prosecutor establishes an independent and relevant reason. La. C.E. art.
404(B)(1); State v. Miner, 17-1586, p. 1 (La. 1/14/18), 232 So. 3d 551, 552.
This evidence must have substantial relevance independent from showing
the defendant’s general criminal character in that it tends to prove a material
fact genuinely at issue. State v. Jones, 17-00658, p. 10 (La. 10/22/19), 285
So. 3d 1074, 1080; State v. Lee, 05-2098, p. 44 (La. 1/16/08), 976 So. 2d
109, 139, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 824, 129 S. Ct. 143, 172 L. Ed. 2d 93
(2008); State v. Moore, 440 So. 2d 134, 137 (La. 1983). The probative value
of the other crimes evidence must outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice.
La. C.E. art. 403.
A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of other crimes evidence will
not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Scales, 93-03 (La.
5/22/95), 655 So. 2d 1326, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1050, 116 S. Ct. 716, 133
L. Ed. 2d 670 (1996); State v. Caston, 43,565 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/24/08), 996
So. 2d 480. 2 Analysis
We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
the other crimes evidence in this case—a 2006 conviction for false
personation of a peace officer in Louisiana and a 2016 conviction in Texas
for impersonating a public servant—met the requirements of La. C.E. art.
404(B).
This evidence was relevant to prove a material fact at issue, i.e.,
whether Ruffins had the specific intent to intentionally impersonate a police
officer when he met with Ms. Kennedy in an attempt to obtain a security
contract with the Cooper Road Plaza Apartments. It further showed that the
defendant knew what he was doing in claiming to be an SPD officer,
wearing clothing and gear similar to that worn by police officers, and in
outfitting his vehicle with lights and other equipment that a police vehicle
would have. The prior convictions were also relevant to show preparation,
plan, motive, opportunity, and absence of mistake as found by the trial court.
This assignment of error is without merit.
Constitutionality of Habitual Offender Sentence
In his third assignment of error, while he acknowledges that he
received the mandatory minimum as a fourth felony offender, Ruffins asserts
that the trial court imposed an unconstitutionally harsh and excessive
sentence under the facts and circumstances of this case.
The State contends that, since Ruffins failed to file a motion to
reconsider sentence, on appeal, he is limited to a review for a bare claim of
constitutional excessiveness.
3 Applicable Legal Principles
When a defendant fails to make a motion to reconsider sentence, the
appellate court’s review of the sentence is limited to a bare claim of
constitutional excessiveness. State v. Cooksey, 53,660 (La. App. 2 Cir.
5/26/21), 316 So. 3d 1284, writ denied, 21-00901 (La. 10/12/21), 325 So. 3d
1074; State v. Benson, 53,578 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/10/20), 305 So. 3d 135.
Since the habitual offender law is constitutional in its entirety, the
minimum sentences it imposes upon recidivists are also presumed to be
constitutional. State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So. 2d 672; State
v. Miller, 54,897 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/11/23), 355 So. 3d 1165, writ denied, 23-
00200 (La. 12/5/23), 373 So. 3d 713; State v. Gay, 34,371 (La. App. 2 Cir.
4/4/01), 784 So. 2d 714. While the Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized
that courts have the power to declare a mandatory minimum sentence
excessive under La. Const. art. I, § 20, our highest court has cautioned that
this power should only be exercised in rare cases and only when the court is
firmly convinced that the minimum sentence is excessive. State v. Johnson,
supra at 676-77; State v. Boyd, 54,950 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/5/23), 360 So. 3d
1264; State v. Ponsell, 33,543 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/23/00), 766 So. 2d 678, writ
denied, 00-2726 (La. 10/12/01), 799 So. 2d 490.
The burden is on the defendant to rebut the presumption that a
mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional. State v. Johnson, supra;
State v. Miller, supra; State v. Robbins, 43,240 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/4/08), 986
So. 2d 828, writ denied, 08-1438 (La. 2/20/09), 1 So. 3d 494. To do so, the
defendant must “clearly and convincingly show that he is exceptional which
in this context means that because of unusual circumstances this defendant is
a victim of the legislature’s failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully 4 tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the
circumstances of the case.” State v. Johnson, 709 So. 2d at p. 676, citing
State v. Young, 94-1636, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/26/95), 663 So. 2d 525,
528 (Plotkin, J., concurring), writ denied, 95-3010 (La. 3/22/96), 669 So. 2d
1223; State v. Miller, supra at p. 7, 355 So. 3d at 1173; State v. Fisher,
50,301, p. 5 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/30/15), 185 So. 3d 842, 845, writ denied, 16-
0228 (La. 2/3/17), 215 So. 3d 687; State v. Mead, 44,47, p. 7 (La. App. 2 Cir.
7/1/09), 16 So. 3d 470, 474, writ denied, 09-2065 (La. 4/9/10), 31 So. 3d
388. The court may not rely solely on the nonviolent nature of the instant or
past crimes as evidence to justify rebutting the presumption of
constitutionality. The lack of violence cannot be the only reason, or even the
major reason, for declaring such a sentence excessive. State v. Boyd, supra
at p. 14, 360 So. 3d at 1273.
Analysis
After reviewing this record, we find that Ruffins did not prove by
clear and convincing evidence any unusual circumstances which would
demonstrate that he is a victim of the legislature’s failure to assign sentences
meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the
offense, and the circumstances of the case. There was nothing in his
personal, social, or employment history (or this history considered in toto) to
warrant a deviation from the mandatory minimum sentence for a fourth
felony offender, notwithstanding the fact that this 20-year sentence was more
than ten times the maximum penalty provided for a person convicted of false
personation of a police officer (two years’ imprisonment at hard labor and
imposition of a fine of not more than $1,000). Furthermore, Ruffins’
criminal history warranted his adjudication as a fourth felony offender and 5 imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence. The disparity between the
sentence for false personation of a police officer and the mandatory
minimum sentence for a habitual offender is something that was considered
by the Louisiana Legislature when it fashioned the mandatory minimum and
maximum multiple offender sentences. It is not for this Court to usurp the
role of the legislature and make a downward departure from the sentencing
guidelines when there has not been the requisite particularized showing by
the defendant.
This 20-year sentence is not grossly disproportionate to the severity of
the offense or shocking to the sense of justice, considering that this is
Ruffins’ third conviction for the same type of conduct, and he has multiple
theft convictions, which provided the predicate offenses upon which his
habitual offender adjudication was based. This assignment of error is
without merit.
Error Patent Review
While technically not error patent, in its brief, the State has pointed
out that Ruffins’ sentence is illegally lenient because it does not include a
proper restriction of benefits as required by La. R.S. 14:529.1(G). A
defendant in a criminal case does not have a constitutional right or a
statutory right to an illegally lenient sentence. State v. Williams, 00-1725
(La. 11/28/01), 800 So. 2d 790. An illegally lenient sentence may be
corrected at any time by the court that imposed the sentence or by an
appellate court on review. La. C. Cr. P. art. 882(A).
However, when the trial court fails to order that a sentence be served
without benefits as statutorily mandated, the sentence will be automatically
served without benefits for the requisite time period. La. R.S. 15:301.1(A); 6 State v. Williams, 52,618 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 1241. As the
habitual offender statute mandates that the defendant’s sentence be served
without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, and the trial
court’s failure to declare that those sentences be served with restricted
benefits is harmless and self-correcting, this Court will take no further action
regarding this issue.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the convictions and sentence of the
defendant, Reginald Ruffins, are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.