NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
09-981
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
REGAL MINOR
**********
APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 05-K-5819-C HONORABLE ALONZO HARRIS, DISTRICT JUDGE
OSWALD A. DECUIR JUDGE
Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Oswald A. Decuir and Elizabeth A. Pickett, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
Earl B. Taylor District Attorney P. O. Drawer 1968 Opelousas, LA 70571 (337) 948-0551 Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee: State of Louisiana Jennifer Ardoin Assistant District Attorney P. O. Drawer 1968 Opelousas, LA 70571 (337) 948-0551 Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee: State of Louisiana
Annette Roach Louisiana Appellate Project P. O. Box 1747 Lake Charles, LA 70602-1747 (337) 436-2900 Counsel for Defendant/Appellant: Regal Minor DECUIR, Judge.
Defendant, Regal Minor, was charged with second degree battery, a violation
of La.R.S. 14:34.1. Defendant elected to have a bench trial, and the court found
Defendant guilty as charged and sentenced him to two and one-half years in parish
jail.
Defendant now appeals his conviction, assigning a single error.
FACTS
On December 2, 2005, the Defendant and another individual drove up, exited
their vehicle and attacked Mark Gillis in the front yard of his home beating him to the
ground. After the beating ceased, Gillis called 911. The responding officer advised
that he seek medical attention. Gillis presented to the ER with multiple contusions,
numbness in his head, headache, and pain in his ribs. Gillis also had to have blood
drained from a hematoma on his ear to avoid a potential deformity. Gillis testified
that he was in extreme pain and could not get out of bed for a week following the
attack.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
In his sole assignment of error, Defendant argues the evidence adduced at trial
does not support his conviction for second degree battery. The analysis for this type
of argument is well-established:
When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.
Second degree battery is defined by La.R.S. 14:34.1, which states, in pertinent
part:
Second degree battery is a battery committed without the consent of the victim when the offender intentionally inflicts serious bodily injury.
For purposes of this article, serious bodily injury means bodily injury which involves unconsciousness, extreme physical pain or protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty, or a substantial risk of death.
Defendant argues the State did not prove he had the specific intent to inflict
“serious bodily injury” upon the victim. He also appears to question whether the
victim actually suffered serious bodily injury. Regarding intent, we note that
Defendant and an accomplice knocked the victim to the ground and then continued
punching and kicking him. Such action has been recognized as indicative of a
specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury. See, e.g., State v. Robertson, 98-883
(La.App. 3 Cir. 12/9/98), 723 So.2d 500, writ denied, 99-658 (La. 6/25/99), 745
So.2d 1187; State v. Daigle, 439 So.2d 595 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1983). Also, Louisiana
courts have found specific intent in cases where larger men hit smaller men. See, e.g.,
State v. Accardo, 466 So.2d 549 (La.App. 5 Cir.), writ denied, 468 So.2d 1204
(La.1985). An attack in concert with other assailants is at least as dangerous as an
attack by a single large, strong man. Thus, the fact that Defendant acted in concert
2 with an accomplice should be viewed as indicative of a specific intent to inflict
serious bodily injury.
Regarding the degree of actual injury to the victim, Defendant correctly
observes he did not break any of Gillis’s bones, or cause permanent physical
disfigurement. He also argues that the victim’s claim to have suffered “extreme
physical pain” is not consistent with other evidence.
Photos of the victim show extensive bruising to the left side of his face, and to
his right ear. Dr. Mark Francis Olivier, the emergency room physician who treated
the victim, described the injuries as follows:
A. He has some injuries to his face and head.
Q. Okay. And did you examine him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did he have any complaints of pain at that time?
Q. Doctor, how did he describe the level of pain he was in?
A. Moderate.
Q. At that time it was moderate?
Q. What were the - how would you classify - what did you do to treat him?
A. Well, he had bruising and swelling in the left cheek area. He had a small laceration over the eye on the left which required some steri-strip placement. He had bruising and swelling in the back of the head. He had tenderness in the right side of the jaw. And he had a um - swelling of the right ear which was a hematoma which is a collection of blood under the skin of the ear above the cartilage. And the way that is treated is you have to drain the blood away to prevent destroying the cartilage in the future.
3 Q. So, Doctor, would you say if Mr. Gillis had not received the medical treatment that you provided to him as it pertains to his ear, what would have happened in your professional opinion?
A. If the hematoma is not drained then there is potential for deformity of the ear, the cartilage could die and you would end up with a deformed ear.
His testimony of cross-examination was similar. During redirect, the following
colloquy occurred:
Q. Doctor, before you treated Mr. Gillis for the hematoma, would you consider the hematoma a disfigurement of his ear? Did he have a disfigurement on his ear before you treated him?
A. He had a swelling [of] the ear above the cartilage which I would consider a disfigurement.
Q. And when you treated him for the hematoma that prevented the ear from being permanently disfigured. Would you say that that was to the highest degree of medical certainty that you know, that prevented a permanent disfigurement from staying there.
A. Right.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
09-981
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
REGAL MINOR
**********
APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 05-K-5819-C HONORABLE ALONZO HARRIS, DISTRICT JUDGE
OSWALD A. DECUIR JUDGE
Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Oswald A. Decuir and Elizabeth A. Pickett, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
Earl B. Taylor District Attorney P. O. Drawer 1968 Opelousas, LA 70571 (337) 948-0551 Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee: State of Louisiana Jennifer Ardoin Assistant District Attorney P. O. Drawer 1968 Opelousas, LA 70571 (337) 948-0551 Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee: State of Louisiana
Annette Roach Louisiana Appellate Project P. O. Box 1747 Lake Charles, LA 70602-1747 (337) 436-2900 Counsel for Defendant/Appellant: Regal Minor DECUIR, Judge.
Defendant, Regal Minor, was charged with second degree battery, a violation
of La.R.S. 14:34.1. Defendant elected to have a bench trial, and the court found
Defendant guilty as charged and sentenced him to two and one-half years in parish
jail.
Defendant now appeals his conviction, assigning a single error.
FACTS
On December 2, 2005, the Defendant and another individual drove up, exited
their vehicle and attacked Mark Gillis in the front yard of his home beating him to the
ground. After the beating ceased, Gillis called 911. The responding officer advised
that he seek medical attention. Gillis presented to the ER with multiple contusions,
numbness in his head, headache, and pain in his ribs. Gillis also had to have blood
drained from a hematoma on his ear to avoid a potential deformity. Gillis testified
that he was in extreme pain and could not get out of bed for a week following the
attack.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
In his sole assignment of error, Defendant argues the evidence adduced at trial
does not support his conviction for second degree battery. The analysis for this type
of argument is well-established:
When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.
Second degree battery is defined by La.R.S. 14:34.1, which states, in pertinent
part:
Second degree battery is a battery committed without the consent of the victim when the offender intentionally inflicts serious bodily injury.
For purposes of this article, serious bodily injury means bodily injury which involves unconsciousness, extreme physical pain or protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty, or a substantial risk of death.
Defendant argues the State did not prove he had the specific intent to inflict
“serious bodily injury” upon the victim. He also appears to question whether the
victim actually suffered serious bodily injury. Regarding intent, we note that
Defendant and an accomplice knocked the victim to the ground and then continued
punching and kicking him. Such action has been recognized as indicative of a
specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury. See, e.g., State v. Robertson, 98-883
(La.App. 3 Cir. 12/9/98), 723 So.2d 500, writ denied, 99-658 (La. 6/25/99), 745
So.2d 1187; State v. Daigle, 439 So.2d 595 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1983). Also, Louisiana
courts have found specific intent in cases where larger men hit smaller men. See, e.g.,
State v. Accardo, 466 So.2d 549 (La.App. 5 Cir.), writ denied, 468 So.2d 1204
(La.1985). An attack in concert with other assailants is at least as dangerous as an
attack by a single large, strong man. Thus, the fact that Defendant acted in concert
2 with an accomplice should be viewed as indicative of a specific intent to inflict
serious bodily injury.
Regarding the degree of actual injury to the victim, Defendant correctly
observes he did not break any of Gillis’s bones, or cause permanent physical
disfigurement. He also argues that the victim’s claim to have suffered “extreme
physical pain” is not consistent with other evidence.
Photos of the victim show extensive bruising to the left side of his face, and to
his right ear. Dr. Mark Francis Olivier, the emergency room physician who treated
the victim, described the injuries as follows:
A. He has some injuries to his face and head.
Q. Okay. And did you examine him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did he have any complaints of pain at that time?
Q. Doctor, how did he describe the level of pain he was in?
A. Moderate.
Q. At that time it was moderate?
Q. What were the - how would you classify - what did you do to treat him?
A. Well, he had bruising and swelling in the left cheek area. He had a small laceration over the eye on the left which required some steri-strip placement. He had bruising and swelling in the back of the head. He had tenderness in the right side of the jaw. And he had a um - swelling of the right ear which was a hematoma which is a collection of blood under the skin of the ear above the cartilage. And the way that is treated is you have to drain the blood away to prevent destroying the cartilage in the future.
3 Q. So, Doctor, would you say if Mr. Gillis had not received the medical treatment that you provided to him as it pertains to his ear, what would have happened in your professional opinion?
A. If the hematoma is not drained then there is potential for deformity of the ear, the cartilage could die and you would end up with a deformed ear.
His testimony of cross-examination was similar. During redirect, the following
colloquy occurred:
Q. Doctor, before you treated Mr. Gillis for the hematoma, would you consider the hematoma a disfigurement of his ear? Did he have a disfigurement on his ear before you treated him?
A. He had a swelling [of] the ear above the cartilage which I would consider a disfigurement.
Q. And when you treated him for the hematoma that prevented the ear from being permanently disfigured. Would you say that that was to the highest degree of medical certainty that you know, that prevented a permanent disfigurement from staying there.
A. Right. The ear is different as far as hematomas in that area because they have the potential of destroying cartilage underneath them and causing permanent disfigurement if you don’t evacuate them.
On appeal, Defendant argues the potential for disfigurement was “speculative
at best.” However, the doctor’s testimony showed the victim was treated specifically
to prevent such disfigurement. The fact that Gillis received timely and effective
medical help does not negate Defendant’s criminal culpability. The record is clear
that Defendant and his accomplice inflicted an injury sufficient to disfigure the
victim’s ear. Thus, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to conclude that
Defendant’s conduct constituted second degree battery.
Defendant cites three cases in which Louisiana courts have reduced second
degree battery convictions to simple battery. The victim in the present case received
a more serious injury than those suffered in the cases Defendant cites. In State v.
4 Helou, 02-2302 (La. 10/23/03), 857 So.2d 1024, the victim had a bloody nose, in
State v. Vidaurri, 05-742 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/30/05), 919 So.2d 803, writ denied, 06-
573 (La. 10/27/06), 939 So.2d 1270, the victim sustained scratches and a black eye;
in State v. Touchet, 04-1027 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/9/05), 897 So.2d 900, the injuries at
issue were bruises. However, the present case is distinguishable from those three
cases because of the damage to Gillis’s ear. While bruises and scratches will heal and
fade naturally, the victim’s ear required medical intervention to avoid permanent
damage.
For the reasons discussed, this assignment lacks merit.
DECREE
The Defendant’s conviction is affirmed.
This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Rule 2-16.3, Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal.