State of Louisiana v. Pineda Yanez Osbaldo
This text of State of Louisiana v. Pineda Yanez Osbaldo (State of Louisiana v. Pineda Yanez Osbaldo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
13-439
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
PINEDA YANEZ OSBALDO
**********
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. CR 137511, DIVISION J HONORABLE KRISTIAN D. EARLES, DISTRICT JUDGE
J. DAVID PAINTER JUDGE
Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and J. David Painter, Judges.
REVERSED. CONVICTION VACATED.
Chad Ikerd Office of the District Defender Fifteenth Judicial District P.O. Box 3622 600 Jefferson Street, Suite 902 Lafayette, LA 70502 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Pineda Yanez Osbaldo
J. N. Prather, Jr., Assistant District Attorney Michael Harson, District Attorney Fifteenth Judicial District Court, District Attorney’s Office P.O. Box 3306 Lafayette, LA 70502 COUNSEL FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA PAINTER, Judge.
In State v. Sarrabea, 13-1271 (La. 10/15/13), ___ So.3d ___, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has upheld our decision in the same case (12-1013 (La.App. 3 Cir.
5/1/13), ___ So.3d ___, writ granted, 13-1271 (La. 6/26/13), 118 So.3d 428),
finding that La.R.S. 14:100.13 is unconstitutional. Accordingly, we vacate the
conviction of Defendant, Pineda Yanez Osbaldo.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 20, 2011, Defendant operated a vehicle without
documentation of his lawful presence in the United States. He was charged with
operating a motor vehicle as an alien student and/or a nonresident alien without
documentation demonstrating he was lawfully present in the United States, a
violation of La.R.S. 14:100.13, and originally pled not guilty. He filed a motion to
quash, arguing that the statute was not a valid exercise of police powers and was
preempted by federal legislation. The State, represented by the Louisiana Attorney
General’s Office, opposed the motion.
At a hearing of the motion to quash, the trial court indicated that it would
“rule the same way” as it had in previous cases addressing this issue and denied the
motion. Defendant then entered a no-contest plea pursuant to State v. Crosby, 338
So.2d 584 (La.1976), reserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion to
quash. He was sentenced to serve twenty days in the parish jail, with credit for
time served, to run concurrently with any other sentence he might be serving. He
now appeals the denial of the motion to quash.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash
and in finding that La.R.S. 14:100.13 is a proper exercise of state police powers. He further contends that the trial court erred in holding that the statute is not
preempted by federal law.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:100.13(A) provides:
No alien student or nonresident alien shall operate a motor vehicle in the state without documentation demonstrating that the person is lawfully present in the United States.
The penalty for a violation is a fine of up to one thousand dollars and/or
imprisonment for up to one year, with or without hard labor, making the offense a
felony. La.R.S. 14:100.13(C); La.R.S. 14:2(A)(4).
In Sarrabea, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that La.R.S. 14:100.13
“operates in the field of alien registration and is, therefore, preempted by federal
law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.” Id. at p. 2. This
follows the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Arizona v. United States, ___
U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012), where the United States Supreme Court noted
that federal law requires aliens to carry proof of registration and concluded that
“the Federal Government has occupied the field of alien registration.” Id. at 2502.
Field preemption forecloses any state regulation, even when it parallels federal
standards, so that “even complementary state regulation is impermissible.” Id.
The United States Supreme Court further noted that “[e]ven if a State may make a
violation of federal law a crime in some instances, it cannot do so in a field (like
the field of alien registration) that has been occupied by federal law.” Id.
Both the Arizona statute and the Louisiana statute forbid the willful failure
to carry documentation demonstrating a lawful presence in the United States and
provide a penalty in excess of the penalty provided by federal law. This
inconsistency “creates a conflict with the plan Congress put in place . . .
underscor[ing] the reason for field preemption.” Id. at 2503.
2 In State v. Sarrabea, 12-1013 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/1/13), ___ So.3d ___, writ
granted, 13-1271 (La. 6/26/13), 118 So.3d 428, the defendant was convicted under
La.R.S. 14:100.13 and sentenced to three months in the parish jail. On appeal, he
argued that the statute was unconstitutional, violated the Equal Protection clause,
and was overly broad and vague. This court agreed, holding that Arizona is
controlling jurisprudence, and stated, “To put it plain and simple, La.R.S.
14:100.13 is preempted by federal law; and the State of Louisiana lacks
Constitutional authority to enforce it.” Id. at 17. The conviction was reversed.
Likewise, this court adopted the Arizona reasoning in State v. Gomez, 12-
1357 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/22/13), 115 So.3d 1200.1 Finding that Louisiana’s statute is
field and conflict preempted, this court held the statute unconstitutional and
reversed the conviction. The second circuit reached the same conclusion in State v.
Anaya-Espino, 48,025 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/22/13), 114 So.3d 1248. The first circuit,
in State v. Lopez, 12-2043 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/21/13), 116 So.3d 1, reached the
opposite conclusion. However, this split in the circuits has been resolved, and the
finding that La.R.S. 14:100.13 is unconstitutional and preempted by federal law
has been upheld by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Sarrabea, ___ So.3d ___.
Thus, we must follow Sarrabea and reverse Defendant’s conviction on the ground
that La.R.S. 14:100.13 is unconstitutional.
DECREE
We reverse the trial court’s ruling denying Defendant’s motion to quash and
vacate his conviction.
1 The State has applied for a writ with the Louisiana Supreme Court in Gomez. Writs have also been granted to address this issue in State v. Marquez, 12-1316 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/7/13) (unpublished writ), writ granted 13-315 (La. 5/3/13), 112 So.3d 851, and State v. Ramirez, 12- 1245 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/7/13) (unpublished writ), writ granted, 13-276 (La. 5/3/13), 112 So.3d 851, in which a different panel of this court denied the defendants’ writ applications and held La.R.S. 14:100.13 constitutional. 3
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