STATE OF LOUISIANA
5-fu COURT OF APPEAL
Z& 14/ ll FIRST CIRCUIT
jr:
4 ,, r& 2019 KA 1143
VERSUS
MILLENNIUM HEALTH CARE SERVICES
JUDGMENT RENDERED: JUN 2 2 2021
Appealed from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge • State of Louisiana Docket Number 02- 12- 0330 • Division J • Section 8
The Honorable Trudy M. White, Judge Presiding
La' Deisha Woods COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT Port Allen, Louisiana DEFENDANT— Millennium Health Care Services, L.L. C., d/ b/ a Millennium PCA Services
Tasha K. Stockwell COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE Assistant Attorney General State of Louisiana Baton Rouge, Louisiana
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C. J., WELCH, AND CHUTZ, JJ. WELCH, J.
The defendant, Millennium Health Care Services, LLC, d/b/ a Millennium
PCA Services, was charged by grand jury indictment with one count of conspiracy
to commit forgery ( count I), a violation of La. R. S. 14: 26 and 14: 72; nineteen
counts of forgery ( counts II —XX), violations of La. R. S. 14: 72, and one count of
theft by fraud ( value over $ 500. 00) ( count XXI), a violation of La. R. S. 14: 67.'
Following a jury trial, it was found guilty as charged on all counts. On count I, it
was fined $ 2, 500. 00. On counts II —XX, on each count, it was fined $ 5, 000. 00. 2
On count XXI, it was fined $ 10, 000. 00.3 It was also ordered to pay $ 6, 985, 249. 73
in restitution. Thereafter, the court deleted the order to pay restitution. The
defendant now appeals challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, claiming the
trial court erred in denying its request for a bill of particulars, claiming the trial
court failed to review the record before denying post -trial motions and imposing
sentence, challenging the record as incomplete for review, and claiming the trial
court erred in accepting a verdict of guilty against both the defendant and Dwaine
Woods. For the following reasons, we reverse the convictions and sentences.
FACTS
In 2004, Dwaine Joseph Woods, Sr., founded Millennium Health Care
Services, LLC ( Millennium or the defendant), which did business as Millennium
PCA (personal care assistance) Services. He designated himself as the president of
Dynetta Hadrick Woods was charged by the same indictment with the first twenty counts. Dwaine Joseph Woods, Sr. was charged by the same indictment with the same offenses. Dynetta and Dwaine Woods separately appeal from their convictions. See State v. Woods, 2019- 1141 La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 4/ 21), So. 3d ` and State v. Woods, 2019- 1142 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 16/ 21), _ So. 3d
2 The minutes reflect that, on counts II -XX, the defendant was sentenced to pay a fine of 5, 00." The transcript, however, reflects that, on counts II -XX, the defendant was sentenced to 5, 000. 00 on each count. When there is a discrepancy between the minutes and the transcript, the transcript must prevail. State v. Lynch, 441 So. 2d 732, 734 ( La. 1983).
3 The minutes reflect that, on counts XXI, the defendant was sentenced to pay a fine of 10, 00." The transcript, however, reflects that, on count XXI, the defendant was sentenced to
2 Millennium, and Dynetta Woods, his wife, as the secretary of the company.
Millennium provided personal care services, with the majority of its business
involving services billed to Medicaid. Between 2006 and 2010, Millennium billed
Medicaid approximately $ 790001000. 00.
Terry Cooper, R.N., had worked for the Louisiana Department of Health and
Hospitals ( DHH) since 1984. In 2006, she was the RN manager over nursing
homes and immediate care facilities for the developmentally disabled, as well as
home and community based services. She indicated that in 2005, the legislature
transferred licensing authority for home and community based programs to DHH,
which already controlled Medicaid enrollment. She testified that in November of
2006, DHH promulgated a rule requiring direct service workers to be trained in
cardiopulmonary resuscitation ( CPR) and basic first aid within forty- five days of
hire. In 2012, the requirement was removed from DHH regulations. According to
Cooper, providing DHH with a fake CPR card as proof of training would constitute
fraud.
Pamela Moseley worked in program integrity/Medicaid fraud and health
standards prior to her retirement from DHH in 2011. She acknowledged that in
2006, direct service workers were required to have CPR training. DHH would
check for compliance with the CPR training requirement by examining the
personnel files of direct service workers to determine whether they contained an
original or a photocopy of a CPR card.
Melissa Landrum Rohner testified at trial. In August of 2009, she had
planned to work for Extended Family, a personal care assistance program operated
by Stacy Baptiste. However, Baptiste "[ pled] out for Medicaid fraud" and shut
down the business. Baptiste referred Rohner to Dynetta and Dwaine Woods.
pay a fine of $10, 000. 00. When there is a discrepancy between the minutes and the transcript, the transcript must prevail. Lynch, 441 So. 2d at 734.
3 Thereafter, Rohner was hired as a regional director for Millennium. Some of the
former clients of Extended Family transferred to Millennium.
Rohner identified a copy of a CPR First Aid card with her name on it.
Dwaine Woods had given her the original CPR First Aid card. The card indicated
Rohner had received CPR First Aid training on October 13, 2009. Rohner testified
she had not received CPR First Aid training on October 13, 2009. Rohner told
Dwaine Woods that she " did not take this class" when he handed her the card. He
told her " the card was for [her]."
Dwaine Woods also gave Rohner CPR First Aid cards for other employees
of Millennium and instructed her to make copies of the cards, distribute the
originals to the employees, and file the copies in their files. In addition to the false
statement concerning her own CPR First Aid training, due to her familiarity with
another employee' s time sheets, Rohner was also aware of at least one other CPR
First Aid card that falsely indicated the employee had received training. Because
of her past experience at Extended Family, Rohner was concerned about getting
wrapped up" in any dishonest activity. When she noticed " things that started to
not make sense" in regard to billing, she emailed Dwaine Woods, specifically
advising him that " things were getting billed for hours that people were not
working." Rohner emailed rather than telephoned because Dwaine and Dynetta
Woods were on a cruise, and Rohner did not think she would be able to contact
Dwaine Woods by telephone.
According to Rohner, during the last week of November 2009, Dwaine
Woods called her. Rohner told Dwaine Woods " what [ was] going on." Based on
the tone of Dwaine Woods' voice and the way he responded to her, Rohner
realized he " had something to do with [ the irregularities]." Approximately one
hour later, another employee of Millennium seized Rohner' s computer and
removed it from her office. Rohner gathered her belongings and left Millennium.
0 Rohner subsequently notified the Medicaid fraud department at DHH, the
company that billed for Medicaid, and Louis Hicks with the American Red Cross,
that there were a " multitude" of American Red Cross CPR First Aid cards that had
been given out to employees even though they had not attended the CPR First Aid
training classes. Rohner admitted she was arrested on January 10, 2010, and
convicted on July 8, 2010, for possession of crystal methamphetamine.
Jamaal Ellis Fletcher testified at trial. He was Dynetta Woods' cousin and
had " been knowing her just about all [ his] life." Additionally, Dynetta Woods'
brother, Regis Hadrick, was Fletcher' s business partner, former roommate, and one
of his best friends. Fletcher also knew Dwaine Woods. Prior to trial, Fletcher pled
guilty to conspiracy to commit forgery. According to Fletcher, he conspired with
Millennium, Dynetta Woods, and Dwaine Woods to create false CPR cards.
Fletcher indicated that between August and December of 2009, Millennium
was a personal care service, and " around that time," he was certified by the Red
Cross as a CPR/ First Aid Instructor. Fletcher had previously been paid for
teaching Red Cross training classes that he had not actually taught.
Fletcher was unaware of the exact date, but in approximately October of
2009, he was contacted by Dynetta Woods. She told him she needed some cards
done," and " needed them done fast." Dynetta Woods told Fletcher she would fax
the names to him, and he subsequently received a fax from Millennium with a list
of the names for the CPR cards. She made no inquiry about Fletcher' s availability
to teach the CPR class. Fletcher stated, " I know [ the Red Cross] wanted the class
to be taught. I chose not to teach it." Fletcher did not agree, however, that Dynetta
Woods wanted the class to be taught. He indicated, while she did not specifically
instruct him to " forge CPR cards and provide them to Millennium[,]" that is what
was " perfectly understood[.]" Fletcher testified he " might have asked for the
names," but he did not know who worked at Millennium and would not have
E known which names to put on the CPR cards unless they were provided to him.
Fletcher wrote up the CPR cards and submitted them to the Red Cross.
In December of 2009, Louis Hicks of the Red Cross called Fletcher. Hicks
either told Fletcher that the cards " weren' t right," or that Fletcher had not taught
the class and someone had " called in on it." Fletcher called Dynetta Woods and
told her about the call, stating that "[ the Red Cross] caught up with it" or "[ the Red
Cross] caught us." Less than ten minutes later, Dwaine Woods called Fletcher.
Fletcher testified, "[ Dwaine Woods] wanted to know what was going on and I let
him know." Dwaine Woods told Fletcher, " don' t worry about [ it]. He was going
to handle it." Dwaine Woods also told Fletcher to tell Hicks that Fletcher had in
fact taught the class.
Thereafter, Fletcher went to the Red Cross and talked to Hicks. In
accordance with Dwaine Woods' instructions, Fletcher lied to Hicks and told him
that he had taught the class referenced in the CPR cards. Hicks started talking
about the Attorney General, and Fletcher wondered, " What am I in to." He told
Hicks, " I don' t know what [ the defendants] got me into."
At trial, Fletcher identified his signature on Red Cross CPR cards indicating
he had trained Yvette Ferguson, Jeana Cooper, and Falin Carter in CPR on either
October 13, 2009 or October 14, 2009. Fletcher had not in fact provided the
training. Additionally, he identified an August 15, 2009 check for $ 300 made out
to him and signed by Dynetta Woods for CPR/ First Aid. He also identified a
November 5, 2009 check for $ 1, 125 made out to him from Millennium and signed
by Dynetta Woods for First Aid/CPR. Fletcher indicated the check was payment
for the October 13, 2009 and October 14, 2009 classes that he did not teach.
Fletcher indicated he was paid $ 25 per person upon delivery of the fake CPR cards.
Randy Henagan, a criminal investigator with the Louisiana Department of
Justice, Attorney General' s Office, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, testified at trial.
3 He reviewed Fletcher' s AT& T phone records for the period between August of
2009 and September of 2010. In both August and September of 2009, Fletcher' s
telephone was used to call Millennium three times. In October of 2009, Fletcher' s
telephone was used to call Millennium one time. No calls were made from
Fletcher' s telephone to Millennium in November and December of 2009.
Fletcher' s telephone was used to call Dynetta Woods' cellphone one time in
August of 2009. No additional calls were made from Fletcher' s telephone to her
cellphone in September and October of 2009. Fletcher' s telephone was used to
call Dynetta Woods' cellphone three times in November of 2009 and twelve times
in December of 2009. Henagan did not know what was discussed in the telephone
calls.
Dwaine Woods testified at trial. He was aware that in 2006 and 2009, CPR
training was a mandatory requirement for direct service workers who came into
contact with a client. He claimed, every quarter, the training coordinator at each
of Millennium' s locations would direct the staff of each office to audit the charts to
determine if there were any employees that needed CPR renewals or initial
certification. According to Dwaine Woods, if any employees needed CPR
training, the staff would generate a list of names and the training coordinator
would schedule a class. Thereafter, an instructor would come, provide the training
for the employees, and they would " get certified."
Nicole Skidmore was the training coordinator for the Baton Rouge and
Denham Springs offices.' In mid- September of 2009, however, Skidmore was out
of the office on sick leave. Dwaine Woods claimed he instructed the directors of
the Baton Rouge and Denham Springs offices to "[ ensure] that all of the trainings
were completed." Yolanda Grisby was the director of the Baton Rouge office and
Rohner was the director of the Denham Springs office.
7 According to Dwaine Woods, he first learned of a problem with the CPR
cards on November 20, 2009, when Skidmore informed him that she had been
contacted by an employee who questioned why her card had not been signed by the
instructor. Dwaine Woods claimed Rohner was present, and he asked her if she
had allowed the employee to take the class on- line. Dwaine Woods claimed, at the
time, he had been meeting with Rohner to give her a verbal warning concerning
her drug use. He claimed he told her he would rather get her some help than fire
her. Dwaine Woods claimed he was preparing to go out of town for a week, so he
told Skidmore and Rohner he would " see what was going on with the CPR cards"
when he returned.
Dwaine Woods claimed Rohner left him voice mails while he was on his
trip, and when he called back, she " had left the office." He denied talking to
Rohner after his trip. In a letter to Congressman Charlie Melancon, Dwaine
Woods claimed Rohner quit on November 24, 2009, " after several discussions
concerning her performance and possible drug use." In the letter, Dwaine Woods
also claimed the allegations against him were " based on information from a
disgruntled employee who has since been arrested on drug charges."
Dwaine Woods stated when he returned from his trip, he tried to talk to
Louis Hicks with the American Red Cross, but he was unavailable. Woods did,
however, contact Hicks the next day and, pursuant to his instructions, gave him a
letter describing what had happened. Dwaine Woods claimed " we" paid Fletcher
because we thought he had taught the class. Dwaine Woods denied participating
or conspiring with Fletcher to forge CPR cards. Dwaine Woods denied that
Dynetta Woods ever told him that the CPR cards were " fraudulently done" by
Fletcher. Dwaine Woods also denied that Dynetta Woods ever asked him to tell
Fletcher to tell Hicks that Fletcher had " done the training." When asked if he and
4 Millennium also had an office in Lafayette.
8 Dynetta Woods had discussed the fake CPR cards issued by Fletcher, Dwaine
Woods answered, " It was my company, something was going on, that' s my wife,
we talked."
Dwaine Woods claimed Hicks told him that the cards were invalid and that
he needed to retrieve them. Dwaine Woods claimed he retrieved the cards,
returned them to Hicks, scheduled another class for the employees and " made sure
that everyone was there." Dwaine Woods claimed his investigation of the incident
revealed that of the 19 employees with invalid CPR cards, approximately 13 of
them did not need CPR cards. Dwaine Woods claimed 11 of the employees
already had CPR cards, and several employees " didn' t even work with our
company anymore," and thus, "[ did not need] to have the certification." He denied
telling Fletcher to lie to Hicks that Fletcher had performed the CPR training.
Dwaine Woods identified State Exhibit # 23 as a list of the Millennium
employees that were scheduled for First Aid CPR training on December 18, 2009
because Fletcher did not teach them on October 13 and 14, 2009. Woods gave the
list to the American Red Cross. He agreed the names matched the initials in counts
II -XX of the indictment.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In assignment of error number 1, the defendant argues it is a " judicial" entity
and unable to generate the requisite intent necessary to substantiate a guilty verdict
in this matter. The defendant also adopts the arguments of Dynetta and Dwaine
Woods on sufficiency of the evidence.
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates Due
Process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of
review for the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
6 reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61
L.Ed.2d 560 ( 1979). See also La. Code Crim. P. art. 821( B); State v. Ordodi,
2006- 0207 ( La. 11/ 29/ 06), 946 So. 2d 654, 660. The Jackson standard of review,
incorporated in Article 821, is an objective standard for testing the overall
evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. State v. Eason,
2019- 0614 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 12/ 27/ 19), 293 So. 3d 61, 69- 70.
When a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the
reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When analyzing
circumstantial evidence, La. R. S. 15: 438 provides that, in order to convict, the fact
finder must be satisfied that the overall evidence excludes every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence. The facts then established by the direct evidence and
inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence must be sufficient for
a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was guilty of every essential element of the crime. Eason, 293 So. 3d at 69- 70.
The due process standard of Jackson " does not permit a reviewing court to
substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder or to
second guess the credibility determinations of the fact finder necessary to render an
honest verdict." State v. Calloway, 2007- 2306 ( La. 1/ 21/ 09), 1 So. 3d 417, 422
per curiam). In cases of circumstantial evidence, the Jackson standard means
that when a jury " reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the
defense], that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another
hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt." State v. Captville, 448 So. 2d 676,
680 ( La. 1984). Nevertheless, the Jackson standard does not permit jurors "` to
speculate if the evidence is such that reasonable jurors must have a reasonable
doubt."' State v. Mussall, 523 So. 2d 1305, 1311 ( La. 1988) ( quoting 2 C. Wright,
Federal Practice & Procedure, Criminal 2d § 467 at 660- 61 and n.23 ( 2d ed.
10 1982)). See State v. Jones, 2016- 1502 ( La. 1/ 3/ 18), So. 3d , 2018 WL
6184335 * 3 ( per curiam).
All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or
absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and
abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to
commit the crime, are principals. La. R.S. 14: 24. However, the defendant' s mere
presence at the scene is not enough to " concern" him in the crime. Only those
persons who knowingly participate in the planning or execution of a crime may be
said to be " concerned" in its commission, thus making them liable as principals. A
principal may be connected only to those crimes for which he has the requisite
mental state. State v. Neal, 2000- 0674 ( La. 6/ 29/ 01), 796 So. 2d 649, 659, cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 940, 122 S. Ct. 1323, 152 L.Ed. 2d 231 ( 2002). However, "[ i] t is
sufficient encouragement that the accomplice is standing by at the scene of the
crime ready to give some aid if needed, although in such a case it is necessary that
the principal actually be aware of the accomplice' s intention." State v. Anderson,
97- 1301 ( La. 2/ 6/ 98), 707 So. 2d 1223, 1225 ( per curiam) ( quoting 2 W. LaFave,
A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, § 6. 7, p. 138 ( West 1996)); State v. Clay,
2011- 1974 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 3/ 12) ( unpublished, 2012 WL 1564626, at * 2, writ
denied, 2013- 0287 ( La. 6/ 14/ 13), 118 So. 3d 1084.
An individual is a criminal conspirator if he makes an agreement with one or
more persons for the specific purpose of committing any crime and at least one of
the parties does an act in furtherance of the object of the agreement. La. R.S.
14: 26( A). The elements of conspiracy may be proven by direct or circumstantial
evidence. State v. Belino, 96- 0789 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 12/ 20/ 96), 686 So. 2d 101,
103, writ denied, 98- 2992 ( La. 6/ 25/ 99), 745 So. 2d 625.
It is unlawful to forge, with intent to defraud, any signature to, or any part
of, any writing purporting to have legal efficacy. La. R. S. 14: 72( A). Issuing,
11 transferring, or possessing with intent to defraud, a forged writing, known by the
offender to be a forged writing, shall also constitute a violation of La. R.S. 14: 72.
La. R.S. 14: 72( B).
Knowledge, like intent, must often be inferred from the totality of the
circumstances of the transaction where it is an element of the crime charged. The
test of knowledge is not a subjective test, but rather a completely objective test,
i.e., the offender is taken to know that which any reasonable person so situated
would have known. An intent to defraud is also an essential element of the offense
of forgery. The criminal intent required for forgery is the intent to defraud any
person, and it suffices if the forged instrument has prejudiced or might prejudice
the rights of another. An intent to profit by the act is not a necessary element of
the case. Moreover, specific intent is a state of mind and need not be proved as a
fact but may be inferred from the circumstances and transactions of the case.
Specific intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate
that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow
his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14: 10( 1). Such state of mind can be formed in an
instant. The existence of specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be
resolved by the trier of fact. State v. Dufrene, 2017- 1496 ( La. App. 1st Cir.
6/ 4/ 18), 251 So. 3d 1114, 1119, writ granted in part on other grounds and
remanded, 2018- 1174 ( La. 5/ 28/ 19), 273 So. 3d 301 ( per curiam).
As defined in La. R.S. 14: 67( A), theft consists of the following elements: ( 1)
the misappropriation or taking of anything of value, ( 2) which belongs to another,
3) without consent or by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or
representations, and ( 4) with the intent to permanently deprive the other of the
object of the misappropriation or taking. Theft is a specific intent crime. Specific
intent may be inferred from the circumstances of a transaction and from the actions
of the accused. Further, specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be
12 resolved by the fact finder. State v. Fisher, 2013- 1152 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 6/ 14)
unpublished), 2014 WL 3765945, * 4. The gist of theft by fraudulent conduct or
misrepresentations is a misappropriation or the taking of money by fraudulent
conduct or representations. " Fraudulent conduct" is a conclusion of law. See
State v. Heymann, 256 La. 18, 24, 235 So. 2d 78, 80 ( 1970).
Criminal liability in our system of justice has always been founded upon the
simultaneous existence of two distinct elements namely: ( 1) actus reus, and ( 2)
mens rea. The existence of only one of these elements does not make one
criminally liable. Both must be present to invoke the sanctions society has placed
on what is termed " criminal conduct." Certainly one cannot be held criminally
liable for simply thinking of a criminal act without the act occurring. See La. R.S.
14: 8 and comments, La. R.S. 14: 27. A somewhat more difficult, but logically
consistent idea, is that an act, committed without the required criminal intent or
mens rea, is not criminally punishable. We do not criminally punish those that do
not know what they are doing - such as the insane. Neither do we punish those
who, while aware of what they are doing, have no control over their actions - the
victims of threats or coercion. We do not impose criminal liability on those who
act without criminal intent for the simple reason that such an imposition would not
achieve the main goal of our criminal law: deterrence. State v. Chapman Dodge
Center, Inc., 428 So. 2d 413, 417 ( La. 1983).
When a corporation is accused of committing a crime which requires intent,
it must be determined who within the corporate structure had the intent to commit
the crime. If the crime was the product of a board of directors' resolution
authorizing its employees to commit specific criminal acts, then intent on the part
of the corporation is manifest. However, a more difficult question arises if the
crime is actually committed by an employee of the corporation not authorized to
perform such an act. Holding a corporation criminally responsible for the acts of
13 an employee may be inconsistent with basic notions of criminal intent, since such a
posture would render a corporate entity responsible for actions which it
theoretically had no intent to commit. Id.
In the instant case, Millennium was a business founded by Dwaine Woods.
Dwaine Woods was designated as the president of Millennium. Dynetta Woods
was designated as the secretary of the company. Donald Joseph Triggs, Jr., was
listed as a Millennium board member.' He was not charged with any crime
involving the defendant.
Dwaine Woods was found not guilty on counts I -XX, but found guilty on
count XXI. Following appeal, however, this court reversed that conviction. See
State v. Woods, 2019- 1142 ( La. App. lst Cir. 6/ 16/ 21), So. 3d
Accordingly, there is no guilt, and thus, no proof of intent on the part of Dwaine
Woods, which can be imputed to Millennium in regard to counts I-XXI.
Dynetta Woods was found guilty as charged on counts I -XX. She was not
charged in count XXI. There is, however, no proof that Dwaine Woods or the
board of directors of Millennium authorized the criminal conduct of Dynetta
Woods. Indeed, to the contrary, the jury specifically found Dwaine Woods not
guilty of all counts involving Dynetta Woods. There was no complicity by the
officers or the board of directors, explicit or tacit, in the criminal conduct of
Dynetta Woods. Therefore, the actions of Dynetta Woods were insufficient to
cause Millennium to be guilty of counts I -XX. See Chapman Dodge Center,
Inc., 428 So. 2d at 420.
For the foregoing reasons, under the circumstances of this case, there was
5 Triggs gave Dwaine Woods permission to use his name as a Millennium board member. Triggs testified he was initially listed as president. He indicated, however, even if he felt Dwaine Woods was not doing a good job, he did not have the authority to fire him as the administrator of Millennium. Triggs claimed, as president, he assumed he would have the authority to fire Dwaine Woods.
14 insufficient intent shown in the trial court to withstand a Jackson v. Virginia
analysis, and therefore, this company defendant may not be found criminally
responsible on counts I-XXI.
When issues are raised on appeal both as to the sufficiency of the evidence
and as to one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first assess the
sufficiency of the evidence, see State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731, 734 ( La. 1992),
because the accused may therefore be entitled to an acquittal under Hudson v.
Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 101 S. Ct. 9709 67 L.Ed.2d 30 ( 1981). The defendant here
is so entitled. See enerally State v. Corkern, 593 So.2d 1259, 1260 ( La. 1992)
per curiam) ( When the state' s evidence merely invites the jury to speculate on a
number of reasonable probabilities, some consistent with guilt, others consistent of
innocence, a reasonable jury must entertain a reasonable doubt of the defendant' s
guilt.). Accordingly, for the reasons assigned, the defendant' s convictions and
sentences are reversed and a judgment of acquittal is entered in its favor. See
Jones, 2018 WL 618433 at * 3.
CONCLUSION
For all of the above and foregoing reasons, the convictions and sentences of
Millennium Health Care Services, LLC, d/b/ a Millennium PCA Service are
reversed and a judgment of acquittal is entered in its favor.
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES REVERSED; JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL ENTERED.