State of Louisiana v. Michael Vanwhalraven

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: October 30, 2019
• Docket: 2019-K-0942
• Status: Published

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2019-K-0942

VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL MICHAEL VANWHALRAVEN * FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******

APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH NO. 541-108, SECTION “C” Honorable Benedict J. Willard, Judge ****** Judge Dale N. Atkins ****** (Court composed of Judge Regina Bartholomew-Woods, Judge Tiffany G. Chase, Judge Dale N. Atkins)

Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr. DISTRICT ATTORNEY Kyle Daly Assistant District Attorney Parish of Orleans 619 S. White Street New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR STATE OF LOUISIANA/APPELLANT

Tina Peng Orleans Public Defenders 2601 Tulane Avenue, 7th Floor New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED OCTOBER 30, 2019 This emergency writ application is taken from the district court’s ruling,

rendered on October 29, 2019, which granted Respondent’s, Michael

Vanwhalraven (“Defendant”), Motion in Limine Regarding Ultimate Conclusions

to Be Decided By Finder of Fact. Relator, the State of Louisiana (“the State”),

seeks expedited supervisory review of the district court’s ruling due to the trial

being in progress. In consideration of the State’s writ application, this Court, on

October 29, 2019, ordered the district court to file a per curiam by Wednesday,

October 30, 2019, at 9:00 A.M., which the district court timely filed. For the

reasons that follow, the writ application is granted and the district court’s judgment

is reversed.

Defendant, in this matter, is charged with first degree rape, indecent

behavior with a juvenile under the age of thirteen, and sexual battery under the age

of thirteen. On October 29, 2019, the morning of jury selection, Defendant filed a

Motion in Limine Regarding Ultimate Conclusions to Be Decided By Finder of

Fact. Defendant’s motion requested the district court to bar the State and its

witnesses from the following:

(1) Using the words “rape” or “sexual assault;”

1 (2) Referring to the child victim as “the victim;” or

(3) Referencing the evidence kit as “rape kit” or “Sexual Assault Collection

Kit.”

The district court granted Defendant’s motion. The State’s writ application

timely follows.

In its writ application, the State argues the district court’s ruling barred the

usage of the words “rape,” “victim,” and “sexual assault.” However, the State,

subsequently, supplemented its writ application to provide that the district court’s

ruling only excluded the use of the word “rape,” but did not exclude the usage of

the other words, “sexual assault” and “victim,” complained of in its original

application.

The only issue before this Court is whether the word “rape” can be used

during the trial. The standard of review for a motion in limine is abuse of

discretion. River Rental Realty LLC v. Deep South Leasing, LLC, 2017-0982, p. 8

(La. App. 4 Cir. 6/20/18), 250 So.3d 372, 377. “A trial court is vested with much

discretion in determining whether the probative value of relevant evidence is

substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.” State v. Greenberry, 2014-0335,

pp.13-14 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/19/14); 154 So.3d 700, 708, writ denied, 2014-2656

(La. 10/9/15); 178 So.3d 1000.Thus, this Court must determine if the district court

abused its discretion in granting Defendant’s motion in limine.

In the instant matter, Defendant is charged with first degree rape, indecent

behavior with a juvenile under the age of thirteen, and sexual battery under the age

of thirteen. The nature of these offenses is rape. As the State argues, the jury will

hear the word “rape,” as it is the offense that Defendant is charged. As such, we

find, based on the record before us, the district court abused its discretion

2 prohibiting the State and its witnesses from using the word “rape” during the

course of trial when Defendant is charged with first degree rape.

For these reasons, the State’s writ application is granted, and the district

court’s judgment is reversed.

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED