State of Louisiana v. Michael Deon Riley

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: February 26, 2025
• Docket: 56,131-KA
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered February 26, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,131-KA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

MICHAEL DEON RILEY Appellant

Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 382,248

Honorable Michael A. Pitman, Judge

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Annette Fuller Roach

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney

MARGARET E. RICHIE GASKINS SAMUEL S. CRICHTON CHRISTOPHER BOWMAN Assistant District Attorneys

Before STEPHENS, MARCOTTE, and ELLENDER, JJ. ELLENDER, J.

Michael Riley (“Riley”) was found guilty of three crimes: 1) the

second degree murder of Daron Hardin (“Hardin”); 2) the attempted second

degree murder of Jacqueline Lee (“Lee”); and 3) possession of a firearm by

a convicted felon. He received sentences of life in prison, 50, and 20 years,

all to be served at hard labor, consecutively, and without the benefit of

parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Riley now appeals, arguing the

trial court erred by allowing evidence of other crimes, thereby rendering the

evidence insufficient to sustain the guilty verdicts. Finding no merit in

Riley’s argument, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the evening of April 2, 2021, Lee and Hardin, who were

romantically involved, went to Ken Anderson’s (“Anderson”) home on

Powell Street in Shreveport. They intended to celebrate Anderson’s birthday

and also check on the progress of some repairs Anderson was making to

Hardin’s truck. While Hardin and Anderson were discussing the truck

repairs outside the home, Lee walked to the end of the driveway, where she

saw Riley, whom she recognized as a longtime friend of her daughter’s. As

Riley approached the two men, Hardin held up his hand and gestured for

Riley not to interrupt the conversation between himself and Anderson. Lee

noticed Riley’s body language immediately changed, which made her

uneasy. She suggested to Hardin they should leave and, shortly thereafter,

the two began walking toward another friend’s house a few blocks away.

As they were walking down Singletary Street, Lee saw a dark sedan

turn onto Singletary and proceed toward them. Hardin told Lee to move to

the inside position, placing himself between Lee and the street. Lee heard gunfire, saw Hardin fall, felt a burning sensation in her shoulder, and fell

into the roadside ditch. She tried to get up to find Hardin but fell down. As

she tried to get up again, she looked toward the street and saw Riley’s face

in the vehicle, illuminated by the muzzle flashes from continued gunfire.

Lee then attempted to walk down the street to get help but passed out. Upon

regaining consciousness, she called 911.

When paramedics arrived, Hardin was dead from what was

determined to be a single intermediate range gunshot wound that entered his

upper back, passed through both lungs, and lodged in his chest wall. Police

found three .40 caliber and one 9 millimeter shell casings near the area of the

shooting on Singletary Street.

Paramedics transferred Lee to the hospital for treatment of gunshot

wounds to her shoulder and, while there, she was also questioned by police.

She was able to give investigating officers some preliminary information

about the shooting but, upon hearing of Hardin’s death, Lee’s distress

rendered her unable to answer any more questions. Approximately one

week later, Lee contacted the Shreveport Police Department (“SPD”), gave a

statement to investigators, named Riley as the shooter, and positively

identified him in a photographic lineup.

Prior to trial, Riley filed a notice of intent to offer an alibi defense

claiming he was at the home of Freddy Young at the time of the shooting. In

response, the State filed a motion notifying Riley of its intent to present

evidence pursuant to La. C.E. art. 404(B), in the form of testimony given by

Deaira Robinson (“Robinson”), Riley’s girlfriend, whom he attempted to

shoot a couple of days after shooting Hardin and Lee. At the hearing on the

State’s motion, the trial court found Robinson’s testimony recounting 2 Riley’s attempt to shoot her proved he had the opportunity, intent, and

preparation to possess a firearm as a convicted felon, as well as the requisite

knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or accident. No objection was

made to the court’s ruling on the motion.

At trial, Robinson testified that on April 4, 2021, she picked Riley up

in her vehicle. Shortly after he got into her car, Riley began crying and he

told Robinson he “shot a guy on Singletary, and he still had the gun in the

car with me.” Robinson believed Riley was referring to the shooting of

Hardin and Lee as she previously heard “on the street” that Riley was the

shooter. Robinson stated she actively tried to stop Riley from confessing to

her, telling him repeatedly to stop talking about it. Riley then attempted to

discharge a firearm he had with him out the window of her vehicle, causing

them to argue. He got out of the car and Robinson followed, telling him to

just come into the house with her. Riley became more upset, told Robinson

to leave him alone, pointed the gun at her, threatened to kill her, and tried to

shoot her. The gun would not fire, and Robinson was able to push Riley

down and flee. After she escaped, Robinson called Crime Stoppers and

identified Riley as the person who shot Hardin and Lee, and reported Riley’s

attempt to shoot her as well. Robinson also called the Office of Probation

and Parole and identified Riley, who she believed to be on active probation,

as the individual who shot Hardin and Lee. Robinson provided the same

information to the police when questioned.

On cross-examination, Robinson was asked about several jail phone

calls she had with Riley in which Robinson told Riley she knew he did not

shoot Hardin and Lee because he was with her at the time. Robinson

3 testified she just told Riley what he wanted to hear when she spoke to him

on the phone because she was afraid of Riley after he tried to shoot her.

Several other recorded jail phone calls were also played and entered

into evidence without objection. These calls were determined to be made by

Riley, using the personal identification number (“PIN”) associated with

another inmate, presumably for the purpose of concealing the information

discussed. The recordings of these calls revealed Riley asking for assistance

from several persons to dissuade Anderson and Lee from appearing in court

at his trial.

While Robinson did not recall seeing Riley drive a dark sedan like the

one Lee described, Cpl. Adam McEntee with SPD testified that when he

took Anderson home following his interview with police, Riley drove by

Anderson’s house in a dark sedan. Because of the Crime Stoppers tip, Cpl.

McEntee stated he wanted to question Riley, so he tried to flag him down.

Riley saw Cpl. McEntee, but sped up and drove away. Another officer with

Cpl. McEntee got a picture of Riley speeding away from Anderson’s street

driving the dark sedan.

As to the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge, Sgt.

John Madjerick with SPD testified Riley’s fingerprints matched those taken

from Riley following his November 14, 2011, conviction for illegal use of a

weapon.

The jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict for each of the charged

offenses. The trial court then sentenced Riley to serve life in prison for the

second degree murder of Hardin, 50 years for the attempted second degree

murder of Lee, and 20 years for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

The sentences were ordered to be served at hard labor, consecutively, and 4 without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. This

appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

In his sole assignment of error, Riley contends the trial court should

not have allowed the State to introduce evidence of his subsequent attempt

to shoot Robinson in the days immediately following the shooting. He

argues the State failed to establish an exception to La. C.E. art. 404(B) that

would render Robinson’s testimony about Riley’s attempt to kill her

admissible because his alleged possession of a gun on April 4, 2021, does

not prove he was in possession of a gun on April 2, 2021. Additionally,

while Riley does not explicitly ask this court to consider the sufficiency of

the evidence presented against him, he clearly contends that but for the

improperly admitted character evidence, the guilty verdicts would not have

been reached because the jury would not have considered the other evidence

presented as sufficient.

Riley further claims even if Robinson’s testimony about his attempt to

shoot her was appropriately admitted, the trial court failed to determine

whether the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its

prejudicial effect. Riley argues Robinson’s testimony about his attempt to

shoot her was more prejudicial than probative, and the admission of other

crimes evidence was not harmless because it improperly bolstered

Robinson’s testimony.

The State contends the trial court’s ruling allowing Robinson’s

testimony about Riley’s attempt to shoot her was correct, and the record

shows the trial court did weigh the probative value of the evidence prior to

issuing its ruling. The State argues Riley’s attempt to shoot Robinson was 5 admissible under the res gestae doctrine as it could not present a complete

narrative to the jury without including her testimony about Riley’s

confession and his subsequent attempt to shoot her because her Crime

Stoppers tip, which was made prior to Lee’s full statement to police and

prior to her identification of Riley as the shooter, provided law enforcement

with the first real break in its investigation. The State further contends there

was no way for it to rebut the defense’s attempts to impeach Robinson’s

testimony and explain why her statements to Riley were inconsistent with

her testimony, other than to allow Robinson to testify that she was afraid of

Riley because he tried to shoot her after he confessed to shooting Hardin and

Lee.

Finally, the State claims even if the trial court did err in allowing the

introduction of Robinson’s testimony, it would constitute harmless error

because Riley could have been convicted of all three offenses based on

Lee’s testimony alone.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Although it is not designated as an assignment of error, sufficiency of

the evidence forms an integral part of Riley’s argument, the implication

being that without the allegedly improper evidence being admitted, the jury

would have been less likely to believe the testimony given by Lee and

Robinson and, therefore, less likely to return a guilty verdict. When issues

are raised on appeal both as to the sufficiency of the evidence and as to one

or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the

sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731 (La. 1992). If

the entirety of the evidence admitted at trial is sufficient to support the

conviction, the accused is not entitled to an acquittal, and the reviewing 6 court must then consider the assignments of trial error. Id. The relevant

question is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.

Ramsey, 55,491 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/24), 381 So. 3d 308, writ denied, 24-

00379 (La. 10/1/24), 393 So. 3d 865.

Riley’s three convictions are defined as follows:

1) Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1);

2) Attempted second degree murder is when any person who, having a specific intent to kill, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward killing the victim. La. R.S. 14:27; La. R.S. 14:30.1. Although the statute for the completed crime of second degree murder allows for a conviction based on specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, attempted second degree murder requires specific intent to kill. State v. Bishop, 01-2548 (La. 1/14/03), 835 So. 2d 434; and

3) Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (at the time of Riley’s offenses) made it unlawful for any person convicted of a felony crime of violence as defined in La. R.S. 14:2(B) to possess a firearm or carry a concealed weapon. La. R.S. 14:95.1(A).

After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of all three crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. The trier of fact is charged to

make a credibility evaluation and may, within the bounds of rationality,

accept or reject the testimony of any witness, and a reviewing court accords

great deference to a fact finder’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of

a witness in whole or in part. Ramsey, supra; State v. Palmer, 45,627 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 1/26/11), 57 So. 3d 1099, writ denied, 11-0412 (La. 9/2/11), 68 7 So. 3d 526. Lee identified Riley as the person who shot her and killed

Hardin. Riley confessed to shooting a man on Singletary Street when he

spoke to Robinson, who testified to the same at trial, and he also admitted to

Robinson being in possession of the murder weapon. The State proved

Riley’s prior conviction for a felony crime of violence, as well as his

possession of a firearm on the date of the shooting and when he confessed to

being the shooter. As such, the State met its burden of proving Riley killed

Hardin, intended to kill Lee, and illegally possessed a firearm as a convicted

felon. Riley’s arguments as to the sufficiency of the evidence lack merit.

Admission of Other Crimes Evidence

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove

the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity

therewith. However, it may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof

of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,

absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused,

the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance

of trial, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial for

those purposes, or when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part

of the act that is the subject of the present proceeding. La. C.E. art. 404(B);

State v. Warren, 56,041 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/18/24), ____ So. 3d ____, 2024

WL 5149817; State v. Langston, 43,923 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/25/09), 3 So. 3d

707, writ denied, 09-0696 (La. 12/11/09), 23 So. 3d 912. In order to be

admissible under an exception listed in La. C.E. art. 404(B), the evidence

must have some independent relevance or be an element of the crime

charged and, further, must be a genuinely contested issue at trial. Langston,

supra. 8 The trial court articulated its reasons for finding the La. C.E. art.

404(B) evidence relevant apart from merely showing Riley’s bad character.

It found the evidence of Riley’s subsequent crimes tended to prove he had

the opportunity, intent, and preparation to possess a firearm as a convicted

felon, as well as the requisite knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or

accident. As the State noted, without Robinson’s testimony about Riley’s

attempt to shoot her, and his admission to being in possession of the murder

weapon, the State would not have been able to refute Riley’s attempts to

impeach Robinson with the recorded jail calls between the two when she

claimed to be with him in another location at the time of the shooting.

Further, the record supports the State’s argument that the probative value of

Robinson’s testimony outweighs the possible prejudicial effect. Finally, we

note no contemporaneous objection was made by the defense to the trial

court’s ruling on the State’s motion. For these reasons, the admission of this

other crimes evidence was not in error.

Even if the portion of Robinson’s testimony involving Riley’s attempt

to shoot her two days after the shooting of Hardin and Lee was not properly

admitted, the erroneous admission of other crimes evidence is subject to the

harmless error analysis. Langston, supra. The test for determining harmless

error is whether the reviewing court may conclude that the error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, or whether the guilty verdict actually

rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. Id. This record

supports that even without Robinson’s testimony about Riley trying to shoot

her, the evidence presented was more than sufficient to support each of

Riley’s convictions.

9 Riley does not contest the portion of Robinson’s statement wherein

Riley told Robinson he “shot a guy on Singletary, and he still had the gun in

the car with me.” Riley’s confession to committing the shooting on

Singletary Street, with a weapon still in his possession, would be admissible

as a statement against interest. La. C.E. art. 804(B)(3); State v. Mays,

51,552 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/16/17), 244 So. 3d 607, writ denied, 17-1640 (La.

5/25/18), 243 So. 3d 565; State v. Aulph, 47,966 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/13),

114 So. 3d 610.

For the reasons above, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Errors Patent

As Riley notes, the record does not show he was arraigned on the

charges for which he was tried and convicted. However, as pointed out by

the State, a failure to arraign the defendant is waived if the defendant

proceeds to trial without objecting. La. C. Cr. P. art. 555; State v. Flanagan,

32,535 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/29/99), 744 So. 2d 718. Since no objection was

made, any defect has been waived.

While Riley did not raise any errors in regard to his sentence, there is

an error patent regarding the trial court’s imposition of an illegally lenient

sentence. For Riley’s convictions for possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon, the trial court failed to impose the mandatory fine of not less than

$1,000, and not more than $5,000 pursuant to La. R.S. 14:95.1. An illegally

lenient sentence may be corrected at any time by the court that imposed the

sentence or by an appellate court on review. La. C. Cr. P. art. 882(A). This

court, however, is not required to take such action. State v. Dock, 49,784

(La. App. 2 Cir. 6/3/15), 167 So. 3d 1097, citing State v. Young, 46,575 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 9/21/11), 73 So. 3d 473, writ denied, 11-2304 (La. 3/9/12), 84 10 So. 3d 550. Since this court is not required to take action, the record

supports Riley was likely indigent, the state has not objected to the error, and

the defendant is not prejudiced in any way by the failure to impose the

mandatory fine, we decline to impose the fine. Id.; State v. Holmes, 48,535

(La. App. 2 Cir. 1/15/14), 130 So. 3d 999.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences of

Michael Riley.

AFFIRMED.