State of Louisiana v. Marcus Devon McCray

CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedFebruary 8, 2012
DocketKA-0011-0806
StatusUnknown

This text of State of Louisiana v. Marcus Devon McCray (State of Louisiana v. Marcus Devon McCray) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Louisiana v. Marcus Devon McCray, (La. Ct. App. 2012).

Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-806

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

MARCUS DEVON MCCRAY

********** APPEAL FROM THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF RAPIDES, DOCKET NO. 301,842 HONORABLE JOHN C. DAVIDSON, PRESIDING **********

SYLVIA R. COOKS JUDGE **********

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and Phyllis M. Keaty, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Beth S. Fontenot Louisiana Appellate Project P.O. Box 3183 Lake Charles, LA 70602-3183 (337) 491-3864 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: Marcus Devon McCray

James C. Downs, District Attorney Monique Y. Metoyer, Assistant District Attorney Ninth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides P.O. Drawer 1472 Alexandria, LA 71309 (318) 473-6650 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: State of Louisiana COOKS, Judge.

On Saturday, January 30, 2010, the Alexandria Police Department was

called to investigate the disappearance of Chiquina Robinson. The police were

called by Ms. Robinson’s family after family members went to her apartment and

questioned Defendant, Marcus Devon McCray, who was Ms. Robinson’s

boyfriend. After arrival, it was determined by police that the apartment was a

potential crime scene. Following a series of interviews with Defendant, he

confessed to killing the victim.

On April 29, 2010, Defendant was indicted by a grand jury for second

degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. Following a jury trial, Defendant

was found guilty as charged. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment at

hard labor, to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of

sentence.

Defendant is now before this court on appeal, challenging the sufficiency of

the evidence to support his conviction. Defendant also contends that the trial court

erred in denying his motion to suppress and motion for a mental examination and

the appointment of a sanity commission. For the following reasons, we affirm

Defendant’s conviction.

ANALYSIS

In his first assignment of error, Defendant argues the evidence was

insufficient to convict him of second degree murder. Defendant maintains the only

direct evidence of the circumstances surrounding an altercation between Defendant

and the victim was Defendant’s statement to police. He contends his statement

supports only a verdict of manslaughter--that he killed the victim in the heat of blood or sudden passion as a result of an intent formed during his struggle with the

victim. La.R.S. 14:31.

The analysis for a claim of insufficient evidence is well-settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

“Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and

circumstances from which elemental factors may be inferred according to reason,

experience and common sense.” State v. Burns, 441 So.2d 843, 845 (La.App. 3

Cir. 1983).

The statutory rule in evaluating the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence is, “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” La.R.S. 15:438. The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained the “hypothesis of innocence” stating:

Consequently, before a trier of fact can decide the ultimate question of whether a reasonable hypothesis of innocence exists in a criminal case based crucially on circumstantial evidence, a number of preliminary findings must be made. In addition to assessing the circumstantial evidence in light of the direct evidence, and vice versa, the trier of fact must decide what reasonable inferences may be drawn from the circumstantial evidence, the manner in which competing inferences should be resolved, reconciled or 2 compromised; and the weight and effect to be given to each permissible inference. From facts found from direct evidence and inferred from circumstantial evidence, the trier of fact should proceed, keeping in mind the relative strength and weakness of each inference and finding, to decide the ultimate question of whether this body of preliminary facts excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

State v. Johnson, 09-231, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/4/09), 21 So.3d 1159, 1164, writ

denied, 09-2643 (La. 5/21/10), 36 So.3d 230 (quoting State v. Chism, 436 So.2d

464, 469 (La.1983)).

Defendant was convicted of second degree murder, defined in La.R.S.

14:30.1, which reads in pertinent part:

A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being:

(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm . . . .

As noted by this court in State v. Corley, 97-235, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/8/97), 703

So.2d 653, 659, writ denied, 97-2845 (La. 3/13/98), 712 So.2d 875,

“Specific intent is the state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” State v. Carroll, 95-859, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/96), 670 So.2d 286, 288. “Specific criminal intent is a state of mind and need not be proven as fact, but may be inferred from the circumstances present in the case and from the action of the defendant.” Id. at 289. The severity of the attack on the victim is an indicator of the defendant’s specific intent to kill. State v. Myers, 584 So.2d 242 (La.App. 5 Cir.), writ denied, 588 So.2d 105 (La.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 912, 112 S.Ct. 1945, 118 L.Ed.2d 550 (1992); State v. Segura, 464 So.2d 1116 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 468 So.2d 1203 (La.1985).

Manslaughter is defined in La.R.S. 14:31(A)(1), as:

A homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 (first degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender's blood

3 had actually cooled, or that an average person's blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed; . . . .

At trial, Lashandra Wright, who was a good friend of the victim’s sister,

Necomie Johnson, testified that on Friday, January 29, 2010, she tried to call the

victim but did not get an answer. The following day, she received unusual text

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Related

Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1979)
State v. Myers
584 So. 2d 242 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1991)
State v. Kennerson
695 So. 2d 1367 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1997)
State v. Johnson.
21 So. 3d 1159 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2009)
State v. Richardson
425 So. 2d 1228 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1983)
State v. Runyon
916 So. 2d 407 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2005)
State v. Segura
464 So. 2d 1116 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1985)
State v. Carroll
670 So. 2d 286 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1996)
State Ex Rel. Graffagnino v. King
436 So. 2d 559 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1983)
State v. Chism
436 So. 2d 464 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1983)
State v. Corley
703 So. 2d 653 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1997)
State v. Duncan
420 So. 2d 1105 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1982)
State v. Moody
393 So. 2d 1212 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1981)
State v. Burns
441 So. 2d 843 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1983)

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