Judgment rendered February 26, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,170-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
LAUREN NGUYEN Appellant
Appealed from the Forty-Second Judicial District Court for the Parish of DeSoto, Louisiana Trial Court No. 23CR33771
Honorable Amy Burford McCartney, Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Douglas Lee Harville
LAUREN NGUYEN Pro Se
CHARLES B. ADAMS Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
EDWIN BLEWER, III ETHAN P. ARBUCKLE Assistant District Attorneys
Before PITMAN, THOMPSON, and ELLENDER, JJ. PITMAN, C. J.
Defendant Lauren Nguyen1 pled guilty to one count of possession
with the intent to distribute a Schedule II Controlled Dangerous Substance
(“CDS”), cocaine, in an amount less than 28 grams and to one count of
possession with the intent to distribute a Schedule I CDS, psilocin, in an
amount less than 28 grams. The trial court sentenced her to ten years at hard
labor for each count, with the sentences to run concurrently. She appeals her
sentences. For the following reasons, we affirm her convictions and
sentences and remand with instructions.
FACTS
On July 21, 2023, the state filed a bill of information charging
Defendant with one count of possession of a firearm or dangerous weapon in
conjunction with CDS in violation of La. R.S. 14:95(E); one count of
possession with the intent to distribute a Schedule II CDS in violation of La.
R.S. 40:967(A)(1) and (B)(1)(b); one count of possession with the intent to
distribute a Schedule I CDS in violation of La. R.S. 40:966(A)(1) and
(B)(1)(b); one count of possession with the intent to distribute a Schedule I
CDS in violation of La. R.S. 40:966(A)(1) and (B)(2)(a); and one count of
possession of a Schedule IV CDS in violation of La. R.S. 40:969(C). As to
Count 1, the state alleged that Defendant used, possessed or had in her
immediate control a 9mm pistol while in possession of cocaine. As to
Count 2, the state alleged that Defendant possessed with the intent to
distribute more than 28 grams of cocaine. As to Count 3, the state alleged
1 Throughout much of the record, Defendant is referred to as “Aniyah Blackwolf,” and she pled guilty under this name. Prior to sentencing, it was discovered that Defendant’s name is Lauren Nguyen. that Defendant possessed with the intent to distribute more than 28 grams of
psilocin. As to Count 4, the state alleged that Defendant distributed or
dispensed less than 2.5 pounds of marijuana. As to Count 5, the state
alleged that Defendant possessed alprazolam. The state alleged that these
actions occurred on or about June 9, 2023.
At a hearing on September 19, 2023, the state orally amended
Counts 2 and 3 to be less than 28 grams of cocaine and psilocin,
respectively. Defendant then pled guilty to Counts 2 and 3, and the state
dismissed the remaining charges. Sentencing was deferred until Defendant
completed the Louisiana Adult & Teen Challenge program.
A sentencing hearing was held on April 16, 2024. The trial court
stated that Defendant pled guilty under a false name, that she absconded
from the Louisiana Adult & Teen Challenge substance abuse program after
two days and that she was apprehended in Oklahoma. It reviewed the
presentence investigation report and discussed her personal history,
including that she was raised by a single mother; that she attended school
through the eleventh grade; and that she was placed in a group home at the
age of 17 due to being ungovernable; that she absconded from the group
home and that she was returned there after being arrested. Defendant
reported having depression, anxiety and bipolar disorder and that she was
sober after a history of alcohol, marijuana, cocaine and prescription drug
use. The trial court discussed her employment history, including that she
worked at a farm for two years and a bar for two months. In reviewing
Defendant’s criminal history, the trial court stated that she was a first-time
felony offender for the purpose of this sentencing but that in January and
February 2024, she pled guilty in Oklahoma to trafficking illegal drugs, 2 possession of a CDS with intent to distribute, use of a firearm while
committing a felony and escape from a juvenile detention facility, all of
which offenses she committed in 2019. Defendant then made a statement in
which she noted that she was 23 years old and asked the trial court to allow
her the chance “to get [her] life together,” obtain a GED and pursue being an
esthetician. The trial court stated that it considered the La. C. Cr. P.
art. 894.1 sentencing guidelines and determined that a lesser sentence would
deprecate the seriousness of Defendant’s crimes. It explained that
Defendant lied to law enforcement and the court for months about her
identity, likely because she had outstanding felony warrants in Oklahoma
and that she absconded from a substance abuse treatment facility after two
days. It sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of ten years at hard
labor as to Count 2 and ten years at hard labor as to Count 3, with credit for
time served, and referred her for substance abuse treatment, mental health
treatment and the completion of her GED while in custody.
On May 2, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence and
argued that the maximum sentence is excessive. A hearing on the motion
was held on May 29, 2024. The trial court denied the motion but noted that
it took into consideration at the time of sentencing the considerations
requested in the motion.
Defendant appeals her sentences.
DISCUSSION
In her sole assignment of error, Defendant argues that the trial court
imposed excessive sentences. She contends that the statutory maximum
sentences are constitutionally harsh and merely punitive. She states that she
was 23 years old when sentenced, that she has no arrests or convictions for 3 crimes of violence and that she has a history of mental illness, for which she
self-medicated with illegal substances. Although she agrees that her actions
merit punishment, she argues that she is not the worst of the worst of
narcotics-related offenders. She contends that there is little reason to believe
she will be a threat to society when released from prison and that with
proper treatment, she is unlikely to commit future crimes. She requests that
this court vacate her sentences and remand for resentencing.
The state argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when
sentencing Defendant. It contends that by absconding from the substance
abuse treatment program, Defendant has shown that she cannot adhere to
rules and presents a risk that she would commit another crime if the court
imposed a suspended sentence or probation. It argues that the trial court
properly considered the seriousness of the crimes, specifically that
distribution surpasses the seriousness of personal harm, and that Defendant
enriched herself while harming others.
An appellate court utilizes a two-pronged test in reviewing a sentence
for excessiveness. First, the record must show that the trial court complied
with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State v.
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Judgment rendered February 26, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,170-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
LAUREN NGUYEN Appellant
Appealed from the Forty-Second Judicial District Court for the Parish of DeSoto, Louisiana Trial Court No. 23CR33771
Honorable Amy Burford McCartney, Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Douglas Lee Harville
LAUREN NGUYEN Pro Se
CHARLES B. ADAMS Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
EDWIN BLEWER, III ETHAN P. ARBUCKLE Assistant District Attorneys
Before PITMAN, THOMPSON, and ELLENDER, JJ. PITMAN, C. J.
Defendant Lauren Nguyen1 pled guilty to one count of possession
with the intent to distribute a Schedule II Controlled Dangerous Substance
(“CDS”), cocaine, in an amount less than 28 grams and to one count of
possession with the intent to distribute a Schedule I CDS, psilocin, in an
amount less than 28 grams. The trial court sentenced her to ten years at hard
labor for each count, with the sentences to run concurrently. She appeals her
sentences. For the following reasons, we affirm her convictions and
sentences and remand with instructions.
FACTS
On July 21, 2023, the state filed a bill of information charging
Defendant with one count of possession of a firearm or dangerous weapon in
conjunction with CDS in violation of La. R.S. 14:95(E); one count of
possession with the intent to distribute a Schedule II CDS in violation of La.
R.S. 40:967(A)(1) and (B)(1)(b); one count of possession with the intent to
distribute a Schedule I CDS in violation of La. R.S. 40:966(A)(1) and
(B)(1)(b); one count of possession with the intent to distribute a Schedule I
CDS in violation of La. R.S. 40:966(A)(1) and (B)(2)(a); and one count of
possession of a Schedule IV CDS in violation of La. R.S. 40:969(C). As to
Count 1, the state alleged that Defendant used, possessed or had in her
immediate control a 9mm pistol while in possession of cocaine. As to
Count 2, the state alleged that Defendant possessed with the intent to
distribute more than 28 grams of cocaine. As to Count 3, the state alleged
1 Throughout much of the record, Defendant is referred to as “Aniyah Blackwolf,” and she pled guilty under this name. Prior to sentencing, it was discovered that Defendant’s name is Lauren Nguyen. that Defendant possessed with the intent to distribute more than 28 grams of
psilocin. As to Count 4, the state alleged that Defendant distributed or
dispensed less than 2.5 pounds of marijuana. As to Count 5, the state
alleged that Defendant possessed alprazolam. The state alleged that these
actions occurred on or about June 9, 2023.
At a hearing on September 19, 2023, the state orally amended
Counts 2 and 3 to be less than 28 grams of cocaine and psilocin,
respectively. Defendant then pled guilty to Counts 2 and 3, and the state
dismissed the remaining charges. Sentencing was deferred until Defendant
completed the Louisiana Adult & Teen Challenge program.
A sentencing hearing was held on April 16, 2024. The trial court
stated that Defendant pled guilty under a false name, that she absconded
from the Louisiana Adult & Teen Challenge substance abuse program after
two days and that she was apprehended in Oklahoma. It reviewed the
presentence investigation report and discussed her personal history,
including that she was raised by a single mother; that she attended school
through the eleventh grade; and that she was placed in a group home at the
age of 17 due to being ungovernable; that she absconded from the group
home and that she was returned there after being arrested. Defendant
reported having depression, anxiety and bipolar disorder and that she was
sober after a history of alcohol, marijuana, cocaine and prescription drug
use. The trial court discussed her employment history, including that she
worked at a farm for two years and a bar for two months. In reviewing
Defendant’s criminal history, the trial court stated that she was a first-time
felony offender for the purpose of this sentencing but that in January and
February 2024, she pled guilty in Oklahoma to trafficking illegal drugs, 2 possession of a CDS with intent to distribute, use of a firearm while
committing a felony and escape from a juvenile detention facility, all of
which offenses she committed in 2019. Defendant then made a statement in
which she noted that she was 23 years old and asked the trial court to allow
her the chance “to get [her] life together,” obtain a GED and pursue being an
esthetician. The trial court stated that it considered the La. C. Cr. P.
art. 894.1 sentencing guidelines and determined that a lesser sentence would
deprecate the seriousness of Defendant’s crimes. It explained that
Defendant lied to law enforcement and the court for months about her
identity, likely because she had outstanding felony warrants in Oklahoma
and that she absconded from a substance abuse treatment facility after two
days. It sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of ten years at hard
labor as to Count 2 and ten years at hard labor as to Count 3, with credit for
time served, and referred her for substance abuse treatment, mental health
treatment and the completion of her GED while in custody.
On May 2, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence and
argued that the maximum sentence is excessive. A hearing on the motion
was held on May 29, 2024. The trial court denied the motion but noted that
it took into consideration at the time of sentencing the considerations
requested in the motion.
Defendant appeals her sentences.
DISCUSSION
In her sole assignment of error, Defendant argues that the trial court
imposed excessive sentences. She contends that the statutory maximum
sentences are constitutionally harsh and merely punitive. She states that she
was 23 years old when sentenced, that she has no arrests or convictions for 3 crimes of violence and that she has a history of mental illness, for which she
self-medicated with illegal substances. Although she agrees that her actions
merit punishment, she argues that she is not the worst of the worst of
narcotics-related offenders. She contends that there is little reason to believe
she will be a threat to society when released from prison and that with
proper treatment, she is unlikely to commit future crimes. She requests that
this court vacate her sentences and remand for resentencing.
The state argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when
sentencing Defendant. It contends that by absconding from the substance
abuse treatment program, Defendant has shown that she cannot adhere to
rules and presents a risk that she would commit another crime if the court
imposed a suspended sentence or probation. It argues that the trial court
properly considered the seriousness of the crimes, specifically that
distribution surpasses the seriousness of personal harm, and that Defendant
enriched herself while harming others.
An appellate court utilizes a two-pronged test in reviewing a sentence
for excessiveness. First, the record must show that the trial court complied
with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983). The
trial court need not articulate every aggravating and mitigating circumstance
outlined in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, but the record must reflect that it
adequately considered these guidelines in particularizing the sentence to the
defendant. Id. The important elements the trial court should consider are
the defendant’s personal history, prior criminal record, seriousness of
offense and the likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049
(La. 1981). There is no requirement that specific matters be given any
4 particular weight at sentencing. State v. DeBerry, 50,501 (La. App. 2 Cir.
4/13/16), 194 So. 3d 657, writ denied, 16-0959 (La. 5/1/17), 219 So. 3d 332.
Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is
constitutionally excessive. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is
grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more
than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v.
Smith, 01-2574 (La. 1/14/03), 839 So. 2d 1, citing State v. Bonanno,
384 So. 2d 355 (La. 1980).
The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences
within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as
excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Abercrumbia, 412 So. 2d 1027 (La. 1982). On review, an appellate court
does not determine whether another sentence may have been more
appropriate but whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v.
Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7, citing State v. Cook,
95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So. 2d 957.
La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1)(a) states that a defendant convicted of
possession of a Schedule II CDS, cocaine, in an amount less than 28 grams
shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not less than one year
nor more than ten years and may, in addition, be required to pay a fine of not
more than fifty thousand dollars.
La. R.S. 40:966(B)(1)(a) states that a defendant convicted of
possession with the intent to distribute a Schedule I CDS, psilocin, in an
amount less than 28 grams, shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor,
for not less than one year nor more than ten years and may, in addition, be
required to pay a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars. 5 The trial court did not abuse its discretion when sentencing Defendant
to concurrent ten-year sentences. The trial court complied with La. C. Cr. P.
art. 894.1 by considering these guidelines and particularizing the sentences
to Defendant. It detailed Defendant’s personal history, prior criminal record,
the seriousness of the offense and her likelihood of rehabilitation. The trial
court emphasized that Defendant provided a false identity, likely to prevent
discovery of her juvenile and adult criminal records in Oklahoma, and
absconded from a substance abuse treatment facility within days of
reporting.
Although the trial court imposed the statutory maximum sentences,
these sentences are not grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the
offenses and are not a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and
suffering. Defendant received benefits from the state dismissing three
charges pursuant to her guilty plea; from the amendment of Counts 2 and 3
to be less than 28 grams of the CDS, which lessened her sentencing
exposure from 20 years to 10 years; and from the trial court ordering her
sentences to run concurrently. She also benefited from not being sentenced
as a multiple-felony offender once her true identity and Oklahoma felony
convictions were discovered. As stated by Defendant at her resentencing
hearing, her parole date is April 27, 2027, i.e., 3 years from her sentencing
date. The trial court noted that Defendant’s completion of available
programming through the Department of Corrections, including substance
abuse treatment, could lead to an earlier parole date.
Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.
ERRORS PATENT
A review of the record raises two errors patent. 6 The minute entry on April 16, 2024, incorrectly states that Defendant
was charged under La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1)(b) as to Count 2 and under La.
R.S. 40:966(B)(1)(b) as to Count 3. At a hearing on September 19, 2023,
the state orally amended Counts 2 and 3 to be less than 28 grams of cocaine
and psilocin, respectively, which changed the applicable sentencing statutes.
After the charges were amended, the applicable statutes were La.
R.S. 40:967(B)(1)(a) as to Count 2 and under La. R.S. 40:966(B)(1)(a) as to
Count 3.
Similarly, Defendant’s Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order
incorrectly states that she was sentenced under La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1)(b) as
to Count 2 and under La. R.S. 40:966(B)(1)(b) as to Count 3. As discussed
above, the trial court sentenced Defendant under La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1)(a) as
to Count 2 and under La. R.S. 40:966(B)(1)(a) as to Count 3.
Accordingly, we instruct the trial court to amend the minute entry and
the Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order to include the correct
sentencing statutes.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences of
Defendant Lauren Nguyen and remand this case to the trial court with
instructions to correct the minute entry and the Uniform Sentencing
Commitment Order.
AFFIRMED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.