Judgment rendered March 9, 2022. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 54,236-KA No. 54,237-KA (Consolidated Cases)
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
KEUNTREL RAYSHUN KNIGHT Appellant
Appealed from the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Bossier, Louisiana Trial Court Nos. 222,256 and 222,256-A
Honorable A. Parker Self, Jr., Judge
GILLEY & GILLEY Counsel for Appellant By: Patricia A. Gilley Tristan P. Gilley
J. SCHUYLER MARVIN Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
JOHN MICHAEL LAWRENCE ANDREW JACOBS RICHARD R. RAY Assistant District Attorneys
Before PITMAN, COX, and O’CALLAGHAN (Pro Tempore), JJ. PITMAN, J.
Defendant Keuntrel Rayshun Knight appeals the imposition of his
sentences of 35 years at hard labor after a guilty plea to a charge of
manslaughter and 12 years at hard labor after a guilty plea to a charge of
attempted manslaughter. For the following reasons, we affirm his
convictions, amend his sentences and, as amended, affirm.
FACTS
On July 30, 2017, at 1:00 a.m., Reese Williams, Sr. (“Williams”),
drove with his two children to the home of their mother, Nicorya Chisley, in
Bossier Parish, Louisiana. Williams entered the house, but left the children
in the car parked in Chisley’s driveway. Chisley was home with Defendant,
her boyfriend of two weeks. An altercation occurred, and Defendant, who
was armed, fired his gun five times and shot Williams twice in the torso
while he was in the house. Williams ran outside; Defendant fired one shot
outside of the home. That bullet struck five-year-old Reese Williams, Jr.
(“Reese”), who was sitting in his car seat, and killed him. Williams
survived.
Defendant was charged by bill of information with attempted second
degree murder of Williams, in violation of La. R.S. 14:27 and La.
R.S. 14:30.1, Docket No. 222,256-A, and by indictment with the second
degree murder of Reese, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1), Docket
No. 222,256. On January 22, 2020, a Bossier Parish assistant district
attorney (“ADA”) filed a motion for joinder of causes so that the two cases
could be tried together. The motion was granted.
The trial was set for January 27, 2020, but on that day, discussions
were held and Defendant was offered a plea agreement whereby the ADA would reduce the charges to attempted manslaughter and manslaughter in
exchange for a guilty plea. Defendant’s attorneys believed that a cap was to
be placed on the amount of time Defendant would be required to serve if he
pled guilty to the charges, but this discussion was never placed on record,
and the ADA claimed that stipulation had never been made.
The transcript of the guilty plea, with both Patricia Gilley and Tristan
Gilley representing Defendant, states as follows:
MR. GILLEY: The State’s tendered an offer in exchange for a guilty plea. There would be an amended charge of Manslaughter and Attempted Manslaughter. And those would be run concurrently. The Judge, we order a PSI [presentence investigation].
THE COURT: All right. Is Mr. Knight prepared to take that amended.
MR. GILLEY: We’re going to enter a guilty plea.
MS. GILLEY: With the understanding that there would be a PSI and-
THE COURT: And the Court would share that PSI with you and with the District Attorney and then we would sentence Mr. Knight in accordance with that.
MS. GILLEY: Your Honor, at this time would you be in a position to say-put a cap on what you would expect.
THE COURT: I don’t put caps. They put caps on.
MR. RAY: No. The State would object to any cap on this. That’s not been the offer. That’s never been the offer.
THE COURT: Yeah, they put caps on. We’ve had discussions, but those discussions, of course, are off the record. And so, that’s where we are.
MR. GILLEY: And, Your Honor, you would, review any sentencing memorandum we would file.
THE COURT: A sentencing memorandum? I would be happy for you- - I’ve had sentencing hearings, so I’m open to those. You’ve been with me for those-Well, nine of my 17 years here- ...
2 -and know how we proceed in this courtroom.
MR. GILLEY: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right, where are we, counselors?
MS. GILLEY: Your Honor, I believe that Mr. Knight has decided to go ahead and take the plea offer.
...
MR. RAY: Yes. Yes, Your Honor. . . . I guess what we’re going to do is under docket number 222,256 we will amend Second Degree Murder to Manslaughter, which the amended Revised Statute will be 14:31. And then under 222,256A the Attempted Second Degree Murder, I guess, the attempt is already in it, so that’s 14:27 is the Attempt and then Manslaughter is, again, 14:31.
During the district attorney’s (“DA”) statement of the facts of the
case, Defendant admitted that there were fewer than seven shots fired and
that at least one shot fired outside the house resulted in the death of the
minor child. After the guilty plea colloquy, Defendant pled guilty to both
charges and did not reserve any nonjurisdictional errors or objections for
appeal.
On June 27, 2020, after the PSI was provided to the trial court, a
sentencing hearing was held at which Defendant’s attorney called many
people to the stand, including Defendant, in an attempt to show mitigating
factors for the court to consider in sentencing. After Defendant’s attorney
presented over an hour of statements, the state presented Williams and his
mother, Patricia Williams, to make victim impact statements. Defendant was
not allowed to ask these witnesses any questions. The victims asked the
court to impose the maximum sentence of 40 years. The state also argued
that the trial court should impose maximum sentences.
3 The trial court stated that it had reviewed the PSI and considered
factors found in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. It considered mitigating and
aggravating factors associated with Defendant, including his young age at
the time of the commission of the crime and that it was his first felony
offense. It also discussed his home life and his attempts to engage in a
professional career. It further noted that Defendant was the father of three
children of his own. It considered that the crime involved the use of a
handgun and that very serious consequences resulted from the poor decision
Defendant made in using that gun.
Having considered all of the pertinent facts, the trial court sentenced
Defendant to 35 years for the manslaughter of Reese and 12 years for the
attempted manslaughter of Williams, to be served concurrently. It failed to
state that the sentences were without benefit of probation or suspension of
sentence.
On July 22, 2020, Defendant’s attorney filed a motion to reconsider
sentence pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 881.1 in Docket No. 222,256-A, the
case concerning attempted manslaughter, but did not file a separate motion
in Docket No. 222,256. Defendant alleged that the DA and/or his ADA
were directly or indirectly guilty of prosecutorial misconduct resulting in
due process violations, which affected not only the sentence imposed, but
the overall fairness of the judgment in the case, including the sentence.
Defendant also alleged that the DA and ADA threatened Chisley, a key
witness in the murder case, by telling her that she would end up in prison
with her boyfriend if she did not change her story as to the facts of the fatal
incident. He further alleged that the DA and ADA conspired with Williams
and his mother, Patricia Williams, to threaten Chisley to change her version 4 of the facts. He also alleged that the trial court had entered into an
agreement with him that it would not impose a sentence of more than
20 years, that it did not keep its word and denied having entered into the
agreement and that it violated other rights of Defendant by not allowing him
to rebut adverse information in the PSI and letters written by members of the
Williams family. Further, he alleged that the trial court prevented him from
asking Chisley any questions at the sentencing hearing, which violated his
right to due process. He also claimed that the sentences imposed were
constitutionally excessive.
On July 30, 2020, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration
of sentence. A motion for appeal was filed in Docket No. 222,256-A, but
the order was granted in Docket No. 222,256. The motion for appeal in
Docket No. 222,256-A raised issues pertaining only to the sentences
imposed. Because the sentences for both crimes were imposed at the same
time, this court will review the sentences imposed for both manslaughter and
attempted manslaughter.
On August 11, 2020, the DA filed a rule to show cause why
Defendant’s attorney should not be held in contempt for filing the motion to
reconsider sentence that contained insulting, abusive, discourteous or false
language constituting direct contempt accusing the DA, ADA and even the
trial judge of engaging in serious breaches of professional conduct.
Defendant’s attorney filed a motion to dismiss the rule to show cause, and a
hearing was held on September 23, 2020, at which the trial court denied the
motion to dismiss the rule. However, it also recused itself from any further
proceedings since a portion of the motion to reconsider sentence, upon
5 which the rule for contempt was based, concerned allegations related to the
trial judge.
A hearing was held on September 30, 2020, according to the minutes
of the record, which are the only evidence that a second hearing was held on
the matter by a different judge. The minutes of that hearing state that
Defendant’s attorney was found to be in direct contempt and was ordered to
pay sanctions of penalty in the amount of $100 within seven days. She
refused to pay and was booked into the parish jail, where she remained for a
short period of time until someone else paid the $100. No appeal was taken
from the contempt ruling, and there is no evidence of the contempt hearing
except in the minutes of the record of the appeal currently before this court.
Defendant appeals his sentences.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court breached its
agreement to sentence him to no more than 20 years for the crimes to which
he pled guilty; and, thus, his guilty pleas are constitutionally infirm, and he
should be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas and proceed to trial. He also
argues that the DA and ADA violated his constitutional and statutory rights,
as well as their own prosecutor’s code of professional conduct, and that the
sentences must be revoked. He further argues that the sentences imposed of
35 years and 12 years, to be served concurrently, are constitutionally
excessive.
Violation of a Plea Agreement
Defendant argues that the trial court breached a plea agreement to
sentence him to no more than 20 years and that this breach rendered his
guilty pleas constitutionally infirm and subject to withdrawal. 6 The state argues that the record clearly contradicts the claim that the
trial court breached any plea agreement. It points out that nowhere in the
extensive record of the proceedings, which included numerous pretrial and
post-trial hearings, is there any confirmation of a cap on sentencing of
20 years and that it would never agree to a cap in this situation. It argues
that Defendant received a considerable benefit from the plea bargain
agreement when the charges were reduced from second degree murder of the
juvenile and attempted murder of Williams to manslaughter and attempted
manslaughter, respectively. It also argues that the sentences were left to the
discretion of the trial court, that the trial court had the benefit of a PSI, that
the trial court gave reasons for the sentences imposed and that the sentences
were within the sentencing range of the pled offenses.
A guilty plea is invalid when the defendant is induced to plead guilty
by a plea agreement or by what the defendant reasonably believes is a plea
agreement and the terms of the bargain are not satisfied. State v. Hall,
637 So. 2d 645 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1994), writ denied, 94-1373 (La. 9/30/94),
642 So. 2d 868.
Where a defendant’s misunderstanding is not induced by or attributed
to representations made by the district attorney or the trial court, there are no
grounds for withdrawal of the plea. State v. Hall, supra. In the absence of
fraud, intimidation or incompetence of counsel, a guilty plea is not made less
voluntary or less informed by the considered advice of counsel. Id.
A misunderstanding between counsel and defendant does not have the same
implication as a breached plea bargain and does not render the guilty plea
not “free and voluntary”; nor is dissatisfaction with the sentence or expected
sentence after sentencing sufficient to invalidate a guilty plea if the plea was 7 entered into on advice of competent counsel and there is no indication that a
plea agreement had been broken. State v. Banks, 49,767 (La. App. 2 Cir.
4/15/15), 163 So. 3d 895, citing State v. Senterfitt, 00-415 (La. App. 3 Cir.
9/27/00), 771 So. 2d 198, writ denied, 00-2980 (La. 9/28/01), 798 So. 2d
107.
The transcript of the guilty plea hearing shows that no one other than
perhaps Defendant’s counsel was under the impression that a plea bargain
agreement limiting his sentence to 20 years had been made, and the record
does not explain how counsel remained confused. When the attorney
broached the subject with the trial court, it clearly stated that there would be
no cap placed on the sentences. The trial court stated that it did not take that
action, and the ADA protested that he would never enter into such an
agreement under the circumstances of this case. Even though these
assertions that no such 20-year cap existed were made in open court,
Defendant pled guilty to the reduced charges of manslaughter and attempted
manslaughter while knowing that a PSI had been ordered and that the trial
court would consider the PSI and any sentencing memoranda filed by his
attorney when determining his sentences.
Defendant’s misunderstanding was not induced by or attributed to
representations made by the ADA or the trial court. There was no fraud or
intimidation which induced him to plead guilty. There are no grounds for
withdrawal of the guilty pleas, which were freely and voluntarily given.
For these reasons, this assignment of error is without merit.
Alleged Misconduct of the DA and ADA
Defendant argues that the DA and ADA violated his constitutional
and statutory rights, as well as the prosecutor’s code of conduct. He bases 8 this assertion on two separate arguments, the first of which is that the DA’s
office intimidated or threatened Chisley, the mother of the deceased child.
The state responds to Defendant’s argument by asserting that there is
no evidence, inside or outside the record, that indicates there was a violation
of Code of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8, concerning special
responsibilities of a prosecutor. Further, it contends that the same
allegations were adjudicated at the contempt hearing and were found to be
without merit. That judgment was not appealed and is now final.
La. C. Cr. P. art. 881.2 concerns review of sentence and states in
pertinent part as follows:
A. (1) The defendant may appeal or seek review of a sentence based on any ground asserted in a motion to reconsider sentence. The defendant also may seek review of a sentence which exceeds the maximum sentence authorized by the statute under which the defendant was convicted and any applicable statutory enhancement provisions.
(2) The defendant cannot appeal or seek review of a sentence imposed in conformity with a plea agreement which was set forth in the record at the time of the plea.
The issue of alleged intimidation by the DA and ADA of the deceased
child’s mother was raised by Defendant’s motion for reconsideration of
sentence and cannot be reviewed in the context of this appeal currently
before our court. In response to the motion to reconsider sentence in the trial
court, the DA filed a rule to show cause why Defendant’s attorney should
not be held in contempt because the motion contained insulting, abusive,
discourteous or false language constituting direct contempt. The contempt
hearing was held after the notice of appeal was filed. There is no transcript
of the hearing or a signed order. The only reference to the contempt hearing
in the record is found in the minutes. Apparently, the trial court, which
9 heard the contempt matter, agreed that the allegations against the DA and
ADA were insulting, abusive, discourteous or false since Defendant’s
attorney was found to be in contempt. No appeal was taken from the
decision to hold her in contempt; therefore, this issue is not currently before
this court for review.
The second argument of this assignment of error is that the DA’s
office interfered with Defendant’s ability to call witnesses at his sentencing
hearing. He asserts that he was not allowed to confront his accusers when
the victims made their impact statements to the trial court regarding the
sentences to be imposed. He also argues that the trial court denied him the
right to confront the witnesses against him when it did not allow him to
question Williams or his mother, the grandmother of the deceased child,
when they gave their impact statements.
Defendant argues that by denying him the right to confront witnesses
against him in the sentencing phase and refusing to allow him to develop the
mitigating circumstances important to his sentencing, the DA and ADA
violated Rule 3.8 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, entitled “Special
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor,” which provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(d) Make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that the prosecutor knows, or reasonably should know, either tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal[.]
10 La. C. Cr. P. art. 881.3 concerning the record on review of the
sentence states as follows:
In reviewing a sentence, the appellate court may consider the record of the case which shall include any evidence or relevant information introduced at preliminary hearings, hearings on motions, arraignments, or sentencing proceedings, and any relevant information included in a presentence investigation report filed into the record at sentencing. In order to preserve confidentiality, in appropriate cases, the court may order that the presentence report, or any portion thereof, be held under seal.
The sentencing hearing transcript shows that Defendant was allowed
to present many witnesses who testified to his good character and nature.
Further, Defendant’s mother was called to testify that she and the deceased
child’s mother had a good relationship after the incident. Defendant was
allowed to make a statement to the trial court expressing his remorse for
what had occurred and the result of his actions. He presented a statement
indicating that he was acting in self-defense.
The U.S. Constitution requires that a guilty plea be recorded showing
that the defendant was informed of and waived his constitutional right
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury and the
right to confront one’s accusers. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct.
1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969); State v. Russell, 46,426 (La. App. 2 Cir.
8/17/11), 73 So. 3d 991, writ denied, 11-2020 (La. 2/10/12), 82 So. 3d 270.
In a felony case, a court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first
addressing the defendant personally in open court and informing him of, and
determining that he understands, inter alia, the right to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him. La. C. Cr. P. art. 556.1(A)(3).
In this case, the trial court informed Defendant of his constitutional
right to confront his accusers before his decision to plead guilty. The trial 11 court specifically told him that by pleading guilty he waived the rights
provided by Boykin, supra. The safeguards provided by the Boykin colloquy
protect defendants during the guilty phase of trial and do not apply to
situations when victims are making their impact statements at sentencing.
Defendants are not allowed to confront their victims when they have already
pled guilty to the crimes against them.
Defendant pled guilty to the charges of manslaughter and attempted
manslaughter. The testimony presented by Defendant at the sentencing
hearing raised no substantial issues regarding the free and voluntary nature
of the guilty plea. There is no proof in the record that the actions of the DA
and ADA violated Defendant’s statutory or constitutional rights or the Rules
of Professional Conduct by withholding exculpatory evidence at the guilty
phase of the trial or at sentencing.
For the foregoing reasons, this assignment of error lacks merit.
Excessive Sentence
Defendant claims his sentences of 35 years and 12 years, to be served
concurrently, are excessive and that the trial court failed to take into
consideration the mitigating circumstances he attempted to develop at the
sentencing hearing, but was prevented from doing.
The state argues that the sentences imposed by the trial court are fair
and are not excessive and withstand constitutional review.
An appellate court utilizes a two-pronged test in reviewing a sentence
for excessiveness. First, the record must show that the trial court took
cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial judge
is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance so long
as the record reflects that he adequately considered the guidelines of the 12 article. State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. Meadows, 51,843
(La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/18), 246 So. 3d 639, writ denied, 18-0259 (La.
10/29/18), 254 So. 3d 1208. The articulation of the factual basis for a
sentence is the goal of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, not rigid or mechanical
compliance with its provisions. Where the record clearly shows an adequate
factual basis for the sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary even where
there has not been full compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State v.
Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475 (La. 1982); State v. Meadows, supra. The
important elements which should be considered are the defendant’s personal
history (age, family ties, marital status, health, employment record), prior
criminal record, seriousness of the offense and the likelihood of
rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1981); State v.
Meadows, supra. There is no requirement that specific matters be given any
particular weight at sentencing. State v. Meadows, supra; State v. Shumaker,
41,547 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/13/06), 945 So. 2d 277, writ denied, 07-0144 (La.
9/28/07), 964 So. 2d 351.
Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is
constitutionally excessive. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is
grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more
than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v.
Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Bonanno, 384 So. 2d 355 (La.
1980). A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime
and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the
sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d
166; State v. Meadows, supra.
13 As a general rule, maximum or near maximum sentences are reserved
for the worst offenders and the worst offenses. State v. Woods, 41,420 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 11/1/06), 942 So. 2d 658, writs denied, 06-2768, 06-2781 (La.
6/22/07), 959 So. 2d 494. However, in cases where the defendant has pled
guilty to an offense which does not adequately describe his conduct, the
general rule does not apply and the trial court has great discretion in
imposing the maximum sentence possible for the pled offense. This is
particularly true in cases where a significant reduction in potential exposure
to confinement has been obtained through a plea bargain and the offense
involves violence upon a victim. State v. Meadows, supra; State v.
McKinney, 43,061 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/13/08), 976 So. 2d 802.
La. C. Cr. P. art. 14:31(B) provides that a person found guilty of
manslaughter:
[s]hall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than forty years. However, if the victim killed was under the age of ten years, the offender shall be imprisoned at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, for not less than ten years nor more than forty years.
La. C. Cr. P. art. 14:27(D)(3), which provides the penalties when a
person is found guilty of attempted crimes, states that he:
[s]hall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court took notice of the
information provided in the PSI, as well as other documentation which had
been submitted to it for sentencing purposes. It stated that pursuant to the
plea bargain agreement, it had the task of determining the length of the
sentences. It also stated that it had reread the statutes related to conviction 14 and reread La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, setting forth the factors to be considered
in sentencing. It noted that this was a very serious crime that resulted in the
death of a young child and that the offender created a risk of death or great
bodily harm to more than one person. Defendant utilized a dangerous
weapon in the commission of the offense, and any reasonable person could
have anticipated the consequences of these actions.
The trial court cited the PSI and stated that there were mitigating
factors to be considered, including Defendant’s young age and that this was
his first felony offense. It considered Defendant’s social history by stating
that although Defendant’s father was a convicted felon, his mother provided
him with a good and stable home and encouraged him to do well in school.
Defendant was a church member and worked in the medical community
rendering assistance. He is the father of three children, one of whom he
supports. Defendant expressed his remorse for his actions, which resulted in
the death of the child.
After considering and discussing the factors found in La. C. Cr. P.
art. 894.1 and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the trial court
sentenced Defendant to 35 years for manslaughter and 12 years for
attempted manslaughter, to be served concurrently. It failed to include that
the sentences were to be served without benefit of probation or suspension
of sentence.
According to La. R.S. 14:31, the maximum sentence for manslaughter
is 40 years in prison; and the maximum sentence for attempted manslaughter
is 20 years in prison. In sentencing Defendant to 35 and 12 years, the trial
court greatly reduced the number of years to which Defendant could have
been sentenced had he not agreed to accept the plea bargain agreement. 15 The sentences are not grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of
the offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of
pain and suffering. They do not shock or offend the sense of justice.
For the foregoing reasons, this assignment of error is without merit.
Error Patent
We note that there is an error patent in the record. The trial court
failed to state that Defendant’s sentences are to be served without benefit of
probation or suspension of sentence as provided in La. R.S. 14:31(B). That
statute is self-activating and makes the denial of benefits self-operative.
State v. Williams, 00-1725 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So. 2d 790; State v. Neely,
35,993 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/8/02), 818 So. 2d 829.
Defendant’s sentences are amended to reflect that they are to be
served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence and, as
amended, are affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The convictions of Defendant Keuntrel Rayshun Knight are affirmed.
The sentences of Defendant are amended to include that they are imposed
without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence and, as amended, are
affirmed.
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES AMENDED AND,
AS AMENDED, AFFIRMED.