KJYM'I'lWAV §
SEP 2 0 2024 Judgment Rendered:
On Appeal from the 22nd Judicial District Court Parish of St. Tammany, State of Louisiana Trial Court No. 592919
J. Collin Sims Attorneys for Appellee, District Attorney State of Louisiana Matthew Caplan Assistant District Attorney Covington, Louisiana
Jane L. Beebe
Kessler King Addis, Louana
BEFORE: WOLFE, MILLER, AND GREENE, JJ.
jr + later withdrew that plea and entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Thereafter, the trial court denied the defendant' s motion to suppress his confession.
The defendant was tried by a Jury and found guilty as charged.' The trial court
denied the defendant' s motion for new trial and motion for post -verdict Judgment of
acquittal. The trial court imposed a sentence of eighteen years imprisonment at hard
labor, suspended five years of the sentence, and placed the defendant on superviseM
probation for three years, upon his release from imprisonment, with general and
special conditions. The defendant now appeals, assigning error to the admission of
prejudicial" evidence, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the denial of his motion
to suppress. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction, vacate t1s,
who went to the computer area and remained there all morning'. After Moore went hiram
n her lunch break and the other patron left, the defendant asked Atkins to help ind a book. When Atkins walked to the back • the library to show him where th:
book was located, the defendant grabbed her around her neck and dragged her
towards the bathroom, as she screamed for help. The defendant told Atkins to shut
1 Before the trial, the defendant' s attorney filed a motion to test the defendant' s mental capacity. The trial court appointed a sanity commission, and the defendant was found competent to proceed to trial.
PA Moore heard Atkins screaming, assisted her out of the library, and called 911.
Officers of the Folsom Police Department responded to the scene and observed till
defendant still inside of the library, sitting at a computer desk. The defendant stood
bathroom. He was then taken into custody.
in assignment of error number two, the defendant argues the evidence
ritresented at trial only proved a simple kidnapping or an attempted rape, at best, A?
was insufficient to support the conviction of second degree kidnapping.
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could
conclude that the State proved the essential elements of the crime beyond I
La. 11/ 29/ 06), 946 So.2d 654, 660; State v. Welch, 2019- 0826 ( La. App. I st Cir.
The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821, is an objective
standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, A reasonable doubt. Welck 297 So3d at 27. When a conviction is based on botM
2 When issues are raised on appeal as to the sufficiency of the evidence and as to one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first assess the sufficiency of the evidence. See State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731, 734 ( La. 1992). When the entirety of the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, the accused must be discharged as to that crime, and any discussion of trial error issues as to that crime would be pure dicta since those issues are moot. However, when the entirety of the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, the accused is not entitled to an acquittal, and the reviewing court must then consider the other assignments of error to determine whether the accused is entitled to a new trial. State v. Germany, 2021- 1614 ( La. App. I st Cir. 9/ 26/ 22), 353 So. 3d 804, 809, writ denied, 2022- 01568 ( La. 1/ 11/ 23), 352 So. 3d 983. Accordingly, we will first address the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence.
3 direct and circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court must resolve any conflict in
the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the
direct evidence and the facts reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence
defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Coleman,
IMM
11/ 21/ 20, 373 o. 3d 460.
When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15: 438 basically provides
that the fact finder must be satisfied that the overall evidence excludes every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence. When a case involves circumstantial evidence,
and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the
defendant' s own testimony, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless
there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Alexander,
2014- 1619 ( La. App. I st Cir. 9/ 18/ 15), 182 So. 3d 126, 13 1, writ denied, 2015- 1912
La. 1/ 25/ 16), 185 So. 3d 748.
Second degree • is defined, in • part, as the forcible seizing
and carrying of any person from one place to another, wherein any of the following acts occur: the victim is used to facilitate the commission of a felony; the victim is
physically injured; or, the offender is armed with a dangerous weapon. La—R.S.
1 841 § I and 2022 La. Acts No. 173, § 1). As second degree kidnapping is a general
intent crime, proof of intent requires only a showing that the circumstances of the
crime indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must
Crom his act or failure to act. See La. R.S. 14- 10( 2); State v. Dickerson, 2012- 0388
4 La. App. I stCir. 11/ 2/ 12), 2412 5387365, * 2 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2012 -
At the trial, Atkins testified that, upon the defendant' s request, she initially
gave him directions to where he could locate a book on deer hunting in the back of
the library, upon his request. However, minutes later the defendant returned to the
front desk and told her he was unable to find the book, so she proceeded to walk to
her neck and started R.«•• her body backwards, towards the bathroom. T113
defendant continued to drag Atkins, as she tried to fight, pull, and yank herself free.
her to shut up as she yelled for help. She stated i' was fondling hQ
breasts while pulling her by the neck. Atkins further testified that during the
and/ or bruises on her hands. The photographs taken of Atkins when the police
arrived on the scene showed the bruising and cuts on her lip, arms, and hands, I
described in her testimony.
Moore, the library manager, testified the defendant regularly frequented the
library, with his father dropping him off. She stated that she did not park in h(M
normal parking spot on the day of the incident and her vehicle was not visible from
hearing a peculiar sound. At that point, Atkins ran out from in between the
that Atkins did • • any shoes on, her blouse was skewed, and her mouth wel
puffy. When Moore called 911, she noticed the entrance door near the bathroon-11
was locked, though it had been unlocked that morning when the library was opened.
61 Officer Jeremy Hutchinson, with the Folsom Police Department, testified that
Atkins was frazzled and uncontrollably hysterical when he first arrived on the scene.
injuries. Officer Hutchinson testified zip ties were found on the floor next to the
computer at which the defendant was seated. Some of the zip ties were connected
111 111111111 11111 lI IF Pill Wil"I E- 5- oll • s a
shorts. Officer Hutchinson did not photograph the zip ties or the knife, was unabs
evidentiary custody. However, at the trial, Officer Hutchinson drew pictures of the
zip ties and knife, and his hand -drawn pictures were introduced as evidence.
years old, and Detective Huey Davis of the St. Tammany Parish Sheriffs Officl
assisted Officer Hutchinson in an unsuccessful effort to contact a concerned adult
Cor the defendant. The defendant was advised of his rights, executed a waiver of
trial. Further, the computer at which the defendant sat while in the library was
collected and analyzed, and the results indicated the following search was conducted
zt 10.-43 a.m., on the day in question- " How many years in jail for a rape." The
offense took place hours later, after Atkins returned from her lunch break.
Dr. Michelle Garriga, an expert forensic psychiatrist, interviewed the
defendant prior to trial. 3 Dr. Garriga testified that the defendant told her that he was
3 Dr. Garriga was initially appointed to the sanity commission to determine the defendant' s competency to stand trial and later appointed to determine his sanity at the time of the offense. ( R. 1, 11, 950, 952). The defendant has not on appeal reasserted his challenge regarding his state of mind at the time of the offense. In an abundance of caution, we note that in addition to the defendant being found competent to stand trial, Dr. Garriga testified that he was capable of distinguishing right from wrong when the offense was committed. After a thorough review of the record, we are convinced a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant failed to rebut his presumed sanity at the time of the offense. See La. R.S. 14: 14; La. R.S. 15: 432; State v. Dixon, 2008- 1038 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 12/ 23/ 08), 2008 WL 6809594, * 4 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2009- 0189 ( La. 10/ 30/ 09), 21 So. 3d 27.
0 sexually aroused when he attacked Atkins and that he intended to rape her. She also
testified that the defendant told her that he knew where the librarians parked their
cars and that he thought he and, Atkins were alone at the time of the •
The defendant testified at trial and said he did not recall Dr. Garriga
that he was sexually aroused at the time ofthe offense. However, during his recorded
police interview and again at trial, the defendant admitted to kidnapping Atkins, i IN I IN 0 NEW F R
defendant further admitted to using his hand to muzzle Atkins' mouth when she
he could not recall searching the internet for the penalty for rape or fondling Atkins'
breasts during the attack, and denied the latter on cross- examination. However, the
that he did not think that Atkins, Moore, or Dr. Garriga lied at any point during their
trial testimony.
The defendant described the knife that he had on his person at the time of his
arrest as a four -inch, silver sheath knife with a one -and -a -halfto two- inch long blade.
The defendant testified he never pulled the knife out from his pocket or threatened
Atkins with it. The defendant further denied trying to use the zip ties, but admitted
When there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of
which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is
one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. Alexander, 182 So3d at 131.
It is well settled that the trier of fact can accept or reject, in whole or in part, the
testimony of any witness. Accordingly, on appeal, this court will not assess the
credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence to overturn a fact finder' s
detennination of guilt. State v. Lavy, 2013- 1025 ( La. App. Ist Cir. 3/ 11/ 14), 142
N a reviewing court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility
of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis
the fact finder. See State v. Calloway, 2007- 2306 ( La. 1/ 21/ 09), 1 So. 3d 417, 418
per cur am).
argues the State failed to prove Atkins was used to facilitate the commission of a
felony, that she was physically injured, or that a dangerous weapon was used durinM the offense. This court is not persuaded by the defendant' s arguments. As detailed
I I PERSON I' I 1 11 1 I I 1 4
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14- 41( A) in part defines rape as " the act of ...
sexual intercourse with a ... person committed without the person' s lawful consent."
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14.-43( A)(4) pertinently defines third degree rape as " a
rape committed when the ... sexual intercourse [ occurs] ... without the consent of
the victim[.]" An attempt is defined by La. R.S. 14: 27( A) as "[ a] ny person wha
having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of
9,nd tending • toward the accomplishing • his object is guilty of an attempt
to commit the offense intended." It is immaterial whether, under the circumstances,
Specific intent is therefore a required element for a conviction of attempted
third degree rape. Specific intent is defined by La. R.S. 14: 10( 1) as " that state of
mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired
M the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act." Specific
intent need not be proven as a fact but may be inferred from the circumstances of the
rape, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant: ( 1) had tj
specific intent to commit third degree rape; and ( 2) he did an act for the purpose of,
MMME
La. R.S. 14- 27; see also State v. Walston, 2022- 0317 ( La. App. Ist Cir.
11/ 4/ 22), 2022 WL 16707997, * 2 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2022- 01809 ( La.
Herein, testimony showed the defendant searched a library computer
regarding the penalty for rape, waited until it appeared he was alone with Atkins,
nd told Dr. Garriga that he was sexually aroused at the time of the offense anE
intended to rape Atkins. The State presented ample evidence from which the jury
could infer the defendant had the specific intent to rape Atkins and committed
several acts in furtherance of that objective. Accordingly, we find that the jury could
have rationally concluded the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt tfa
kidnapping was committed to facilitate an attempted third degree rape. See State I
Skipper, 97- 2209 ( La. App. 4th Cir. 5/ 5/ 99), 737 So. 2d 872, 877 ( wherein t1a
appellate court, in part, upheld a conviction of second degree kidnapping based om evidence that the defendant " participated in the imprisonment of the victim t*
facilitate his own rape of the victim").
Ife note that the defendant on appeal contends that the State was required to
show the commission of a completed felony to prove second degree kidnappinj
under La. R. S. 14: 44. 1( 10(2). However, the State notes that " attempted rape is itself
a felony offense." We agree with the State. Louisiana Revised Statutes 14: 2( 4)
defines a felony as " any crime for which an offender may be sentenced to death or
I imprisonment at hard labor." Third degree rape is punishable by imprisonment at 1, 1 1111 III I li ii Rggr
to commit a crime, " shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for
the offense attempted[.]" Thus, attempted third degree rape is a felony because it is
Moreover, as discussed below, we find the jury could have also rationally
concluded the State proved the elements of the offense under subsections ( 3) and ( 5)
14- 44. 1( A). Thus, in this case, we need not rely solely on ous
determination ofwhether the use of the victim to commit an attempted felony offense
meets the definition of second degree kidnapping pursuant to the discussed portion
1111, 11: 11PNEN0ii 11 01
As the defendant concedes on appeal, La. R.S. 14- 44. 1 ( A)(3) does not require
the victim' s physical injury be serious. In addition to Atkins' testimony,
photographs of her injuries were admitted into evidence and shown to the jury. The
defendant admitted to inflicting injuries to Atkins' lip, arms, and hands, specifically the bruises and cuts shown in the photographs. See Dickerson, 2012 WL 5387365
at * 24 (wherein the victim suffered bruising injuries to her left eye, her nose, her
mouth, and her back right shoulder during a kidnapping and this court upheld the
conviction of second degree kidnaping). Thus, the jury could have rationallm
deten-nined that Atkins was physically injured by the defendant during the
The defendant admitted to having a dangerous weapon, a knife, at the time of
the offense. A " dangerous weapon" includes any gas, liquid or other substance or
instrumentality, which, in the manner used, is calculated or likely to produce death
U or great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14: 2( A)(3). The term is not limited to
instrumentalities which are inherently dangerous. See La. R.S. 14: 2, Reporter' s
the victim to reasonably believe he is armed with a dangerous weapon." La. R.S.
14: 44. 1( A)(5). In State v. Hearne, 55, 311 ( La. App. 2d Cir. 9/ 27/ 23), 373 So. 3d
101, 1051 the defendant argued a pocketknife in his pants pocket was insufficient to
show he was " armed" at the time of the offense. The appellate court concluded that
needs to have a dangerous weapon in his possession in order to be considerca
possess a dangerous weapon at the time of the offense to be considered " armed"' for
purposes of La. R.S. 14: 44. 1( A)(5). Thus, the jury could have rationally determined
the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon during the commission of the
ME=
In reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we cannot say that the jury' s
determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented. See
1771TIT11102MITIWI
that a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State, could find that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the
In assignment of error number one, the defendant argues the trial court erred
in allowing the State to present evidence of the knife, zip ties, and computer search.
11 He argues the evidence was not relevant to the offense, was prejudicial but not
probative, and consisted of evidence of other crimes or bad acts.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by the defendant is
generally inadmissible because of the substantial risk of grave prejudice to the
defendant. It is well settled that courts may not admit evidence of other crimes to
his bad character. State v. Calloway, 2018- 1396 ( La. App. I st Cir. 4/ 12/ 19), 276
under La. Code Evid. art. 404( B)( 1), such evidence may be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake or accident, or when it relates to conduct that constitutes
an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceedinim
At least one of the enumerated purposes in Article 404( B) must be at issue, haNs liqli III IN All I Ili ,
evidence to be admissible under Article 404. State v. Selders,,2019- 0777 (La. App,
I st Cir. 12/ 27/ 19), 293 So. 3d 1170, 1176, writ denied, 2020- 00194 ( La. 7/ 24/ 20),
burden of proving that the defendant committed the other crimes, wrongs, or actl 11 i I I 111W • '
Other Crimes evidence is admissible under the integral act exception
formerly known as res gestae) when the evidence relates to conduct that constitutes
an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding - Thus, evidence fon-ns part of the res gestae when the crime is related and intertwined
with the charged offense to such an extent that the State could not have accuratelm presented its case without reference to the other crime. The res gestae doctrine in
12 Louisiana is broad and includes not only spontaneous utterances and declaratiors
made before or after the commission of the crime, but also testimony of witnesses
and police officers pertaining to what they heard or observed before, during, or afta the commission of the crime, if a continuous chain of events is evident under the
circumstances. Integral act evidence in Louisiana incorporates a rule of narrative
completeness without which the State' s case would lose its narrative momentum and
cohesiveness. Calloway, 276 So. 3d at 147.
Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence. La. Code Evid. art. 401. All
relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by positive law.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. La. Code Evid. art. 402. Although
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, risk of misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay or waste of time. La. Code Evid. art. 403M
Ultimately, questions of relevancy and admissibility are discretionary calls for the
trial court, and its determinations regarding relevancy and admissibility should not
be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Phillips, 2023- 0243 ( La -
Prior to the trial, the defendant moved to prohibit the State from introducing the evidence at issue. Following a hearing, the trial court agreed with the State' s
argument that the evidence was relevant and denied the defendant' s motions. As
4 We note that pertinent jurisprudence questions whether integral act evidence under La. Code Evid, alt. 404( B) remains subject to the balancing test of La. Code Evid. art. 403. State v. Taylor, 2001- 1638 ( La. 1/ 14/ 03), 838 So. 2d 729, 745, cert. denied, 540 U. S. 1103, 124 S. Ct. 1036, 157 L.Ed.2d 886 ( 2004). However, we find that the prejudicial effect of the evidence admitted in this case does not substantially outweigh its probative value. Thus, we need not decide whether integral act evidence presented under the authority of La. Code Evid. art. 404( B) must invariably pass the balancing test of Article 403. See Taylor, 838 So. 2d at 745.
13 follows, we find that the related testimony and drawings of the zip ties and knife,
evidence of the instant offense, not a separate " other crime" within the meaning of
11 111 111111111re MOM
regarding the penalty for rape while at the library, just hours before he committed
library computer, just after the offense. Finally, the knife was found on the
defendant' s person at the scene, during his arrest. As discussed in the context of the
sufficiency of the evidence, under La. R.S. 14: 44. 1( A)(2), ( 3), and ( 5), the State
introduced evidence to prove the defendant kidnapped Atkins to facilitate till
RM "64M-- 4
to prove elements of the instant offense. Further, the evidence had independent
the State established an independent reason for admission of the evidence at issue.
Finally, we find that the evidence constitutes an integral part of the act that is the
subject of the present proceeding, as provided for by La. Code Evid. art. 404( B)( 1).
The evidence forms an inseparable link in the continuous chain of events leading to
the defendant' s arrest for the instant charged offense. Accordingly, the contesteM
evidence was necessary to complete the story of the crime on trial and allow the
State to accurately present its case. See Calloway, 276 So3d at 148.
As the State notes on appeal, the evidence at issue was also relevant to the defendant' s plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason ofinsanity, C y requiring , the jury to determine whether he was capable of distinguishing between right and wrong at the time of the offense. Considering the highly probative value of the evidence, the relevancy of the
evidence was not outweighed by any danger of unfair prejudice, confusiolM
misleading the jury, undue delay, or waste of time. We find no abuse of discretion
in the trial court' s rulings finding the evidence admissible. Accordingly, assignment
RRIT11017M
In assignment of error number three, the defendant argues the trial court erred
in denying the motion to suppress his confession. He notes he was only fifteen years
LK31111- 111 VIONX
him in the presence of his father.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 703( D) provides that, on th,;
trial of a motion to suppress, the burden is on the defendant to prove the ground of
his motion, except the State shall have the burden of proving the admissibility of a
purported confession or statement by the defendant. Before a purported confession
can be introduced in evidence, it must be affirmatively shown that the statement was
free and voluntary, and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation,
menaces, threats, or promises. La. R. S. 15 -.45 1. Prior to questioning,
an individual must be advised of his right to remain silent, that anything he says can
be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an
and if he cannot afford an attorney, • will •- appointed • him prior •
any questioning if he so desires. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 8,f--,
S. Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ( 1966). Further, if in any manner and at any stagm
the process, the individual wishes to consult with • attorney before speaking,,
questioning must cease. Id., 384 U. S. at 444- 45, 86 S. t. at 1612. The confession
of an accused of any age is valid if it was given knowingly and voluntarily. State v.
15 In Fernandez, the Louisiana Supreme Court overruled State in the Interest
706 ( 1978), which had previously mandated that, in order to introduce a juvenile' s
confession, the State must affirmatively show the juvenile engaged in a meaningful
consultation with an attorney or informed parent, guardian, or other adult interested
in his welfare before he waived his right to counsel and privilege against self-
incrimination. Dino, 359 So. 2d at 594. The Fernandez court reinstated the totality
of the circumstances standard as the basis for determining the admissibility of
juvenile confessions. Thus, all of the facts and circumstances must be reviewed to
determine whether ajuvenile' s confession was freely given. Fernandez, 712 So. 2d
Among the factors to be considered in determining the admissibility of a
juvenile' s confession are the juvenile' s youth, experience, comprehension, and the
presence or absence of an interested adult. The special needs of juveniles are
analogous to the special needs of individuals with mental deficiencies and are factors
to be considered. The waiver of the defendant' s constitutional rights in making a
confession or statement does not require a higher level of mental capacity than his
level of competency to enter a plea of guilty, to assist counsel at trial, to waive his
right to an attorney, or to waive other constitutional rights. The testimony of a police
officer alone can be sufficient to prove the juvenile' s statements were freely and
voluntarily given. State v. Robinson, 2016- 1594 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 2/ 17), 2017
WL 2399362, * 3 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2017- 1241 ( La. 4/ 27/ 18), 241 So. 3M
ME
When a trial court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility
determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial
court' s discretion, i. e., unless the ruling is not supported by reliable evidence. See
IM In the instant case, Detective Davis interviewed the defendant and testified at
the motion to suppress hearing. He noted that Officer Hutchinson contacted him
aware the defendant was a victimin an unrelated prior offense. He noted the
defendant' s educational challenges but that he was " very street smart" and internet
savvy. Detective Davis noted that he made several attempts to contact the
understand the rights that were explained to him prior to questioning. The interview
lasted approximately twenty- four minutes. After reviewing the inter v- iew, the trial
court noted Detective Davis thoroughly explained the situation to the defendant and
trial court concluded that the defendant understood his rights and waived them
intelligently.
The admissibility of a confession is, in the first instance, a question for the
trial court; its conclusions on the credibility and weight of the testimony relating to
the voluntary nature of the confession are accorded great weight and will not be
overturned unless they are not supported by the evidence. Whether a showing of
voluntariness has been made is analyzed on a case- by-case basis with regard to the
facts and circumstances of each case. The trial court must consider the totality of
the circumstances in deciding whether a confession is admissible. Once the trial
court has determined that the State has met its burden of proof with respect to
voluntariness of the confession, its decision is entitled to great weight on review.
17 We find that the record fully supports the trial court' s denial of the motion to
suppress in this case. At the beginning of the interview, Detective Davis informed
the defendant that he made several attempts to contact his father, and that he had
spoken to his aunt but she declined or was unable to attend the interview. Detective
Davis asked the defendant if he knew of any other family that he could try to contact,
and the defendant indicated that he did not know of anyone else to ••'•
Davis then carefully explained the defendant' s rights, using plain, simple language.
For example, in explaining the right to remain silent, Detective Davis added, " you
don' t have to talk to me." He then told the defendant, in further explaining his
privilege against self-incrimination, " if you tell me something ... and a crime is
involved, you can get in trouble." Detective Davis repeatedly reminded the
defendant that if he decided to start the conversation, he could stop at any time, or
could request an attorney. The defendant, in reading along as his rights were given,
The defendant was fully informed of his rights, confirmed that he understood
his rights, and signed a waiver of rights form. There was no indication that the
defendant' s state of mind was altered or that he felt threatened or coerced. Further,
as stated, there is no absolute requirement that an attorney or guardian be present
with a juvenile suspect at the time he makes the statement. State in Interest of
C.11, 2015- 1024 ( La. App. Ist Cir. 11/ 6/ 15), 183 o.3d 567, 571. Considering the
totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in
denying the motion to suppress the statement. Thus, we find that assignment of error
number three lacks merit.
On appeal, this court routinely reviews the record for error patent. Pursuant
to La. Code Crim. P. art. 920( 2), in conducting a patent error review, this court shaM
M consider "[ a] n error that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and
proceedings and without inspection of the evidence."
As the State notes in its brief, the sentence is illegally lenient, requiring that it
be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.' Specifically, the trial court
effective November 1, 2017) against doing so for an offense designated in the court
criminal case does not have a constitutional or statutory right to an illegal sentence.
See State v. Williams, 2000- 1725 ( La. 11/ 28/ 01), 800 So. 2d 790, 797; State v.
Gregoire, 2013- 0751 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 3/ 21/ 14), 143 So3d 503, 510, writ denied,
An appellate court is authorized to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to La.
Code Crim. P. art. 882( A), when the sentence does not involve the exercise of
sentencing discretion by the trial court. The sentencing herein, however, involves
discretion. See La. R. S. 14: 44. 1( C). To the extent that amending the defendant' s
sentence entails more than a ministerial correction of a sentencing error, a sua sponte
correction by a court of appeal is not sanctioned by the jurisprudence. See State v.
Haynes, 2004- 1893 ( La. 12/ 10/ 04), 889 So. 2d 224 ( per curiam); State v. Grosl
2016- 1168 ( La. App. lst Cir. 4/ 18/ 17), 218 So. 3d 1089, 1099. Thus, we vacate t1a
sentence and remand for resentencing.
CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDEgi FOR RESENTENCI-WG.
6 At the sentencing, the State noticed its intent to take a writ on the issue of the partial suspension of the defendant' s sentence. However, there is no indication that the State filed a writ on the matter.