Judgment rendered March 3, 2021. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 53,744-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
KENNY MCKNIGHT Appellant
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 354648
Honorable Katherine Clark Dorroh, Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Mary Constance Hanes
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
NANCY F. BERGER-SCHNEIDER ALEX L. PORUBSKY JASON WAYNE WALTMAN Assistant District Attorneys
Before STONE, THOMPSON, and BLEICH (Pro Tempore), JJ. STONE, J.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Kenny McKnight was convicted of second degree rape pursuant to La.
R.S. 14:42.1, and was originally sentenced to 25 years of incarceration at
hard labor with the first five years to be served without sentencing benefits.
McKnight unsuccessfully appealed that sentence as excessive. State v.
McKnight, 53, 261 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/16/20), 289 So. 3d 208. The following
recitation of the facts is taken from the original appellate opinion:
A.G. testified that Defendant is her cousin, i.e., her grandmother’s sister’s child. She stated that on July 19, 2017, she was 16 years old and was at home with several family members, including Defendant. Defendant came into her bedroom, locked the door, grabbed her by her arms and “slammed” her face down onto the bed. While holding her arms behind her back, Defendant pulled down her elastic-waist pants and underwear. She yelled and screamed and told Defendant to get off of her. She squeezed her buttocks to try to prevent him from penetrating her, but he inserted the top part of his penis into her anus.
McKnight, supra.
After the instant forcible rape conviction, McKnight was adjudicated a
third-felony offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1. The predicate offenses used
to obtain this adjudication were a 2013 simple burglary conviction and a
2014 conviction for illegal possession of stolen firearms. Pursuant to La.
R.S. 15:529.1, the trial court vacated the original sentence and resentenced
McKnight to 40 years at hard labor, with the first 5 years to be served
without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.
In pronouncing McKnight’s habitual offender sentence, the trial court
adopted its reasons for the original sentence. At the original sentencing, the
trial court found that there is an undue risk that McKnight would reoffend if
given a suspended or probated sentence, that he is in need of correctional treatment, and that a lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of his
crime. As aggravating factors, the trial court found that: (1) McKnight’s
conduct manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim; (2) he knew or should
have known that the victim was particularly vulnerable or incapable of
resistance due to her youth; (3) the offense resulted in significant permanent
emotional injury to the victim and her mother; and (4) McKnight’s past
crimes. It found that no mitigating factors applied. McKnight filed a motion
to reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied.
McKnight now appeals his habitual offender sentence, arguing that
the 40-year sentence for second degree rape as a third-felony offender is
excessive under the circumstances. For the reasons stated herein,
McKnight’s sentence is affirmed.
DISCUSSION
McKnight’s argument
In his sole assignment of error, McKnight argues that his 40-year
sentence for second degree rape as a third-felony habitual offender is
excessive under the circumstances. First, McKnight argues that the offense
in question was a single incident which lasted mere seconds, and that there is
no indication that the victim or her mother suffered any significant,
permanent physical injury or emotional trauma. Therefore, according to
McKnight, using “deliberate cruelty” as an aggravating factor in sentencing
was inappropriate: any act of second degree rape constitutes some degree of
deliberate cruelty, yet the legislature allows for a sentence as short as five
years for conduct meeting the definition of second degree rape.
Second, McKnight argues that the trial court failed to address specific
factors raised in mitigation, namely, that he did not contemplate that his 2 criminal conduct would cause or threaten serious harm, and was the result of
circumstances unlikely to recur. McKnight argues that his conduct was an
impulsive act by “a young adult (twenty-four years old) who had not reached
the age of maturity.”
Law
The version of La. R.S. 15:529.1 applicable at the time of this offense
provided, in pertinent part:
A. Any person who, after having been convicted within this state of a felony, or who, after having been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States, or any foreign government of a crime which, if committed in this state would be a felony, thereafter commits any subsequent felony within this state, upon conviction of said felony, shall be punished as follows: …
(3) If the third felony is such that upon a first conviction, the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life then the following sentences apply:
(a) The person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a determinate term not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction. (Emphasis added.)
At the time McKnight committed forcible rape, La. R.S. 14:42.1
imposed a hard labor sentence of not less than 5 nor more than 40 years.
Thus, for his third-felony habitual offender adjudication, McKnight faced
potential sentencing exposure of 26.6-80 years at hard labor under La. R.S.
15:529.1(A)(3)(a).
When reviewing an excessive sentence claim, the appellate court uses
a two-prong test. First, the record must demonstrate that the trial court
complied with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial court is not required to list
every aggravating and mitigating circumstance, but the record must reflect 3 that it adequately considered the guidelines of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State
v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983). The trial court should consider the
defendant’s personal history and prior criminal record, the seriousness of the
offense, the likelihood that the defendant will commit another crime and the
defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049 (La.
1981). The trial court is not required to assign any particular weight to any
specific matters at sentencing. State v. Quiambao, 36,587 (La. App. 2 Cir.
12/11/02), 833 So. 2d 1103, writ denied, 03-0477 (La. 5/16/03), 843 So. 2d
1130.
Second, the appellate court must determine if the sentence is
constitutionally excessive. A sentence is excessive and violates La. Const.
art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime or is
nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering. State v. Bonanno, 384 So. 2d 355 (La. 1980). A sentence is
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Judgment rendered March 3, 2021. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 53,744-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
KENNY MCKNIGHT Appellant
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 354648
Honorable Katherine Clark Dorroh, Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Mary Constance Hanes
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
NANCY F. BERGER-SCHNEIDER ALEX L. PORUBSKY JASON WAYNE WALTMAN Assistant District Attorneys
Before STONE, THOMPSON, and BLEICH (Pro Tempore), JJ. STONE, J.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Kenny McKnight was convicted of second degree rape pursuant to La.
R.S. 14:42.1, and was originally sentenced to 25 years of incarceration at
hard labor with the first five years to be served without sentencing benefits.
McKnight unsuccessfully appealed that sentence as excessive. State v.
McKnight, 53, 261 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/16/20), 289 So. 3d 208. The following
recitation of the facts is taken from the original appellate opinion:
A.G. testified that Defendant is her cousin, i.e., her grandmother’s sister’s child. She stated that on July 19, 2017, she was 16 years old and was at home with several family members, including Defendant. Defendant came into her bedroom, locked the door, grabbed her by her arms and “slammed” her face down onto the bed. While holding her arms behind her back, Defendant pulled down her elastic-waist pants and underwear. She yelled and screamed and told Defendant to get off of her. She squeezed her buttocks to try to prevent him from penetrating her, but he inserted the top part of his penis into her anus.
McKnight, supra.
After the instant forcible rape conviction, McKnight was adjudicated a
third-felony offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1. The predicate offenses used
to obtain this adjudication were a 2013 simple burglary conviction and a
2014 conviction for illegal possession of stolen firearms. Pursuant to La.
R.S. 15:529.1, the trial court vacated the original sentence and resentenced
McKnight to 40 years at hard labor, with the first 5 years to be served
without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.
In pronouncing McKnight’s habitual offender sentence, the trial court
adopted its reasons for the original sentence. At the original sentencing, the
trial court found that there is an undue risk that McKnight would reoffend if
given a suspended or probated sentence, that he is in need of correctional treatment, and that a lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of his
crime. As aggravating factors, the trial court found that: (1) McKnight’s
conduct manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim; (2) he knew or should
have known that the victim was particularly vulnerable or incapable of
resistance due to her youth; (3) the offense resulted in significant permanent
emotional injury to the victim and her mother; and (4) McKnight’s past
crimes. It found that no mitigating factors applied. McKnight filed a motion
to reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied.
McKnight now appeals his habitual offender sentence, arguing that
the 40-year sentence for second degree rape as a third-felony offender is
excessive under the circumstances. For the reasons stated herein,
McKnight’s sentence is affirmed.
DISCUSSION
McKnight’s argument
In his sole assignment of error, McKnight argues that his 40-year
sentence for second degree rape as a third-felony habitual offender is
excessive under the circumstances. First, McKnight argues that the offense
in question was a single incident which lasted mere seconds, and that there is
no indication that the victim or her mother suffered any significant,
permanent physical injury or emotional trauma. Therefore, according to
McKnight, using “deliberate cruelty” as an aggravating factor in sentencing
was inappropriate: any act of second degree rape constitutes some degree of
deliberate cruelty, yet the legislature allows for a sentence as short as five
years for conduct meeting the definition of second degree rape.
Second, McKnight argues that the trial court failed to address specific
factors raised in mitigation, namely, that he did not contemplate that his 2 criminal conduct would cause or threaten serious harm, and was the result of
circumstances unlikely to recur. McKnight argues that his conduct was an
impulsive act by “a young adult (twenty-four years old) who had not reached
the age of maturity.”
Law
The version of La. R.S. 15:529.1 applicable at the time of this offense
provided, in pertinent part:
A. Any person who, after having been convicted within this state of a felony, or who, after having been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States, or any foreign government of a crime which, if committed in this state would be a felony, thereafter commits any subsequent felony within this state, upon conviction of said felony, shall be punished as follows: …
(3) If the third felony is such that upon a first conviction, the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life then the following sentences apply:
(a) The person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a determinate term not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction. (Emphasis added.)
At the time McKnight committed forcible rape, La. R.S. 14:42.1
imposed a hard labor sentence of not less than 5 nor more than 40 years.
Thus, for his third-felony habitual offender adjudication, McKnight faced
potential sentencing exposure of 26.6-80 years at hard labor under La. R.S.
15:529.1(A)(3)(a).
When reviewing an excessive sentence claim, the appellate court uses
a two-prong test. First, the record must demonstrate that the trial court
complied with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial court is not required to list
every aggravating and mitigating circumstance, but the record must reflect 3 that it adequately considered the guidelines of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State
v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983). The trial court should consider the
defendant’s personal history and prior criminal record, the seriousness of the
offense, the likelihood that the defendant will commit another crime and the
defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049 (La.
1981). The trial court is not required to assign any particular weight to any
specific matters at sentencing. State v. Quiambao, 36,587 (La. App. 2 Cir.
12/11/02), 833 So. 2d 1103, writ denied, 03-0477 (La. 5/16/03), 843 So. 2d
1130.
Second, the appellate court must determine if the sentence is
constitutionally excessive. A sentence is excessive and violates La. Const.
art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime or is
nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering. State v. Bonanno, 384 So. 2d 355 (La. 1980). A sentence is
grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered
in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. Id.
The trial court is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences
within the statutory limits, and the sentence imposed by the trial court should
not be set aside as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of its
discretion. State v. Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7. The
trial court is in the best position to consider the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances of a particular case and, therefore, is given broad discretion in
sentencing. Id. On review, an appellate court does not determine whether
another sentence may have been more appropriate, but whether the trial
court abused its discretion. Id.
4 In this case, the trial court easily satisfied La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1.
Furthermore, the record would support the sentence even without the trial
court’s well-expressed reasoning. McKnight’s conduct did manifest
deliberate cruelty to the victim; indeed, he physically overpowered her and
forced himself into her anus despite her screaming and clenching her
buttocks. McKnight must have known that the victim was particularly
vulnerable due to her youth. We reject McKnight’s contention that since he
was only 24 years old at the time he raped his cousin, he is somehow less
culpable than an older rapist. We agree with the trial court that McKnight is
likely to reoffend, and note that his criminal history also includes a
conviction for misdemeanor carnal knowledge of a juvenile. We also give
full credit to the trial court’s observation that the victim and her mother
displayed genuine, significant emotional trauma while testifying in this
matter. McKnight’s forcible rape of his 16-year-old cousin will be etched
into her and her mother’s memories for the rest of their lives. The sentencing
range under La. R.S. 15:529.1 was 26.6 to 80 years. McKnight’s 40-year
sentence is well below the 53.3-year midpoint of the sentencing range.
This sentence is not constitutionally excessive. In light of McKnight’s
forcible rape and serious past crimes, this sentence does not shock the sense
of justice, nor is it grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing McKnight to 40
years at hard labor, with the first 5 years to be served without benefits.
Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Kenny McKnight’s sentence is
AFFIRMED. 5