State of Louisiana v. Kendrick Wayne Jones

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: May 25, 2022
• Docket: 54,395-KA
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered May 25, 2022.. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.

No. 54,395-KA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

Versus

KENDRICK WAYNE JONES Appellant

Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 364691

Honorable Erin Leigh Waddell Garrett, Judge

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Paula Corley Marx

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney

ROSS S. OWEN ERICA N. JEFFERSON REBECCA A. EDWARDS Assistant District Attorneys

Before STEPHENS, ROBINSON, and HUNTER, JJ. STEPHENS, J.

This criminal appeal by the defendant, Kendrick Wayne Jones, arises

from the First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo, State of Louisiana.

Following a jury trial, Jones was convicted of possession with intent to

distribute a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance; possession with

intent to distribute a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance; and, illegal

carrying of weapons while in possession of a controlled dangerous substance

and sentenced to total of 20 years at hard labor. He now appeals, arguing his

sentence is excessive. For the following reasons, Jones’ sentences are

vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 10, 2019, the Shreveport Police Department responded

to the residence of Betty White. Betty had called the police after defendant,

who had been in a romantic relationship with her daughter, came to Betty’s

home with a gun after he had been previously informed he was not welcome.

Jones, who was eventually located in a nearby field, attempted to flee, but

was ultimately apprehended by law enforcement officers. He was found to

be in possession of a Mason jar filled with 59 individual packages of

marijuana, a separate package containing 180 pills of suspected

methamphetamine, and a loaded .40-caliber handgun.

Jones was arrested and charged by bill of information with Count 1:

possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I controlled dangerous

substance (marijuana) of less than 2½ pounds, in violation of La. R.S.

40:966(A)(1) and (B)(2)(a); Count 2: possession with intent to distribute a

Schedule II controlled dangerous substance (methamphetamine) of 28 grams

or more, in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1) and (B)(1)(b); and, Count 3: illegal carrying of weapons while in possession of a controlled dangerous

substance (methamphetamine), in violation of La. R.S 14:95(E).1

A jury trial commenced on October 21, 2019, after which unanimous

verdicts of guilty as charged were returned on all three counts. Notably,

Jones was present with counsel for the first day of trial, wherein the jury was

selected and sworn, but he failed to appear for the remainder of the trial.

Following Jones’ subsequent arrest and delays related to the COVID-19

pandemic, on October 20, 2020, Jones filed motions for new trial and post-

verdict judgment of acquittal, which were both denied by the trial court.

Thereafter, on February 2, 2021, the trial court imposed the following

concurrent sentences: Count 1, eight years at hard labor; Count 2, 20 years at

hard labor; Count 3, ten years at hard labor to be served without benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Jones received the maximum

1 It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally produce, manufacture, distribute or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analogue classified in Schedule I. La. R.S. 40:9669(A)(1). Any person who violates Subsection A of this Section with respect to a substance classified in Schedule I which is marijuana for an amount of an aggregate weight of less than two and one half pounds, shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not less than one year nor more than ten years, and pay a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars. La. R.S. 40:966(B)(2)(a).

It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analogue classified in Schedule II. La. R.S. 40:9679(A)(1). Any person who violates Subsection A of this Section with respect to a substance classified in Schedule II for an amount of an aggregate weight of twenty-eight grams or more, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than one year nor more than twenty years and may, in addition, be fined not more than fifty thousand dollars. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1)(b).

If an offender uses, possesses, or has under his immediate control a firearm, while unlawfully in the possession of a controlled dangerous substance except the possession of fourteen grams or less of marijuana, the offender shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars and imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five nor more than ten years without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:95(E). 2 sentences on Counts 2 and 3, whereas the maximum he could have received

on Count 1 was ten years.

In sentencing Jones on Count 1, the trial court stated it had considered

all of the factors pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. Additionally, after

imposing the remainder of Jones’ sentences and informing him of his right

to post-conviction relief, the trial judge stated the following on the record:

The court has considered all of the evidence from the jury trial as well as the motions that were filed after the jury trial and the evidence that was submitted at the trial as well. Like I said, I contemplated 894.1 looking at the penalty ranges and I think that based on the facts, that these are fair and equitable sentences with regard to that.

Notably, immediately prior to the imposition of Jones’ sentences, the court

and counselors for the State and Jones discussed the timeline regarding

Jones’ last conviction in 2005 for felon in possession with a firearm,

including the 12½-year sentence he received, his release date, which Jones

claimed was in 2011, and that, according to his rap sheet, his supervision

ended in 2017.

Jones filed a timely motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial

court denied on July 1, 2021. In its written ruling denying Jones’ motion,

the trial court noted each of Jones’ sentences fall within the statutory

sentencing range and asserted the maximum sentences imposed were within

its discretion and allowable by law. The trial court also pointed out that it

had exercised leniency by ordering the three sentences to run concurrently.

This appeal by Jones ensued.

DISCUSSION

In two related assignments of error, Jones asserts his sentence is

constitutionally excessive. He argues the trial court failed to provide

3 sufficient reasons for the imposition of near-maximum and maximum

sentences and notes the trial court failed to comply with La. C. Cr. P. art.

894.1. Jones further asserts the sentences imposed are unduly harsh and

excessive considering mitigating factors that were not articulated at

sentencing, including his personal and criminal history as well as the facts of

the crime.

An appellate court utilizes a two-pronged test in reviewing a sentence

for excessiveness. First, the record must show that the trial court took

cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial judge

is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance so long

as the record reflects that he adequately considered the guidelines of the

article in particularizing the sentence to the defendant. State v. Smith, 433

So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. West, 53,526 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/24/20), 297

So. 3d 1081. The articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal

of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its

provisions. State v. Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475 (La. 1982); State v. West,

supra. The important elements which should be considered are the

defendant’s personal history (age, family ties, marital status, health,

employment record), prior criminal record, seriousness of the offense, and

the likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1981);

State v. West, supra. There is no requirement that specific matters be given

any particular weight at sentencing. State v. Shumaker, 41,547 (La. App. 2

Cir. 12/13/06), 945 So. 2d 277, writ denied, 2007-0144 (La. 9/28/07), 964

So. 2d 351. Where the record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the

sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary even where there has not been full

compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State v. Lanclos, supra; State v. 4 DeBerry, 50,501 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/13/16), 194 So. 3d 657, writ denied,

2016-0959 (La. 5/1/17), 219 So. 3d 332.

Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is

constitutionally excessive. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is

grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more

than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v.

Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Bonanno, 384 So. 2d 355 (La.

1980). A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime

and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the

sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 2001-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166;

State v. Meadows, 51,843 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/18), 246 So. 3d 639, writ

denied, 2018-0259 (La. 10/29/18), 254 So. 3d 1208.

The sentencing court has wide discretion in imposing a sentence

within statutory limits, and such a sentence will not be set aside as excessive

in the absence of manifest abuse of that discretion. State v. Williams, 2003-

3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7; State v. Duncan, 47,697 (La. App. 2 Cir.

1/16/13), 109 So. 3d 921, writ denied, 2013-0324 (La. 9/13/13), 120 So. 3d

280. Nevertheless, this discretion is not unbridled. State v. Quebedeaux,

424 So. 2d 1009, 1014 (La. 1982). When considered in light of the

particular defendant and the circumstances of the particular crime, a

sentence may be found to be excessive even if it falls within the statutory

limit. Id. As a general proposition, maximum or near-maximum sentences

are reserved for the worst offenders and the worst offenses. State v.

Sandifer, 54,103 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/15/21), 330 So. 3d 1270.

Maximum sentences are generally reserved for the most egregious and

blameworthy offenders in a class. State v. Cozzetto, 2007-2031 (La. 5 2/15/08), 974 So. 2d 665; State v. Cotten, 50,747 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/16),

201 So. 3d 299. The trial court nevertheless remains in the best position to

consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a particular case

and, therefore, is given broad discretion in sentencing. State v. Cook, 1995-

2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So. 2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S. Ct.

615, 136 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1996); State v. Jackson, 51,575 (La. App. 2 Cir.

9/27/17), 244 So. 3d 764.

For his conviction of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute,

Jones faced a term of imprisonment with or without hard labor of not less

than one year nor more than ten years, and a fine of not more than fifty

thousand dollars. La. R.S. 40:966(B)(2)(a). He was sentenced to eight years

at hard labor.

For his conviction of possession of methamphetamine with intent to

distribute, Jones faced a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than

one year nor more than 20 years and a fine of not more than fifty thousand

dollars. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1)(b). He was sentenced to the maximum

sentence of 20 years at hard labor.

For his conviction for the illegal carrying of a weapon, Jones faced a

term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than

ten years without the benefit of probation, parole, suspension of sentence,

and a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars. La. R.S. 14:95(E). He was

sentenced to the maximum sentence of ten years at hard labor without the

benefit of probation, parole, suspension of sentence.

The record in this case does not show the trial court adequately

considered the guidelines of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 in particularizing the

sentence to Jones. Instead, the record reflects the trial court simply stated it 6 had “considered/contemplated” Article 894.1 and its factors. While the trial

court was not required to consider each and every factor or apply certain

weight to specific factors, the record does not reflect which, if any, factors

the trial court actually considered.

Furthermore, we find the record does not contain an adequate factual

basis for the sentence imposed. The record contains little to no information

about Jones, including his personal life, family, education, employment

background, or any other possible mitigating, or aggravating, factors.

Notably, the trial court did not avail itself of the benefit of a presentence

investigation to assist in its sentencing of Jones. This court was able to

gather only the following pertinent information on Jones from the record: his

name, date of birth, age at time of the offense—36, and criminal history.

Therefore, we must conclude Jones’ sentence was imposed in violation of

La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1.

Because the first prong of this court’s analysis regarding the

excessiveness of Jones’ sentence is clearly not satisfied, discussion of the

second prong is pretermitted. We cannot determine whether or not Jones is

the worst and most egregious offender worthy of the maximum and near

maximum sentences he received without knowing the basis on which the

trial court imposed those sentences. Accordingly, Jones’ sentences are

vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the sentences of defendant, Kendrick

Wayne Jones, are vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for

resentencing.

SENTENCES VACATED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING. 7