Judgment rendered March 4, 2020. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 53,321-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
JOSEPH M. BRYANT Appellant
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 327055
Honorable Brady D. O’Callaghan, Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Holli Ann Herrle-Castillo
JOSEPH BRYANT Pro Se
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
RICHARD S. FEINBERG KODIE K. SMITH Assistant District Attorneys
Before WILLIAMS, STEPHENS, and McCALLUM, JJ. McCALLUM, J.
Adjudicated a second-felony habitual offender after being convicted
of armed robbery and attempted aggravated rape, Joseph Bryant appeals his
habitual offender sentences, contending that they are unconstitutionally
excessive. Concluding that the sentences are justified and that the trial judge
did not abuse his discretion when imposing the sentences, we affirm them.
FACTS
The details of Bryant’s current offenses were set forth in a prior
appeal in this matter:
On the morning of August 22, 2014, the victim, SS, was home alone watching television when her doorbell rang. SS looked through the peephole, and observed a tall, dark-skinned black male, wearing a baseball cap, holding a business card. The man, later identified as the defendant, Joseph M. Bryant, indicated that he worked for a tree service and inquired if SS desired service at her home. SS declined, but cracked the door open just enough to take the business card from Bryant. As she opened the door, Bryant put his foot in the threshold of the door. SS noted the perpetrator was much larger than she. Bryant asked SS if her husband was home. When she said no, Bryant forced his way into SS’s home.
Once inside the home, SS observed Bryant holding a pocketknife. Bryant ordered SS not to scream and told her, “I am going to rape you and kill you,” a threat he repeatedly made during the assault. SS and Bryant walked from the entryway of her home, through the dining room, into the kitchen, and eventually ended up in the den. While in the den, Bryant threw SS onto the sofa and again informed her that he was going to rape her. While still armed with the pocketknife, Bryant then straddled SS, throwing both of his legs on the outside of both of SS’s legs and untied her robe. SS was wearing only a robe, nightshirt, and underwear. After untying SS’s robe, Bryant lifted up SS’s nightshirt and touched her vagina on top of her underwear. Throughout the incident, SS continually pleaded for her life and Bryant repeatedly told SS that he planned to rape and kill her. While pleading for her life, SS offered Bryant her vehicle, money, and jewelry. Bryant became interested in the money and got off SS, at which point she wrapped her robe around herself. Bryant followed her to the master bedroom to retrieve her purse. The two went back into the den, where Bryant took $120 cash from SS. Somehow, with his knife still drawn, the two ended back up in the bedroom. For a second time, Bryant threw SS onto the bed and told her he would rape her. Bryant, again, untied SS’s robe and straddled her - she could not move. SS made every effort to protect herself as she was being attacked.
Suddenly, Bryant stopped, sat up on the bed, and instructed SS to fix her robe. He then began to tell SS that she was a nice person and told her that his daughter had recently been killed. Bryant became emotional and began to weep. At that point, Bryant got off the bed and the two went into the sunroom, through the den, into the entryway, and arrived at SS’s front door. Bryant asked for a hug, SS relented, and Bryant exited the home. Having learned SS’s first name at some point during the incident, Bryant called out to her from the other side of the door using her name. Bryant asked to reenter the home, and SS refused. Bryant then asked if SS intended to call the police and requested reentry a second time. Again, SS refused and eventually Bryant left. Afraid to call the police, SS called her husband, who then called police.
Later, Bryant was apprehended in connection with other incidents and arrested. When SS was shown a six-person photographic lineup, she identified Bryant as the man who entered her home on the morning of August 22, 2014. SS additionally made an in-court identification of Bryant at his trial.
State v. Bryant, 52,743, pp. 1-3 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/26/19), 277 So. 3d 874,
876-7, writ denied, 19-01320 (La. 10/08/19), 280 So. 3d 171.
Bryant was charged by bill of information with attempted aggravated
rape (La. R.S. 14:42 and 14:27)1 and armed robbery (La. R.S. 14:64).
Bryant’s mental status became an issue leading up to trial. On September
14, 2015, the trial judge ordered Bryant’s commitment upon finding that he
lacked the mental capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to
assist in his defense. The Eastern Louisiana Mental Health System Forensic
Division (“state hospital”) discharged Bryant in March of 2016 on the basis
that he had the mental capacity to proceed. Following a hearing on May 31,
1 Aggravated rape is now designated as first degree rape. La. R.S. 14:42. 2 2016, the trial judge determined that Bryant had not regained competency
and ordered his return to the state hospital.
Another sanity hearing was held on January 10, 2017, during which
the trial judge heard testimony from treating providers that Bryant presented
one affect when he was being evaluated and a different affect at other times.
The providers also asserted that Bryant was competent to stand trial. The
trial judge ruled that Bryant had been restored to competency.
On November 8, 2017, Bryant was convicted as charged of armed
robbery and attempted aggravated rape. Bryant filed a motion for new trial
as well as a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. Both motions
were denied.
On December 13, 2017, the State filed a habitual offender bill against
Bryant charging him as a third-felony habitual offender. Bryant had been
convicted of the two predicate felonies, robbery and sexual assault, in Dallas
County, Texas, on October 31, 1994. He had received a sentence of 10
years for the sexual assault, and a sentence of 20 years for the robbery. The
predicate felonies had been committed on different dates. The robbery
occurred on June 19, 1992, while the sexual assault occurred on April 9,
1994. According to testimony at that habitual offender proceeding, records
from Texas indicated that Bryant’s departure date from the Texas
Department of Corrections was February 7, 2014.
On January 4, 2018, Bryant was adjudicated a third-felony habitual
offender and sentenced to life imprisonment without the benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence. The trial judge concluded that the
mandatory sentence of life without parole, probation, or suspension, as
dictated by La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b), was appropriate considering not only 3 the violent nature of the current offenses, but also the brief time between
Bryant’s release from incarceration and the commission of the current
offenses.
A motion to reconsider sentence was filed on January 18, 2018.
Bryant’s counsel contended that Bryant was 18 years old when previously
convicted and that he suffered from mental health issues.2 The court denied
the motion.
Bryant appealed his convictions and sentence. The first assignment of
error asserted that the trial court erred in finding Bryant competent to
proceed to trial. In the second assignment of error, Bryant’s counsel argued
that the trial court erred in adjudicating Bryant a third-felony offender. This
Court found no merit to the first assignment of error and affirmed Bryant’s
convictions. However, this Court vacated Bryant’s habitual offender
adjudication and remanded for resentencing. Pursuant to La. R.S.
15:529.1(B) and State v. Shaw, 06-2467 (La. 11/27/07), 969 So. 2d 1233, the
predicate convictions were to be counted as one conviction because they
were obtained on the same date and prior to October 19, 2004. State v.
Bryant, supra.
Upon remand, Bryant was adjudicated a second-felony habitual
offender on July 24, 2019, and sentenced on each count to 65 years at hard
labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The
sentences were to be served concurrently. Defense counsel objected to the
sentences. The trial judge noted the objection and stated that the sentences
were actually lower than the midrange sentences requested by the defense.
2 A presentence investigation report prepared on December 27, 2017, reflected that Bryant’s birthdate was February 24, 1975. 4 Bryant was advised by the trial judge that he had 30 days to appeal his
sentences and 2 years to seek post-conviction relief.
Bryant filed a motion to reconsider sentence on July 26, 2019. He
asked the court to reconsider the sentences imposed because of his young
age at the time of the predicate offenses and because he suffered from
mental health issues. The trial judge denied the motion, noting in a written
ruling that he had carefully considered the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and concluded that the sentences were appropriate. The trial
judge added that after reviewing the motion and the reasons stated in court,
his opinion remained that the sentences were reasonable. Bryant has
appealed his sentences.
DISCUSSION
Bryant’s sole assignment of error on appeal is that his sentences are
unjustified and unconstitutionally excessive. He maintains that the trial
judge did not properly consider the long history or magnitude of his mental
illness and the effect it had on his behavior. In support of this argument,
Bryant’s appellate counsel refers to a competency evaluation report as well
as testimony given by physicians at the competency hearings.
A competency evaluation was conducted by Dr. George Seiden on
July 17, 2015. During the evaluation, Bryant informed Dr. Seiden that he
heard voices that told him to do bad things. Dr. Seiden also noted that
Bryant appeared to be responding to voices during the evaluation. Bryant
reported having hallucinations, including some where he ate bloody bodies.
Bryant also told Dr. Seiden that he had attempted suicide several times. Dr.
Seiden’s diagnosis was schizophrenia.
5 Drs. Marc Colon and Ashleigh Fleming examined Bryant on August
25, 2015. Bryant told them about a history of psychiatric treatment dating
back to when he first saw a psychiatrist at the age of 9 or 10 after he set his
stepfather’s bed afire. He also reported delusions of control and paranoia, as
well as hallucinations.
Bryant was ordered committed on September 14, 2015. However, he
was discharged from the state hospital and sent back to the Caddo
Correctional Center (“CCC”) in March of 2016.
Dr. Dennis Kelly, a staff psychiatrist at the state hospital, testified at
an April 27, 2016, hearing that Bryant had been diagnosed with
schizoaffective disorder of a bipolar type and post-traumatic stress disorder.
Dr. Kelly also testified that Bryant had been subjected to an aggressive
treatment regimen at the state hospital. Bryant continued to report
hallucinations and suicidal thoughts. Dr. Kelly agreed that Bryant had a
significant history of mental illness.
Dr. Colon, who treated Bryant at CCC, testified at a hearing
conducted on May 31, 2016. Dr. Colon stated that Bryant had been
withdrawn and psychotic since his return to CCC. Bryant also refused to
accept medical and psychiatric treatment there. Bryant, who had attempted
suicide by overdose twice, was placed on suicide watch. Bryant had also
complained of hallucinations, and in one instance, had punched a wall. Dr.
Colon did not think that Bryant was malingering in order to avoid going to
trial, but thought that his condition was related to chronic mental illness. Dr.
Colon recommended a specific medication and electroconvulsive therapy if
Bryant returned to the state hospital.
6 Drs. Laura Brown and John Roberts testified at a sanity hearing on
January 10, 2017. Dr. Brown, accepted as an expert in the field of forensic
psychiatry, had assessed Bryant at the state hospital. She thought Bryant
probably suffered from a depressive type of mental illness, and possibly a
personality disorder.
Dr. Roberts, who was accepted as an expert in the field of psychiatry,
treated Bryant when he was at the state hospital in 2016. He testified that
Bryant had been diagnosed with a depressive disorder and an unspecified
personality disorder, and he possibly had some psychosis as well. Bryant
also reported hearing voices with command hallucinations. Dr. Roberts
acknowledged that Bryant’s records showed that he had a long psychiatric
history. Bryant had been prescribed medicines for mood stabilization and
for the treatment of psychosis.
While Dr. Roberts was testifying about one of Bryant’s suicide
attempts, Bryant disrupted the proceedings by shouting, “Liar, liar, liar,
liar.” Dr. Roberts thought the outburst could be indicative of mental illness
or possibly frustration over his situation. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the trial judge described Bryant’s conduct in court for the record. Bryant,
who was handcuffed to a wheelchair, had leapt forward and tried to leave the
courtroom through the inmate entrance while dragging the wheelchair
behind him.
Bryant’s appellate counsel also refers to a mental health evaluation
report in the Texas Department of Corrections records which showed that
Bryant had been diagnosed with impulse control, kleptomania, pyromania,
and intermittent explosive disorder. Finally, counsel asserts that Bryant’s
7 actions during the current offenses were bizarre and indicative of someone
with mental health issues.
The State argues in opposition that Bryant was found competent to
stand trial following numerous competency hearings during which his
mental health issues were thoroughly discussed and several doctors testified
that Bryant was a malingerer. The State notes that Bryant’s convictions are
of the same nature as his two prior felony convictions, and that the
concurrent 65-year sentences are well within the applicable ranges and are
not the maximum sentences available. The State points out that because the
trial judge observed Bryant during his multiple competency hearings, at trial,
and at sentencing, he was in the best position to consider Bryant’s age and
mental health issues and weigh those factors against the trauma that Bryant
caused the victim and his prior convictions of the same nature. The State
maintains that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion and that the
sentences imposed are not constitutionally excessive.
A reviewing court imposes a two-prong test to determine whether a
sentence is excessive. First, the record must show that the trial court took
cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial court
is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance so long
as the record reflects adequate consideration of the guidelines of the article.
State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. Boehm, 51,229 (La. App.
2 Cir. 4/5/17), 217 So. 3d 596. The court shall state for the record the
considerations taken into account and the factual basis therefor in imposing
sentence. La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1(C). The articulation of the factual basis
for the sentence is the goal of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, not rigid or
mechanical compliance with its provisions. Where the record clearly shows 8 an adequate factual basis for the sentence, resentencing is unnecessary even
where there has not been full compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State
v. Fontenot, 49,835 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/27/15), 166 So. 3d 1215.
The defendant’s personal history (age, family ties, marital status,
health, employment record), prior criminal record, seriousness of the
offense, and the likelihood of rehabilitation are important elements to
consider. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1981); State v. Boehm, supra.
There is no requirement that specific matters be given any particular weight
at sentencing. State v. Boehm, supra.
Second, a sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out
of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a
purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Dorthey,
623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993). A sentence is considered grossly
disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of
the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-
0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166.
A trial court has wide discretion to sentence within the statutory
limits. Absent a showing of manifest abuse of that discretion, a sentence
will not be set aside as excessive. On review, an appellate court does not
determine whether another sentence may have been more appropriate, but
whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Boehm, supra.
At resentencing, the trial judge reviewed the applicable sentencing
ranges for both convictions under the habitual offender law as written at the
time the instant offenses were committed on August 22, 2014. For
attempted aggravated rape, the sentencing range was 10 to 50 years at hard
labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. La. 9 R.S. 14:42; 14:27. As a second-felony habitual offender under La. R.S.
15:529.1(A)(2)(a), Bryant faced a potential sentence of two-thirds to three
times the longest sentence, or 33 to 150 years, because he had a prior
conviction for sexual assault.
For armed robbery, the sentencing range was 10 to 99 years at hard
labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La.
R.S. 14:64. Under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1), Bryant faced a potential
sentence of one-half the longest sentence to two times the longest sentence,
or 49.5 to 198 years.
At resentencing, the trial judge stated that he had previously
considered all of the relevant factors under La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. In
particular, he considered Bryant’s criminal history and mental health issues,
which the trial judge was familiar with from having considered Bryant’s
competency to stand trial. The trial judge noted that Bryant had a prior
conviction for sexual assault of a minor and now had a conviction for sexual
assault of an adult, and that his prior conviction for robbery had elevated to a
new conviction for armed robbery. The trial judge found that the similarity
and nature of the instant offenses as compared to the prior offenses indicated
that a serious sentence was both appropriate and necessary. The trial judge
also remarked that while Bryant’s mental health problems were a mitigating
factor, that factor was grossly outweighed by the trauma to the victim and
Bryant’s criminal history.
The sentences imposed were particularized to Bryant. Despite having
already served considerable time for two similar crimes, Bryant engaged in
serious criminal activity not long after being released in Texas. The fact and
severity of Bryant’s ongoing mental health issues were thoroughly addressed 10 in the competency hearings. Moreover, those mental health issues were
clearly considered by the trial judge when fashioning a punishment that was
well below half the maximum allowed for each offense under the habitual
offender statute.
The State argued at resentencing that sentences at the higher end of
the ranges were warranted. Defense counsel countered that in light of
Bryant’s mental health issues, mid-range sentences were more appropriate.
The 65-year sentences imposed fall within the statutory range, are far from
the maximum available sentences of 150 and 198 years, and were ordered to
be served concurrently. Notably, the sentences imposed are actually less
than the midrange sentences sought by Bryant’s counsel at resentencing.
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, and in consideration of
the harm done to society, the sentences imposed on Bryant are not
disproportionate and do not shock the sense of justice. The sentences were
absolutely justified. There is no showing that the trial judge abused his
discretion in the sentences imposed. These sentences are not
unconstitutionally excessive.
CONCLUSION
Bryant’s habitual offender sentences are AFFIRMED.