State of Louisiana v. Jonathan Jermaine Crenshaw

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: August 27, 2025
• Docket: 56,377-KA
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered August 27, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,377-KA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

JONATHAN JERMAINE Appellant CRENSHAW

Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 385,727

Honorable Michael A. Pitman, Judge

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Christopher Albert Aberle

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney

TOMMY JAN JOHNSON KODIE K. SMITH Assistant District Attorneys

Before STONE, COX, and ROBINSON, JJ. STONE, J.

Jonathan Crenshaw (“Crenshaw”) and his co defendants, Terrance

Felix, Jr. (“Felix”) and Tamala Ware (“Ware”), were indicted for the second

degree murder of Derrick Terrell (“Terrell”) on December 18, 2019. The

State successfully had Ware severed from the original indictment on October

7, 2021, (after a hearing) and later called her as a witness for its case-in-

chief. Thereafter, Crenshaw and Felix were tried together under the same

docket number, although under separate indictments.1

A jury trial commenced for Crenshaw and his co defendant, Felix, for

the second-degree murder of Terrell on December 13, 2023. At the end of

trial, the jury unanimously convicted Crenshaw, and he was subsequently

sentenced to life imprisonment without the benefit of probation, parole, or

suspension of sentence. Crenshaw appeals, asserting that the evidence was

insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a principal to the

murder of Terrell.

FACTS

In August of 2019, Terrell arrived at the Knights Inn Motel (“motel”)

on Monkhouse Drive in Shreveport to see Ware, a woman with whom he

was having an affair.2 Ware had been living at the motel for two months

prior to the day of the murder. Crenshaw and Felix were at the motel

visiting with Ware in her room when Terrell arrived on the premises. Upon

his arrival, Ware went downstairs to meet Terrell in the parking lot at his

1 The indictment for this case is not signed by the grand jury foreperson as required by La. C. Cr. P. art. 383. However, the original indictment before the cases were severed was in proper form with the required signatures. 2 Terrell was married to Christy Terrell. SUV. Terrell and Ware exchanged words, and Terrell began to assault Ware

by striking her across the face. Crenshaw and Felix witnessed the

altercation, armed themselves, and rushed downstairs to intercede.

Crenshaw and Felix chased Terrell through the motel grounds.

Motel surveillance cameras captured Crenshaw stopping his pursuit

and heading back toward the motel parking lot. Felix, however, continued to

run after Terrell and caught up to him when Terrell fell near the motel

swimming pool. Felix then stood over Terrell, shooting him several times,

killing him. After the shooting, Felix fled the scene in his brown pickup

truck. Surveillance video also shows an unidentified subject getting into

Terrell’s SUV and exiting the parking lot behind Felix’s brown pickup truck.

The SUV was later discovered burned.

An investigation by the Shreveport Police Department (“SPD”)

resulted in the arrest of Crenshaw and Felix for Terrell’s murder. The events

leading to the murder — and the murder itself — were witnessed by Ware,

James Farrar (“Farrar”), and Emanuel Barrett (“Barrett”), all of whom

testified at trial.

The first witness to testify was Farrar, who was also a resident at the

motel. He testified that he saw Felix run past him chasing Terrell and then

run back past him after shooting Terrell. Farrar recovered Felix’s cell phone,

which fell from his pocket during his pursuit of Terrell, and was crucial to

initially identifying him. Upon Felix’s arrest, he had flash burn injuries on

his arm and burn cream in his backpack.3

3 Felix’s backpack was found in Ware’s daughter’s apartment, where Ware was arrested days after the shooting. 2 The next witness to testify was Ware, who was also charged with the

second degree murder of Terrell.4 She testified that Terrell drove into the

parking lot of the motel in his white SUV that evening to meet up with her.

Ware testified that an argument ensued between her and Terrell when he

learned that Crenshaw and Felix were in her room. She stated that Terrell

struck her hard, causing her to have a momentary loss of consciousness. She

stated her next recollection was seeing Terrell start running with Crenshaw

running behind him, gun in hand. She testified that she remained hidden

behind Terrell’s SUV and did not recall hearing any gunshots at that point.

Ware then testified that she witnessed Felix standing over Terrell and

shooting him.

The last witness was Barrett — described by SPD as a “prolific”

confidential informant (to SPD) with an extensive criminal history and

charges pending at the time — who testified to witnessing the sequence of

events that led to Terrell’s murder. Barrett was also a resident at the motel

and testified that Crenshaw and Ware were seen together at the motel earlier

in the day. Barrett also testified that he witnessed Felix’s arrival at the motel

later. Barrett saw the physical altercation between Terrell and Ware that led

to Crenshaw and Felix’s immediate foot chase and the firing of shots at

Terrell. Barrett ran to his room for cover during the actual shooting. After

about 10 minutes, he went outside to find Terrell deceased. Barrett initially

4 She initially told police that she did not know who the shooters were. However, her involvement in the shooting prompted the state to also charge her with the murder of Terrell. Ware testified as to her pending charges and other unrelated charges before the jury. She testified that she was not promised anything by the state in exchange for her testimony and had no expectations of a benefit from her cooperation. 3 identified Crenshaw to the police as the shooter and was able to pick Felix

out of a photo lineup.

Following Crenshaw’s arrest, Barrett executed an affidavit in which

he stated that he did not see Crenshaw at the motel. However, at trial,

Barrett admitted that the affidavit was false and testified that he was coerced

into signing it after being “mistakenly” placed in a holding cell with

Crenshaw. According to Barrett, while he was in the cell, a guard called out

his name, prompting Crenshaw to inquire if his name was Emanuel Barrett.

When Barrett asked “Why?,” Crenshaw explained, “Because you’re in my

paperwork.” As the interaction was witnessed by his fellow inmates, Barrett

testified that he felt compelled to comply with executing the affidavit.

At trial, Crenshaw testified in his own defense, claiming that he was

not present at the motel on the day of the shooting, but was nearly four hours

away in Abbeville, Louisiana. He testified that the person depicted in the

video did not appear to have any tattoos on his arms like he does and

asserted that his hair was different than what was reflected in an Instagram

photo taken earlier that day in Abbeville. Crenshaw further claimed that he

only “knew of” Felix but did not know him personally. Lastly, he testified

that Ware was his ex-girlfriend who lied at trial to protect her son, who was

Terrell’s drug supplier.

SPD investigators testified to taking numerous photographs and

collecting evidence at the crime scene — which included projectiles, soda

cans, cigarette butts, and DNA swabs — which were all consistent with both

Crenshaw and Felix’s presence at the motel on the day of the murder. The

evidence also included two sets of shell casings (from two different

4 weapons) that were left in a trail throughout the motel parking lot and

accumulated around Terrell’s body.

Following a three-day trial, a jury unanimously convicted Crenshaw

and Felix of the second degree murder of Terrell, and they were sentenced to

life imprisonment at hard labor without benefits. Crenshaw now appeals

asserting that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that he was a principal to the murder of Terrell.

DISCUSSION

In his sole assignment of error, Crenshaw asserts that the evidence

was insufficient to establish that he acted in concert with Felix or was

otherwise a principal to the murder of Terrell. Crenshaw contends that the

evidence shows that he acted independently of Felix, as he withdrew from

the pursuit and was not aware, nor could he predict, that Felix would

continue the pursuit with the intention of fatally shooting Terrell.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate,

01-1658 (La. 05/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S.

Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004); State v. Ladell, 52,847 (La. App. 2 Cir.

9/25/19), 280 So.3d 932. This standard, now legislatively embodied in La.

C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to

substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the factfinder.

State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 02/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517. 5 The appellate court does not assess credibility or reweigh the

evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442; State v.

Green, 49,741 (La. App. 2 Cir. 04/15/15), 164 So. 3d 331. The trier of fact

is charged with weighing the credibility of this evidence and, on review, the

same standard as in Jackson, supra, is applied, giving great deference to the

factfinder’s conclusions. Green, supra.

Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the

resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the

witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.

Green, supra; State v. Glover, 47,311 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/10/12), 106 So. 3d

129, writ denied, 12-2667 (La. 05/24/13), 116 So. 3d 659. Such testimony

alone is sufficient even where the state does not introduce medical,

scientific, or physical evidence. State v. Larkins, 51,540 (La. App. 2 Cir.

09/27/17), 243 So. 3d 1220, writ denied, 17-1900 (La. 09/28/18), 253 So. 3d

154. A reviewing court accords great deference to the trier of fact’s decision

to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v.

Jackson, 53,497 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/20/20), 296 So. 3d 1156.

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the

offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S.

14:30.1 (A) (1). Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists

when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the

prescribed consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R. S. 14:10

(1). Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the

offense and the conduct of the defendant. State v. Walker, 53,975 (La. App.

6 2 Cir. 6/30/21), 321 So. 3d 1154, writ denied, 21-01334 (La. 11/23/21), 328

So. 3d 83.

We find that the evidence at trial was indeed sufficient for Crenshaw

to be convicted (as a principal) of second degree murder. By his own

admission on appeal, Crenshaw asserts that he merely chased and shot at —

but did not kill — Terrell and argues that Terrell was killed exclusively by

the bullets fired from Felix’s gun.

A person may be convicted of an offense even if he has not personally

fired the fatal shot. State v. Frost, 53,312 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/4/20); 293 So.

3d 708, writ denied, 20-00628 (La. 11/18/20); 304 So. 3d 416. The law of

principals states that all persons involved in the commission of a crime are

equally culpable. A principal may be connected to those crimes for which he

has the requisite mental state. State v. Brooks, 42,226 (La. App. 2 Cir.

8/15/07), 962 So. 2d 1220. The determination of whether the requisite intent

is present in a criminal case is for the trier of fact. State v. Jones, 49,396

(La. App. 2 Cir.11/19/14), 152 So. 3d 235. State v. Smith, 49,839 (La. App. 2

Cir. 5/20/15), 166 So. 3d 416, writ denied, 015-1244 (La. 6/3/16); 192 So.

3d 753.

It is immaterial that Crenshaw did not fire the final (and fatal) shot at

Terrell because he actively participated in the violent confrontation against

him, which indicates Crenshaw’s desire for Terrell to be killed or otherwise

sustain great bodily harm. The discharge of a firearm at close range and

aimed at a person is indicative of a specific intent to kill or inflict great

bodily harm upon that person. State v. Seals, 95–0305 (La.11/25/96), 684

So. 2d 368, cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1199, 117 S. Ct. 1558, 137 L. Ed. 2d 705

7 (1997); State v. Dooley, 38,763 (La. App. 2d Cir.9/22/04), 882 So. 2d 731,

writ denied, 04–2645 (La.2/18/05), 896 So. 2d 30; State v. Smith, supra.

Moreover, Crenshaw was accompanied by Felix in his initial pursuit of

Terrell, which led the reasonable trier of fact to believe that they shared a

common objective. At trial, Crenshaw maintained that he was not present at

the motel on the day of the murder. On appeal, he backtracks, stating that he

was present at the motel, and expects this court to be impressed that he

withdrew from this deadly conflict he started in the first place.

The jury heard the testimony of Ware, Farrar, and Barrett, where each

disclosed and explained their inconsistent statements, criminal history,

pending charges, and work as a confidential informant, thereby enabling the

jury to make credibility determinations. That said, the jury could have easily

disregarded any witness testimony it deemed not credible and concluded that

Felix was the sole actor in this murder. However, the jury, after hearing all

evidence presented — including the testimony from Crenshaw himself —

still unanimously convicted him. We cannot say that the evidence in this

case does not support the jury’s conclusion. When viewed in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, there is sufficient evidence to prove that

Crenshaw was a principal to the second degree murder of Terrell.

ERROR PATENT

A review of the record reveals an error patent. The trial court failed to

properly advise Crenshaw of his rights under La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.8.

Crenshaw is hereby advised that no application for postconviction relief

shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of

8 conviction and sentence have become final. State v. Jones, 56,042 (La. App.

2 Cir. 12/18/24); 403 So. 3d 659, writ denied, 25-00020 (La. 2/25/25); 401

So. 3d 665.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, defendant Jonathan Crenshaw’s

conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.