State of Louisiana v. John Duncan

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2024-KA-0664

VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL

JOHN DUNCAN * FOURTH CIRCUIT

* STATE OF LOUISIANA

*

* *******

JCL LOBRANO, J., CONCURS IN PART, AND DISSENTS, IN PART, AND ASSIGNS REASONS

I concur in the affirmance of Defendant’s convictions for second-degree

murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The evidence, when

viewed in the light most favorable to the State, supports both verdicts. I

respectfully dissent from the vacatur of the obstruction of justice conviction. The

majority’s analysis relies on State v. Scott, 23-0022 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/30/23), 372

So.3d 42, State v. White, 24-0385 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/14/25), --- So.3d ----, 2025

WL 1415587, and State v. Bowie, 24-0700 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/1/25), --- So.3d ----,

2025 WL 1806684, which require direct evidence of the defendant’s subjective

intent to obstruct justice. Nothing in La. R.S. 14:130.1 imposes such a requirement,

and this Court’s controlling precedent does not either.

In State v. Powell, 15-0218 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/28/15), 179 So.3d 721, this

Court explained that La. R.S. 14:130.1 does not require destruction or elaborate

concealment of evidence. Powell held that intentional removal of the most

probative evidence, viewed alongside the surrounding circumstances, may permit

the jury to infer the specific intent to hinder an investigation. 15-0218, p. 11, 179

So.3d at 728. Powell emphasized that “nothing beyond movement of the evidence

1 is required” when the defendant’s conduct supports a reasonable inference of

obstructive purpose. Id.

Our more recent decisions in State v. Bethley, 22-0849 (La. App. 4 Cir.

6/21/23), 368 So.3d 1148, and State v. Richardson, 23-0584 (La. App. 4 Cir.

4/25/24), 390 So.3d 851, reaffirm this principle. In both cases, the defendant’s

removal of the firearm from the scene, coupled with its disappearance, provided

sufficient circumstantial evidence of intent to obstruct. As Richardson

summarized, the jury may reasonably infer obstruction “where the defendant left

the scene with the firearm that he knew would be the subject of a criminal

investigation.” 23-0584, p. 16, 390 So.3d at 861.

The same reasoning applies here. If Defendant lacked the intent to distort the

investigation, he could have acted as such by remaining on the scene, rendering

aid, notifying law enforcement, or at minimum leaving the firearm in place.

Instead, he did the opposite. He removed the weapon and fled. Defendant’s

removal of the firearm from the scene, coupled with its disappearance, provided

sufficient circumstantial evidence of intent to obstruct. Nothing in the record

suggests that his conduct reflected innocence. To the contrary, it is the precise

conduct Powell found sufficient to support an inference of obstruction.

The majority relies on Scott, White, and Bowie. Those cases departed from

Powell by requiring direct evidence of the defendant’s subjective intent. That

requirement does not appear in La. R.S. 14:130.1, and Powell expressly rejected

such a limitation. Powell held that intentional removal alone, in the context of a

shooting, can itself establish specific intent. 15-0218, p. 11, 179 So.3d at 728. The

later cases cited by the majority improperly narrowed that rule without overruling

it.

2 Because Powell, Bethley, and Richardson remain binding and directly

support the jury’s verdict, I would affirm the obstruction of justice conviction. I

therefore respectfully dissent.