STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2025-KA-0105
VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL JIMMIE DIXON, JR. * FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******
APPEAL FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH NO. 551-347, SECTION “L” Judge Angel Harris, ****** Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase ****** (Court composed of Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins, Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase)
Jason R. Williams DISTRICT ATTORNEY Brad Scott CHIEF OF APPEALS Zachary M. Phillips ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY 619 S. White Street New Orleans, LA 70119
COUNSEL FOR STATE OF LOUISIANA/APPELLEE
Sherry Watters LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT P. O. Box 58769 New Orleans, LA 70158
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED DECEMBER 10, 2025 1
TGC DLD SCJ
Jimmie Dixon, Jr. (hereinafter “Defendant”) appeals his conviction and
sentences for indecent behavior with a juvenile and sexual battery. After
consideration of the record before this Court, and the applicable law, we affirm
Defendant’s convictions and sentences for indecent behavior with a juvenile and
sexual battery.
Facts Procedural History
In 2018, T.T. was an eighth-grade student at a school where Defendant was
employed as the janitor.1 Defendant’s role at the school also included mentoring
troubled students. In May 2018, T.T.’s mother dropped him off at Defendant’s
residence for a visit, at which other young boys were also supposed to be present.
After T.T. did not answer his mother’s phone calls, she returned to Defendant’s
residence to retrieve T.T. Upon her return, she discovered that no other children
were present. She retrieved T.T. and they left Defendant’s residence.
In 2020, T.T.’s mother contacted the New Orleans Police Department and
reported that her son recently divulged that he was molested in 2018 by Defendant.
1 In accordance with La. R.S. 46:1844(W)(1)(a), to keep confidential the identity of the person
who was a minor at the time of the offense, initials have been used in place of a name.
1 After an investigation, Defendant was charged by bill of indictment with one count
of indecent behavior with a juvenile, pursuant to La. R.S. 14:81, and one count of
sexual battery, pursuant to La. R.S. 14:43.1. Defendant was arraigned and pled not
guilty to both counts. A two-day jury trial commenced, at the conclusion of which
the jury unanimously found Defendant guilty as charged on both counts.2
Defendant subsequently filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, which the district court denied. The district court sentenced Defendant to
seven years, at hard labor, for the indecent behavior with a juvenile conviction and
ten years, at hard labor, for the sexual battery conviction—each count to run
concurrently. This appeal followed.
Relevant Trial Testimony
The following testimony was adduced at Defendant’s trial:
Victim’s Mother
T.T.’s mother testified that when she and T.T. arrived at Defendant’s
residence, no other children were present and Defendant advised that the other
young boys were en route. She told T.T. to call her if no other children arrived.
Upon arriving at her next destination, she attempted to call T.T. numerous times to
no avail. Since he was not answering his phone, she returned to Defendant’s
residence where she observed T.T. and Defendant walking down the street, holding
hands, returning from getting food. She testified that she was angry about the
situation and ordered T.T. to get in the car. She stated that T.T.’s behavior
significantly changed after this day and a couple of years later he ran away from
home. She testified that once she located him, T.T. told her about an incident with
Defendant. T.T. told her that Defendant played pornographic material on the
2 Defendant’s trial consisted of a six-person jury.
2 television, undressed and began to masturbate in front of him. T.T. said that the
Defendant coerced him into undressing and also masturbating. She testified that
T.T. told her that Defendant placed T.T.’s hand on his penis and that Defendant
placed his hand on T.T.’s penis. After ejaculating, Defendant went to the restroom
and the two left his house to get food.3
T.T.
T.T. testified that he was an eighth grader in 2018 and attended the school
where Defendant was employed as a janitor. When children would exhibit
disciplinary problems, the school would have them work alongside Defendant and
complete janitorial duties. T.T. testified that Defendant asked him to obtain
permission from his mother to visit Defendant at his residence. T.T. was under the
impression other young boys would be at Defendant’s residence but, upon arrival,
no other children were present. After being dropped off, T.T.’s mother advised him
to call her if no other children arrived. T.T. stated that Defendant mirrored
pornographic material from his cellular phone onto the television, began to
masturbate and coerced T.T. to do the same. T.T. further testified that Defendant
placed T.T.’s hand on Defendant’s penis, placed Defendant’s hand on T.T.’s penis
and ejaculated. T.T. and Defendant then left the house and walked to get Chinese
food. Upon their return, he saw his mother’s car, went back into the residence to
obtain his cellular phone and left. T.T. testified that, approximately two years later,
he saw Defendant at a school alumni picnic. Defendant inquired as to whether T.T.
3 In his brief to this Court, Defendant references a pending civil lawsuit against himself and the
Orleans Parish School Board, filed by T.T. and his mother. At trial, both T.T. and his mother acknowledged participating in a deposition regarding a separate related case. While defense counsel did not attempt to introduce the deposition testimony or proffer it for review, he was allowed to question T.T. and his mother about any inconsistencies between their trial and deposition testimony.
3 told anyone about the incident and asked T.T. why he had not maintained contact.
In 2020, T.T. reported the incident to his mother, after running away from home,
and later provided a statement to the police after they were contacted by his
mother. T.T. conducted an interview with the New Orleans Advocacy Center
detailing the incident.
Maria Isabella Pontoriero
Maria Isabella Pontoriero (hereinafter “Ms. Pontoriero”), formerly employed
with the New Orleans Children’s Advocacy Center, was qualified as an expert in
conducting forensic interviews. Ms. Pontoriero explained that it was not the
purpose of her interview to determine whether T.T. was truthful about the
allegations. She testified that forensic interviews are conducted with a victim in
order to obtain information for investigation purposes. Ms. Pontoriero explained
that delayed disclosure about abuse is common and asserted that T.T.’s statements
were consistent with a child being groomed by an adult. She noted that, during the
interview, T.T. recounted several different instances of abuse by different people,
which occurs when a victim recounts a present allegation of abuse. The jury
watched the video of T.T.’s interview with Ms. Pontoriero.
Defendant
Defendant testified that he knew T.T. from the school where he was
employed as a janitor. He stated that his residence was near the school and students
would visit his home after school for snacks. Defendant denied the allegations
asserted by T.T. and stated that they listened to the radio and talked for a while,
after which they walked to get Chinese food. Defendant denied telling T.T.’s
mother that other boys would be present on the day she dropped T.T. off at his
4 residence. He testified that he kept in contact with T.T. for approximately one year
after the day T.T. was at his residence.
Discussion
Defendant asserts three assignments of error:
1. The State failed to prove the defendant was guilty of indecent behavior with a juvenile and sexual battery beyond a reasonable doubt;
2. The district court erred in prohibiting the defense from using impeachment, res gestae and other non-hearsay evidence, including direct testimony, text messages and a stay away order, and curtailing cross- examination, all in violation of the constitutional right to present a defense;
3. The district court erred in imposing the excessive maximum sentences on the first-time offender. 4
We will discuss each argument under its relevant topic.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first assignment of error, Defendant contends the evidence presented
was insufficient to support his convictions. The State charged Defendant with
indecent behavior with a juvenile, a violation of La. R.S. 14:81, and sexual battery,
a violation of La. R.S. 14:43.1.
La. R.S. 14:81 provides, in pertinent part,
A. Indecent behavior with juveniles is the commission of any of the following acts with the intention of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires of either person:
(1) Any lewd or lascivious act upon the person or in the presence of any child under the age of seventeen, where there is an age difference of greater than two years between the two persons. Lack of knowledge of the child's age shall not be a defense.
La. R.S. 14:81(A)(1). Thus, to support a conviction for indecent behavior of a
juvenile, “the State must prove three elements, namely (1) an age difference of
4 While not listed as an assignment error, Defendant also asserts an ineffective assistance of
counsel at sentencing claim in his argument regarding excessive sentencing.
5 more than two years between the defendant and the victim, who was not yet
seventeen; (2) the defendant committed a lewd or lascivious act upon the person or
in the presence of a child; and (3) the defendant intended to arouse or gratify either
his own or the victim’s sexual desires.” State v. Robinson, 2021-0254, pp. 25-26
(La.App. 4 Cir. 2/18/22), 336 So.3d 567, 582 (citations omitted). Our Supreme
Court has defined “‘lewd [or] lascivious conduct” in the context of La. R.S.
14:81(A) as an act which is ‘lustful, obscene, indecent, tending to deprave the
morals in respect to sexual relations, and relating to the sexual impurity or
incontinence carried on in a wanton manner.’” State v. Jones, 2010-0762, p. 4, n. 1
(La. 9/7/11), 74 So.3d 197, 200 (quoting State v. Interiano, 2003-1760 (La.
2/13/04), 868 So.2d 9, 15) (citation omitted).
La. R.S. 14.43.1 defines sexual battery, in pertinent part, as follows:
[T]he intentional touching of the anus or genitals of the victim by the offender using any instrumentality or any part of the body of the offender, directly or through clothing, or the touching of the anus or genitals of the offender by the victim using any instrumentality or any part of the body of the victim, directly or through clothing, when any of the following occur:
***
(2) The victim has not yet attained fifteen years of age and is at least three years younger than the offender.
La. R.S. 14:43.1(A)(2). Thus, to support a conviction of sexual battery, the State is
required to prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) In May 2018, T.T.
was under fifteen years of age at the time of the offense; (2) T.T. was at least three
years younger than Defendant; and (3) Defendant touched T.T.’s genitals, directly
or through clothing, using any instrumentality or any part of his body.
It is well settled that when sufficiency of the evidence, and one or more trial
errors, are raised on appeal, this Court should first determine the sufficiency of the
6 evidence. State v. Groves, 2020-0450, p. 21 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/10/21), 323 So.3d
957, 971 (quoting State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La. 1992)). We review
sufficiency of the evidence first because “if there is not sufficient evidence to
support a conviction, an accused is not entitled to a new trial; rather, an accused is
entitled to an acquittal. If an accused is entitled to an acquittal, this prevents the
need for a retrial.” Groves, 2020-0450, p. 21, 323 So.3d at 971 (citation omitted).
This Court has previously set forth the applicable standard of review for
sufficiency of the evidence:
In evaluating whether evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support a conviction, an appellate court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Green, 588 So.2d 757 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991). However, the reviewing court may not disregard this duty simply because the record contains evidence that tends to support each fact necessary to constitute the crime. State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305 (La. 1988). The reviewing court must consider the record as a whole since that is what a rational trier of fact would do. If rational triers of fact could disagree as to the interpretation of the evidence, the rational trier’s view of all the evidence most favorable to the prosecution must be adopted. The fact finder’s discretion will be impinged upon only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law. Mussall; Green; supra. “[A] reviewing court is not called upon to decide whether it believes the witnesses or whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of the evidence.” State v. Smith, 600 So.2d 1319 (La. 1992) at 1324.
State v. Huckabay, 2000-1082, p. 32 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/6/02), 809 So.2d 1093, 1111
(citation omitted).
Pursuant to Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d
560 (1979), this Court must determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, “was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that
all the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Neal, 2000-0674, p. 9 (La. 6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649, 657 (quoting State v.
7 Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La. 1984)). The elements must be proven such that
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is excluded. La. R.S. 15:438. The
statutory test of La. R.S. 15:438 “works with the Jackson constitutional sufficiency
test to evaluate whether all evidence, direct and circumstantial, is sufficient to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to a rational jury.” Neal, 2000-0674, p. 9,
796 So.2d at 657 (citation omitted). “When circumstantial evidence forms the basis
of the conviction, such evidence must consist of proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according
to reason and common experience.” State v. Brown, 2012-0626, p. 7 (La.App. 4
Cir. 4/10/13), 115 So.3d 564, 571 (citation omitted). “[A] reviewing court is not
called upon to decide whether it believes the witnesses or whether the conviction is
contrary to the weight of the evidence.” Huckabay, 2000-1082, p. 32, 809 So.2d at
1111 (quoting State v. Smith, 600 So.2d 1319, 1324 (La. 1992)). As an appellate
court we must review the record as a whole, just as the trier of fact would do. State
v. Wilson, 2022-0346, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/9/22), 353 So.3d 389, 393 (citation
omitted).
Defendant asserts that T.T. and his mother’s testimony contained numerous
inconsistencies from their statements to the police and T.T.’s interview with the
New Orleans Children’s Advocacy Center. Defendant contends that T.T. and his
mother’s testimony is therefore unreliable. Defendant further maintains that due to
the lack of forensic and corroborative evidence, his convictions cannot stand on
inconsistent testimony alone. Thus, the State’s witnesses failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he committed the crimes for which he was charged.
The State presented the testimony of T.T. and his mother. T.T. testified that
Defendant played pornographic material on the television, masturbated in front of
8 T.T., encouraged T.T. to also masturbate, placed T.T.’s hand on the Defendant’s
genitals, placed his hand on T.T.’s genitals and ejaculated. Both T.T. and his
mother testified that T.T. was fourteen years old at the time of the incident. The
testimony elicited also demonstrates that Defendant intended to gratify his own,
and T.T.’s, sexual desires. It is not the role of this Court to assess the credibility of
witnesses or re-weigh the evidence submitted at trial. See State v. Brown, 2016-
0965, p. 28 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/3/17), 219 So.3d 518, 536 (concluding that “[t]he
credibility of witnesses presenting conflicting testimony on factual matters is
within the sound discretion of the trier of fact.”) (citation omitted). Credibility
determinations are matters of weight, not sufficiency, and does not cause the
evidence to be insufficient to convict. State v. Woods, 2000-2712, p. 6 (La.App. 4
Cir. 5/29/02), 828 So.2d 6, 10 (citation omitted). Additionally, “[i]n cases
involving sexual offenses, the testimony of the victim alone may be sufficient to
establish the elements of a sexual offense, even where the State does not introduce
medical, scientific, or physical evidence to prove the commission of the offense.”
State v. Barbain, 2015-0404, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/4/15), 179 So.3d 770, 778
(citation omitted). While we recognize that conflicting testimony exists, we find
the testimony was sufficient to support a finding of indecent behavior with a
juvenile and sexual battery. A jury heard the testimony of the witnesses. They
listened to the trial testimony and watched T.T.’s interview with Ms. Pontoriero;
ultimately finding Defendant guilty as charged. The testimony of a single witness,
if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support a factual conclusion. State v.
Campbell, 2015-0017, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/24/15), 171 So.3d 1176, 1182
9 “Appellate review for constitutional sufficiency of evidence is limited by the
due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia. Under that standard, ‘the relevant
question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Toby, 2023-00722, p. 3 (La. 10/25/24),
395 So.3d 831, 833, reh’g denied, 2023-00722 (La. 12/12/24), 397 So.3d 424
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d
560 (1979)) (internal citation omitted). Viewing the evidence presented by the
State, in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find the trier of fact was
presented with sufficient evidence to determine that Defendant committed the
crimes of indecent behavior with a juvenile and sexual battery. Accordingly, we
find no merit to this assignment of error.
Admissibility of Evidence
By his second assignment of error, Defendant asserts the district court
violated his constitutional right to present a defense by not allowing him to
introduce certain evidence. The right of a defendant to present evidence of a
defense is provided by both the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Art.
1, Section 16 of the Louisiana Constitution. This includes the right to full
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920
(1967); State v. Gremillion, 542 So.2d 1074 (La. 1989); State v. Clark, 2023-0717
(La.App. 4 Cir. 6/10/24), 401 So.3d 171. While generally the introduction of
evidence must comply with evidentiary rules, these rules “may not supersede the
fundamental right to present a defense.” State v. Van Winkle, 1994-0947, p. 5 (La.
6/30/95), 658 So.2d 198, 202. A district court’s ruling on the admissibility of
10 evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review. State v.
Wright, 2011-0141, pp. 10-11 (La. 12/6/11), 79 So.3d 309, 316 (citation omitted).
In the matter sub judice, Defendant contends that the district court’s rulings
prevented him from presenting evidence that the accusations against him were
false. Specifically, Defendant contends he should have been allowed to present
evidence that contradicted T.T.’s mother’s testimony concerning how the visit was
arranged and when it occurred; showed an on-going relationship with T.T. after the
incident; and contradicted T.T. and his mother’s testimony that she did not have a
propensity for violence.
Defendant argues the district court erred in excluding text messages from
T.T. and his mother regarding T.T.’s visit to his residence. Defendant also
contends that the district court erred in not allowing text messages between
Defendant and T.T. after the incident to be admitted into evidence. He avers that
the ongoing communication with T.T. creates reasonable doubt on the reliability of
the accusations and he should have been allowed to introduce the text messages for
impeachment purposes. The district court did not allow the introduction of the text
messages between T.T. and Defendant after the incident because they were
presented for the first time on the second day of trial. Defendant acknowledges that
he was allowed to ask questions about the text messages on cross-examination but,
asserts that being prevented from entering the text messages into evidence did not
allow the jury “fair consideration” of all the facts. The record reflects that
Defendant was able to extensively question both T.T. and his mother regarding the
text messages on the day of the visit and text messages between T.T. and
Defendant after the incident. While each individual’s recollection regarding the
11 text messages varies, we find that Defendant was not prohibited from exploring the
issue during cross-examination.
Defendant also maintains the district court erred by ruling that he could not
introduce evidence of a domestic stay-away order issued against T.T.’s mother.5
He argues this evidence was necessary to prove his theory that T.T.’s mother had a
propensity towards violence and coerced T.T. into accusing Defendant of sexual
misconduct. Prior to the start of trial, the district court advised the State that
defense counsel intended to cross-examine T.T.’s mother about a domestic stay-
away order issued against her in municipal court. Citing to La. C.E. art. 609.1, the
district court determined that because the charges were refused by the State, and
thus no conviction resulted, the defense could not question her about the order in
an attempt to impeach her credibility. Defendant contends that this ruling
impinged on his ability to present a defense. As noted by the district court, this
evidence was not admissible for impeachment purposes under the code of
evidence. La. C.E. art. 609.1(B), provides: “[g]enerally, only offenses for which
the witness has been convicted are admissible upon the issue of his credibility, and
no inquiry is permitted into matters for which there has only been an arrest, the
issuance of an arrest warrant, an indictment, a prosecution, or an acquittal.” The
protective order Defendant sought to introduce arose out of a criminal case for
which T.T.’s mother was not convicted and thus, it was inadmissible for
impeachment purposes.
Absent an abuse of discretion, a district court’s ruling on the admissibility of
evidence will not be disturbed on review. Wright, 2011-0141, pp. 10-11, 79 So.3d
5 The domestic stay-away order issued against T.T.’s mother did not involve Defendant and was
unrelated to the incident that forms the basis of Defendant’s convictions.
12 at 316 (citation omitted). The record before this Court demonstrates that the district
court did not err in its evidentiary rulings. The decision to exclude certain evidence
did not prevent Defendant from presenting a defense. Accordingly, we find no
merit to this assignment of error.
Excessive Sentence
By his final assignment of error, Defendant contends the district court
imposed constitutionally excessive sentences for his two convictions. The district
court sentenced Defendant to serve seven years at hard labor on the indecent
behavior with a juvenile conviction and ten years at hard labor on the sexual
battery conviction, the sentences are to run concurrently.6 He argues that
imposition of the maximum sentences violated his constitutional rights. “A [district
court] has broad discretion when imposing a sentence and a reviewing court may
not set a sentence aside absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” State v. Bethley,
2022-0849, p. 14 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/21/23), 368 So.3d 1148, 1158 (quoting State v.
Smith, 2001-2574, p. 7 (La. 1/14/03), 839 So.2d 1, 4) (internal citation omitted).
When reviewing a claim of excessive sentence, this Court must “consider the
punishment and the crime in light of the harm to society caused by its commission
and determine whether the penalty is so disproportionate to the crime committed as
to shock our sense of justice.” State v. Bonanno, 384 So.2d 355, 358 (La. 1980)
(citation omitted). In an excessive sentence claim, the relevant question presented
before this Court is not whether another sentence would be more appropriate, but
6 Under this assignment of error, Defendant also asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim arguing that failure of his defense counsel to file a motion to reconsider sentence or request a pre-sentencing investigation constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. While this Court may consider such claims on direct review, in general an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is properly raised in an application for post-conviction relief, in the district court, where a full evidentiary hearing on the matter may be conducted. See Brown, 2016-0965, p. 17, 219 So.3d at 531; see also State v. Seiss, 428 So.2d 444, 449 (La. 1983). We find the record before this Court does not contain sufficient evidence to decide the issue.
13 whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing the sentence. State v.
Cook, 1995-2784, p. 3 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, 959 (citation omitted). Where,
as here, a defendant fails to object to a sentence or file a motion for reconsideration
of sentence per La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1, appellate review of a sentence is limited to a
review for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Banks, 2023-0806, p. 5 (La. App.
4 Cir. 5/24/24), 391 So.3d 24, 28.
Defendant contends that his sentences are constitutionally excessive due to
his lack of criminal record and his good reputation in the community. He notes
that the charges for which he was convicted were based on a single incident and
the imposition of the maximum sentences is unconstitutionally excessive. While
this Court may consider a different sentence more appropriate, given the record
presented, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in the imposition of
Defendant’s sentences.7 See Cook, 1995-2784, p. 3, 674 So.2d at 959. Accordingly,
we find no merit to this assignment of error.
Errors Patent Review
In accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 920, this Court reviews all criminal
appeals for errors patent on the face of the record. An error patent is one “that is
discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without
inspection of the evidence.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2). A review of the record reveals
one error patent. In sentencing Defendant, the district court failed to specify that
his sentence for the sexual battery conviction was to be served without benefit of
parole, probation or suspension of sentence as required by the statute. See La. R.S.
14.43.1. However, La. R.S. 15:301.1(A) provides,
7 We note that Defendant’s right to seek post-conviction relief remains as to any and all appropriate issues. See La. C.Cr.P. arts. 930.3 and 930.8.
14 When a criminal statute requires that all or a portion of a sentence imposed for a violation of that statute be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, each sentence which is imposed under the provisions of that statute shall be deemed to contain the provisions relating to the service of that sentence without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The failure of a sentencing court to specifically state that all or a portion of the sentence is to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence shall not in any way affect the statutory requirement that all or a portion of the sentence be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.
La. R.S. 15:301.1 cures the district court’s failure to “specifically state that
all or a portion of the sentence is to be served without benefit of probation, parole,
or suspension of sentence… .” Accordingly, we deem this error patent warrants no
action by this Court.
Decree
After a review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and
sentences for indecent behavior with a juvenile and sexual battery.
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED