State of Louisiana v. Jeremy J. Jackson

Opinion

Judgment rendered July 15, 2026. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,955-KA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

JEREMY J. JACKSON Appellant

Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 398,145

Honorable Donald E. Hathaway, Jr., Judge

***** LOUISIANA APPEALS AND Counsel for Appellant WRIT SERVICE By: Remy V. Starns Michael A. Mitchell Justin C. Harrell

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney

JASON W. WALTMAN ERIC M. WHITEHEAD STEPHEN FOLK-CRUTHIRDS Assistant District Attorneys

Before THOMPSON, MARCOTTE, and ELLENDER, JJ. THOMPSON, J.

After a high-speed police chase of a stolen vehicle and brief foot

pursuit, the passenger in the vehicle, Jeremy Jackson, was apprehended and

a firearm was located in the vehicle. During a search the next day where

Jackson was arrested, two additional firearms were recovered. One of those

firearms was tested and confirmed to have Jackson’s DNA on it. Jackson, a

convicted felon, was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm.

At the conclusion of his jury trial, he was convicted of those charges and,

after having been adjudicated a second habitual offender, sentenced to a

midrange sentence of 25 years. For the reasons described in more detail

below, his conviction and sentence are affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

While on patrol the evening of October 14, 2023, Shreveport Police

Department (“SPD”) Officers Austin Terry and Christian Fyffe noticed a

grey Corvette matching the description of a vehicle recently reported as

stolen. When the officers initiated a stop and attempted to pull the vehicle

over, the driver led them on a high-speed chase through a neighborhood

before the pursuit ended at a dead-end street. The driver was taken into

custody at that scene, but the passenger, later identified as Jeremy Jackson

(“Jackson”), jumped out of the vehicle and ran into the nearby woods.

Jackson was apprehended approximately 50 yards from the vehicle. Officers

then searched the vehicle and recovered a firearm under the passenger seat.

Officers also briefly searched the area where Jackson ran into the woods but

initially found nothing else.

While being processed at city jail following his arrest, Jackson told

Officer Terry, “I didn’t know those guns were in there.” Officer Terry, noting the word “guns” being used, returned to the scene the following

afternoon and recovered two additional weapons in the woods where

Jackson had been arrested. Officer Terry activated his body camera on site

once he located the additional pistols.

In all, three weapons were recovered from the scene: a Glock 9mm,

located under the passenger seat of the Corvette, a Taurus 9mm, and a Canik

9mm, located in the woods the next day by Officer Terry. It was the Taurus

9mm that was later conclusively determined to have Jackson’s DNA on the

grip.

Jackson was arrested for possession of a firearm, the Taurus 9mm, by

a convicted felon. A jury trial followed. Prior to trial, the State disclosed

that after the arrest of Jackson, Officer Terry had been charged with

domestic abuse battery and child endangerment, and it filed a motion in

limine to prohibit any questioning related to his pending charges. The trial

court granted the motion in limine in part but stated that the jury was entitled

to know that he was arrested for domestic abuse and child endangerment and

the fact of his pending prosecution.

At trial, Officer Terry testified as to the facts listed above, including

that he had been arrested and was being prosecuted for domestic abuse

battery and child endangerment. He testified that he was receiving no

benefit or special consideration from the State in exchange for his testimony

in the Jackson matter.

Also testifying at trial was SPD Officer Susan Mendels, who

confirmed that she took fingerprint and DNA samples from the pistols

recovered in connection with Jackson’s arrest. James Upton testified that he

is with the Caddo Parish District Attorney’s office and he took buccal swabs 2 from Jackson, and Dr. Jessica Esparza with the North Louisiana

Criminalistics Laboratory identified Jackson’s DNA on the Taurus 9mm

pistol. Louisiana State Probation Officer David Francis testified that

Jackson had previously been on parole from a prior felony conviction. SPD

Sergent John Madjerick confirmed that Jackson had been previously

convicted of the crime of aggravated battery. Jackson did not testify at the

trial, and the defense called no other witnesses.

A unanimous jury convicted Jackson as charged of possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon. Jackson filed a motion for post-verdict

judgment of acquittal, which was denied, as well as filing a motion for new

trial, which was also denied. Jackson was subsequently adjudicated a

second habitual offender and sentenced to 25 years in prison.1 This appeal

followed.

DISCUSSION

Jackson asserts four assignments of error.

First Assignment of Error: The district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a defense continuance after tardily disclosed body worn camera footage revealed “inconsistences” in the manner in which crucial evidence was discovered. Jackson contends that the district court erred in refusing to grant him a

continuance because the State provided him with Officer Terry’s body

camera footage only days before trial.

1 La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1) provides that the sentencing range for habitual offenses is “not less than one-third the longest term and not more than twice the longest terms prescribed for a first conviction.” Jackson originally faced a sentencing range of not less than five nor more than 20 years, which was enhanced to a sentencing range of “not less than one-third the longest term and not more than twice the longest terms prescribed for a first conviction,” which would have been between 6 ⅔ to 40 years.

3 A motion for continuance, if timely filed, may be granted, in the

discretion of the court, in any case if there is good ground therefor. La. C.

Cr. P. art. 712. The grant or denial of a motion for continuance or a motion

for recess is within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his ruling will

not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse and specific prejudice.

State v. Mandigo, 44,698 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/30/09), 21 So. 3d 1027, writs

denied, 09-2287 (La. 5/28/10), 36 So. 3d 244 and 09-2366 (La. 5/28/10), 36

So. 3d 245. The decision whether to grant or deny a motion to continue

depends on the circumstances of each particular case. Id. Even when an

abuse of discretion is shown, this Court typically declines to reverse a

conviction based on the denial of a continuance absent a showing of specific

prejudice. The specific prejudice requirement may be disregarded only

where the time allowed defense counsel to prepare is so minimal that the

fairness of the proceeding becomes questionable. Id.

In the present matter, the record reflects that the existence of body

camera footage was disclosed and referenced in the State’s responses to

Jackson’s discovery, filed January 6, 2025, almost seven months prior to

trial. When the State discovered that Jackson did not have a copy of the

footage as trial approached, it was provided to defense counsel five days

prior to trial. Officer Terry was cross-examined at trial regarding the body

camera footage and the timing of its activation. Jackson has argued that

there are “clear irregularities” in the timing of when Officer Terry activated

his body camera. However, Jackson’s counsel had the opportunity, and did

in fact question Officer Terry about the timing. We find there was no abuse

or specific prejudice in the trial court’s denial of Jackson’s motion for

continuance. This assignment of error is without merit. 4 Second Assignment of Error: The district court abused its discretion in limiting cross-examination of Officer Austin Terry’s pending criminal charges and the potential for motivation or bias. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine to prevent defense

counsel from discussing Officer Terry’s pending criminal charges as

irrelevant. The trial court ruled that Officer Terry could be questioned

before the jury regarding the charges for which he was arrested and the fact

that he is being prosecuted by the State. During trial, the State elicited

testimony from Officer Terry about the charges against him, the fact that he

is being prosecuted by the State, and that he is not receiving any benefit or

incentive for his testimony. Jackson’s defense counsel was able to cross-

examine him on these and other topics.

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,

§ 16 of the Louisiana Constitution guarantee an accused in a criminal

prosecution the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. State

v. Tauzin, 38,436 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/18/04), 880 So. 2d 157. The primary

purpose of confrontation is to secure for the defendant the opportunity for

cross-examination. Id. However, the extent of cross-examination is not

without limitation. In order for evidence to be admissible at trial, it must be

relevant. The determination regarding the relevancy of tendered evidence,

and therefore the scope and extent of cross-examination, is within the

discretion of the trial judge, whose ruling will not be disturbed absent an

abuse of discretion. Id.

The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including

the party calling him. La. C.E. art. 607(A). However, “[p]articular acts,

vices, or courses of conduct of a witness may not be inquired into or proved

by extrinsic evidence for the purpose of attacking his character for 5 truthfulness, other than conviction of a crime as provided in Articles 609 and

609.1 or as constitutionally required.” La. C.E. art. 608(B). La. C.E. art.

609.1(B) provides that “[g]enerally, only offenses for which the witness has

been convicted are admissible upon the issue of his credibility, and no

inquiry is permitted into matters for which there has only been an arrest, the

issuance of an arrest warrant, an indictment, a prosecution, or an acquittal.”

Despite the general rule, the possibility that the prosecution may have

leverage over a witness due to that witness’s pending criminal charges is

recognized as a valid area of cross-examination. State v. Blueford, 48,823

(La. App. 2 Cir. 3/5/14), 17 So. 3d 54, writ denied, 14-0745 (La. 11/21/14),

160 So. 3d 968, cert. denied, 575 U.S. 988, 135 S. Ct. 1900, 191 L. Ed. 2d

770 (2015). The possibility that a witness will receive leniency from the

State is relevant to establish bias or interest. Id. However, relevant evidence

may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or

by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time. La. C.E. art. 403.

The record reflects that the trial court allowed Jackson to cross-

examine Officer Terry about his pending charges, his upcoming prosecution

by the State, and whether he received any particular benefit in exchange for

his testimony. We cannot say this ruling on the part of the trial court was an

abuse of discretion. For this reason, this assignment of error is without

merit.

Third Assignment of Error: The district court erred in permitting the admission of unrelated weapons that were not linked to appellant and were unduly prejudicial. Jackson argues that the district court erred in permitting the admission

of unrelated weapons that were not linked to him and were unduly 6 prejudicial. He argues that the admission of all three weapons into evidence

was prejudicial because only one of them, the Taurus, was attributed to him.

La. C.E. art. 403 provides that although relevant, evidence may be

excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by

consideration of undue delay, or waste of time. A trial court’s ruling on the

admissibility of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.

Wright, 11-0141 (La. 12/6/11), 79 So. 3d 309; State v. Cosey, 97-2020 (La.

11/28/00), 779 So. 2d 675, cert. denied, 533 U.S. 907, 121 S. Ct. 2252, 150

L. Ed. 2d 239 (2001). As this Court has noted:

Relevant evidence of other crimes or misconduct of an accused will always be inculpatory and thus prejudicial. It is only unduly prejudicial evidence of other crimes which inflames the jury’s emotions or otherwise causes them to convict the Defendant for reasons other than his actual guilt which should be excluded. Inculpatory evidence is probative of an incriminating fact, circumstance, or involvement which tends to either establish guilt or from which guilt may be inferred. Inculpatory evidence, by its nature, is prejudicial to a defendant accused of a crime. Unfairly prejudicial evidence makes a conviction more likely because it inflames the emotions of the jury or affects the jury's attitude toward the defendant wholly apart from its judgment as to his guilt or innocence of the crime charged.

State v. Smith, 56.209 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/16/25), 409 So. 3d 1114, quoting

State v. Hamilton, 99-523 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/3/99), 747 So. 2d 164, writ

denied, 25-00622 (La. 11/25/25), 421 So. 3d 531.

In the present matter, Jackson objects to the admission of two

firearms, one of which was found in the car in which Jackson was riding and

the other of which was found in the woods during Officer Terry’s search.

We cannot find that the admission of this evidence was an abuse of

discretion. While the presence of other guns could indicate other crimes or

7 misconduct, it cannot be said that the evidence of two additional guns was

unfairly prejudicial evidence when evidence was presented of a gun with

Jackson’s DNA present on it. The trial court has broad discretion in

evidentiary rulings, and there is no abuse of discretion, as at most it could be

considered harmless error. This assignment of error is without merit.

Fourth Assignment of Error: Appellant’s 25-year sentence is constitutionally excessive.

Finally, Jackson argues that his 25-year sentence is excessive

considering that his conviction is for a nonviolent offense that has no victim

and that his earlier convictions do not justify the sentence under the habitual

offender statute.

An appellate court utilizes a two-pronged test in reviewing a sentence

for excessiveness. First, the record must show that the trial court complied

with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983). The

trial judge need not articulate every aggravating and mitigating circumstance

outlined in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, but the record must reflect that he

adequately considered these guidelines in particularizing the sentence to the

defendant. Id. The important elements the trial court should consider are

the defendant’s personal history, prior criminal record, seriousness of

offense, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049

(La. 1981). There is no requirement that specific matters be given any

particular weight at sentencing. State v. DeBerry, 50,501 (La. App. 2 Cir.

4/13/16), 194 So. 3d 657, writ denied, 16-0959 (La. 5/1/17), 219 So. 3d 332.

Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is

unconstitutionally excessive. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it

is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more

8 than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v.

Smith, 01-2574 (La. 1/14/03), 839 So. 2d 1, citing State v. Bonanno, 384 So.

2d 355 (La. 1980).

The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as

excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.

Abercrumbia, 412 So. 2d 1027 (La. 1982). On review, an appellate court

does not determine whether another sentence may have been more

appropriate but whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v.

Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7, citing State v. Cook, 95-

2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So. 2d 957.

La. R.S. 14:95.1(B)(1) states that those found guilty of felon in

possession of a firearm are subject to imprisonment at hard labor for not less

than five nor more than 20 years without the benefit of probation, parole, or

suspension of sentence and be fined not less than $1,000 nor more than

$5,000. The sentencing exposure for habitual offenders is intentionally

more severe by design of the legislature. Any criminal activity is frowned

upon, but those who continually engage in criminal endeavors face

significantly longer prison sentences. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1) provides that

the sentencing range for habitual offenses is “not less than one-third the

longest term and not more than twice the longest terms prescribed for a first

conviction,” or 6 ⅔ to 40 years in this case.

A review of the record reveals that the trial court adequately

addressed all issues related to La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, including Jackson’s

criminal history and found that there was an undue risk that he would

commit another crime. The trial court noted in the record that it found no 9 mitigating factors were applicable in the present matter. Thus, the first

inquiry is satisfied. As to the constitutionality of the sentence, we cannot

find that with a 40-year sentencing exposure that this midrange sentence of

25 years is constitutionally excessive. It does not shock the sense of justice

as designed by our legislative body and applied by our courts, and there is no

evidence of an abuse of discretion. This assignment of error is without

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Jeremy Jackson’s conviction and sentence

are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.