State of Louisiana v. Jeanell Latrice Jackson

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: May 20, 2020
• Docket: 53,497-KA
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered May 20, 2020. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.

No. 53,497-KA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

Versus

JEANELL LATRICE JACKSON Appellant

Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 355053

Honorable Katherine Dorrah, Judge

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Holli Ann Herrle-Castillo

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney

JASON WALTMAN TRINICIA S. LEONARD Assistant District Attorneys

Before MOORE, COX, and STEPHENS, JJ. STEPHENS, J.

This criminal appeal by defendant Jeanell Latrice Jackson arises from

the First Judicial District Court, Caddo Parish, State of Louisiana, where she

waived her right to a jury trial. Following a bench trial, Jackson was

initially convicted of aggravated battery, and her motion for post-verdict

judgment of acquittal was denied. However, the trial court granted

Jackson’s motion for post-verdict judgment modification and amended the

verdict to guilty of second degree battery, a violation of La. R.S. 34.1. The

trial court sentenced Jackson to five years at hard labor, suspended, and

placed her on three years’ active supervised probation. Jackson was also

ordered to pay a fine of $200.00, court costs, and a $50.00 fee to the Indigent

Defender’s Office. The trial court further advised that Jackson would be

sentenced to 30 days in jail for failure to pay.

Jackson now appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to convict

her of second degree battery. For the following reasons, we affirm

Jackson’s conviction but conclude her sentence is illegal in two respects.

Thus, we vacate Jackson’s sentence and remand to the trial court for

resentencing.

FACTS

Jeanell Latrice Jackson was charged by bill of information with

aggravated second degree battery, which was later amended to aggravated

battery. The amended bill alleged this crime occurred on January 21, 2018,

and Jackson committed a battery upon Henry Bradford with a dangerous

weapon: hot grease. After Jackson waived her right to a jury trial, a bench

trial commenced on June 20, 2019. There were two witnesses: the victim, Henry Bradford, and the Shreveport Police Department investigating officer,

Ron Richardson.

Evidence at trial showed that Bradford and Jackson were in a

relationship and living together, along with three children, one of whom was

the couple’s child. Bradford testified at the time of the incident he was

intoxicated, and he and Jackson “passed a few words,” the content of which

he could not recall at trial. However, Ofc. Richardson testified Bradford told

him the argument revolved around cheating rumors. Bradford testified he

could not recall what happened after the conversation, but that while he was

standing outside, he was burned by grease and had to be hospitalized for “a

little grease burn.” Bradford testified he could not recall who put the grease

on him, but “wasn’t but two of us there, so—.” Bradford stated he was not

physically hurt by the burn but was emotionally hurt. Officer Richardson

testified Bradford told him he and Jackson got into an altercation, and she

splashed grease in his face. Officer Richardson recalled that Bradford

expressed to the officer that he was in pain.

Following the burn, Bradford recalled he had trouble seeing, and he

“stumbled” into the street. Someone provided him a ride to the hospital, but

he could not remember who. Notably, there was no evidence that Jackson

drove him to the hospital. While at the hospital, Bradford evidently was

treated for his eye injury, spoke with Ofc. Richardson, and had photos taken;

however, no medical records were introduced at the trial, so the precise

extent of Bradford’s medical condition was unestablished by the state.

Bradford testified he had “fragments” and/or a “splatter of grease” in his eye

and that medical providers put a cleaning solution in it. Bradford also

testified he could not recall his conversation with Ofc. Richardson. The 2 state admitted the photographs taken of Bradford, a dark-skinned black man,

which showed areas of pink discoloration on his face that Bradford testified

he did not have prior to arriving at the hospital. When asked if the pink

scars were caused by the grease, Bradford replied, “I imagine so.” Bradford

testified it took him four days to heal from his injury, but he did not have

any type of surgery, did not take pain medication, and did not have follow-

up treatment. The state also admitted photographs of the home Bradford and

Jackson shared on the day in question as well as photos of Jackson.

After Ofc. Richardson spoke with Bradford, he went to the house

Bradford and Jackson shared. He entered the home and observed what he

observed to be grease on the living room floor.

At the conclusion of testimony, Jackson moved for a directed verdict,

arguing the state had not excluded the possibility the incident was an

accident and not a deliberate or specific act. Thus, Jackson argued, the state

failed to prove specific intent. The state opposed the motion, arguing it had

proved Jackson’s motive for the attack: she thought Bradford was cheating

on her and “dashed the hot grease in his face.” The motion was denied. The

trial court delayed ruling.

On July 10, 2019, the trial court found Jackson guilty as charged of

aggravated battery. The trial court noted specifically the offense was a

crime of violence, but wanted the minutes to reflect Jackson would be

sentenced as if aggravated battery were not a crime of violence “so that

probation would be available.” Jackson moved for a post-verdict judgment

of acquittal, which was denied. Then, Jackson moved for a post-verdict

judgment modification for a lesser sentence, which the trial court granted,

amending the verdict to guilty of second degree battery. 3 Subsequently, Jackson was sentenced. Prior to sentencing, the trial

court noted Jackson was a candidate for probation and sentenced Jackson to

five years at hard labor, suspended, and placed her on three years’

supervised probation. The trial court explained she imposed this sentence

because: Jackson did not have a significant criminal history; she was

employed; she had been present for every court appearance; and, Bradford

had significantly downplayed his injuries and did not want to see Jackson go

to jail. Additionally, Jackson was also ordered to pay a $200.00 fine, court

costs, and a $50.00 fee to the Indigent Defender’s Office. The trial court

further stated if Jackson failed to pay, she would be ordered to serve 30 days

in jail.

This appeal by Jackson ensued, wherein she submits the evidence was

insufficient to support her conviction.

DISCUSSION

Legal Principles

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.

Tate, 2001-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905,

124 S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004); State v. Jackson, 51,575 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 244 So. 3d 764. This standard, now legislatively

embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with

a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the

4 fact finder. State v. Pigford, 2005-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517; State

v. Jackson, supra.

The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and

circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of

evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by

viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When

the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct

evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence

must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime.

State v. Sutton, 436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983); State v. Stephens, 49,680 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 5/20/15), 165 So. 3d 1168.

The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or

reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 1994-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d

442. A reviewing court accords great deference to a jury’s decision to

accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v.

Stephens, supra.

Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the

resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the

witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.

State v. Bailey, 50,097 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/30/15), 180 So. 3d 442.

Louisiana R.S. 14:34.1 provides, in part:

A. Second degree battery is a battery when the offender intentionally inflicts serious bodily injury [.]

****

(3) ‘Serious bodily injury’ means bodily injury which involves unconsciousness, extreme physical pain or protracted and 5 obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty, or a substantial risk of death.

Second degree battery is a specific intent crime and, therefore, the

evidence must show that the defendant intended to inflict serious injury.

State v. Fuller, 414 So. 2d 306 (La. 1982); State v. Thomas, 52,617 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 5/22/19), 272 So. 3d 999, writ denied, 2019-01045 (La.

02/10/20), ___ So. 3d ___; State v. Linnear, 44,830 (La. App. 2 Cir.

12/9/09), 26 So. 3d 303. Specific intent is that state of mind that exists when

the circumstances indicate the offender actively desired the prescribed

criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1).

Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the

offense and the conduct of the defendant. State v. Thomas, supra; State v.

Linnear, supra. The determination of whether the requisite intent is present

in a criminal case is for the trier of fact, and a review of this determination is

to be guided by the standards of Jackson v. Virginia, supra. State v.

Jackson, supra; State v. Linnear, supra.

Analysis

Here, the evidence shows Bradford presented to the hospital due to

grease burns to his face. To convict Jackson of second degree battery, the

state was required to prove three elements, evidence of which was presented

to trial court.

First, the state was required to prove a battery was committed.

Battery is the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another.

La. R.S. 14:33. In this case, Ofc. Richardson testified when he encountered

Bradford at the hospital shortly after the incident, Bradford told him he had

gotten into an argument with Jackson. When Ofc. Richardson asked 6 Bradford who had splashed grease in his face, Bradford responded Jackson

had. While Bradford testified that while he could not remember exactly

what transpired that evening, he did recall being burned by grease while he

was outside of the home he shared with Jackson. Importantly, Bradford

admitted there “wasn’t but two of us there.” Therefore, the evidence showed

that a battery was committed by Jackson against Bradford, and this element

was proved.

Second, the state was required to prove the battery to Bradford

resulted in serious bodily injury, which, according to La. R.S. 14:2(C),

involves: unconsciousness; extreme physical pain; protracted and obvious

disfigurement; protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily

member, organ, or mental faculty; or, a substantial risk of death. Here, the

evidence showed that Bradford was injured seriously enough to be

transported to the hospital. As a result of the injuries, he had trouble seeing

after being burned; he had fragments in his eye; the skin on his face turned

pink; and, it took him at least four days to recover. Accordingly, the state

proved this element.

Finally, the state was required to prove specific intent. Specific intent

is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate the

offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his

act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1). Specific intent may be inferred from

the circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant.

State v. Tate, supra; State v. Broadway, 53,105 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/15/20),

288 So. 3d 903. This element raises some questions and is the basis of

Jackson’s sole assignment of error.

7 A case with strikingly similar facts is State v. Speed, 43,786 (La. App.

2 Cir. 1/14/09), 2 So. 3d 582, writ denied, 2009-0372 (La. 11/6/09), 21 So.

3d 299. In that case, where there were no eyewitnesses, the male defendant

also argued the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and the

state failed to prove he had the requisite intent to commit a battery upon his

female victim. The victim in State v. Speed was awakened by hot grease

being poured onto her skin. The defendant was observed running away from

the room. The victim suffered severe burns to her face, back, shoulders, and

right hand, and it took her several months to recover. In State v. Speed, the

victim did not want to pursue charges against the defendant. In fact, she

testified she did not believe the defendant had intent to harm her, and he

claimed the grease accidentally landed on her. However, evidence showed

that the couple had previously argued about an affair the defendant accused

the victim of having. Moreover, the investigating officer testified that

immediately after the incident, and in her interview, the victim accused the

defendant of throwing hot grease at her. The defendant’s conviction for

aggravated second degree battery was upheld in State v. Speed, with the

conclusion the defendant had intentional criminal motive by retaliating

against the victim for having an alleged affair.

Likewise, in this case, the trial court noted that Bradford significantly

downplayed his injuries. It is clear from the testimony that he had

reconciled with Jackson and did not want her to be penalized. Jackson

appears to argue that the splashing of grease was accidental. However, there

is no evidence that points to the incident as accidental. In fact, Bradford’s

initial statement to Ofc. Richardson was the couple argued about cheating,

providing Jackson with the same motive as the defendant in State v. Speed. 8 Moreover, grease was found on the living room floor of their home, but

Bradford testified he was burned outside the home. Significantly, the

evidence does not indicate Jackson transported Bradford to the hospital.

These facts tend to show that Jackson brought hot grease from the kitchen

through the living room and outside the home to throw in Bradford’s face, a

fact supported by the photographs taken by investigators. Bradford’s

injuries were significant, thus the circumstances surrounding the incident

indicate specific intent.

From this evidence, the trial court could have reasonably inferred that

Jackson intentionally splattered hot grease on Bradford in retaliation for the

alleged affair with the specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury. When

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a

rational trier of fact could have rejected Jackson’s claims that the incident

was unintentional as unreasonable and found the essential elements of the

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, this assignment of

error is without merit.

Error Patent

Our error patent review of the appellate record reveals that Jackson’s

sentence is illegal in two respects. First, the sentence is illegally lenient.

Notably, a defendant in a criminal case does not have a constitutional or

statutory right to an illegally lenient sentence. State v. Williams, 2000-1725

(La. 11/28/01), 800 So. 2d 790; State v. Burns, 53,250 (La. App. 2 Cir.

1/15/20), 290 So. 3d 721. An illegally lenient sentence may be corrected at

any time by the court that imposed the sentence or by an appellate court on

review. La. C. Cr. P. art. 882(A). This correction may be made despite the

failure of either party to raise the issue. See State v. Williams, supra; State v. 9 Burns, supra; State v. Leday, 2005-1641 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/3/06), 930 So. 2d

286.

Specifically, Jackson’s sentence is illegally lenient because the trial

court suspended her sentence for second degree battery, which is a crime of

violence as listed in La. R.S. 14:2. Such a suspension is prohibited by La. C.

Cr. P. art. 893(2), which provides:

The court shall not suspend the sentence of a conviction for an offense that is designated in the court minutes as a crime of violence pursuant to Article 890.3, except a first conviction for an offense with a maximum prison sentence of ten years or less that was not committed against a family member or household member as defined by R.S. 14:35.3, or dating partner as defined by R.S. 46:2151. The period of probation shall be specified and shall not be more than five years.

Louisiana R.S. 14:35.3 defines a “household member,” in pertinent part, as

any person presently or formerly living in the same residence with the

offender and who is involved or has been involved in a sexual or intimate

relationship with the offender. Here, Jackson and Bradford admittedly lived

together, thus the exception in La. C. Cr. P. art. 893(2) is inapplicable.

However, La. C. Cr. P. art. 890.3(A)(1) provides that the district

attorney may make a written recommendation to the court that the offense

should not be designated as a crime of violence for the purpose of the

defendant’s eligibility for suspension or deferral of sentence pursuant to

Article 893. In this case, the record is void of any such written

recommendation from the district attorney. Nothing in the statute or case

law suggests the trial court can make its own recommendation, which from

the record appeared to be the trial court’s objective. Accordingly, the

sentence is illegally lenient. Notably, on remand for resentencing, the

district attorney may provide such written recommendation.

10 Second, the trial court sentenced Jackson to default time in the parish

jail for failure to pay fine or costs. An indigent defendant cannot be

subjected to default jail time in lieu of the payment of a fine, costs or

restitution. State v. Malmay, 52,824 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/25/19), 280 So. 3d

947; State v. Barrett, 51,921 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/11/18), 247 So. 3d 164, writ

denied, 2018-0744 (La. 2/18/19), 265 So. 3d 770. A defendant’s indigent

status in such a situation may be discerned from the record. State v.

Malmay; State v. Barrett. Where a defendant is represented at trial by the

Indigent Defender’s Office, or on appeal by the Louisiana Appellate Project,

we have considered it error for a trial court to impose jail time for failure to

pay court costs. State v. Malmay; State v. Barrett.

In this case, Jackson’s indigent status has been shown by her

representation at trial by the Indigent Defender’s Office and her current

representation on appeal by the Louisiana Appellate Project. Thus, the

imposition of default jail time by the trial court was in error. Accordingly,

we hereby instruct the trial court to delete that portion of Jackson’s sentence

that includes default jail time for failure to pay court costs.

CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, the conviction of Jeanell Latrice Jackson is

affirmed. However, for the reasons stated, Jackson’s sentence is vacated and

this matter is remanded for resentencing.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.