State of Louisiana v. Javin James Benoit AKA Javin Benoit

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: June 1, 2016
• Docket: KA-0016-0129
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

16-129

VERSUS

JAVIN JAMES BENOIT

AKA JAVIN BENOIT

**********

APPEAL FROM THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ST. MARTIN, NO. 13-245834 HONORABLE CURTIS SIGUR, DISTRICT JUDGE

SHANNON J. GREMILLION JUDGE

Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and Shannon J. Gremillion, Judges.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED. MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED.

Annette Roach Louisiana Appellate Project P. O. Box 1747 Lake Charles, LA 70602-1747 (337) 436-2900 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: Javin James Benoit M. Bofill Duhe District Attorney, Sixteenth Judicial District Court Chester Cedars Assistant District Attorney 415 S. Main St. St. Martinville, LA 70582 (337) 394-2210 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: State of Louisiana GREMILLION, Judge.

Defendant, Javin James Benoit, went to the home of Jennifer Duffy in an

attempt to reconcile with her after she had terminated their relationship. When she

refused, he convinced her to drive him home. On the way home, he attacked her

and severely beat her about the face and head. He left her unconscious in the back

seat of her vehicle, parked behind a hospital in Lafayette. Defendant went to the

home of his uncle in Lafayette and told him what he had done and where the

victim was located. Defendant’s uncle rode his bike to the hospital and found the

victim semiconscious in the vehicle. There was blood all over the vehicle, and the

victim was bleeding from her nose, ears, mouth, and eyes. The uncle drove the

victim back to his house. Several hours later, after it became apparent the victim

needed serious medical attention, the uncle called Defendant’s mother and sister,

who immediately called 911. The victim was transported to the emergency room,

where she was admitted to the hospital with severe injuries to her face, neck, and

head.

On December 13, 2013, Defendant was charged by a bill of information with

attempted second degree murder, violations of La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1. On

February 6, 2015, Defendant pled guilty to attempted manslaughter, a violation of

La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:31. In exchange for his plea, the State agreed to dismiss an

unrelated charge of introduction of contraband into a penal institution and not to

file a habitual offender bill. On March 9, 2015, the date for sentencing, Defendant

made an oral motion to withdraw the plea of guilty to attempted manslaughter. At

this time, Defendant indicated he was hiring private counsel. A hearing was

scheduled for April 2, 2015, to address the motion to withdraw Defendant’s guilty

plea and attorney status. At the April 2, 2015 hearing, Defendant advised the trial court he desired a court-appointed counsel. New counsel was appointed and the

matter was continued to April 20, 2015.

On April 20, 2015, Defendant withdrew his motion to withdraw the guilty

plea. Defendant was sentenced to the maximum term of twenty years

imprisonment at hard labor, to be served concurrently with two and one-half years

of a five-year sentence he was already serving for a parole violation.

Defendant filed an “Out-of-Time Motion to Reconsider Sentence.” The

motion was denied on May 18, 2015, without a hearing. The motion to reconsider

was not untimely filed, however, as noted by the date the trial court denied the

motion.

Defendant perfected a timely appeal, and a public defender was appointed to

represent Defendant. Defendant’s appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967), alleging that the record

contains no non-frivolous issues for appeal and requests that this court grant her

accompanying motion to withdraw. On March 8, 2016, Defendant was advised,

via certified mail, that counsel filed an Anders brief and that he was given until

April 15, 2016, to file a pro se brief. To date, Defendant has not filed a pro se

brief. For the following reasons, we affirm Defendant’s conviction and sentence

and grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw.

ANDERS ANALYSIS

Pursuant to Anders, Defendant’s appellate counsel filed a brief stating that

she made a conscientious and thorough review of the trial court record and could

find no errors on appeal that would support reversal of Defendant’s conviction or

sentence. Thus, appellate counsel seeks to withdraw.

2 In State v. Benjamin, 573 So.2d 528, 531 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1990), the fourth

circuit explained the Anders analysis:

When appointed counsel has filed a brief indicating that no non-frivolous issues and no ruling arguably supporting an appeal were found after a conscientious review of the record, Anders requires that counsel move to withdraw. This motion will not be acted on until this court performs a thorough independent review of the record after providing the appellant an opportunity to file a brief in his or her own behalf. This court’s review of the record will consist of (1) a review of the bill of information or indictment to insure the defendant was properly charged; (2) a review of all minute entries to insure the defendant was present at all crucial stages of the proceedings, the jury composition and verdict were correct and the sentence is legal; (3) a review of all pleadings in the record; (4) a review of the jury sheets; and (5) a review of all transcripts to determine if any ruling provides an arguable basis for appeal. Under C.Cr.P. art. 914.1(D) this Court will order that the appeal record be supplemented with pleadings, minute entries and transcripts when the record filed in this Court is not sufficient to perform this review.

An appellate counsel’s Anders brief must review the record and provide “a

detailed and reviewable assessment for both the defendant and the appellate court

of whether the appeal is worth pursuing in the first place.” State v. Mouton, 95-

981, p. 2 (La. 4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1176, 1177.

In support of her motion to withdraw, appellate counsel noted that while the

bill of information charged Defendant with attempted second degree murder, the

bill was not formally amended. However, the State acknowledged its acceptance

of a plea to a reduced charge at the guilty plea hearing as permitted by La.Code

Crim.P. art. 558.

Appellate counsel further noted that the trial court gave detailed reasons

supporting the imposition of the maximum sentence for the offense of attempted

manslaughter. The trial court noted that Defendant was a fourth-time felony

offender, which included two convictions for domestic violence and one conviction

for an assault on a police officer. Defendant also had several misdemeanor

3 convictions for various theft and drug offenses. The trial court further noted the

severity of the injuries inflicted on the victim and the emotional and economic

impact his actions had on the victim who has had several facial reconstruction

surgeries and has partial facial paralysis as a result of Defendant’s actions. Finally,

appellate counsel noted the significant benefit Defendant received from the plea

agreement, considering he was looking at the potential of a life sentence had he not

pled to attempted manslaughter and the State chosen to charge him as a habitual

offender.

Appellate counsel concluded that “[b]ased on the record and the conclusions

set forth above, appellate counsel can find no errors on appeal which would

support the setting aside or the amendment of the twenty year hard labor sentence

imposed upon [Defendant].” Appellate counsel desires to withdraw from the case

because she could find no non-frivolous error subject to review on appeal.

Pursuant to Anders, 386 U.S. 738, and Benjamin, 573 So.2d 528, we have

performed a thorough review of the record, including pleadings, minute entries, the

charging instrument, and the transcripts. Our review confirmed the statements

made by appellate counsel. Furthermore, Defendant was present and represented

by counsel at all crucial stages of the proceedings. Additionally, Defendant

entered a free and voluntary plea after he was advised of his rights in accordance

with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (1969).

On February 6, 2015, at the guilty plea hearing, the trial court questioned

Defendant regarding his educational level and ascertained that he could read and

write. The trial court informed Defendant that he was waiving his right to a jury

trial, his right to confront and cross-examine his accusers, his right to compel

witnesses to testify, his right to remain silent, and his right to representation. The

4 trial court also advised Defendant that he was facing a maximum of twenty years

imprisonment. Defendant stated that he understood the range of punishment and

the plea agreement. Additionally, Defendant stated that he had not been induced to

plead by any threats, promises, or force. On the same date of his initial guilty plea,

Defendant signed a form entitled “Certificate Outlining Felony Plea Agreement.”

On the original sentencing date, March 9, 2015, Defendant advised the trial

court that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea and hire private counsel.

Defendant was given a hearing date on the motion to withdraw and the opportunity

to hire private counsel. Defendant was advised by the State that should he

withdraw the guilty plea to attempted manslaughter, he would be charged with

attempted second degree murder, and the State would file a habitual offender bill

against him, which could result in life imprisonment. At the April 20, 2015,

hearing, through defense counsel, Defendant advised the trial court that he did not

wish to withdraw his plea and that he was prepared to go forward with sentencing,

following which Defendant was sentenced.

Finally, we agree with appellate counsel that there were no errors that would

support a reversal of Defendant’s twenty-year sentence as excessive. The attempt

statute, in pertinent part, provides that a defendant shall be punished in the same

manner as for the offense attempted, which shall not exceed one-half of the longest

term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted. La.R.S.

14:27(D)(3). The maximum sentence for the offense of manslaughter is forty years

at hard labor; thus, Defendant received the maximum penalty allowable under the

law. La.R.S. 14:31 and 14:27. “Generally, maximum sentences are reserved for

those cases that involve the most serious violations of the offense charged and the

5 worst type of offender.” State v. Jones, 05-735, p. 6 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/27/06), 924

So.2d 1113, 1116, writ denied, 07-151 (La. 10/26/07), 966 So.2d 567.

In State v. Maze, 09-1298 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/10), 36 So.3d 1072, the

defendant was charged with attempted second degree murder but convicted of

attempted manslaughter and received the maximum sentence of twenty years

imprisonment. This court did not find the sentence excessive. In Maze, the

defendant, armed with a shotgun, broke out the window of a motel room where his

former wife and her boyfriend were staying and shot the boyfriend in the chest.

The second shot went through the room wall into the next room and injured its

occupant. It was noted that the defendant had a lengthy arrest record and had three

prior felonies wherein he received prison time, and, in each case, his parole or

probation was revoked for various violations.

This court went on to state:

Finally, the offenses to which the Defendant pled guilty did not adequately describe the entire course of his conduct, and the plea bargain resulted in a significant reduction in his potential exposure to imprisonment. The Defendant received a considerable benefit when he was allowed to plead to a lesser offense which may be considered when determining whether the sentence is excessive. See State v. Hicks, 07-726 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/5/07), 977 So.2d 1008.

We note that in the instant case, the trial court took cognizance of the requirements of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1. The trial court is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance as long as the record reflects adequate compliance. See State v. Hutcherson, 34,540 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/4/01), 785 So.2d 140.

In comparing the Defendant to other similarly situated defendants, the following cases are pertinent. In State v. Holmes, 99- 631 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/18/00), 754 So.2d 1132, writ denied, 00-1020 (La.3/30/01), 788 So.2d 440, in a similar factual scenario, the first circuit did not find the maximum sentence imposed on a conviction for attempted manslaughter to be excessive. The defendant in that case, charged with second degree murder and attempted second degree murder, was found guilty of manslaughter and attempted manslaughter. He was sentenced to forty years and twenty years,

6 respectively, to be served concurrently. The defendant had crawled into his former wife’s bedroom window, shot and killed her lover, then wounded her in the face. Likewise, in State v. Stanton, 05-812 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/8/06), 929 So.2d 137, writ denied, 06-1381 (La.1/26/07), 948 So.2d 161, the defendant, charged with attempted second degree murder, was convicted of attempted manslaughter and sentenced to the maximum sentence of twenty years imprisonment. During an armed robbery attempt, the defendant aimed the gun at the victim and fired twice, but the gun misfired both times. The fourth circuit did not find the sentence excessive, noting that the defendant had an extensive criminal record and that he had “committed very serious crimes without regard for human life[.]” Id. at 141.

Id. at 1076 (alteration in original).

Considering the above jurisprudence and the facts in this case, the trial court

did not err when it imposed the maximum sentence on Defendant.

A review of the record reveals no issues that would support an assignment of

error on appeal. Therefore, Defendant’s conviction and sentence is affirmed and

appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED. MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED.

7 STATE OF LOUISIANA

LOUISIANA THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL

DOCKET NO. KA 16-0129

On appeal from the Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Martin, Docket Number XX-XXXXXXX, Honorable Curtis Segur, presiding.

ORDER

The above and foregoing Motion considered,

IT IS ORDERED that ANNETTE ROACH and PAULA MARX be allowed

to withdraw as attorneys for JAVIN JAMES BENOIT in this appeal.

Thus done and signed in Lake Charles, Louisiana, this ___ day of

_________, 2016.

_______________________ JUDGE