NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
09-1283
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
JARVIS JERMAINE SHELVIN
**********
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 110,925 HONORABLE PATRICK MICHOT, DISTRICT JUDGE
OSWALD A. DECUIR JUDGE
Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, James T. Genovese, and Shannon J. Gremillion, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
Michael Harson District Attorney Keith A. Stutes Assistant District Attorney P.O. Box 3306 Lafayette, LA 70502-3306 (337) 232-5170 Counsel for Appellee: State of Louisiana Edward Kelly Bauman Louisiana Appellate Project P. O. Box 1641 Lake Charles, LA 70602 (337) 491-0570 Counsel for Defendant/Appellant: Jarvis Jermaine Shelvin DECUIR, Judge.
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Jarvis Jermaine Shelvin, was convicted on
one count of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant
lodged this appeal, alleging that the evidence was not sufficient to support his
conviction and that the trial court erred in denying his request to exclude crime scene
photographs. FACTS
On the evening of April 26, 2006, Defendant shot and killed the victim during
a robbery.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
By this assignment of error, Defendant argues that there was insufficient
evidence for a jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The analysis for a
claim of insufficient evidence is well-settled:
When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.
Second degree murder is defined in La.R.S. 14:30.1(A), in pertinent part, as
follows:
A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or
(2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, forcible rape, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, aggravated escape, assault by drive-by shooting, armed robbery, first degree robbery, second degree robbery, simple robbery, cruelty to juveniles, second degree cruelty to juveniles, or terrorism, even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.
In the instant case, Defendant challenges only his identity as the perpetrator.
Defendant complains that the jury incorrectly relied on the self-serving testimony of
Jamaesha Provost, a participant in the offense, and the testimony of Shayla Prejean,
a sixteen-year-old eyewitness, in finding him guilty. Defendant adds that no weapon
or money was ever recovered from him.
At trial, Jamaesha Provost testified that Defendant killed the victim. She
described a plot to rob the victim that did not turn out as originally planned.
Jamaesha stated that she had known the victim for about a week, and he would stop
to speak with her if he saw her outside her residence. The victim nicknamed her
“Black.” On the day of the offense, the victim stopped to speak to Jamaesha. At that
time, Defendant, Norris Landor, and Georgia Norbert were also at Jamaesha’s house.
Norris was dating Jamaesha at the time. During the victim’s conversation with
Jamaesha, he pulled out a large roll of cash and gave her thirty dollars. According to
Jamaesha, Defendant saw the roll of cash and subsequently devised a scheme to rob
the victim.
Jamaesha was to walk to the victim’s home and persuade the victim to go on
a walk with her. Defendant would then knock the victim out and take his money.
Jamaesha agreed with the plan. Later that evening, Jamaesha, Defendant, and Norris
met back at Jamaesha’s house, and the plan to rob the victim was put into action.
2 Jamaesha walked by the victim’s house where he was outside with two other people.
According to Jamaesha, she asked the victim to walk with her to the store. The
victim, however, asked a guy on a bike to go to the store for Jamaesha, and then he
escorted Jamaesha to her home. Jamaesha testified that the victim wanted to walk to
the nearby park, so they proceeded to the park and sat down on a park bench. Later,
the man on the bike returned with the items he purchased at the store and then rode
away.
Soon thereafter, Defendant approached Jamaesha and the victim as planned,
and then began yelling “get down.” Jamaesha stated that Defendant was dressed in
all black, and she recognized him from his size, the way he talked, and his voice.
Jamaesha saw that Defendant had a gun, and she took off running. Jamaesha
maintained that the gun was not part of the plan. While fleeing from the park,
Jamaesha heard a gunshot. She ran to her house and told Norris that she heard a
gunshot and that Defendant had shot the victim. Jamaesha testified she knew without
a doubt that Defendant shot the victim. Lastly, Jamaesha stated that she was no
longer dating Norris and maintained that she was not protecting Norris by implicating
Defendant.
Georgia Norbert confirmed that there was talk of robbing the victim on the day
of the offense. According to Georgia, Jamaesha was talking to the victim outside.
When she came back inside, Jamaesha reported that the victim had a lot of money on
him. Georgia testified that she believed Norris, Jamaesha’s boyfriend, said they
ought to beat the victim at that time and take his money. She indicated that
Defendant was also present. Georgia testified that both she and Jamaesha
discouraged the suggestion to rob the victim at that time, and Georgia left Jamaesha’s
3 house and did not return that evening. The following afternoon, Georgia learned that
the victim had been killed.
Phillip Gotch, a friend of the victim, confirmed that Jamaesha approached the
victim’s house prior to the shooting and asked for him. Phillip and another man, C.J.,
were at the victim’s home. According to Phillip, the victim came out of his home,
talked with Jamaesha for two to three minutes, and then started walking with
Jamaesha. About ten to fifteen minutes later, a man called “Money” rode up on his
bike and told Phillip that he had gone to the store and that the victim was by the park
with Jamaesha. Soon thereafter, Phillip heard a gunshot from across the park. Phillip
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
09-1283
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
JARVIS JERMAINE SHELVIN
**********
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 110,925 HONORABLE PATRICK MICHOT, DISTRICT JUDGE
OSWALD A. DECUIR JUDGE
Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, James T. Genovese, and Shannon J. Gremillion, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
Michael Harson District Attorney Keith A. Stutes Assistant District Attorney P.O. Box 3306 Lafayette, LA 70502-3306 (337) 232-5170 Counsel for Appellee: State of Louisiana Edward Kelly Bauman Louisiana Appellate Project P. O. Box 1641 Lake Charles, LA 70602 (337) 491-0570 Counsel for Defendant/Appellant: Jarvis Jermaine Shelvin DECUIR, Judge.
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Jarvis Jermaine Shelvin, was convicted on
one count of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant
lodged this appeal, alleging that the evidence was not sufficient to support his
conviction and that the trial court erred in denying his request to exclude crime scene
photographs. FACTS
On the evening of April 26, 2006, Defendant shot and killed the victim during
a robbery.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
By this assignment of error, Defendant argues that there was insufficient
evidence for a jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The analysis for a
claim of insufficient evidence is well-settled:
When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.
Second degree murder is defined in La.R.S. 14:30.1(A), in pertinent part, as
follows:
A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or
(2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, forcible rape, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, aggravated escape, assault by drive-by shooting, armed robbery, first degree robbery, second degree robbery, simple robbery, cruelty to juveniles, second degree cruelty to juveniles, or terrorism, even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.
In the instant case, Defendant challenges only his identity as the perpetrator.
Defendant complains that the jury incorrectly relied on the self-serving testimony of
Jamaesha Provost, a participant in the offense, and the testimony of Shayla Prejean,
a sixteen-year-old eyewitness, in finding him guilty. Defendant adds that no weapon
or money was ever recovered from him.
At trial, Jamaesha Provost testified that Defendant killed the victim. She
described a plot to rob the victim that did not turn out as originally planned.
Jamaesha stated that she had known the victim for about a week, and he would stop
to speak with her if he saw her outside her residence. The victim nicknamed her
“Black.” On the day of the offense, the victim stopped to speak to Jamaesha. At that
time, Defendant, Norris Landor, and Georgia Norbert were also at Jamaesha’s house.
Norris was dating Jamaesha at the time. During the victim’s conversation with
Jamaesha, he pulled out a large roll of cash and gave her thirty dollars. According to
Jamaesha, Defendant saw the roll of cash and subsequently devised a scheme to rob
the victim.
Jamaesha was to walk to the victim’s home and persuade the victim to go on
a walk with her. Defendant would then knock the victim out and take his money.
Jamaesha agreed with the plan. Later that evening, Jamaesha, Defendant, and Norris
met back at Jamaesha’s house, and the plan to rob the victim was put into action.
2 Jamaesha walked by the victim’s house where he was outside with two other people.
According to Jamaesha, she asked the victim to walk with her to the store. The
victim, however, asked a guy on a bike to go to the store for Jamaesha, and then he
escorted Jamaesha to her home. Jamaesha testified that the victim wanted to walk to
the nearby park, so they proceeded to the park and sat down on a park bench. Later,
the man on the bike returned with the items he purchased at the store and then rode
away.
Soon thereafter, Defendant approached Jamaesha and the victim as planned,
and then began yelling “get down.” Jamaesha stated that Defendant was dressed in
all black, and she recognized him from his size, the way he talked, and his voice.
Jamaesha saw that Defendant had a gun, and she took off running. Jamaesha
maintained that the gun was not part of the plan. While fleeing from the park,
Jamaesha heard a gunshot. She ran to her house and told Norris that she heard a
gunshot and that Defendant had shot the victim. Jamaesha testified she knew without
a doubt that Defendant shot the victim. Lastly, Jamaesha stated that she was no
longer dating Norris and maintained that she was not protecting Norris by implicating
Defendant.
Georgia Norbert confirmed that there was talk of robbing the victim on the day
of the offense. According to Georgia, Jamaesha was talking to the victim outside.
When she came back inside, Jamaesha reported that the victim had a lot of money on
him. Georgia testified that she believed Norris, Jamaesha’s boyfriend, said they
ought to beat the victim at that time and take his money. She indicated that
Defendant was also present. Georgia testified that both she and Jamaesha
discouraged the suggestion to rob the victim at that time, and Georgia left Jamaesha’s
3 house and did not return that evening. The following afternoon, Georgia learned that
the victim had been killed.
Phillip Gotch, a friend of the victim, confirmed that Jamaesha approached the
victim’s house prior to the shooting and asked for him. Phillip and another man, C.J.,
were at the victim’s home. According to Phillip, the victim came out of his home,
talked with Jamaesha for two to three minutes, and then started walking with
Jamaesha. About ten to fifteen minutes later, a man called “Money” rode up on his
bike and told Phillip that he had gone to the store and that the victim was by the park
with Jamaesha. Soon thereafter, Phillip heard a gunshot from across the park. Phillip
was not surprised by the gunshot and did not pay much attention to it at first.
Phillip then saw Money run to his bike and take off. Phillip decided to follow
him along with C.J. As they headed toward the park, Phillip saw a short, chubby man
wearing a gray sweatshirt and pants running from the park. Phillip could not see the
man’s face, but noticed that he was holding something in his back pocket. Also, the
person he saw running was not Jamaesha. Later, Phillip added that the man’s
clothing was very dark.
Milton Marshall, a/k/a Money, testified that he was with the victim all day and
that he last saw the victim at the park about five to ten minutes before he was shot.
He explained that the victim was with a short, stocky female wearing a black hood.
Milton spoke to the victim and then went to the victim’s house where he met up with
Phillip and C.J. Soon thereafter, Milton heard a gunshot and took off on his bike to
see what happened. Milton saw someone running from the park but did not recognize
the person. He then testified that it was the female that he had seen with the victim.
Milton’s testimony regarding the identity of the person seen running from the
4 park changed. Milton stated he did not recall giving a statement to police indicating
he saw a male dressed in black running from the park. Milton maintained that this
was an error in the statement. Milton then testified that he remembered telling a
detective that he saw someone wearing black and a hood over his head running from
the park. Milton recalled telling a detective that the person was a man, but at trial,
Milton was not certain that it was a man.
Shayla Prejean, a nearby resident, was a witness to the offense. Shayla testified
that she heard people arguing outside and looked out of her bedroom window to see
who was making the noise. The noise was coming from the area of a tree in the park
near a bench. She was able to see three people arguing, one short person and two
taller people, but she could not make out what they were saying. Before she heard
the gunshot, she saw one of the taller people run from the park out of an entrance
located further down the street.
Shayla then heard a gunshot and saw the shooter lay the victim down on the
ground and then bend over the victim. She described the shooter as short and dark,
with short dark hair, and dressed in all black clothing. The shooter then ran out of the
park and passed in front of Shayla’s bedroom window. With the help of a street light
in front of her house, Shayla was able to see the shooter’s face. Also, the shooter was
carrying something in his left hand that was wrapped in dark-colored material.
Shayla stated that the man was not sprinting, but was jogging.
Shayla identified Defendant in the courtroom to be the man she saw run from
the park and past her window. She also testified that she identified Defendant in a
police photo line-up. However, on the Line-Up Identification Form given to Shayla
to complete, she did not circle any numbers to indicate that she recognized Defendant
5 in the photographic line-up. At the bottom of the form in the section for remarks,
Shayla wrote, “Was unable to identify but #2 was the closest one to look like the
person I saw.” Despite the appearance of her uncertainty at the time of the offense,
Shayla testified at trial that she told the police she was pretty sure that it was number
two. Shayla also stated that she was never told to circle the number that corresponded
to the person she identified. Lastly, Shayla indicated that Defendant was not wearing
his hood so she was able to see his face “pretty clear.” Shayla concluded at trial that
there was no doubt in her mind that Defendant was the man she saw that night.
On appeal, Defendant contends that the testimony of the individuals involved
is so riddled with inconsistencies that the testimony should not have been considered.
While there do appear to be inconsistencies from one witness to another, the basic
story amongst the individuals involved is consistent. Although Georgia testified that
Norris, not Defendant, suggested the robbery earlier that day, she was not present at
the time of the offense to implicate Norris as the shooter.
Additionally, Shayla, an eyewitness with no involvement in the offense or with
the parties involved, identified Defendant as the shooter. Although Shayla indicated
that she was “pretty sure” the man she saw was Defendant at the time she was shown
the photo line-up, she testified at trial that she was certain of Defendant’s identity
and had no doubt in her mind that Defendant was the man she saw that night. Lastly,
the fact that Shayla was only sixteen years old at the time of the offense was a fact
presented to the jury and was considered in determining her credibility. The jury’s
role in this case, in part, was to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses at
trial. In light of the testimony in the record at hand, Defendant has not shown that the
jury’s credibility determinations should be second guessed. With the testimony
6 identifying Defendant as the perpetrator, we find that the State has satisfied its burden
of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
CRIME SCENE PHOTOS
In his last assignment of error, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in
denying his request to exclude prejudicial crime scene photos. In support of his
argument, Defendant refers to State v. Eaton, 524 So.2d 1194, 1201 (La.1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 818 (1989), wherein the supreme court summarizes
the guidelines regarding the introduction of photographs as follows:
The mere fact a photograph is gruesome does not in and of itself render a photograph inadmissible. The test of admissibility is whether the probative value outweighs any prejudicial effect which may result from the display to the jury. State v. Comeaux, 514 So.2d 84 (La.1987); State v. Beach, 320 So.2d 142 (La.1975); State v. Morris, 245 La. 175, 157 So.2d 728 (1963). Generally, photographs of a victim’s body which depict the fatal wounds are relevant to prove the corpus delicti, to establish the identity of the victim, the location, severity and number of wounds, and to corroborate other evidence of the manner in which the death occurred. Comeaux, 514 So.2d at 96. The trial court’s admission of an allegedly gruesome photograph will be overturned on appeal only if the prejudicial effect clearly outweighs the probative value. No error will be found unless the photographs are so gruesome so as to overwhelm the jurors’ reason and lead them to convict the defendant without sufficient other evidence. State v. Perry, 502 So.2d 543 (La.1986).
In the instant case, Defendant contends that the post-mortem photographs of
the victim were not needed to prove the corpus delicti or to identify the victim and,
thus, had no probative value regarding the issues at hand. Defendant concludes the
photos served only to inflame the passions of the jury.
The State submits that the photographs are far from gruesome and did not
overwhelm the reason of the jurors, thereby leading them to convict Defendant
without evidence. State v. Perry, 502 So.2d 543 (La.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
872, 108 S.Ct. 205 (1987). The State maintains that the photos depict the condition
7 of the victim’s body, the position and general location of his body in the park, and the
location of other items of evidence found at the scene. The State adds that the
photographs depict the location, number, and positioning of the victim’s wounds
which were relevant to prove the corpus delicti.
At the beginning of trial, Defendant objected to photographs of the victim and
offered to stipulate that the victim was shot and killed. Defendant argued that the
photographs were too prejudicial and had no probative value regarding the gunshot
wound to the head. Later at trial, Defendant reiterated his objection and added that
repeatedly publishing them to the jury, with the victim’s family members present, was
prejudicial. Defendant also argued that the display of the photographs was
cumulative, redundant, and inflammatory.
The State responded by asserting it had the right to have each witness testify
pursuant to a photograph admitted into evidence and that it was obligated to have the
photographs displayed to the jury. The State maintained that it could pass the
photographs around to the twelve jurors which would stretch the trial out for weeks,
or it could display the photographs through the use of Power Point. The State
stressed that prior to trial, the family members present in court were prepared and
informed that the photographs would be displayed, and they were told that they could
leave the courtroom if needed.
The trial court overruled Defendant’s objection, but opted to address the family
members in court, stressing that they must maintain the integrity of the trial process.
To prevent the jury from being too influenced by their emotions, the trial court
requested that the family members refrain from showing outward emotion and
8 sobbing. The trial court asked them to step outside the courtroom if they felt they
could not control their emotions while the photographs were being shown.
Four photographs of the victim at the crime scene were admitted into evidence.
One photograph was taken of the victim from a distance and depicts the location of
his body in the park. A park bench, tree, picnic table, and fence line can all be seen
in the photograph. The victim is lying on the ground, but his injury is not apparent.
Another photograph was taken closer to the victim from his left side. He is seen lying
on his back with little to no evidence of his injury visible in the photograph. Another
photograph taken at a similar distance as the second one shows the victim from his
right side and again reveals very little evidence of his injury. A small amount of
blood can be seen below his nose. The last photograph is a closeup of the victim’s
head from the left side of his face and reveals a small amount of blood under his nose
and to the left of his nose. Also, a very small amount of blood can be seen at the area
of the gunshot, but the wound, measuring one-eighth of an inch and located two and
one-half inches from the top of his head and four inches from the front of his head,
is mostly obscured by the victim’s hair. As noted in the victim’s autopsy report, the
defect from the injury had no abrasion ring, no soot, and no stippling.
Considering the content of the photographs, along with the trial court’s
instructions to the family members to maintain the integrity of the proceeding, the
trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to exclude the evidence.
Although the victim died as a result of the gunshot, the photographs did not depict a
bloody crime scene or an offensive component such as decomposition. Additionally,
the photographs were relevant in proving the corpus delicti as well as depicting the
9 location of the victim’s body in the park, the position of his body, and the location of
his wounds. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.
This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Rule 2-16.3, Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal.