State of Louisiana v. Jamol Rickmon

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: February 18, 2025
• Docket: 2023-KA-0766
• Status: Published

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2023-KA-0766

VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL JAMOL RICKMON * FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******

APPEAL FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH NO. 543-684, SECTION “B” Honorable Tracey Flemings-Davillier ****** Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott ****** (Court composed of Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott, Judge Monique G. Morial)

Jason Roger Williams District Attorney Brad Scott Chief of Appeals Patricia Amos Assistant District Attorney ORLEANS PARISH 619 South White Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70119

COUNSEL FOR STATE OF LOUISIANA/APPELLEE

Holli Herrle-Castillo LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT P. O. Box 2333 Marrero, LA 70073-2333

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

AFFIRMED February 18, 2025 NEK DLD

MGM

Defendant, Jamol Rickmon (“Defendant”), appeals his convictions for three

counts of aggravated rape in violation of La. R.S. 14:42. For the following reasons,

we affirm Defendant’s convictions.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 29, 2018, the State charged the Defendant with three counts

of aggravated rape in violation of La. R.S. 14:421 for crimes committed in the late

1990s. Specifically, the Defendant was charged as follows—Count 1, aggravated

rape against P.J. on July 20, 1996; Count 2, aggravated rape against C.F. on July

29, 1996; and Count 3, aggravated rape against M.K. on January 31, 1997.2 The

State charged Defendant with these crimes after the Defendant’s DNA had been

submitted to the Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”), which linked him to

the DNA samples collected in the victims’ cases. Defendant pled not guilty to the

crimes, and a four-day jury trial commenced on March 20, 2023. At the conclusion

of the trial, the jury unanimously found the Defendant guilty on all three counts.

1 La. R.S. 14:42 has been amended several times since the commission of the Defendant’s

crimes, and the statute currently charges the crime as first degree rape. 2 In accordance with La. R.S. 46:1844(W)(1)(a), we will refer to Defendant’s victims by their

initials to protect their identity.

1 On April 20, 2023, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment.

This appeal followed.

ERRORS PATENT

Prior to reviewing the merits of this appeal, we are tasked with examining

the record for any errors patent in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 920.3 Our

review of the record does not reveal any errors patent.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, Defendant raises three assignments of error. First, the Defendant

asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce other crimes

evidence under La. C.E. arts. 404(B) and 412.2. Next, Defendant contends that his

counsel was ineffective for failing to request a limiting jury instruction regarding

the use of the other crimes evidence. Finally, Defendant argues that the totality of

the evidence submitted was insufficient to support his conviction. We address each

assigned error in turn.

DISCUSSION

Assignment of Error No. 3: Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction

As a general rule, when a defendant raises issues regarding the sufficiency of

evidence in conjunction with other trial court errors, the appellate court should

determine the sufficiency of the evidence first. State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731,

734 (La. 1992). Here, Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was

insufficient to support his three convictions for aggravated rape under La. R.S.

14:42. Specifically, Defendant argues that the only evidence linking him to the

crimes is “questionable” DNA evidence that exhibited anomalies the experts at

3 An error patent is an error “that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and

proceedings and without inspection of the evidence” La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2).

2 trial were unable to explain, thus rendering the DNA evidence insufficient to

connect him to the crimes.

When reviewing a challenge to the evidence supporting a conviction,

appellate courts are required to review the trial record as a whole and determine

whether, after looking at all the evidence in a light favorable to the prosecution, “a

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven

beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Green, 588 So. 2d 757, 758 (La. App. 4th

Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). In doing so, the appellate court must consider both

the admissible and inadmissible evidence in the record in reaching its

determination. See Hearold, 603 So. 2d at 734. If rational minds could disagree as

to the interpretation of the evidence, then the view most favorable to the

prosecution must be adopted. Green, 588 So. 2d at 758 (citing State v. Mussall,

523 So. 2d 1305 (La. 1988)). A reviewing court should not disturb the factfinder’s

determination unless that determination is clearly contrary to the evidence

presented. State v. Quezada, 2013-1318, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/21/14), 141 So. 3d

906, 911 (quoting State v. Wells, 2010-1338, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/30/11), 64

So. 3d 303, 306) (other citations omitted).

In reaching our decision, we must determine (1) whether the evidence was

sufficient to prove that the charged crimes occurred and (2) whether the evidence

was sufficient to identify the Defendant as the perpetrator of the charged crimes.

i. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that the charged crimes occurred

In this case, Defendant was charged with three counts of aggravated rape in

violation of La. R.S. 14:42. At the time the rapes were committed in the 1990s, La.

R.S. 14:42(A) held, in pertinent part:

3 Aggravated rape is a rape committed . . . [when] the anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be without lawful consent of the victim because it is committed under any one or more of the following circumstances:

(1) When the victim resists the act to the utmost, but whose resistance is overcome by force.

(2) When the victim is prevented from resisting the act by threats of great and immediate bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution.

(3) When the victim is prevented from resisting the act because the offender is armed with a dangerous weapon.

Thus, the State had to prove that the victims did not consent to the intercourse

because the Defendant (1) used force to prevent them from resisting, (2) used

threats of great and immediate bodily harm to prevent them from resisting, or (3)

used a dangerous weapon to prevent them from resisting.

P.J. testified at trial that she was awoken in the middle of the night by a

stranger in her bedroom. At the time, she had her two young nieces and baby step-

son sleeping in the bed with her. The perpetrator put a gun to P.J.’s head and

threatened to harm the children if she made any sudden movements. The

perpetrator made P.J. leave the room, forced her to get on the ground, and made

her perform oral sex on him. Thereafter, the perpetrator performed oral sex on P.J.

and penetrated her vaginally. P.J. testified that the perpetrator had the gun lying on

the floor with his hand on it throughout the encounter. Before leaving, the

perpetrator threatened to harm P.J.’s family if she called the police. After the

perpetrator had left, P.J. called her brother, who reported the crime to the police.

P.J. went to the hospital that same night to have a sexual assault examination

performed.

4 M.K. similarly testified that she was awoken in the middle of the night by a

stranger in her bedroom. The perpetrator pressed a cold object to her neck, which

she believed to be a knife; ordered her to get face down on the bed; and penetrated

her vaginally. At the time of the encounter, M.K.’s family, which included young

children, was residing downstairs, so she waited until the perpetrator had left the

house before screaming for help. M.K. went to the hospital that night to have a

sexual assault examination performed. Years later, she was contacted by Det.

Dennis Dejean, who informed her that the police had found a DNA match from the

samples collected from that night. She confirmed to Det. Dejean that she did not

consent to the sex the night of the crime.

Unfortunately, C.F. passed away prior to this trial and was unable to give her

account. However, her neighbor and the investigating officer testified as to C.F.’s

condition on the day of the rape. Quindaline Fern Hernandez, C.F.’s neighbor,

testified that she heard a pounding on her front door during the early morning

hours. She opened the door to a crying C.F., who was only wearing a blouse and

underwear. C.F. stated that she had been raped at gunpoint behind her house. Ms.

Hernandez testified she gave C.F. a towel to cover herself and called the police.

Det. Dejean testified that he was assigned to investigate C.F.’s case. When he

arrived on the scene the day of the incident, he found C.F. partially disrobed and

wearing a towel. He spoke with C.F., her sister, and the neighbors, and he did not

find any contradictions in their stories. C.F. indicated to him that her vagina was

sore and that she had back pain from where the perpetrator had kicked her. C.F.

went to the hospital to have a sexual assault exam performed, and Det. Dejean

collected the assault kit from the hospital to be placed in storage. Finally, Heidi

Martin, the coordinator of forensic services at University Medical Center and a

5 certified Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner, read to the jury C.F.’s medical report

taken from the day C.F. had her sexual assault examination performed. The report

recounted that C.F. indicated she was forced into an alley behind her house at gun

point. Therein, she was struck in the face and the back and sexually assaulted. The

report noted injuries such as facial and back contusions, and the report ultimately

diagnosed C.F. as being sexually assaulted.

As described above, the jury was presented with ample evidence that the

aggravated rapes occurred. The evidence showed that each of the three victims

were threatened, and in one instance outright attacked, by a perpetrator armed with

a dangerous weapon. The evidence further revealed that all of the victims were

taken by surprise by the perpetrator, that none of them knew who he was prior to

the assault, and that none of them consented to having sex with him. In light of the

above, we find the evidence produced at trial to be sufficient for a rational juror to

find that an aggravated rape occurred.

ii. Whether the evidence was sufficient to identify Defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes

Defendant’s main argument on appeal is that the DNA evidence used to

identify him as the perpetrator of these crimes is insufficient. When a defendant’s

identity as the perpetrator in a crime is a key issue in a case, the State is required to

disprove any reasonable probability of misidentification. State v. Neal, 2000-0674,

p. 11 (La. 6/29/01), 796 So. 2d 649, 658 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). At

trial, the jury heard from numerous witnesses, including the investigating law

enforcement agents, that, after each crime, the victims had sexual assault

examinations performed on them, which included taking DNA samples from the

6 victims and their personal effects. These DNA samples were stored with the

NOPD.

The jury also heard from two experts in DNA analysis—Ann Montgomery

and Julia Naylor—who reviewed the reports linking the DNA samples to

Defendant. Montgomery testified that she helped bring New Orleans into the

CODIS system, a standardized database that analyzes DNA evidence submitted by

federal and state agencies nationwide. She provided a detailed explanation of how

DNA analysis works, including the significance of possible anomalies in a finding

and how such an anomaly would affect the result. Montgomery testified that she

agreed with the findings in the reports she reviewed, all of which found that the

possibility of the DNA structure in the kits belonging to someone other than the

Defendant to be at least one in over a quadrillion. When she was questioned

regarding the anomalies in the report, Montgomery explained that DNA analysts

are conservative in their tests and will report any possible anomalies. However, she

confirmed that, after reviewing the DNA reports, the anomalies did not change her

opinion on the final result. She also confirmed that, while DNA evidence can

degrade over time, any degradation would not produce a wrong result. Rather, the

degradation would produce no result at all.

Naylor, who works in the Forensic Data Unit at the Louisiana State Police

Crime Laboratory, also reviewed all the DNA reports linking Defendant to the

crimes, and she confirmed that she too agreed with the findings. She likewise

explained the anomalies found in the DNA reports and testified that the presence of

these anomalies did not change the overall interpretation of the DNA evidence.

It is well-settled in the jurisprudence that the testimony of a single witness is

enough to support a conviction and that the trier of fact’s credibility determination

7 regarding a witness’ testimony should not be disturbed unless such testimony is

clearly contrary to the evidence. Wells, 2010-1388, p. 5, 64 So. 3d at 306.

Although Defendant attacks the sufficiency of the DNA evidence linking him to

the charged crimes, the jury heard ample testimony from experts in forensics

explaining how the DNA evidence was evaluated and analyzed in order to reach

the conclusion that Defendant committed the crimes. The jury had the discretion to

accept this testimony, and we do not find its decision to do so clearly wrong or

contrary to the evidence presented. As such, we find the evidence presented at trial

sufficient to link Defendant to the crimes charged.

Assignment of Error No. 1: Whether the trial court erred in allowing other crimes evidence under La. C.Cr.P. arts. 404(B) and 412.2

Finding the evidence submitted to be sufficient to convict the Defendant of

the charged crimes, we must now determine whether the trial court erred in

allowing evidence of Defendant’s other crimes to be submitted to the jury. Prior to

trial, the State filed two notices of intent to introduce evidence of other crimes

pursuant to Louisiana Code of Evidence articles 404(B) and 412.2, and, over

Defendant’s objection, the trial court granted the State’s request to use that

evidence at trial.

At trial, the jury heard from four witnesses who corroborated three other

crimes committed by the Defendant.4 First, the jury heard from S.W.5 who testified

that, on August 5, 1997, she awoke to a strange man standing over her. The

perpetrator held a gun in his hand, struck S.W. over her head, and told her to

undress. Fortunately, S.W. was able to escape before the crime escalated any

4 While other crimes were listed in the State’s notices of intent, only these three incidents were

presented to the jury at trial. 5 Evidence from S.W.’s case was admitted under La. C.E. art. 412.2. In accordance with La. R.S.

46:1844(W)(1)(a), we will refer to S.A. by her initials to protect her identity.

8 further. S.W. reported the crime to the police and identified Defendant as the

perpetrator in a photo line-up.

Next, the jury heard from Cassandra Brown6 who testified that, on May 10,

1997, she awoke in the middle of the night to a stranger looking through her

bedroom doorway. The stranger left but subsequently returned with a knife. He

demanded money but departed without incident after Brown told him she did not

have any money. Brown reported the crime to the police, and Defendant ultimately

pled guilty to committing the crime.

Finally, the jury heard from L.A. and her husband, R.A.7 Collectively, the

couple testified that, on August 1, 1997, they awoke in the middle of the night to a

strange man in their bedroom. Specifically, L.A. testified that she awoke because

she felt somebody rubbing her leg. L.A. woke up her husband, but, by the time

R.A. went to reach for a weapon, the stranger had fled. The couple reported that

the perpetrator had stolen a number of items from them.

Appellate courts review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Wright, 2011-0141, pp. 10-11 (La. 12/6/11), 79

So. 3d 309, 316 (citation omitted). Generally, evidence of other crimes or bad

actions is not admissible. State v. Robertson, 2015-2095, p. 2 (La. 2/5/16), 183 So.

3d 1287, 1289 (citation omitted). However, such evidence may be admissible when

the purpose of the evidence has relevance outside of showing a defendant’s bad

character or propensity to criminal activity and when the evidence tends to prove a

material fact at issue. Id. at p. 2, 183 So. 3d at 1289-90 (other citations omitted).

6 Evidence from Cassandra Brown’s case was admitted under La. C.E. art. 404(B). 7 Evidence from the L.A. and R.A.’s case was admitted under both La. C.E. arts. 404(B) and

412.2. Thus, in accordance with La. R.S. 46:1844(W)(1)(a), we will refer to L.A. and R.A. by their initials to protect their identity.

9 Evidence of other crimes or wrongs committed by a defendant may be admissible

to show “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,

identity, [or] absence of mistake or accident.” La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1)(a).

Additionally, when a defendant has been charged with a crime involving sexually

assaultive behavior, evidence of that defendant’s other crimes or actions involving

sexually assaultive behavior may be admissible. La. C.E. art. 412.2(A). Article

412.2 acts as an exception to Article 404(B) in that it allows the evidence of other

crimes or sexually assaultive behavior to be considered for the purpose of showing

a defendant’s propensity to commit such actions. See State v. Layton, 2014-1910,

p. 3 (La. 3/17/15), 168 So. 3d 358, 359. The term “sexually assaultive behavior”

used in Art. 412.2 is a general expression meant to reference a broad range of

behavior. Id. at p. 7, 168 So. 3d at 362.

In reviewing La. C.E. art. 404(B), we find that the trial court did not err in

allowing evidence from the Cassandra Brown and L.A./R.A. cases to be admitted.

Both cases are similar to the crimes of the charged offenses in that the Defendant

entered into a dwelling without authorization and awoke his victims, who mostly

consisted of women, during the late night and early morning hours. The State

argued in its notice of intent that the purpose of introducing these two incidents

was to establish the Defendant’s modus operandi. Given the above, we agree that

these incidents establish a similar modus operandi, and we do not find that the trial

court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence.

Turning to La. C.E. art. 412.2, we also find that the trial court did not err in

admitting evidence from the S.W. and L.A. cases. As previously noted, evidence

under this article may be introduced for the purpose of showing a defendant’s

propensity for committing sexually assaultive behaviors. S.W.’s testimony

10 establishes that Defendant attacked her and told her to undress, implying that some

form of a sexual action would follow. L.A. testified that she awoke in the middle

of the night to the Defendant rubbing her leg, which can be an implicitly sexual

action. Clearly, because she was asleep, L.A. did not consent to the Defendant

touching her. We find the above evidence falls within the ambit of La. C.E. art.

412.2, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence to be

presented at trial.

Even assuming, only for the sake of argument, the above evidence should

not have been admitted, such an erroneous admission would be subject to a

harmless error review. See State v. Johnson, 1994-1379, p. 17 (La. 11/27/95), 664

So. 2d 94, 102. Under a harmless error analysis, the appellate court must determine

whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that “the guilty verdict actually

rendered . . . was surely unattributable to the error.” State v. Wells, 2014-1701, p.

14 (La. 12/8/15), 209 So. 3d 709, 717-18 (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.

275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993)) (other citation omitted).

As already discussed in our analysis of assignment of error no. 3, we find the

evidence submitted as to each victim’s case, including the DNA reports linking the

Defendant to each crime, sufficient alone for a reasonable juror to find Defendant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, any speculative error committed by

the trial court in admitting the other crimes evidence is harmless.

Assignment of Error No. 2: Whether defense counsel was ineffective

Finally, in assignment of error no. 2, Defendant argues his defense counsel

was ineffective. Specifically, Defendant asserts that his defense counsel should

have requested a limiting jury instruction in regards to the other crimes evidence

submitted under La. C.E. arts. 404(B) and 412.2.

11 Typically, ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be raised through

an application for post-conviction relief so that a full evidentiary hearing may be

conducted, if warranted. State v. Williams, 2017-0544, p. 23 (La. App. 4 Cir.

3/14/18), 240 So. 3d 355, 368 (quoting Quezada, 2013-1318, pp. 10-11, 141 So. 3d

at 914-15). However, if the record contains sufficient evidence on appeal, the

appellate court may address the claim. Id. In order to succeed on an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must prove (1) his trial counsel’s

performance was deficient and (2) that deficiency prejudiced him. State v.

Dominick, 2013-0121, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/20/13), 129 So. 3d 782, 790

(citations omitted). To do so, the defendant must prove that, but for his counsel’s

deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial

would have been different. Williams, 2017-0544, p. 23, 240 So. 3d at 368 (citation

omitted).

We do not find that counsel’s performance, deficient or otherwise,

prejudiced Defendant. Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is

restricted to whether his counsel should have requested a limiting jury instruction

regarding the other crimes evidence. However, given that we find the totality of the

evidence sufficient to support his convictions, and the inclusion of other crimes

evidence to be proper or, at most, harmless error, we cannot find that a jury

instruction would have reasonably altered the outcome of the trial.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant’s convictions.

AFFIRMED