State of Louisiana v. Jammie L. Edwards

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: October 2, 2024
• Docket: 55,822-KA
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered October 2, 2024. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,822-KA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

Versus

JAMMIE L. EDWARDS Appellant

Appealed from the Forty-Second Judicial District Court for the Parish of DeSoto, Louisiana Trial Court No. 22-CR-33218

Honorable Amy Burford McCartney, Judge

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Peggy J. Sullivan

CHARLES B. ADAMS Counsel for Appellee District Attorney

EDWIN L. BLEWER, III ETHAN P. ARBUCKLE Assistant District Attorneys

Before PITMAN, STEPHENS, and HUNTER, JJ. STEPHENS, J.,

This criminal appeal arises from the Forty-Second Judicial District

Court, Parish of DeSoto, the Honorable Amy Burford McCartney, Judge,

presiding. The State of Louisiana charged the defendant, Jammie L.

Edwards (“Edwards”), with possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed

weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies in violation of La. R.S.

14:95.1. Following a trial, the jury unanimously convicted Edwards as

charged. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 17, 2022, Deputy Hunter Martinez with the DeSoto

Parish Sheriff’s Office observed an older model GMC truck driven by the

Edwards cross the fog and center lines multiple times. Because there was a

vehicle between Dep. Martinez and the GMC truck, he did not initiate a

traffic stop but continued to follow Edwards. Dep. Martinez and Deputy

Melvin Fayard, who was following Dep. Martinez in his own vehicle,

remained in contact throughout the course of events. Edwards eventually

pulled into the parking lot of a nearby liquor store. Dep. Fayard stated that

he watched Edwards pull into the parking lot, but Dep. Fayard continued

down the highway to a road where he could circle back around to watch the

parking lot of the liquor store. Dep. Fayard testified that Edwards came to a

stop at the corner of the building near the drive-through but did not pull into

the drive-through. Instead, Dep. Fayard watched as Edwards drove out of

the parking lot onto the highway and headed in the opposite direction. Dep.

Fayard then initiated a traffic stop for failure to maintain proper lanes.

While conducting the traffic stop, Dep. Fayard spoke with Edwards

and noticed a firearm located next to Edwards near his thigh as well as an open beer can. Dep. Fayard requested that Edwards exit the vehicle, at

which time Dep. Martinez arrived on the scene. Dep. Martinez also

observed the firearm in the vehicle. Dep. Fayard questioned Edwards about

the firearm, and Edwards stated that the weapon and the truck belonged to

his brother. Dep. Martinez stated that he observed the firearm on the

driver’s seat of the vehicle as Dep. Fayard questioned Edwards. A search of

Edwards’ criminal history revealed that he was a convicted felon, and his

parole had ended in 2014, making it illegal for Edwards to be in possession

of a firearm. The officers then arrested Edwards for possession of a firearm

by a convicted felon.

On January 4, 2023, the State charged Edwards by bill of information

with possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a person

convicted of certain felonies in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1, and a jury trial

commenced on April 25, 2023. The State first called Detective Skyler

Vanzandt with the Red River Parish Sheriff’s Office to testify. The trial

court recognized Det. Vanzandt as an expert in latent fingerprint

examination and identification. Det. Vanzandt testified that the fingerprints

from Edwards’ June 2012 conviction of possession of schedule II controlled

dangerous substance, methamphetamine, matched the fingerprints taken that

same day before the trial began. Agent Shane Lodrigue with probation and

parole next testified that Edwards was on parole for a conviction of

possession of methamphetamine. Agent Lodrigue stated that Edwards’ full-

term date ended on February 5, 2014.

Kadarios Edwards, the defendant’s brother, testified that he loaned his

brother his truck so he could attend a funeral. After learning that his brother

was arrested, Kadarios went to the district attorney to claim his property. He 2 wrote a statement in which he claimed possession of the firearm and stated

that his brother had no idea the gun was in the truck.

Following the testimony and closing arguments, the trial court read

the jury charge. In its charge, the trial court stated the following:

If you find that the defendant fled immediately after a crime was committed, or after he was accused of a crime, the flight alone is not sufficient to prove that the defendant is guilty. However, flight may be considered along with all other evidence. You must decide whether such flight was due to consciousness of guilt or to other reasons unrelated to guilt.

At a charge conference held in chambers prior to the start of trial, Edwards’

attorney argued that the flight instruction was improper as the defendant did

not refuse to pull over. The action of stopping in the parking lot at the liquor

store was not actively fleeing from an officer. The State, in response, argued

that flight does not require aggravated flight but has to do with the defendant

avoiding apprehension by the police. The trial court overruled the objection

and stated that the instruction left it up to the jury to determine whether there

was a flight, and whether the instruction applied to the case.

On April 26, 2023, the jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty as

charged. The jury also requested leniency based on Edwards’ honesty and

cooperation. The trial court set a sentencing date and ordered that a

presentence investigation (“PSI”) report be prepared.

The sentencing hearing took place on August 21, 2023. The trial

court noted that Edwards’ criminal history included five prior felony

convictions: unauthorized use of a motor vehicle in 1998;

manufacturing/distribution/possession of a schedule I (marijuana) in 2007;

possession with intent to distribute schedule I (marijuana) in 2008;

possession of schedule II CDS, methamphetamine in 2012; and the instant

3 offense. Similarly, the court stated that Edwards had previous misdemeanor

convictions as well as numerous arrests for which the disposition is

unknown or the charges were dismissed. Furthermore, Edwards was

arrested for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in 2017, but this

charge was dismissed. The trial court also stated that the defendant had

prior failures on probation and parole in 2008 and 2012.

In its reasoning, the court stated that it considered Edwards’

significant criminal history and prior failures on probation and parole.

Furthermore, the probation and parole office recommended that Edwards

receive the maximum sentence of 20 years. The court noted for the record it

considered the information presented at trial, the PSI report, and the La. C.

Cr. P. art. 894.1 sentencing guidelines. The trial court sentenced Edwards to

ten years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of

sentence and included in its reasoning that a lesser sentence would deprecate

the seriousness of the crime. The trial court also recommended that Edwards

enroll in a substance abuse program through DOC. Edwards was given

credit for any time served on the charges, and the trial court noted the

defense’s objection for the record. A motion to reconsider sentence was

filed on September 6, 2023, and denied by the trial court on September 8,

2023. Edwards has filed the instant appeal.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Edwards asserts three assignments of error. First, Edwards

maintains that the trial court erred in denying four challenges for cause

during jury selection. Edwards also argues that the trial court improperly

granted the State’s motion to include a special jury instruction on flight even

4 though he did not flee from police. Lastly, Edwards urges that the ten-year

hard labor sentence imposed is unconstitutionally harsh and excessive.

No. 1 - Denial of For Cause Challenges:

In his first assignment of error, Edwards maintains that the trial court

erred in denying his challenges for cause as to four prospective jurors:

Odom, Parker, Jones, and Rains. The State urges that the record shows that

there was no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in its rulings on each of the

challenges for cause.

La. C. Cr. P. art. 797 provides five grounds a defendant may use

to challenge a juror for cause:

(1) The juror lacks a qualification required by law;

(2) The juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality. An opinion or impression as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant shall not of itself be sufficient ground of challenge to a juror, if he declares, and the court is satisfied, that he can render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence;

(3) The relationship, whether by blood, marriage, employment, friendship, or enmity between the juror and the defendant, the person injured by the offense, the district attorney, or defense counsel, is such that it is reasonable to conclude that it would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict;

(4) The juror will not accept the law as given to him by the court; or

(5) The juror served on the grand jury that found the indictment, or on a petit jury that once tried the defendant for the same or any other offense.

A trial court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on challenges for

cause, and its rulings will be reversed only when a review of the voir dire

record as a whole reveals an abuse of discretion. State v. Tucker, 13-1631

(La. 9/1/15), 181 So. 3d 590; State v. Haire, 55,289 (La. App. 2 Cir.

5 2/28/24), 381 So. 3d 230; State v. Colby, 51,907 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/30/18),

244 So. 3d 1260, writ denied, 18-1256 (La. 3/25/19), 267 So. 3d 596.

During voir dire, Mr. Odom, Ms. Parker, and Ms. Rains indicated that

they knew the ADA trying the case as a result of a personal or professional

relationship. The ADA previously handled legal matters for Mr. Odom and

Ms. Parker, and Ms. Rains discussed her friendship with the ADA and his

wife. Mr. Odom also revealed he knew a deputy on the witness list. The

State maintains that, after questioning these individuals, each prospective

juror made it clear that they could remain impartial, apply the facts of the

case to the law, and determine whether the defendant was or was not guilty.

As it pertains to Mr. Jones, the defendant notes that Mr. Jones

indicated he took issue with individuals who had a criminal history and

would find it difficult to forget criminal history when deciding the

defendant’s guilt or innocence. The State, however, argues that Mr. Jones

indicated time and time again that he would look to the evidence and not

make assumptions of guilt. The trial court determined that Mr. Jones

communicated he would consider the evidence and not automatically find

the defendant guilty.

Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court abused its discretion

in denying the for-cause challenges made by defendant as to any of the

potential jurors. Therefore, we find the defendant’s first assignment of error

is without merit.

No. 2 - Jury Instruction:

In his second assignment of error, Edwards urges that the trial court

erred in allowing the jury instruction to include flight where there was no

evidence he fled from police. Edwards maintains that the flight instruction 6 was not pertinent because he complied with the traffic stop by pulling over

once the officer activated the lights and sirens. Because the inclusion of the

flight instruction had the potential effect of confusing the jury, Edwards

suggests this was not a harmless error. In contrast, the State urges that the

testimony of the law enforcement officers negates Edwards’ argument that

he never fled from the officers.

Flight and attempt to avoid apprehension are circumstances from

which a trier of fact may infer a guilty conscience. State v. Durden, 36,842

(La. App. 2 Cir. 4/09/03), 842 So. 2d 1244, writ denied, 03-1350 (La.

11/26/03), 860 So. 2d 1131; State v. Garner, 45,474 (La. App. 2 Cir.

8/18/10), 47 So. 3d 584. La. C. Cr. P. art. 802 provides:

The court shall charge the jury:

(1) As to the law applicable to the case;

(2) That the jury is the judge of the law and of the facts on the question of guilt or innocence, but that it has the duty to accept and to apply the law as given by the court; and

(3) That the jury alone shall determine the weight and credibility of the evidence.

La. C. Cr. P. art. 807 states, in pertinent part:

The state and the defendant shall have the right before argument to submit to the court special written charges for the jury.

....

A requested special charge shall be given by the court if it does not require qualification, limitation, or explanation, and if it is wholly correct and pertinent. It need not be given if it is included in the general charge or in another special charge to be given.

While the record more accurately aligns with Edwards’ argument that

he complied with the traffic stop instead of fleeing from law enforcement,

we find that the jury instruction constitutes harmless error when reviewed in 7 light of the record as a whole. The inclusion of this jury instruction for

flight was inappropriate and unnecessary. However, the evidence in this

case overwhelmingly supports Edwards’ conviction, leading us to conclude

that the inclusion of the flight instruction constitutes harmless error.

Nothing in the record suggests that the instruction confused the jury or

weighed heavily in the jury’s determination of guilt. It is for these reasons

that we find no merit in Edwards’ assertion that the trial court erred in

allowing the jury instruction to include flight.

No. 3 – Excessiveness of Sentence:

In his last assignment of error, Edwards argues that his ten-year hard

labor sentence without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of

sentence is excessive. Instead, the proper sentence in this case, according to

Edwards, is the minimum term of five years at hard labor. The State

maintains that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing

Edwards to ten years hard labor.

In reviewing a sentence for excessiveness, an appellate court uses a

two-step process. First, the record must show that the trial court took

cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The

articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of La. C. Cr. P. art.

894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. State v. Bell,

53,712 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 310 So. 3d 307; State v. Kelly, 52,731 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 6/26/19), 277 So. 3d 855, writ denied, 19-01845 (La. 6/3/20),

296 So. 3d 1071. The trial court is not required to list every aggravating or

mitigating circumstance so long as the record reflects that it adequately

considered the guidelines of the article. State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La.

1983); State v. Bell, supra; State v. Kelly, supra. 8 Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is

constitutionally excessive. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is

grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime or nothing more than a

purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Dorthey,

623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Bell, supra. A sentence is considered

grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in

light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v.

Weaver, 01-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166; State v. Bell, supra.

The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within the statutory limits, and such sentences should not be set aside as

excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v.

Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7; State v. Bell, supra. A

trial judge is in the best position to consider the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances of a particular case and, therefore, is given broad discretion in

sentencing. Id.; State v. Allen, 49,642 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/15), 162 So. 3d

519, writ denied, 15-0608 (La. 1/25/16), 184 So. 3d 1289. On review, the

appellate court does not determine whether another sentence may have been

more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v.

Bell, supra; State v. Kelly, supra.

La. R.S. 14:95.1(B) states that whoever is found guilty of possession

of a firearm or carrying concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain

felonies shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five nor more

than 20 years without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of

sentence and be fined not less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000.

In support of his argument that he should only be sentenced to five

years, Edwards points out that he is 45 years old and provides for five 9 children. He maintains that he has consistently been employed, and

Edwards highlights the jury’s request for leniency. The State, however,

asserts that the trial court noted his previous criminal offenses and parole

and probation revocations and opines that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion. Instead, the trial court was lenient in sentencing where the

probation and parole office recommended the maximum sentence.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted for the record it

considered the PSI report and the La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 sentencing

guidelines. Furthermore, the trial court also recognized Edwards’ criminal

history as well as his prior failures on probation and parole. The trial court

articulated that any lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the

crime and recommended that Edwards enroll in a substance abuse program.

Our review of the record shows that the trial court substantially complied

with the sentencing guidelines and properly exercised its discretion in

sentencing Edwards to ten years at hard labor without probation, parole, or

suspension of sentence. In reviewing the record and in light of the harm

done to society, this ten-year sentence fails to shock our sense of justice;

therefore, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing

Edwards.

CONCLUSION

Given the reasons expressed herein, the conviction and sentence of the

defendant, Jammie L. Edwards, are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.