STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2024-K-0354
VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL JAMES E. TATE * FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******
APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH NO. 560-640, SECTION “I” Honorable Leon T. Roche, ****** Judge Rosemary Ledet ****** (Court composed of Chief Judge Terri F. Love, Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins)
LOVE, C.J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS
Jason R. Williams DISTRICT ATTORNEY, PARISH OF ORLEANS Zachary M. Phillips ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY 619 South White Street New Orleans, LA 70119
COUNSEL FOR RELATOR/THE STATE OF LOUISIANA
Sara Wood Jacob McCarty ORLEANS PUBLIC DEFENDERS 2601 Tulane Avenue, Seventh Floor New Orleans, LA 70119
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT/JAMES E. TATE
WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED July 11, 2024 RML
SCJ
In this criminal case, the State of Louisiana seeks supervisory review of the
district court’s May 17, 2024 ruling granting the motion to suppress filed by the
defendant—James Tate—and finding of no probable cause. We grant the State’s
writ, but deny relief.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The district court, in its written reasons for judgment, summarized the
pertinent facts as follows:
While on patrol, [on December 21, 20213, O]fficers [Caldwell and Carroll (the “Officers”)] happened upon a parked, silver or grey Camaro with red stripes. It is undisputed that neither officer witnessed the vehicle being operated at the time or shortly before the stop, and it was parked in the private parking lot of an active residential apartment complex, with the passenger-side door open. Officers immediately pulled in behind where the Camaro was parked, and activated their lights and sirens, indicating that they were conducting a “suspicious vehicle stop” of the car’s occupants. Mr. Tate was sitting in the passenger seat, and was then detained in handcuffs by Off. Carroll. The officers subsequently submitted for and received a search warrant for the vehicle. They recovered two guns and narcotics from various locations in the vehicle.
Mr. Tate was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a machine
gun; possession of a firearm by a felon; and possession with the intent to distribute
1 cocaine and marijuana, violations of La. R.S. 40:1752; 14:95.1; 40:966(A)(1); and
40:967(B)(1)(a), respectively. After pleading not guilty to all the charges, Mr. Tate
filed a motion to suppress the evidence. Following a hearing and briefing, the
district court granted the motion and provided detailed reasons for judgment. This
writ application followed.
DISCUSSION
The dispositive issue is whether the Officers had reasonable suspicious to
conduct the investigatory stop of Mr. Tate. As the district court observed,
“[v]ehicle stops and the seizures of passengers, like the one at issue here, are
evaluated under the same standard as a stop-and-frisk.” See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The relevant statutory provision is
La. C.Cr.P. art. 215.1(A), which provides:
A law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense and may demand of him his name, address, and an explanation of his actions.
The reasonable suspicion standard required for an investigatory stop “is
considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.”
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1
(1989). A reviewing court must look to the facts and circumstances of each case to
determine whether a detaining officer had sufficient facts within his knowledge to
justify infringing on the suspect’s rights. See State v. Williams, 07-0700, p. 11 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 2/13/08), 977 So.2d 1101, 1111.
2 Here, a trio of grounds were cited in support of the position that the Officers
had reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop: (i) the vehicle’s lack of a
license plate; (ii) the Officers’ prior spotting the vehicle speeding; and (iii) the
Officer’s prior spotting the vehicle at various drug hotspots. The district court, in
its written reasons, rejected each of these grounds. We separately address each
ground.
Vehicle’s Lack of a License Plate
In addressing the lack of a license plate ground, the district court cited New
Orleans Municipal Code § 154-307(a), which provides:
Every person who is a resident of the state and owns a motor vehicle of any description must first obtain an appropriate, current, valid license plate from the state before driving his motor vehicle upon any public streets of the city.
Applying this ordinance here, the district court observed that, assuming the
Camaro lacked a license plate, no traffic violation occurred for the following
reasons:
It is undisputed that the Camaro was not being operated at the time of this stop. It was parked in the parking lot of a residential apartment complex, where people still lived. The passenger side door was open with Defendant in the passenger seat of the Camaro. It is not a traffic violation for a vehicle, which is not being operated to not bear a license plate.
Although the district court stated that the Camaro was not being “operated,”
its statement, viewed in context, was a finding that the Camaro was not being
driven on a public street. Rather, the Camaro, at the time of the investigatory stop,
was parked in in a parking lot of an apartment complex. Because the Camaro was
3 not being driven on a public road, its lack of a license plate was not a traffic
violation. We agree.
Officers’ Prior Spotting of The Vehicle Speeding
In finding the prior spotting of the vehicle speeding an insufficient ground to
establish reasonable suspicion, the district court observed:
Could [the Officers] stop a car they believe they saw speeding a month after they claim to have seen the traffic offense? Does this give them reasonable suspicion to stop the car a year later? Ten years later? Here [the Officers] testified that they witnessed a Camaro driving recklessly at some indeterminate time within the last week. They could not give a specific amount of time which had elapsed since witnessing that alleged reckless driving (speeding). Additionally, [the O]fficers testified that they did not see who was driving at the time of the reckless incident, and could not identify [Mr. Tate] as the driver. Therefore, this incident cannot be used as the basis for officers’ reasonable suspicion that [Mr. Tate] had committed a crime for which they were initiating a stop of [Mr. Tate].
The district court thus found that the Officers’ observations of the Camaro—
assuming it was the same vehicle1—speeding within the last week were too
attenuated to serve as reasonable suspicion for the stop. We agree.
Officers’ Prior Spotting This Vehicle at Various Drug Hotspots
The final ground was the Officers’ assertion that they had spotted the
Camaro at various drug hotspots in New Orleans East. Rejecting this ground, the
district court cited the principle that reasonable suspicion must be based on the
1 The district court also questioned whether the Officers could even identify the Camaro they
spotted earlier as the same Camaro they stopped; the district court observed:
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STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2024-K-0354
VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL JAMES E. TATE * FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******
APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH NO. 560-640, SECTION “I” Honorable Leon T. Roche, ****** Judge Rosemary Ledet ****** (Court composed of Chief Judge Terri F. Love, Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins)
LOVE, C.J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS
Jason R. Williams DISTRICT ATTORNEY, PARISH OF ORLEANS Zachary M. Phillips ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY 619 South White Street New Orleans, LA 70119
COUNSEL FOR RELATOR/THE STATE OF LOUISIANA
Sara Wood Jacob McCarty ORLEANS PUBLIC DEFENDERS 2601 Tulane Avenue, Seventh Floor New Orleans, LA 70119
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT/JAMES E. TATE
WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED July 11, 2024 RML
SCJ
In this criminal case, the State of Louisiana seeks supervisory review of the
district court’s May 17, 2024 ruling granting the motion to suppress filed by the
defendant—James Tate—and finding of no probable cause. We grant the State’s
writ, but deny relief.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The district court, in its written reasons for judgment, summarized the
pertinent facts as follows:
While on patrol, [on December 21, 20213, O]fficers [Caldwell and Carroll (the “Officers”)] happened upon a parked, silver or grey Camaro with red stripes. It is undisputed that neither officer witnessed the vehicle being operated at the time or shortly before the stop, and it was parked in the private parking lot of an active residential apartment complex, with the passenger-side door open. Officers immediately pulled in behind where the Camaro was parked, and activated their lights and sirens, indicating that they were conducting a “suspicious vehicle stop” of the car’s occupants. Mr. Tate was sitting in the passenger seat, and was then detained in handcuffs by Off. Carroll. The officers subsequently submitted for and received a search warrant for the vehicle. They recovered two guns and narcotics from various locations in the vehicle.
Mr. Tate was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a machine
gun; possession of a firearm by a felon; and possession with the intent to distribute
1 cocaine and marijuana, violations of La. R.S. 40:1752; 14:95.1; 40:966(A)(1); and
40:967(B)(1)(a), respectively. After pleading not guilty to all the charges, Mr. Tate
filed a motion to suppress the evidence. Following a hearing and briefing, the
district court granted the motion and provided detailed reasons for judgment. This
writ application followed.
DISCUSSION
The dispositive issue is whether the Officers had reasonable suspicious to
conduct the investigatory stop of Mr. Tate. As the district court observed,
“[v]ehicle stops and the seizures of passengers, like the one at issue here, are
evaluated under the same standard as a stop-and-frisk.” See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The relevant statutory provision is
La. C.Cr.P. art. 215.1(A), which provides:
A law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense and may demand of him his name, address, and an explanation of his actions.
The reasonable suspicion standard required for an investigatory stop “is
considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.”
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1
(1989). A reviewing court must look to the facts and circumstances of each case to
determine whether a detaining officer had sufficient facts within his knowledge to
justify infringing on the suspect’s rights. See State v. Williams, 07-0700, p. 11 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 2/13/08), 977 So.2d 1101, 1111.
2 Here, a trio of grounds were cited in support of the position that the Officers
had reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop: (i) the vehicle’s lack of a
license plate; (ii) the Officers’ prior spotting the vehicle speeding; and (iii) the
Officer’s prior spotting the vehicle at various drug hotspots. The district court, in
its written reasons, rejected each of these grounds. We separately address each
ground.
Vehicle’s Lack of a License Plate
In addressing the lack of a license plate ground, the district court cited New
Orleans Municipal Code § 154-307(a), which provides:
Every person who is a resident of the state and owns a motor vehicle of any description must first obtain an appropriate, current, valid license plate from the state before driving his motor vehicle upon any public streets of the city.
Applying this ordinance here, the district court observed that, assuming the
Camaro lacked a license plate, no traffic violation occurred for the following
reasons:
It is undisputed that the Camaro was not being operated at the time of this stop. It was parked in the parking lot of a residential apartment complex, where people still lived. The passenger side door was open with Defendant in the passenger seat of the Camaro. It is not a traffic violation for a vehicle, which is not being operated to not bear a license plate.
Although the district court stated that the Camaro was not being “operated,”
its statement, viewed in context, was a finding that the Camaro was not being
driven on a public street. Rather, the Camaro, at the time of the investigatory stop,
was parked in in a parking lot of an apartment complex. Because the Camaro was
3 not being driven on a public road, its lack of a license plate was not a traffic
violation. We agree.
Officers’ Prior Spotting of The Vehicle Speeding
In finding the prior spotting of the vehicle speeding an insufficient ground to
establish reasonable suspicion, the district court observed:
Could [the Officers] stop a car they believe they saw speeding a month after they claim to have seen the traffic offense? Does this give them reasonable suspicion to stop the car a year later? Ten years later? Here [the Officers] testified that they witnessed a Camaro driving recklessly at some indeterminate time within the last week. They could not give a specific amount of time which had elapsed since witnessing that alleged reckless driving (speeding). Additionally, [the O]fficers testified that they did not see who was driving at the time of the reckless incident, and could not identify [Mr. Tate] as the driver. Therefore, this incident cannot be used as the basis for officers’ reasonable suspicion that [Mr. Tate] had committed a crime for which they were initiating a stop of [Mr. Tate].
The district court thus found that the Officers’ observations of the Camaro—
assuming it was the same vehicle1—speeding within the last week were too
attenuated to serve as reasonable suspicion for the stop. We agree.
Officers’ Prior Spotting This Vehicle at Various Drug Hotspots
The final ground was the Officers’ assertion that they had spotted the
Camaro at various drug hotspots in New Orleans East. Rejecting this ground, the
district court cited the principle that reasonable suspicion must be based on the
1 The district court also questioned whether the Officers could even identify the Camaro they
spotted earlier as the same Camaro they stopped; the district court observed:
This Court has serious concerns based on one officer claiming no license plate was on the Camaro that could identify it from any other Camaro, and the other officer claiming there was a yellow license plate on the Camaro. Based on the contradictory statements of the officers as it relates to the Camaro having a license plate vs. not having a license plate, the Court has serious doubts as to if this was indeed the same Camaro officers claim to have observed at some undetermined time within the last week [speeding]
4 person, not the vehicle. Applying this principle here, the district court reasoned that
the Officers could neither identify any of the Camaro’s occupants that they spotted
at the various drug hotspots, nor confirm that Mr. Tate was present at any of those
hotspots. Regardless, the district court observed that “[e]ven if [the Officers] had,
in [State v.] Ratliff, [98-0094 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/19/99), 737 So.2d 252], the Fourth
Circuit found the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and detain the
defendant, who was merely standing in a high-crime area, known for drug
activity.” According to the district court, the same logic applies here. We agree.
CONCLUSION
In sum, none of the three grounds asserted by the Officers provided
reasonable suspicion to support the investigatory stop. Since the stop was
constitutionally infirm, the district court did not err in granting Mr. Tate’s motion
to suppress. Accordingly, we grant the State’s writ application, but deny relief.
WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED