NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
11-772
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
ISAAC JEROME KING
**********
APPEAL FROM THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 300,968 HONORABLE THOMAS M. YEAGER, DISTRICT JUDGE
OSWALD A. DECUIR JUDGE
Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, Billy Howard Ezell, and James T. Genovese, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
John T. Giordano Assistant District Attorney Ninth Judicial District Court P.O. Drawer 1472 Alexandria, LA 71309 (318) 473-6650 Counsel for Appellee: State of Louisiana Mark O. Foster Louisiana Appellate Project P. O. Box 2057 Natchitoches, LA 71457-2057 (318) 572-5693 Counsel for Defendant/Appellant: Isaac Jerome King
Isaac Jerome King IN PROPER PERSON Louisiana State Penitentiary Angola, LA 70712 DECUIR, Judge.
Defendant, Isaac Jerome King, was charged with armed robbery, a violation
of La.R.S.14:64; simple robbery, a violation of La.R.S.14:65; aggravated battery, a
violation of La.R.S.14:34; and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a
violation of La.R.S.14:95.1.
Defendant was found guilty as charged and was sentenced as follows: 1)
armed robbery – fifty years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or
suspension of sentence, to run consecutively with the sentence for possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon; 2) simple robbery – seven years at hard labor to run
concurrently with all other sentences; 3) aggravated battery – ten years at hard
labor to run concurrently with all other sentences; 4) possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon – ten years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or
suspension of sentence, to run consecutively with the sentence for armed robbery.
Defendant was also adjudicated a second felony offender, and his sentence
for armed robbery was vacated, and he was sentenced to serve sixty years at hard
labor.
Defendant is now before this court asserting two assignments of error. He
contends the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for mistrial, and the trial
court erred in denying his hearsay objection to testimony regarding other crimes
evidence.
FACTS
At trial, Brice Patin and Jessie Roden both testified similarly. Patin’s
testimony indicated that he stopped at the traffic light at the intersection of Chester
and Monroe Streets in Alexandria, and Defendant flagged him down and asked for
a ride to the store. Roden testified that Patin asked Defendant if he needed a ride. Patin stopped at a store, and Defendant informed Patin that he did not want to go to
that particular store. Defendant then asked to go to a store on Bolton Avenue.
On the way to the store on Bolton, Patin stopped at a stop sign, and two men
Defendant said were with him got into Patin’s vehicle. One of the men who got
into the vehicle tried to sell Roden marijuana. The same man took Roden’s cell
phone from her lap and took off running. Roden ran after him. Patin followed in
his vehicle. Patin then got out and went to Roden. At that time, the remaining two
men were still in Patin’s vehicle. Roden used Patin’s phone to call her own phone.
The man who answered said he would return her phone in exchange for twenty
dollars. Roden agreed and, when the man went to hand her the phone, Patin said
the phone was not worth twenty dollars. When Patin turned around, Defendant
was holding a gun and demanded his money.
Patin threw everything from his pockets onto the ground except $600.00 he
had from selling a car. Patin testified that he put the envelope with the money back
into his pocket. Defendant demanded the money. As Patin reached into his
pocket, Roden stepped between Patin and the gun. Patin pushed Roden out of the
way. He and Defendant then struggled on the ground. Patin threw his phone to
Roden and told her to call the police. He and Defendant fought for five to ten
minutes. Patin then stood up, and Defendant hit him across the eye with the butt of
the gun twice, knocking him out. As he hit the ground, Patin heard someone say,
―come on, come on, come on, Jerome, let’s go.‖ Roden also heard someone say
―Jerome, they’re calling the cops.‖ Patin testified that when he regained
consciousness his money and Roden’s phone were gone. Roden testified that her
purse was also gone.
Patin and Roden made in-court identifications of Defendant. They also
identified Defendant in a photographic lineup.
2 As a result of being hit, Patin received seven stitches and had brain trauma.
Patin testified that Roden was bitten by Defendant and received a tetanus shot.
Roden did not know who bit her.
Defendant testified that he did not know Patin and Roden and did not take
anything from them. Additionally, he did not own a gun. He admitted he had prior
convictions for distribution of cocaine and conspiracy to distribute cocaine.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial
which was based on the use of other crimes evidence.
At issue in this assignment of error is testimony regarding events that
occurred on January 7, 2010. In its opening statement, the State set forth the
following regarding the events of January 7: ―about a week later Detective
Howard runs across, uh, an incident whereupon the defendant was found to be in a
backyard where a 38 snub nose revolver was also recovered. Independent of this
and not in criminal activity but it puts him in location with the gun.‖
Sergeant Ronnie Howard was questioned about the events of January 7 as
follows:
Q So at that point you had a name Jerome, the race, and approximate age and physical characteristics of a suspect, but you didn’t have any one suspect in mind at that point, is that correct?
A Not at that point.
Q What did you do with information? What did you begin doing?
A I ...
Q ... to try and identify who Jerome might be?
A I started looking for reports with, uh, the name Jerome in them as they came in, and, uh, actually came upon a report that happened on January 7th. Where a Jerome was in the presence of a firearm when, uh, police were called to uh -- Midway.
3 Q Okay. And, and in checking out that report did you find that in fact someone by the name of Isaac Jerome King was discovered to be in a backyard with a small handgun along with another person as well, correct?
A That is correct.
Q All right.
MR. KUTCH:
I want to put on the record and [sic] objection of the other crimes, evidence, and I’m going to move for a mistrial.
THE COURT:
All right, well, uh, your objection’s overruled. This is one of the things that we discussed.
I realize, your Honor, but I still need to put it on the record.
All right. You’re objection’s overruled.
EXAMINATION CONTINUED BY MR. LAMPERT:
Q He -- we’re not saying that he was committing a crime at that point, we’re just saying you discovered a report showing that he was in the same backyard with a handgun?
Defendant contends ―[t]his other crimes evidence was the January 7, 2010,
arrest of Mr. King for having a firearm while in someone’s backyard, and the
firearm allegedly found in the incident.‖
Defendant cites La.Code Evid. art. 404(B)(1), which provides:
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
11-772
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
ISAAC JEROME KING
**********
APPEAL FROM THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 300,968 HONORABLE THOMAS M. YEAGER, DISTRICT JUDGE
OSWALD A. DECUIR JUDGE
Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, Billy Howard Ezell, and James T. Genovese, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
John T. Giordano Assistant District Attorney Ninth Judicial District Court P.O. Drawer 1472 Alexandria, LA 71309 (318) 473-6650 Counsel for Appellee: State of Louisiana Mark O. Foster Louisiana Appellate Project P. O. Box 2057 Natchitoches, LA 71457-2057 (318) 572-5693 Counsel for Defendant/Appellant: Isaac Jerome King
Isaac Jerome King IN PROPER PERSON Louisiana State Penitentiary Angola, LA 70712 DECUIR, Judge.
Defendant, Isaac Jerome King, was charged with armed robbery, a violation
of La.R.S.14:64; simple robbery, a violation of La.R.S.14:65; aggravated battery, a
violation of La.R.S.14:34; and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a
violation of La.R.S.14:95.1.
Defendant was found guilty as charged and was sentenced as follows: 1)
armed robbery – fifty years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or
suspension of sentence, to run consecutively with the sentence for possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon; 2) simple robbery – seven years at hard labor to run
concurrently with all other sentences; 3) aggravated battery – ten years at hard
labor to run concurrently with all other sentences; 4) possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon – ten years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or
suspension of sentence, to run consecutively with the sentence for armed robbery.
Defendant was also adjudicated a second felony offender, and his sentence
for armed robbery was vacated, and he was sentenced to serve sixty years at hard
labor.
Defendant is now before this court asserting two assignments of error. He
contends the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for mistrial, and the trial
court erred in denying his hearsay objection to testimony regarding other crimes
evidence.
FACTS
At trial, Brice Patin and Jessie Roden both testified similarly. Patin’s
testimony indicated that he stopped at the traffic light at the intersection of Chester
and Monroe Streets in Alexandria, and Defendant flagged him down and asked for
a ride to the store. Roden testified that Patin asked Defendant if he needed a ride. Patin stopped at a store, and Defendant informed Patin that he did not want to go to
that particular store. Defendant then asked to go to a store on Bolton Avenue.
On the way to the store on Bolton, Patin stopped at a stop sign, and two men
Defendant said were with him got into Patin’s vehicle. One of the men who got
into the vehicle tried to sell Roden marijuana. The same man took Roden’s cell
phone from her lap and took off running. Roden ran after him. Patin followed in
his vehicle. Patin then got out and went to Roden. At that time, the remaining two
men were still in Patin’s vehicle. Roden used Patin’s phone to call her own phone.
The man who answered said he would return her phone in exchange for twenty
dollars. Roden agreed and, when the man went to hand her the phone, Patin said
the phone was not worth twenty dollars. When Patin turned around, Defendant
was holding a gun and demanded his money.
Patin threw everything from his pockets onto the ground except $600.00 he
had from selling a car. Patin testified that he put the envelope with the money back
into his pocket. Defendant demanded the money. As Patin reached into his
pocket, Roden stepped between Patin and the gun. Patin pushed Roden out of the
way. He and Defendant then struggled on the ground. Patin threw his phone to
Roden and told her to call the police. He and Defendant fought for five to ten
minutes. Patin then stood up, and Defendant hit him across the eye with the butt of
the gun twice, knocking him out. As he hit the ground, Patin heard someone say,
―come on, come on, come on, Jerome, let’s go.‖ Roden also heard someone say
―Jerome, they’re calling the cops.‖ Patin testified that when he regained
consciousness his money and Roden’s phone were gone. Roden testified that her
purse was also gone.
Patin and Roden made in-court identifications of Defendant. They also
identified Defendant in a photographic lineup.
2 As a result of being hit, Patin received seven stitches and had brain trauma.
Patin testified that Roden was bitten by Defendant and received a tetanus shot.
Roden did not know who bit her.
Defendant testified that he did not know Patin and Roden and did not take
anything from them. Additionally, he did not own a gun. He admitted he had prior
convictions for distribution of cocaine and conspiracy to distribute cocaine.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial
which was based on the use of other crimes evidence.
At issue in this assignment of error is testimony regarding events that
occurred on January 7, 2010. In its opening statement, the State set forth the
following regarding the events of January 7: ―about a week later Detective
Howard runs across, uh, an incident whereupon the defendant was found to be in a
backyard where a 38 snub nose revolver was also recovered. Independent of this
and not in criminal activity but it puts him in location with the gun.‖
Sergeant Ronnie Howard was questioned about the events of January 7 as
follows:
Q So at that point you had a name Jerome, the race, and approximate age and physical characteristics of a suspect, but you didn’t have any one suspect in mind at that point, is that correct?
A Not at that point.
Q What did you do with information? What did you begin doing?
A I ...
Q ... to try and identify who Jerome might be?
A I started looking for reports with, uh, the name Jerome in them as they came in, and, uh, actually came upon a report that happened on January 7th. Where a Jerome was in the presence of a firearm when, uh, police were called to uh -- Midway.
3 Q Okay. And, and in checking out that report did you find that in fact someone by the name of Isaac Jerome King was discovered to be in a backyard with a small handgun along with another person as well, correct?
A That is correct.
Q All right.
MR. KUTCH:
I want to put on the record and [sic] objection of the other crimes, evidence, and I’m going to move for a mistrial.
THE COURT:
All right, well, uh, your objection’s overruled. This is one of the things that we discussed.
I realize, your Honor, but I still need to put it on the record.
All right. You’re objection’s overruled.
EXAMINATION CONTINUED BY MR. LAMPERT:
Q He -- we’re not saying that he was committing a crime at that point, we’re just saying you discovered a report showing that he was in the same backyard with a handgun?
Defendant contends ―[t]his other crimes evidence was the January 7, 2010,
arrest of Mr. King for having a firearm while in someone’s backyard, and the
firearm allegedly found in the incident.‖
Defendant cites La.Code Evid. art. 404(B)(1), which provides:
Except as provided in Article 412, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to 4 introduce at trial for such purposes, or when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding.
Defendant sets forth the criteria necessary for other crimes evidence to be
admissible. He notes the State did not seek a Prieur hearing. Instead, evidence of
his involvement in the January 7, 2010 incident was adduced, and the handgun
seized at that time was brought to trial for the victims and the investigating officer
to examine and testify about. Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying
his objections to the State’s eliciting testimony regarding an unrelated offense and
questioning witnesses about an unrelated handgun. Defendant alleges this allowed
the State to wave a dangerous-looking revolver throughout the trial in order to
show he was a bad person. Defendant also alleges the handgun had no probative
value. Further, it had nothing to do with the December 26, 2009 offense.
Defendant contends the State made no effort to argue that the handgun and
testimony regarding the indictment on January 7 were admissible pursuant to any
exception listed in La.Code Evid. art. 404(B). However, even if the evidence had
some minimal independent relevance, the probative value was substantially
outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice to the jury, confusion of the issues,
misleading the jury, and undue delay or waste of time.
Defendant contends the only reason the State gave for using the evidence
and testimony at issue was to show how the photo lineup was set up. However,
that did not explain its extensive use of an unrelated handgun, and it was not
needed to explain the photo lineup.
The State contends other crimes evidence is not applicable in this case. The
State additionally contends Defendant’s possession of the firearm on January 7,
2010, was an integral part of and a continuation of the crime on December 26,
5 2009. Furthermore, the procedural requirements of Prieur are not applicable to
evidence that forms an integral part of the charged offense.
We find the State did not present other crimes evidence at the trial of this
matter. In State v. Smart, 05-814 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/14/06), 926 So.2d 637, writ
denied, 06-1225 (La. 11/17/06), 942 So.2d 533, the fifth circuit found that an
officer’s comment that the defendant was taken into custody on an unrelated matter
was not inadmissible evidence of other crimes or bad acts because it did not refer
to any specific crime or bad act committed by the defendant and was vague and
ambiguous.
In State v. Marsalis, 04-827 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/26/05), 902 So.2d 1081, the
fifth circuit concluded testimony that the defendant was housed in the maximum-
security section of jail where inmates who had already been sentenced were housed
was not other crimes evidence and was admissible as proof of the charged offense
of battery on a correctional employee. Further, the testimony did not specify any
prior bad acts by the defendant, and by the nature of charged offense, it was clear
that the defendant was in jail for something that suggested that he committed or
allegedly committed prior bad acts.
In State v. Celestine, 98-1166 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/30/99), 735 So.2d 109, writ
denied, 99-1217 (La. 10/8/99), 750 So.2d 178, a police officer was asked if he
attempted to identify the person who broke into the victim’s home. The officer
stated that he ran the subject’s name through the national crime computer and got a
past criminal history. The defendant objected and requested a mistrial. The fifth
circuit found the officer did not refer to any specific crime committed by the
defendant and, under those circumstances, there was no abuse of discretion in the
trial court’s refusal to declare a mistrial.
6 In State v. Malone, 43,548 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/19/08), 998 So.2d 322, writ
denied, 09-198 (La. 10/30/09), 21 So.3d 275, the second circuit found that
testimony from the victim’s cousin that the defendant had loaded and shot the gun
a month before she shot the victim was not other crimes evidence and was
admissible.
The State’s comments in its opening statement and Sergeant Howard’s
testimony indicated Defendant was in the presence of a firearm. Contrary to
Defendant’s assertion, there was no testimony that he was arrested or any details of
a crime given by any witness. As there was no statement that Defendant was in
actual or constructive possession of the firearm, there was no evidence of a bad act
or other crime. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defense counsel’s motion for mistrial.
There was no objection when Patin and Roden were shown the handgun or
questioned about it. However, there was an objection, which the trial court
sustained, when the State sought to have the handgun admitted into evidence.
Because Defendant did not object when Patin and Roden were shown and
questioned about the handgun, any issue regarding the handgun is not properly
before the court for review. La.Code Crim.P. art. 841.
For the reasons asserted herein, this assignment of error lacks merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO
In his second assignment of error, Defendant contends the trial court erred in
denying his hearsay objection as to testimony regarding other crimes evidence.
At trial, Sargent [sic] Howard was questioned as follows:
Q And at that point, that initial interview and getting the medical records, did you know who the suspect was at that point?
A I didn’t know who it was.
7 Q Did you have any idea what you were even looking for at that point or who you were looking for in any manner?
A Uh, from talking to the victim I had an idea that I was looking for a black male, uh, in his early twenties.
Q Okay. Did you have any names to go from?
A Uh, yes, early on in the. . .
I’m going to object, your Honor. If the name came from some third party that’s hearsay.
Okay.
MR. LAMPERT:
It’s all going to show why he did what he did.
It’s going to show why he did what he did and is intended for that purpose and not for the truth of the matter. So you may answer. You’re objection’s overruled.
Defendant contends the State’s use of other crimes evidence without any
effort to produce non-hearsay witnesses to testify about the circumstances
surrounding them clearly violated his right to confront and cross-examine all
witnesses against him, as raised by his hearsay objection to the line of questioning.
In State v. Rainey, 470 So.2d 422 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1985), the State asked a
witness during cross-examination if she knew whether the defendant had ever been
previously convicted of anything. At that time, defense counsel did not object to
the question on the grounds that the State was trying to introduce other crimes
evidence. Instead, defense counsel objected solely on the grounds that the
witness’s answer would be hearsay. On appeal, it was alleged for the first time that
the State’s cross-examination of the witness concerning the defendant’s prior
8 convictions was highly prejudicial and should not have been allowed by the trial
court. This court found that defense counsel did not object on the grounds that the
State was introducing evidence of other crimes; thus, La.Code Crim.P. art. 841
precluded the defendant from raising the objection for the first time on appeal.
The case before the court is exactly like Rainey in that defense counsel
objected as follows: ―I’m going to object, your Honor. If the name came from
some third party that’s hearsay.‖ This objection did not refer to other crimes
evidence. The error complained of was not first asserted in the trial court.
Accordingly, this assignment will not be considered by this court.
DECREE
The Defendant’s convictions are affirmed.
This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–16.3.