State of Louisiana v. Felton Thompson
Opinion
STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2022-K-0842
VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL
FELTON THOMPSON * FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******
APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH NO. 543-874, SECTION “SECTION E”
Judge Rhonda Goode-Douglas, ******
Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott ******
(Court composed of Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase, Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott)
Richard Bourke Russell Barksdale 636 Baronne Street New Orleans, LA 70113
COUNSEL FOR APPLICANT/DEFENDANT
Jason R. Williams DISTRICT ATTORNEY Brad Scott CHIEF OF APPEALS Thomas Frederick ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY ORLEANS PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 619 S. White Street New Orleans, LA 70119
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT/STATE OF LOUISIANA
WRIT GRANTED; REVERSED
February 15, 2023
NEK RLB TGC
Felton Thompson (“Defendant”) seeks review of the trial court’s November 17, 2022 ruling denying his Motion to Quash Bill of Information Due to Prescription. For the following reasons, we grant Defendant’s writ and reverse the trial court’s ruling.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On December 17, 2018, the State of Louisiana (hereinafter “the State”) filed a bill of information for one count of armed robbery and one count of possession of a firearm or weapon by a felon arising from an incident that occurred on June 22, 2017. At the time the bill of information was filed, Defendant was already in the State’s custody in Calcasieu Parish on a charge of first degree murder.
Arraignment was originally set for January 11, 2019 in Orleans Criminal District Court (hereinafter “Criminal District Court”), and then reset for February 1, 2019.
Both times, Defendant did not appear. The State issued a subpoena for him to appear at the February 1, 2019 hearing; however, the return reflects that the subpoena was never served. Nevertheless, the district attorney represented that Defendant had been served, and the district court issued an alias capias for his failure to appear. The case was continued without date. At all relevant times,
Defendant remained in the State’s custody in Calcasieu Parish, but the State did not arrange for him to appear for the scheduled arraignment hearings.
On March 21, 2022, the State filed a writ for the Defendant’s appearance, and he was finally arraigned on May 23, 2022. On August 3, 2022, Defendant filed a motion to quash the bill of information, alleging that the State violated La. C.Cr.P. art. 578 by failing to bring his case to trial within two years of prosecution. The district court heard the merits of the motion on October 14, 2022 and issued a written ruling denying the motion on November 17, 2022.
DISCUSSION
“A ruling on a motion to quash involving a speedy trial violation is a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Thomas, 2013-0816, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/19/14), 138 So. 3d 92, 97. This Court will review factual determinations made by the trial court for abuse of discretion and legal conclusions de novo. See id. Defendant alleges that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash on that basis that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s and Criminal District Court’s COVID-19 orders interrupted prescription under La. C.Cr.P. art. 578. At the hearing on the motion to quash, Defendant argued that the various COVID-19 orders issued by the Louisiana Supreme Court (hereinafter the “Supreme Court”) and Criminal District Court suspended the prescriptive period under the article. Conversely, the State argued that these orders interrupted the prescriptive period, thus restarting anew the time limitations under the article. In its ruling, the trial court agreed with the State and found that the various COVID-19 orders interrupted prescription. The question of whether the COVID-19 orders interrupted prescription is a legal question. Thus, we review the district court’s finding de novo.
La. C.Cr.P. art. 578 No trial shall commence after two years from the date of institution of prosecution in non-capital felony cases. La. C.Cr.P. art. 578(A)(2). Prosecution is initiated when the State files a bill of information. State v. Sorden, 2009-1416, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/04/10), 45 So. 3d 181, 184. In this case, the State filed the bill of information formally charging Defendant on December 17, 2018. As such, the State had until December 17, 2020 to bring Defendant’s case to trial, unless the period of limitation was suspended or interrupted.
When prescription is suspended, the period of suspension is not counted, and prescription will continue to run again upon the termination of the period of suspension. La. C.C. art. 3472. However, if prescription is interrupted, prescription will commence to run anew from the last day of the interruption. La. C.C. art. 3466. Article 579(A)(2) of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the two-year period of limitation will be interrupted if the defendant cannot be tried for any cause “beyond the control of the state.” In other words, “[a]n interruption of prescription occurs when the state is unable, through no fault of its own, to try a defendant within the period specified by statute . . . .” State v. Rome, 1993-1221 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So. 2d 1284, 1286. Once the cause of the interruption ceases, then the period of limitation will commence to run anew. La. C.Cr.P. art. 579(B).
Once a defendant asserts a facially meritorious motion to quash, the State bears the burden of showing that the running of prescription was interrupted. State v. Thibodeaux, 2019-0609, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/04/19), 286 So. 3d 513, 516 (quoting Thomas, 2013-0816, p. 5, 138 So. 3d at 97). This requires that the State show that it exercised due diligence in discovering the whereabouts of the defendant as well as in taking appropriate steps to secure his presence for trial. Id.,
2019-0609, p. 5, 286 So. 3d at 517 (quoting State v. Romar, 2007-2140, p. 3 (La. 7/1/08), 985 So. 2d 722, 725).
The Louisiana Supreme Court’s COVID-19 Orders On March 16, 2020, the Supreme Court issued an order that read, in pertinent part:
1. All jury trials, both civil and criminal, scheduled to commence in any Louisiana state court . . . are hereby continued to a date to be reset by local order. . . .
...
3. Criminal initial appearances for adults and juveniles, arraignments for incarcerated individuals and bond hearings shall continue as scheduled and shall be conducted with the use of telephone and video conferencing whenever possible.
...
6. Given the public health concerns and the necessity of taking action to slow the spread of the disease, the continuances occasioned by this Order serve the ends of justice and outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Therefore, the time periods of such continuances shall be excluded from speedy trial computations pursuant to law, including but not limited to those set forth in the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure and the Louisiana Children’s Code, and presumptively constitute just cause.
(Emphasis added). The subsequent orders issued by the Supreme Court used similar language. The orders issued by the Supreme Court never indicated that the deadlines under La. C.Cr.P. art. 578 were interrupted. To the contrary, the orders imply that the continuances suspended the time period for speedy trial compensations.
In its ruling, the trial court relied on a case from the Louisiana Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, which dealt with the question of whether the Supreme Court’s COVID-19 orders interrupted prescription under La. C.Cr.P. art. 578. See State v. Simmons, 2022-208 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/19/22), 350 So. 3d 599. In
Simmons, the Third Circuit looked to the language used in the orders, and it explicitly found that the Supreme Court’s COVID-19 orders suspended prescription.
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