State of Louisiana v. Felton Allen

CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 19, 2008
DocketKA-0008-0408
StatusUnknown

This text of State of Louisiana v. Felton Allen (State of Louisiana v. Felton Allen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Louisiana v. Felton Allen, (La. Ct. App. 2008).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

08-408

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

FELTON ALLEN

********** APPEAL FROM THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF IBERIA, NO. 06-1509 HONORABLE GERARD B. WATTIGNY, PRESIDING **********

SYLVIA R. COOKS JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Michael G. Sullivan, and Billy Howard Ezell, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

J. Phil Haney, District Attorney Jeffrey J. Trosclair, Assistant District Attorney Courthouse, 5th Floor Franklin, LA 70538 (337) 828-4100 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: State of Louisiana

Mark O. Foster Louisiana Appellate Project P.O. Box 2057 Natchitoches, LA 71457 (318) 572-5693 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Felton Allen COOKS, Judge.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Marenthia Nelson Allen used the identity of Mrs. Lori N. Boyd to purchase

three motor vehicles from Musson-Patout Automotive Group and pled guilty to three

counts of theft over $500.00. One of the vehicles fraudulently purchased by Mrs.

Allen, a 2006 Chevrolet pickup truck, was driven by Mrs. Allen’s husband, Felton

Allen from the time it was purchased.

Based on the fact that he drove the stolen vehicle, the State charged Mr. Allen

by bill of information with illegal possession of a stolen thing valued over $500.00,

a violation of La.R.S. 14:69(B)(1). A jury trial on the merits was held, and Defendant

was found guilty as charged. Defendant was sentenced to serve five years at hard

labor with credit for time served. All but one year of the sentence was suspended,

and Defendant was placed on five years active supervised probation after his release.

Defendant did not seek reconsideration of his sentence. On appeal, he asserts that the

evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.

ANALYSIS

In his sole assignment of error, Defendant argues the State failed to establish

all the elements of proof required to establish that he was guilty of illegal possession

of a stolen thing. Specifically, Defendant maintains his conviction was based on the

State’s allegation that the 2006 Chevrolet truck used by him was stolen or

misappropriated from Musson-Patout Automotive by his wife, Mrs. Allen. Defendant

contends, although his wife purchased the vehicle under another person’s name, she

fulfilled her part of the contract and paid the purchase price of the vehicle. Because

there was no theft from the dealership, Defendant asserts he cannot be guilty as

charged.

-1- The analysis for a claim of insufficient evidence is well-settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

As provided in La.R.S. 14:69(A), “Illegal possession of stolen things is the

intentional possessing, procuring, receiving, or concealing of anything of value which

has been the subject of any robbery or theft, under circumstances which indicate that

the offender knew or had good reason to believe that the thing was the subject of one

of these offenses.” In the instant case, the Defendant challenges only the element of

theft. Theft is defined in La.R.S. 14:67 which reads in pertinent part:

A. Theft is the misappropriation or taking of anything of value which belongs to another, either without the consent of the other to the misappropriation or taking, or by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations. An intent to deprive the other permanently of whatever may be the subject of the misappropriation or taking is essential.

Considering same, Defendant contends that Musson-Patout contractually

agreed to sell the vehicles to Mrs. Allen and that the vehicles belonged to her when

they were driven off the lot. Thus, a theft did not occur. Defendant asserts the actual

victim of Mrs. Nelson’s fraud was Hibernia Bank, which loaned her the money to

purchase the vehicles.

-2- In support of his argument, Defendant first refers this court to State v. Bias, 400

So.2d 650 (La.1981). In Bias, the supreme court addressed the issue of whether the

defendant’s default on a contractual obligation involving the lease of movables by

failing either to make the rental payments or to return the movable was alone

sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed

unauthorized use of a movable pursuant to La.R.S. 14:68. The court concluded that

the failure to make rental payments as agreed did not constitute a “use without

consent” or a “use by fraudulent practices” for purposes of the statute, stating:

R.S. 14:68 may be violated by a taking or use either without the consent of the owner or by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations. Here, the state’s theory must be either (1) that the “use” of the movable was without the owner’s consent, when defendant discontinued paying rent, or (2) that the “use” was by means of fraudulent practices, when defendant kept the set without making the agreed payments. We decline to accept a theory that the mere failure to make rental payments as agreed constitutes a “use without consent” or a “use by fraudulent practices” for purposes of the statute.

Id. at 652.

The Defendant also relies on State v. Ripley, 39,111 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/15/04),

889 So.2d 1214, writ denied, 05-151 (La. 6/24/05), 904 So.2d 718, wherein the court,

relying on the holding in Bias, concluded that the evidence was not sufficient to

support a finding that the thing of value, air time, was taken without the broadcasting

corporation’s consent or that it was misappropriated by fraudulent practices. The

defendant, a radio network, entered into a three-year contract with a broadcasting

corporation and kept current on its obligations under the agreement for over a year

before it started having financial problems. The broadcasting corporation was

informed of the defendant’s financial problems but, nonetheless, allowed the

defendant to continue to operate as it became increasingly in arrears for the rent

amount. On appeal, the court held that the failure to pay rent, standing alone, did not

-3- meet the element required by the statute for theft by fraudulent practices.

The facts of the instant case are substantially different than those of the

jurisprudence cited by Defendant. First, the testimony and evidence adduced at trial

support the fact that Mrs.

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Related

Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1979)
State v. Kennerson
695 So. 2d 1367 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1997)
State v. Richardson
425 So. 2d 1228 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1983)
State v. Bias
400 So. 2d 650 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1981)
State Ex Rel. Graffagnino v. King
436 So. 2d 559 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1983)
State v. Duncan
420 So. 2d 1105 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1982)
State v. Moody
393 So. 2d 1212 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1981)
State v. Ripley
889 So. 2d 1214 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2004)

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