Judgment rendered April 8, 2026. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,800-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
ERIC D. GREEN Appellant
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 402,694
Honorable John D. Mosely, Jr., Judge
LOUISIANA APPEALS AND Counsel for Appellant WRIT SERVICE By: Remy V. Starns Michael A. Mitchell Corrie R. Gallien
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
KODIE K. SMITH ERIC M. WHITEHEAD Assistant District Attorneys
Before COX, THOMPSON, and ELLENDER, JJ. THOMPSON, J.
An unarmed 17-year-old high school student walking home after
school was lured to approach a vehicle when three assailants, motivated by
rival gang membership, jumped out and shot him 19 times, killing him. In
this proceeding, Eric Green, one of shooters, was convicted of second degree
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment1 for his involvement. Green now
argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of this crime, that
he was improperly prevented from confronting his accuser, and that his
sentence is excessive. For the reasons that follow, we affirm his conviction
and sentence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 27, 2022, 17-year-old D’Anthony Walker (“Walker”),
was walking home from Booker T. Washington high school with his
girlfriend, who then split off to go to her house, as Walker continued alone
down Harvard Avenue in Shreveport, Louisiana. The two were not aware
that they had been followed by a group of young men in what turned out to
be a stolen 2021 Kia Soul. Inside the stolen vehicle were Marquise Starks
(“Starks”), Antonio Bryant (“Bryant”), Marvin McDaniel (“McDaniel”), and
the defendant, Eric Green (“Green”). The stolen Kia pulled alongside
Walker, and when one of the dark-tinted windows cracked, Walker could
hear a song playing that was associated with his gang. One of the members
of the car displayed or “threw up” Walker’s gang symbol, and he walked
over to the car under the false impression the people in the vehicle were
1 Green’s sentence is with the possibility of parole, due to his age at the time of the crime, as provided by Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012). friendly to him. Having laid the trap, as Walker approached the vehicle
Green, Starks, and Bryant jumped out and shot Walker, striking him 19
times and killing him. The assailants then fled the scene in the Kia. A few
days later, when the stolen Kia was spotted by police and after a high-speed
chase, McDaniel, Starks, and Bryant were apprehended and arrested for
crimes associated with the murder of Walker. Green was also implicated
and later arrested for second degree murder.
A five-day jury trial eventually commenced, with numerous witnesses
and video of the shooting from a nearby home surveillance camera, and the
following relevant testimony was adduced. The owner of the Kia, Alice
Ragland, testified that she works the 5:00 a.m. shift at the Shopper Value on
Hearne Avenue in Shreveport, Louisiana, and when she arrived at work on
January 27, 2022, two young men approached her, and one of them
brandished a gun. The assailant pushed her head down, putting her to the
ground, and demanded her car keys at gunpoint. She testified she gave him
the keys, and they drove away in the Kia, but that she could not identify the
two young men who carjacked her.
Jason Saiz testified that he is an investigator with the violent crimes
division of the Shreveport Police Department. He investigated the
carjacking of Ragland’s Kia and testified that the Kia was involved in a
shooting later the same day it had been carjacked. Gerald Thomas testified
that he is the supervisor of communications and custodian of records at the
Shreveport Police Department. He identified the various 911 calls
associated with the Harvard Street shooting as they were played for the jury.
Elvira Hughes testified that she lives on Harvard Street, and her security
cameras recorded the shooting. The footage was played for the jury. Earl 2 Bloomer is the assistant principal at Booker T. Washington High School,
and he identified surveillance footage of the parking lot from the high school
that captured Green leaving the school and the Kia following him shortly
thereafter.
Shreveport Police Department Corporal Arthur Green testified that he
is a patrol officer and that he responded to the call that a shooting had taken
place on Harvard Avenue. When he arrived, he saw a black male covered in
blood lying in the middle of the roadway and that there were people in the
area screaming and crying. He secured the scene and noted that the fire
department declared that Walker was dead when they arrived.
Jashonti Jackson testified that she was Walker’s girlfriend, that they
both attended Booker T. Washington High School and frequently walked
home together from school. She identified herself and Walker on the
surveillance video from the high school. That day she noticed a black Kia
driving past them twice before she and Walker split up to walk to their own
homes. Before she arrived home, she heard gunshots. She ran home, and
then she and her father got in the car to find out what happened. She saw
Walker lying in the street on his stomach and testified he was coughing up
blood. She called 911, and that call was played for the jury.
Corporal Cody Walsworth testified that he is a member of the crime
scene investigation unit of the Shreveport Police Department. He testified
that he examined the scene of the shooting. He testified that he collected 26
9mm expended cartridge casings and three .357 caliber shell casings. He
also examined the scene of the recovery of the stolen Kia. He testified that a
.45 Glock was found at Green’s mother’s house, along with Ragland’s
3 insurance card for the Kia. None of the ammunition from this .45 Glock
matched the ammunition from the crime scene where Walker had been shot.
Officer Austin Page, formerly of the Shreveport Police Department,
testified that he engaged in the police pursuit of the Kia. During that pursuit,
he witnessed three people flee from the vehicle after a high-speed chase. He
chased Starks, and the K-9 unit arrived to help locate the suspects. Starks,
McDaniel, and Bryant were all located and arrested after the pursuit ended.
Dr. James Traylor testified that he is a forensic pathologist at
Louisiana Health Sciences in Shreveport, Louisiana. He performed the
autopsy on Walker and found that Walker died of multiple gunshot wounds.
He noted that Walker sustained 19 gunshot wounds. Phillip Stout testified
that he works for the firearms section of the Texas Department of Public
Safety Crime Laboratory in Garland, Texas. Before that, he worked at the
North Louisiana crime lab. He testified that he was provided with three
9mm firearms that were all located at Bryant’s house. One of the 9mm
pistols collected had fired 17 shell casing from the shooting site where
Walker was killed.
Dr. Jessica Esparza testified that she is the DNA technical leader at
the North Louisiana Crime Lab and that she was unable to match the DNA
from the guns’ triggers to Green. Corporal John Madjerick, who took
photographs of Green after his arrest, testified that he was an investigator
with the Crime Scene Investigation Unit at the Shreveport Police
Department when the crime occurred.
Officer Delandro Washington testified that he works in the homicide
division of the Shreveport Police Department, but at the time of the crime he
worked in the patrol division. It was Washington who, a few days after the 4 shooting, spotted the stolen Kia and attempted to pull it over. The occupants
of the Kia fled and a high-speed pursuit ensued. When the pursuit came to an
end the occupants, later found to be Green, Starks, Bryant, and McDaniel,
jumped out of the vehicle and fled. Sergeant Jeffrey Hammer testified that
he works in the K-9 division of the Shreveport Police Department. His dog
brought Bryant and McDaniel out from under different houses, and they
were treated for dog bites. Officer Anthony Haines testified that he is a
patrol officer with the Shreveport Police Department. His body camera
footage shows Green being arrested.
McDaniel testified at the trial that he did not remember anything
about the day of the shooting. However, prior to his testimony at trial,
McDaniel had testified at a proffered testimony hearing.2 He was cross-
examined by counsel.
During that earlier hearing, he testified:
• He was picked up from a girl’s house by the rest of the young men in
the stolen Kia. They left the house to go get an acquaintance only
identified by the nickname “Fat,” with Green driving. After they
picked up Fat, McDaniel drove the car and Green sat behind the
driver’s seat.
• He testified that as they were driving around, they saw Walker, whom
he identified as a member of a rival gang. He did not know Walker
personally but referred to him as an “op.”
2 Mekisha Smith Creal testified that she is the homicide screening chief with the Caddo Parish district attorney’s office, and she certified and presented the recorded testimony from McDaniel at a previous hearing. 5 • McDaniel testified that Bryant called Walker over to the car, and
when he got close, Green jumped out of the back and started firing his
gun. Starks then started firing, and then Bryant. McDaniel identified
that Green started firing first with a Glock 19. He testified that Bryant
was firing a Glock .357 and Starks was firing a Glock 9 Smith &
Wesson. McDaniel identified where Walker was in relation to the car
when he was shot. After Walker collapsed, McDaniel and the other
men drove off.
• McDaniel was shown the surveillance video in court, and identified
each person in the video, including Green.
• McDaniel testified that Walker approached the vehicle because they
were playing his gang song and Green threw up his gang sign. The
windows were tinted so Walker could not see who exactly was in the
car.
• McDaniel testified that they first saw Walker leaving the high school
to walk home, as they were sitting in the parking lot of the school.
Even after reviewing his earlier testimony, McDaniel maintained that he
remembered no details from the day of the shooting. He also claimed not to
remember his prior testimony. A video of his earlier testimony was played
for the jury.
Felicia Henry testified that she is the compliance coordinator with the
Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Office, and she certified a phone call made by Green
at the jail in which he called McDaniel a “rat.” Detective Torian Wesley
testified that he works in the homicide division of the Shreveport Police
Department and investigated Walker’s homicide. He described how he
obtained the Ring camera footage from a neighbor that depicts the murder, 6 which was played for the jury. He also obtained security footage from the
high school, which shows the Kia parked in the student parking lot and
leaving to follow Walker and Jackson as they walk home from school. He
stated that the statement given by McDaniel was consistent with the video
surveillance he collected.
Sergeant Jeremy Jordan testified that he manages the digital forensics
unit at the Shreveport Police Department. He used cellular location data to
place Green near the site of the shooting at the time of the shooting. Ashley
Green testified that she is Green’s mother but that he had not lived with her
since 2017.
At the conclusion of the five-day trial, the jury unanimously returned
a guilty verdict for second degree murder. Green filed a motion for new trial
and a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, which were both denied.
Green was sentenced to life imprisonment, without the benefits of
suspension of sentence or probation, but with the benefit of parole due to his
age at the time of the crime. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Green asserts four assignments of error, each of which will be
addressed below.
First Assignment of Error: There was insufficient evidence to convict Green of second degree murder.
In his first assignment of error, Green contends that there was
insufficient evidence to convict him of second degree murder. The standard
of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
7 beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct.
2781, 61 L.Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731 (La. 1992);
State v. Smith, 47,983 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/15/13), 116 So. 3d 884. See also
La. C. Cr. P. art. 821. This standard does not provide an appellate court with
a vehicle for substituting its appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact
finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517. The trier of
fact makes credibility determinations and may accept or reject the testimony
of any witness. State v. Casey, 99-0023 (La. 1/26/00), 775 So. 2d 1022,
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S. Ct. 104, 148 L.Ed. 2d 62 (2000). The
appellate court does not assess credibility or reweigh the evidence. State v.
Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442.
The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and
circumstantial evidence. State v. Allen, 36,180 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/18/02),
828 So. 2d 622, writs denied, 02-2595 (La. 3/28/03), 840 So. 2d 566, and
02-2997 (La. 6/27/03), 847 So. 2d 1255, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1185, 124 S.
Ct. 1404, 158 L.Ed. 2d 90 (2004). An appellate court reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence
by viewing it in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Id. When the
direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by that evidence must be
sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. Id.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred
according to reason and common experience. State v. Broome, 49,004 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 4/9/14), 136 So. 3d 979, writ denied, 14-0990 (La. 1/16/15), 157
So. 3d 1127. If a case rests essentially upon circumstantial evidence, that 8 evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La. R.S.
15:438; State v. Broome, supra.
La. R.S. 14:30.1 provides, in pertinent part, that second degree murder
is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill
or to inflict great bodily harm. Specific intent is that state of mind that exists
when the circumstances indicate the offender actively desired the prescribed
criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1).
Specific intent need not be proven as a fact and may be inferred from the
defendant’s actions and the circumstances of the transaction. State v.
Brown, 03-0897 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So. 2d 1, cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1022,
126 S. Ct. 1569, 164 L. Ed. 2d 305 (2006). Deliberately pointing and firing
a deadly weapon at close range are circumstances that will support a finding
of specific intent to kill. Id. Specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily
harm may be inferred from the extent and severity of the victim’s injuries.
State v. Odums, 50,969 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/30/16), 210 So. 3d 850, writ
denied, 17-0296 (La. 11/13/17), 229 So. 3d 924.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the
State provided the essential elements of second degree murder. Walker was
shot 19 times, and evidence presented at trial stated that 26 shell casings
were found near his body. The record includes eyewitness testimony that
Green was the first out of the Kia and the first to shoot Walker.
Circumstantial evidence in the form of the surveillance videos and GPS
tracking indicate that Green shot and killed Walker. Although McDaniel
denied remembering the shooting at trial, the jury heard his detailed
testimony during his proffer hearing of the description of the shooting. This 9 testimony was supported by the various surveillance videos. The jury had
the opportunity to weigh this conflicting evidence and returned a guilty
verdict. Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters and
resolution of the conflict depends on witness credibility, the conflicting
testimony is considered for the weight of the evidence and not the
sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Jackson, 50,400 (La. App. 2 Cir.
2/24/16), 189 So. 3d 1150. Considering the above, this assignment of error
is without merit.
Second Assignment of Error: The trial court erred in prohibiting Green from questioning McDaniel about the State’s leverage over him.
In his second assignment of error, Green contends that the trial court
erred in prohibiting him from questioning McDaniel about the State’s
leverage over him. Green specifically argues that he was not allowed to
cross-examine McDaniel about the benefit he was receiving from the State
in exchange for his testimony. The record indicates otherwise.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that,
“[in] all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.” This bedrock procedural
guarantee applies to both federal and state prosecutions. State v. Carper,
45,178 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/9/10), 41 So. 3d 605, writ denied, 10-1507 (La.
9/3/10), 44 So. 3d 708. The Sixth Amendment safeguards the defendant’s
right to confront his accusers and to subject their testimony to rigorous
testing in an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact. Id.
The record reflects that McDaniel was questioned several times on the
record about any potential benefit he was receiving from the State in
exchange for his testimony. At trial, he testified:
10 Q: Ok. Have I or anyone else promised you anything in exchange for your testimony?
A: No, sir.
The State further questioned him regarding his appearance in an orange
jumpsuit, and he explained that he was incarcerated for an unrelated
shooting that occurred in 2024. Green directs this Court to his attempt to
question McDaniel about his appearance in a prison jumpsuit during his
proffered testimony hearing. The Court allowed Green’s counsel to ask if
McDaniel had ever been convicted of a crime but not testify about any
pending charges he may have. However, the record reflects the following
exchange that occurred between Green’s counsel and McDaniel at this
hearing:
Q: Has she given you any offers or said if you testify, it will help your case or we will plead you to a lesser charge down the road?
Q: She hasn’t given you any plea offers?
Q: Okay. What is your expectation of what you can receive as a result of this testimony?
A: I don’t know. I don’t know.
Q: Do you expect to get a plea offer or a deal?
Q: At all? You’re doing this out of the goodness of your heart?
A: Yes, sir.
After reviewing the entirety of McDaniel’s testimony, both at trial and at the
proffered testimony hearing, it is apparent that Green had the opportunity to
confront his accuser. McDaniel was repeatedly questioned about any 11 potential benefit provided to him from the State in exchange for his
testimony. Green’s counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine McDaniel
and did in fact do so during both of his testimonies. We find this assignment
of error is without merit.
Third Assignment of Error: The trial court abused its discretion in imposing an excessive and unsupported sentence because there was no pre-sentence investigation and the trial court did not list any Article 894.1 factors.
Fourth Assignment of Error: The trial court imposed an unconstitutionally excessive sentence.
Both the third and fourth assignments of error address the
excessiveness of Green’s sentence, and as such, we will consider them
together. Green argues that his sentence is excessive because the trial court
did not consider any mitigating factors and no presentence investigation was
ordered by the court. He further argues that he should have been sentenced
to a lesser sentence because of his youth, lack of criminal record, and
propensity for change.
The mandatory sentence for second degree murder is punishment by
life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or
suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). La. R.S. 15:574.4(F) states
that any person serving a sentence of life imprisonment for a conviction of
second degree murder who was under the age of 18 years at the time of the
commission of the offense, shall be eligible for parole if certain conditions
have been met. Green was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of life
imprisonment at hard labor, with the benefit of parole.
Ordinarily, appellate review of sentences for excessiveness is a two-
step process, the first being an analysis of the district court’s compliance
12 with the sentencing guidelines of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 and the second
being an analysis of the sentence for constitutional excessiveness. State v.
Smith, 53,827 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/3/21), 315 So. 3d 407. Here, the record
reflects that Green timely filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the
trial court denied. However, in the motion, he asserts only that his sentence
is excessive. Green did not object to the failure to adequately articulate
reasons for sentence under La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. Pursuant to La. C. Cr. P.
art. 881.1, the failure to include a specific ground upon which a motion to
reconsider sentence may be based precludes Green from raising the ground
for relief on appeal. State v. Mims, 619 So. 2d 1059 (La. 1993).
Moreover, where there is a mandatory sentence, there is no need for
the trial court to justify, under La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, a sentence it is legally
required to impose. State v. Ivory, 54,886 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/11/23), 355 So.
3d 1157, writ denied, 23-00275 (La. 1/10/24), 376 So. 3d 132. As such,
Green’s claim of sentencing error is limited to the issue of constitutional
excessiveness.
Constitutional review turns upon whether the sentence is illegal,
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense, or shocking to the
sense of justice. State v. Lobato, 603 So. 2d 739 (La. 1992); State v. Davis,
50,149 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 181 So. 3d 200; State v. Scott, 50,920
(La. App. 2 Cir. 11/16/16), 209 So. 3d 248, writ denied, 17-0353 (La.
11/13/17), 229 So. 3d 478. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is
grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more
than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v.
Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Davis, 52,453 (La. App. 2 Cir.
2/27/19), 265 So. 3d 1194. A sentence is considered grossly 13 disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of
the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-
0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166; State v. Boehm, 51,229 (La. App. 2 Cir.
4/5/17), 217 So. 3d 596.
The trial judge is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences
within the statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside
as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of his discretion. State v.
Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7; State v. Diaz, 46,750 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 12/14/11), 81 So. 3d 228. On review, an appellate court does not
determine whether another sentence may have been more appropriate, but
whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Williams, supra; State
v. Free, 46,894 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/25/12), 86 So. 3d 29.
Louisiana appellate courts have repeatedly rejected the argument that
the mandatory life sentence for second degree murder is a violation of the
prohibition against excessive punishment in the Louisiana Constitution.
State v. Ivory, supra. To rebut the presumption that the mandatory sentence
is constitutional, a defendant must clearly and convincingly show that he is
exceptional, which means that because of unusual circumstances, he is a
victim of the legislature’s failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully
tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the
circumstances of the case. State v. Ivory, supra.
Here, we find no justification for a downward departure from the
mandatory minimum sentence. The record reflects that this was a cold-
blooded killing of a young man who had been followed and lured to his
death by Green and his friends. Green has already received the benefit of
the potential for parole. While we acknowledge his age at the time this 14 crime was committed, there is nothing in the record that indicates a
downward departure is warranted or necessary. For these reasons, this
assignment of error is without merit.
ERROR PATENT
Our review of the record reveals that the trial court did not comply
with the obligatory delay before sentencing Green. La. C. Cr. P. art. 873
requires that “[i]f a defendant is convicted of a felony, at least three days
shall elapse between conviction and sentence. If a motion for new trial, or in
arrest of judgment, is filed, sentence shall not be imposed until at least
twenty-four hours after the motion is overruled.” Green was sentenced on
the same date that his motion for a new trial was denied. Nevertheless, we
conclude that any error was harmless in this instance because Green did not
object to the trial court's failure to observe the sentencing delay and because
he suffered no prejudice as he faced a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment. State v. Jones, 56,042 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/18/24), 403 So. 3d
659, writ denied, 25-0002 (La. 2/25/25), 401 So. 3d 665.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the conviction and sentence of Eric Green
are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.