Judgment rendered March 1, 2023. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 54,920-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
EMILY R. FIELDS Appellant
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 356,567
Honorable Donald E. Hathaway, Jr., Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Jane L. Beebe
JAMES E. STEWART, JR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
JASON W. WALTMAN REBECCA A. EDWARDS VICTORIA T. WASHINGTON Assistant District Attorneys
Before PITMAN, COX, and STEPHENS, JJ. COX, J.
This criminal appeal arises out of the First Judicial District Court,
Caddo Parish, Louisiana. Emily Fields was found guilty by a unanimous
jury of obstruction of justice, in violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1. She was
sentenced to five years at hard labor. Fields now appeals her conviction.
For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS
According to Shreveport Police Department (“SPD”) Officer Diane
Sanchez’s report, on October 4, 2015, at approximately 9:11 p.m., officers
responded to an emergency involving a pedestrian and a vehicle at the
corner of East 76th Street and Fairfield Avenue. The pedestrian, Nathaniel
Nicholson, was having trouble breathing and was transported to University
Health, where he was pronounced dead. The vehicle that struck Mr.
Nicholson fled the scene before emergency responders arrived. Crash
investigators gathered pieces of the vehicle that were left at the scene to
determine the make and model. It was later determined that the passenger
side mirror left at the scene was possibly from a 2003-2007 Honda Accord.
A press release was sent to the media on October 7, 2015, requesting any
information about the accident and/or vehicle.
After the media release, Officer Sanchez was contacted by Blake
Stephenson, the owner of Louisiana Glass in Bossier City. Mr. Stephenson
informed Officer Sanchez that one of his employees, Ronnie Odums,
believed Louisiana Glass replaced the front windshield on a 2003 black
Honda Accord that was described in the SPD media release. Mr.
Stephenson stated that Louisiana Glass received a request from Joseph
Lofton for a front windshield for a 2003 Honda Accord. He stated that Mr. Lofton brought the vehicle in on October 6, 2015. Mr. Lofton was followed
in a vehicle by Fields, who spoke to Mr. Odums. Mr. Odums stated that
Fields told him the vehicle was hers and asked him how long it was going to
take to repair the windshield. Mr. Odums stated that he observed damage to
the vehicle’s front bumper, fender, A-pillar, and windshield.
Officer Sanchez stated in her report that she reviewed the surveillance
video and was able to positively identify Mr. Lofton and Fields. She also
confirmed that the 2003 black Honda Accord was registered to Fields.
Officer Sanchez met with Mr. Lofton on October 9, 2015, and he agreed to
go to the police station for an interview regarding the accident. Mr. Lofton
was Mirandized prior to questioning at the police station. According to
Officer Sanchez’s report, Mr. Lofton stated that he had been friends with
Fields for four years and described himself as “Mr. Over-reliable.” He
stated that Fields texted him for help at 6:00 a.m. on October 5, 2015. He
said she asked for help because her vehicle was vandalized, but he knew
there must be more to the story after looking at the damage to the vehicle.
Mr. Lofton stated that he did not ask Fields many questions regarding the
vandalism and described the following as being damaged on Fields’ vehicle:
windshield shattered, passenger side dents, the bumper was loose, passenger
headlights cracked, and passenger side mirror parts were hanging off. He
told Officer Sanchez that he ordered new vehicle parts in his name because
Fields said she “couldn’t put the parts in her name.” He stated that he did
not know why she was putting the parts in his name and giving him cash to
pay for it, but he felt that if he helped her out, there might be a way for them
to have a relationship.
2 Mr. Lofton told Officer Sanchez that he drove Fields’ vehicle to
Sherwin-Williams to match the paint color and purchased a half-pint of
touchup paint. The manager at Sherwin-Williams verified this purchase for
officers. Mr. Lofton stated that he picked up the parts that were ordered
from New World International and paid cash. The manager of New World
International verified this purchase for officers. Mr. Lofton stated that
Fields asked him to drive her vehicle to Louisiana Glass because she did not
want to get pulled over for the busted windshield. He stated that he did not
know who repaired the vehicle or where the repairs were made and had not
seen Fields since October 6, 2015, after dropping off the vehicle at
Louisiana Glass.
Fields’ employer at the time of the accident recalled the following for
Officer Sanchez: Fields came to work on October 6, 2015, and stated that
her car had been vandalized over the weekend while she was at a house
party; Fields seemed very nonchalant about what happened to her car but
was more upset about the new headlights being clear instead of smoky;
Fields stated a friend of a friend was replacing the headlights; Fields
received a phone call while at work on October 8, 2015, which visibly upset
her; and, Fields left work on October 8, 2015, around noon, and never
returned.
Officer Sanchez stated in her report that she was contacted by
Attorney Stephen Glassell on October 12, 2015. Glassell told Officer
Sanchez that he was representing Fields, Fields would not be giving a
statement, and the vehicle could be located at her residence. After
impounding the vehicle, Officer Sanchez made the following observations:
the vehicle smelled of fresh paint; the passenger side mirror was different 3 than the driver side mirror; the headlights were offset; there was a green
substance under the passenger fender, which they thought to be used to fill
in holes that were drilled to pull out the dent in the fender; and small pieces
of glass (presumably from the windshield) were found on the front and rear
passenger floorboards.
Officer Sanchez removed the driver side mirror of the vehicle and sent
it to the lab to compare it to the side mirror left at the scene of the accident.
The lab results included the following, “The paint samples tested in item 5
were similar in color, layer structure, solubility and infra-red absorbance
spectra to the paint samples tested in item 6.” Office Sanchez noted in her
report that the lab could not say that both mirrors came from the same car.
SPD Corporal Dirk Morris stated in his report that he was called to the
scene of the accident to investigate. He noted in the narrative of his report
that a concerned citizen who was passing by called for help after checking
on the victim, who was lying face down on the sidewalk. He stated that the
victim had obvious head trauma with blood coming from his ear. Cpl.
Morris stated that while preparing to photograph the scene, he received a call
that the victim had passed away. According to the citizen who found the
victim, the victim was lying with his legs in the street and his head was face
down on the sidewalk. He stated that the victim’s shoes were knocked off
his feet; one shoe was next to the victim and the other a few feet away. Cpl.
Morris noted that the victim appeared to be carrying groceries in a brown
paper bag, which was located in the street next to him. He stated in his
report that multiple pieces of side mirror were located next to the victim.
Cpl. Morris’ initial involvement with the case ended at this point, but he was
4 reassigned to the case on June 21, 2017, after Officer Sanchez was promoted
and moved to another unit.
Cpl. Morris searched Fields’ phone but was unable to find anything
prior to October 19, 2015. He attempted to search Mr. Lofton’s phone but
was unable to complete the download of the data due to technical
difficulties. Cpl. Morris was able to obtain Fields’ phone records from
Metro PCS. The phone records showed that the phone was in continuous
use before and after the crash. According to location data, Fields’ phone
was at her residence until approximately 8:56 p.m., when the phone moves
to the vicinity of the crash from 9:00 p.m. until 9:07 p.m. The phone then
travels back to Fields’ residence, approximately 8 miles from the scene of
the accident.
Cpl. Morris obtained an arrest warrant for Fields on March 13, 2018,
charging her with felony hit and run and obstruction of justice.
On May 15, 2018, the State filed its bill of information against Fields
for violating La. R.S. 14:130.1 (obstruction of justice) and La. R.S. 14:100
(hit and run driving).
On June 12, 2019, the State filed its notice that it intended to use
evidence of Fields’ other crimes, wrongs, and/or acts during the trial. The
State listed a previous offense from 2007 in which Fields struck another
vehicle and fled the scene in a careless or reckless fashion. The State
submitted that this previous offense would be offered to show proof of
intent, knowledge, identity, notice, absence of mistake or accident, and
modus operandi, or for any other purposes for which it may be deemed
relevant and admissible.
5 On June 23, 2020, in open court, the trial court ruled that the previous
offense was admissible if the State could prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the previous offense was committed by Fields. It stated the
purpose of the evidence would be to prove motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or
other reasonable purposes. The trial court noted Fields’ objection for the
record.
On October 4, 2021, Fields filed a motion in limine to exclude the
evidence of her previous hit-and-run citation. She asserted that the evidence
was prejudicial, shameful, and irrelevant. On October 11, 2021, in open
court, the trial court denied the motion in limine. It ruled that it would allow
the officer who wrote the previous citation to testify as long as it did not
involve hearsay.
The six-member jury was chosen and the trial began on October 12,
2021. The State’s first witness was Alice West, Nathaniel Nicholson’s
sister. She stated that she last saw her brother on the morning of the
accident before he left for church. She stated that she received a phone call
that evening from a doctor who told her she needed to get to the hospital
because her brother had been hit and he was not looking good. She stated
that when she arrived at the hospital, her brother was deceased.
Lashonda Tilmon testified that as she was leaving work the night of
the accident, she saw someone lying on the side of the road, between the
road and the sidewalk. She stated that she went to check on him and when
she saw all the blood, she called 911. She testified that one of his shoes was
in the middle of the street and it looked as if he had a bag with him.
6 Cpl. Morris testified that when he arrived on the scene, he took
pictures of the vehicle debris, the victim’s shoes and bag, and the blood on
the sidewalk. Those pictures were introduced as evidence. He stated that
after photographing the scene, he went to the hospital to photograph the
victim’s injuries, which were also introduced into evidence. He testified that
his initial involvement in the case ended after taking the pictures, but he was
later reassigned to the case after the previous investigator was promoted.
Cpl. Morris detailed the steps he took in the investigation, which coincides
with his police report narrative detailed above. He testified that based on
Fields’ cell phone data, her internet activity included “searching legal,
looking for the wreck on the internet, things like that.”
On cross-examination, Cpl. Morris testified that he did not believe the
victim was walking on the sidewalk at the time of the accident; the area was
not well-lit; and, the victim was wearing blue jeans, a black shirt, a black or
blue hat, and no reflective material. He stated that there were no
eyewitnesses to the accident and he does not know 100 percent that Fields
was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident.
Jarvis Armington testified that he was friends with Fields at the time
of the accident, he formerly coached her son in football, and they previously
dated for a few months. He testified that Fields contacted him and stated she
hit something in the road and asked if he knew anyone who does car repairs.
He stated that he never saw the vehicle and she never told him that she hit
someone.
Lieutenant Shannon Mack of the Bossier Parish Sheriff’s Office
testified that she assisted in retrieving the cell phone information for SPD.
She described the process of mapping a phone’s location from the data 7 received from the carrier. Through Lt. Mack, the State introduced maps
showing that Fields moved from her house to the accident site and back to
her house on the night of the accident.
Bobby Rothenberger, the parts manager at a Honda dealership,
testified that he assisted SPD in identifying the make and model of the
vehicle to which the passenger side mirror belonged. Mr. Stephenson, the
owner of Louisiana Glass, testified that he called SPD to notify them that a
vehicle they worked on matched the description of a vehicle described in the
SPD media release. The surveillance video from Louisiana Glass was
introduced and played for the jury during Mr. Stephenson’s testimony.
Ronnie Odums, an employee with Louisiana Glass, testified that he
heard on the news that police were looking for a vehicle that had damage on
the right side, windshield, mirror, and possibly the headlights. He stated that
the description resembled a vehicle that he had worked on, which had a
bashed-in windshield on the passenger side, damage to the passenger side
mirror, and a new mirror in the back seat of the vehicle. Mr. Odums
testified that the damage to the car did not look consistent with damage
caused by a baseball or baseball bat, but it looked like a large object hit the
windshield, like an animal or deer. Mr. Odums stated that he told his boss,
Mr. Stephenson, about the vehicle, and Mr. Stephenson contacted the police.
Joseph Lofton testified that Fields texted him the night of the accident
and he went to help her with her car the next morning. He stated that he
helped her pay to have her windshield fixed and drove her car to Louisiana
Glass. He testified that Fields asked him to pick up some paint from
Sherwin-Williams and parts from New World International. He stated that
he did not ask Fields questions regarding the car and described himself as 8 “Mr. Old Reliable.” Mr. Lofton testified that when questioned by the police,
he told them everything about the windshield, paint, and car parts. He stated
that he was not involved in the accident and only drove the vehicle to get it
repaired.
Sgt. Sanchez testified that she was assigned the case the morning after
the accident and she received all of the photos and evidence collected from
the scene. She described the comparison of the paint chips on the side
mirrors, as detailed in her report above. She further described her process of
identifying the type of vehicle to which the mirror belonged. Photos taken
of evidence were introduced during Sgt. Sanchez’s testimony. She testified
that after the media release seeking information about the accident, she
received a call from the owner of Louisiana Glass and spoke with employees
about a vehicle matching the description.
Sgt. Sanchez testified that she interviewed Mr. Lofton and was able to
verify his statements regarding purchases with all the stores he visited. She
stated that when they impounded Fields’ vehicle, she could smell a strong
paint odor on the vehicle.
Dr. James Traylor testified that he performed the autopsy on
Nathaniel Nicholson. He was accepted as an expert in forensic pathology.
Dr. Traylor’s autopsy report was introduced into evidence. He stated that
Mr. Nicholson had blunt force injuries to his head, which were fatal. He
stated that Mr. Nicholson also had abrasions, a large contusion on the left
side of his head, fractures on his skull, right side rib fractures, which
punctured his lung, and a laceration to his liver. He testified that the only
thing found in his system was caffeine. Dr. Traylor concluded that
9 Nicholson was not lying in the road and run over, rather he was upright
when he was hit.
SPD Sgt. John Jackson testified regarding Fields’ previous hit-and-run
citation in 2007. He referred to his report and stated that he met up with
Fields after a minor accident with another vehicle. He testified that he
issued her a citation for hit and run. The State rested after the testimony of
Sgt. Jackson.
The defense called its only witness, Terrell Myles, a former
prosecutor in Shreveport City Court. He testified that the City did not
proceed with prosecuting Fields’ 2007 hit-and-run citation. He stated that
the citation was ultimately dismissed.
After closing arguments and jury instructions, the jury was sent back
for deliberations. The jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty for
obstruction of justice and not guilty for hit-and-run driving. The State
requested that the jury be polled.
On October 19, 2021, Fields filed a motion for new trial arguing that
the trial court’s rulings made during the trial show prejudicial error. She
argued the trial court erred in denying her motion in limine to exclude
404(B) evidence. Fields filed a motion for judgment of acquittal on the
same day arguing the weight of the evidence did not support a finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for the crime of obstruction of justice. She
also argued in this motion that the trial court erred in denying her motion in
limine to exclude 404(B) evidence. Both of these motions were denied in
open court prior to sentencing. Defense then waived all sentencing delays.
At sentencing, the trial court received multiple letters and statements
on Fields’ behalf. The trial court stated that it found paragraph three of La. 10 C. Cr. P. art. 894.1(A) to be applicable—a lesser sentence would deprecate
the seriousness of the offense. It stated that it had considered all factors in
La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1(B). It stated that the only aggravating circumstance
was that she committed the offense in order to facilitate or conceal the
commission of another offense. The trial court found no mitigating
circumstances to apply. The trial court then sentenced Fields to five years at
hard labor. Fields now appeals her conviction.
DISCUSSION
Insufficient Evidence
Fields argues the trial court erred when it denied her motion for new
trial and motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal because there was no
evidence that she attempted to conceal that her car was in an accident. She
argues that Mr. Lofton’s self-serving testimony was the only evidence
presented that she was involved in the post-accident clean-up. She asserts
the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The State asserts that Fields’ argument is nothing more than an attack
on the jury’s acceptance of Mr. Lofton’s testimony and its credibility
determination, which is entitled to great deference on appeal. The State
asserts that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer from the
circumstances that Fields had the requisite specific intent to tamper with
evidence of her car being involved in a hit-and-run.
Fields argued before the trial court and on appeal that there was
insufficient evidence to convict her of obstruction of justice. The standard
of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 11 rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.
Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851
So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248
(2004); State v. Steines, 51,698 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/15/17), 245 So. 3d 224,
writ denied, 17-2174 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So. 3d 797. This standard, now
legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the
appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the
evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06),
922 So. 2d 517; State v. Nabors, 52,163 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/19/18), 251 So.
3d 1214, writ denied, 18-1477 (La. 9/21/18), 252 So. 3d 496.
The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and
circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of
evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by
viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When
the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct
evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence
must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime.
State v. Sutton, 436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983); State v. Nabors, supra.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred
according to reason and common experience. State v. Mingo, 51,647 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 244 So. 3d 629, writ denied, 17-1894 (La. 6/1/18), 243
So. 3d 1064. If a case rests essentially upon circumstantial evidence, that
evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La. R.S. 12 15:438; Id. The appellate court reviews the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution and determines whether an alternative
hypothesis is sufficiently reasonable that a rational juror could not have
found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Calloway, 07-2306
(La. 1/21/09), 1 So. 3d 417; State v. Mathis, 52,500 (La. App. 2 Cir.
1/16/19), 263 So. 3d 613.
The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or
reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442;
State v. Mathis, supra. A reviewing court accords great deference to the
jury’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in
part. State v. Mathis, supra.
Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the
resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the
witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.
State v. Cooley, 51,895 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/23/18), 247 So. 3d 1159, writ
denied, 18-1160 (La. 3/6/19), 266 So. 3d 899. In the absence of internal
contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one witness’s
testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient support for a requisite
factual conclusion. State v. Jones, 52,672 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/19), 273 So.
3d 585, writ denied, 19-01075 (La. 10/1/19), 280 So. 3d 160; State v.
Cooley, supra.
La. R.S. 14:130.1 states the following, in pertinent part:
A. The crime of obstruction of justice is any of the following when committed with the knowledge that such act has, reasonably may, or will affect an actual or potential present, past, or future criminal proceeding as described in this Section: (1) Tampering with evidence with the specific intent of distorting the results of any criminal investigation or proceeding which may reasonably prove relevant to a criminal 13 investigation or proceeding. Tampering with evidence shall include the intentional alteration, movement, removal, or addition of any object or substance either: (a) At the location of any incident which the perpetrator knows or has good reason to believe will be the subject of any investigation by state, local, or United States law enforcement officers; or (b) At the location of storage, transfer, or place of review of any such evidence.
The knowledge requirement in paragraph (A) is met if the perpetrator
merely knows that an act reasonably may affect a potential or future criminal
proceeding. State v. Jones, 07-1052 (La. 6/3/08), 983 So. 2d 95; State v.
Matthews, 50,838 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/16), 200 So. 3d 895, writ denied, 16-
1678 (La. 6/5/17), 220 So. 3d 752. The defendant must also have tampered
with evidence with the specific intent of distorting the results of a criminal
investigation. La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1). Nothing beyond movement of the
evidence is required by the statute if accompanied by the requisite intent and
knowledge. Id.
After review under the Jackson standard, we conclude that the
evidence was sufficient to support Fields’ conviction for obstruction of
justice. The jury, as finder of fact, accepted the following testimony from
Mr. Lofton: Fields contacted him the day after the accident for help repairing
her car; he only drove the car for repairs; he had not driven the car prior to
that day; and, Fields told him where to go for parts and paint. The stores
where Mr. Lofton purchased the parts and paint corroborated his story of
what he purchased and that he paid with cash.
In addition to Mr. Lofton’s testimony, the jury heard from
investigators who stated that they found internet searches on Fields’ phone
for legal information and news of the accident. These internet searches,
coupled with the other witnesses’ testimonies about Fields’ behavior after
14 the accident, are sufficient for the jury to find the requisite intent and
knowledge that any vehicle repairs may affect a future investigation. Our
law only requires the movement of evidence if the requisite intent or
knowledge is established. Therefore, Fields’ replacement of her windshield
and side mirror and repainting of her vehicle, coupled with her
intent/knowledge, are sufficient to establish that she violated La. R.S.
14:130.1, obstruction of justice. This assignment of error lacks merit.
Other Crimes Evidence- La. C.E. art. 404(B)
Fields argues that the trial court erred when it granted the State’s
motion to admit other crimes evidence of a minor traffic accident in 2007,
which was 14 years before the trial was held in this matter. Fields asserts
that the State failed to state under which 404(B) factor it sought to admit the
prior accident—plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or accident.
She asserts that allowing the admission of the evidence was not harmless
error because it was extremely prejudicial and the jury’s verdict cannot be
considered “unattributable” to this error. She requests that her conviction
and sentence be reversed.
The State argues that Fields has failed to show any error by the trial
court in admitting the evidence of the previous hit-and-run citation. The
State argues that even if it was an error to admit the other crimes evidence,
which it disputes, the harmless error review applies. It asserts that Fields
was not convicted of the hit-and-run so the evidence had no effect on
influencing the jury to find her guilty of that charge.
Code of Evidence article 404(B)(1) embodies the settled principle that
evidence of other crimes may be admissible if the state establishes an
independent and relevant reason for its admission. State v. Taylor, 16-1124 15 (La. 12/1/16), 217 So. 3d 283. This evidence must have substantial
relevance independent from showing defendant’s general criminal character
in that it tends to prove a material fact genuinely at issue. State v. Jones, 17-
00658 (La. 10/22/19), 285 So. 3d 1074; State v. Lee, 05-2098 (La. 1/16/08),
976 So. 2d 109.
It is the duty of the district court in its gatekeeping function to
determine the independent relevancy of this evidence. State v. Miner, 17-
1586 (La. 1/4/18), 232 So. 3d 551; State v. Altenberger, 13-2518 (La.
4/11/14), 139 So. 3d 510. The district court must also balance the probative
value of the other crimes, wrongs or acts evidence against its prejudicial
effects before the evidence can be admitted. State v. Miner, supra; State v.
Henderson, 12-2422 (La. 1/4/13), 107 So. 3d 566.
A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of other crimes evidence
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 18-
01999 (La. 9/30/21), 330 So. 3d 199, cert. denied, 212 L. Ed. 2d 596, 142 S.
Ct. 1702 (2022); State v. Allen, 54,153 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/15/21), 331 So.
3d 1101. The erroneous introduction of other crimes evidence is subject to
harmless error review. State v. Gatti, 39,833 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/13/05), 914
So. 2d 74, writ denied, 05-2394 (La. 4/17/06), 926 So. 2d 511. Trial error is
harmless where the verdict rendered is “surely unattributable to the error.”
State v. Jones, 50,270 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/10/16), 188 So. 3d 268, writ denied,
16-0858 (La. 5/1/17), 220 So. 3d 742.
Given the trial court’s vast discretion in this regard, the trial court did
not abuse that discretion in finding the prior hit-and-run charge was relevant
to establish Fields’ motive, knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident.
Even if the trial court erred in admitting the prior charge, the error is 16 harmless. In the case before us, the jury found Fields not guilty of the hit-
and-run charge and guilty of obstruction of justice. The prior charge, which
the jury heard was dismissed, was not for obstruction of justice. Therefore,
the guilty verdict was unattributable to any error. As previously stated, the
evidence of obstruction of justice was sufficient to render this error
harmless. This assignment of error lacks merit.
Error Patent
Our error patent review indicates that Fields’ sentence is illegally
lenient as the trial court did not impose a fine of not more than $10,000, as
required by La. R.S. 14:130.1(B)(3). Pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 882(A),
an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time by the court that imposed
the sentence or by an appellate court on review. However, as this Court has
recognized, we are not required to take such action. State v. Bell, 51,312
(La. App. 2 Cir. 5/17/17), 222 So. 3d 79; State v. Pena, 43,321 (La. App. 2
Cir. 7/30/08), 988 So. 2d 841.
The State did not object to the error and Fields was not prejudiced in
any way by the failure to impose the mandatory fine. Thus, we decline to
remand the case for correction of the sentence to include a fine. See also
State v. Murray, 42,655 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/24/07), 968 So. 2d 916, writ
denied, 08-0468 (La. 11/14/08), 996 So. 2d 1083.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Fields’ conviction and sentence are
affirmed.