NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
13-1045
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
DONALD LEDET, JR.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ST. MARTIN, NO. 11-239832 HONORABLE PAUL JOSEPH DEMAHY, DISTRICT JUDGE
ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX CHIEF JUDGE
Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks, and John E. Conery, Judges.
AFFIRMED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
J. Phillip Haney District Attorney – 16th Judicial District 300 Iberia Street - Suite 200 New Iberia, LA 70560 Telephone: (337) 369-4420 COUNSEL FOR: Plaintiff/Appellee - State of Louisiana
Angela B. Odinet Assistant District Attorney – 16th Judicial District 415 Main Street St. Martinville, LA 70582 Telephone: (337) 394-2220 COUNSEL FOR: Plaintiff/Appellee - State of Louisiana Brent A. Hawkins Louisiana Appellate Project P. O. Box 3752 Lake Charles, LA 70602-3752 Telephone: (337) 502-5146 COUNSEL FOR: Defendant/Appellant - Donald Ledet, Jr.
Donald Ledet, Jr. Winn Corr. Ctr Elm C-2 P. O. Box 1260 Winnfield, LA 71483 Defendant/Appellant - Donald Ledet, Jr. THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.
Defendant was charged by grand jury with five counts of aggravated
rape, violations of La.R.S. 14:42. He entered a guilty plea for the reduced charges
of forcible rape, a violation of La.R.S. 14.42.1, and indecent behavior with a
juvenile, a violation of La.R.S. 14:81. Defendant now appeals his convictions and
sentences, arguing that the voluntariness of his guilty plea was compromised as the
trial court failed to advise him of the time period to register as a sex offender in
accordance with La.R.S. 15:543. For the following reasons, we affirm Defendant’s
convictions and sentences. However, we remand this matter to the trial court with
instructions to provide Defendant with proper written notice of his sex offender
registration requirements.
I.
ISSUE
We shall consider whether the voluntariness of Defendant’s guilty
pleas was vitiated by the failure of the trial court and the failure of the
“Notification to Sex Offender” form to advise Defendant of the time period for
which he must register as a sex offender.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
During the calendar year of 2010, Defendant Donald Ledet, Jr.
engaged in numerous sexual acts with two minors, G.G. and G.T. Discovery of the
illicit sexual encounters occurred when the mother of G.T. overheard Defendant
warning G.G. not to disclose what they had done. Defendant fully cooperated with the authorities in the investigation of this matter, and he gave a recorded interview
to Detective Jennifer Hebert of the St. Martin Parish Sheriff’s Office in which he
admitted to the sexual acts.
On April 18, 2011, Defendant was charged by grand jury indictment
with five counts of aggravated rape, violations of La.R.S. 14:42. Defendant
initially entered pleas of not guilty to the charges, but he later changed his plea to
guilty of the reduced charges of forcible rape, a violation of La.R.S. 14.42.1, and
indecent behavior with a juvenile, a violation of La.R.S. 14:81. Defendant further
agreed to specific sentencing ranges where sentences would run concurrently, and
he agreed to a sentencing hearing to determine how much of the sentences would
be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The
State further agreed not to file a multiple offender bill against Defendant.
At the guilty plea proceeding, the trial court informed Defendant that
he would be required to register as a sex offender. Defendant stated that he had
initialed and signed the “Notification to Sex Offender” document and that he had
reviewed the document with his attorney. The document, however, did not state
the time period for which Defendant must register as a sex offender.
At sentencing, the trial judge again referred to the “Notification to Sex
Offender” form and asked Defendant if he had initialed the form, reviewed the
form with his lawyer, and was aware of the requirements he would have to meet
upon his release. Once again, however, neither the form nor the trial judge stated
the time period for which Defendant would be required to register as a sex
offender. The trial court sentenced Defendant to thirty years at hard labor with
twenty-five years to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension
of sentence for the forcible rape and twenty-five years at hard labor, without
2 benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for indecent behavior with a
juvenile. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently.
Originally in this matter, appellate counsel filed a brief and a motion
to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct.
1396 (1967). This court denied the motion to withdraw and ordered counsel to
brief the issue of whether the voluntariness of Defendant’s pleas was affected by
the failure of the trial court and the failure of the “Notification to Sex Offender”
form to advise Defendant of the time period for which he must register as a sex
offender.
III.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
On appeal, we must consider the totality of the circumstances in
determining whether a guilty plea was free and voluntary and whether Defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. State v. R.A.L., 10-1475 (La.App. 3
Cir. 6/29/11), 69 So.3d 704. Defendant argues that the voluntariness of his guilty
plea was compromised by the failure of the trial court to advise him of the time
period he must register as a sex offender. Considering the totality of the
circumstances, we disagree.
According to La.R.S. 15:543(A), a trial court is required to “provide
written notification to any person convicted of a sex offense . . . of the registration
requirements and the notification requirements. . . .” Additionally, La.R.S.
15:543(A) requires the notice to be included on any guilty plea forms and
judgment and sentence forms provided to the defendant. The Louisiana Supreme
Court has held that the “failure to timely notify a defendant of the registration
3 requirements is a factor that can undercut the voluntary nature of a guilty plea[.]”
State v. Calhoun, 96-786, p. 9, n. 6 (La. 5/20/97), 694 So.2d 909, 914).1
While the supreme court acknowledged that the failure to notify a
defendant of the registration requirements may vitiate the voluntariness of the
guilty plea, this is only a factor for the courts to consider, and failure alone does
not mandate that we vacate a guilty plea. For example, in State v. Williams, 02-
707 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/03), 839 So.2d 1095, this court upheld the defendant’s
guilty plea even though the defendant did not receive notice of the sex offender
registration requirements. The court reasoned that the defendant was informed and
waived his right to a trial by jury, right to confront his accusers, and his right
against self-incrimination. Id. at 1100. The court further recognized that the
defendant was informed of the sentencing range, was represented by counsel at the
time of the plea, and was satisfied with his attorney’s advice and services. Id. The
Williams court distinguished these facts from those in Calhoun, noting that unlike
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
13-1045
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
DONALD LEDET, JR.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ST. MARTIN, NO. 11-239832 HONORABLE PAUL JOSEPH DEMAHY, DISTRICT JUDGE
ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX CHIEF JUDGE
Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks, and John E. Conery, Judges.
AFFIRMED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
J. Phillip Haney District Attorney – 16th Judicial District 300 Iberia Street - Suite 200 New Iberia, LA 70560 Telephone: (337) 369-4420 COUNSEL FOR: Plaintiff/Appellee - State of Louisiana
Angela B. Odinet Assistant District Attorney – 16th Judicial District 415 Main Street St. Martinville, LA 70582 Telephone: (337) 394-2220 COUNSEL FOR: Plaintiff/Appellee - State of Louisiana Brent A. Hawkins Louisiana Appellate Project P. O. Box 3752 Lake Charles, LA 70602-3752 Telephone: (337) 502-5146 COUNSEL FOR: Defendant/Appellant - Donald Ledet, Jr.
Donald Ledet, Jr. Winn Corr. Ctr Elm C-2 P. O. Box 1260 Winnfield, LA 71483 Defendant/Appellant - Donald Ledet, Jr. THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.
Defendant was charged by grand jury with five counts of aggravated
rape, violations of La.R.S. 14:42. He entered a guilty plea for the reduced charges
of forcible rape, a violation of La.R.S. 14.42.1, and indecent behavior with a
juvenile, a violation of La.R.S. 14:81. Defendant now appeals his convictions and
sentences, arguing that the voluntariness of his guilty plea was compromised as the
trial court failed to advise him of the time period to register as a sex offender in
accordance with La.R.S. 15:543. For the following reasons, we affirm Defendant’s
convictions and sentences. However, we remand this matter to the trial court with
instructions to provide Defendant with proper written notice of his sex offender
registration requirements.
I.
ISSUE
We shall consider whether the voluntariness of Defendant’s guilty
pleas was vitiated by the failure of the trial court and the failure of the
“Notification to Sex Offender” form to advise Defendant of the time period for
which he must register as a sex offender.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
During the calendar year of 2010, Defendant Donald Ledet, Jr.
engaged in numerous sexual acts with two minors, G.G. and G.T. Discovery of the
illicit sexual encounters occurred when the mother of G.T. overheard Defendant
warning G.G. not to disclose what they had done. Defendant fully cooperated with the authorities in the investigation of this matter, and he gave a recorded interview
to Detective Jennifer Hebert of the St. Martin Parish Sheriff’s Office in which he
admitted to the sexual acts.
On April 18, 2011, Defendant was charged by grand jury indictment
with five counts of aggravated rape, violations of La.R.S. 14:42. Defendant
initially entered pleas of not guilty to the charges, but he later changed his plea to
guilty of the reduced charges of forcible rape, a violation of La.R.S. 14.42.1, and
indecent behavior with a juvenile, a violation of La.R.S. 14:81. Defendant further
agreed to specific sentencing ranges where sentences would run concurrently, and
he agreed to a sentencing hearing to determine how much of the sentences would
be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The
State further agreed not to file a multiple offender bill against Defendant.
At the guilty plea proceeding, the trial court informed Defendant that
he would be required to register as a sex offender. Defendant stated that he had
initialed and signed the “Notification to Sex Offender” document and that he had
reviewed the document with his attorney. The document, however, did not state
the time period for which Defendant must register as a sex offender.
At sentencing, the trial judge again referred to the “Notification to Sex
Offender” form and asked Defendant if he had initialed the form, reviewed the
form with his lawyer, and was aware of the requirements he would have to meet
upon his release. Once again, however, neither the form nor the trial judge stated
the time period for which Defendant would be required to register as a sex
offender. The trial court sentenced Defendant to thirty years at hard labor with
twenty-five years to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension
of sentence for the forcible rape and twenty-five years at hard labor, without
2 benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for indecent behavior with a
juvenile. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently.
Originally in this matter, appellate counsel filed a brief and a motion
to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct.
1396 (1967). This court denied the motion to withdraw and ordered counsel to
brief the issue of whether the voluntariness of Defendant’s pleas was affected by
the failure of the trial court and the failure of the “Notification to Sex Offender”
form to advise Defendant of the time period for which he must register as a sex
offender.
III.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
On appeal, we must consider the totality of the circumstances in
determining whether a guilty plea was free and voluntary and whether Defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. State v. R.A.L., 10-1475 (La.App. 3
Cir. 6/29/11), 69 So.3d 704. Defendant argues that the voluntariness of his guilty
plea was compromised by the failure of the trial court to advise him of the time
period he must register as a sex offender. Considering the totality of the
circumstances, we disagree.
According to La.R.S. 15:543(A), a trial court is required to “provide
written notification to any person convicted of a sex offense . . . of the registration
requirements and the notification requirements. . . .” Additionally, La.R.S.
15:543(A) requires the notice to be included on any guilty plea forms and
judgment and sentence forms provided to the defendant. The Louisiana Supreme
Court has held that the “failure to timely notify a defendant of the registration
3 requirements is a factor that can undercut the voluntary nature of a guilty plea[.]”
State v. Calhoun, 96-786, p. 9, n. 6 (La. 5/20/97), 694 So.2d 909, 914).1
While the supreme court acknowledged that the failure to notify a
defendant of the registration requirements may vitiate the voluntariness of the
guilty plea, this is only a factor for the courts to consider, and failure alone does
not mandate that we vacate a guilty plea. For example, in State v. Williams, 02-
707 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/03), 839 So.2d 1095, this court upheld the defendant’s
guilty plea even though the defendant did not receive notice of the sex offender
registration requirements. The court reasoned that the defendant was informed and
waived his right to a trial by jury, right to confront his accusers, and his right
against self-incrimination. Id. at 1100. The court further recognized that the
defendant was informed of the sentencing range, was represented by counsel at the
time of the plea, and was satisfied with his attorney’s advice and services. Id. The
Williams court distinguished these facts from those in Calhoun, noting that unlike
the defendant in Calhoun, the defendant in Williams “did not claim lack of
notification of the sex offender registration requirements as grounds to withdraw
his plea and ha[d] not asserted an ineffective assistance of counsel claim[,]” and
“[a]s a result, the record before [it] [did] not establish that the totality of
1 In 2007, the legislature amended La.R.S. 15:543. Prior to the 2007 amendment, the trial court was required to provide written notification of the registration and notification requirements to any person charged with a sex offense. The 2007 amendment changed the notification requirement to anyone convicted of a sex offense. The second circuit has interpreted this amendment as abolishing the requirement that the trial judge notify the defendant of the sex offender registration requirements prior to accepting his guilty plea. State v. Bazile, 47,412, p. 6 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/26/12), 106 So.3d 560, 263, writ denied, 12-2443 (La. 4/5/13), 110 So.3d 1071. The second circuit further noted that the supreme court’s decision in Calhoun was based on the pre-2007 language. Id. at 563. However, the post-2007 language of La.R.S. 15:543 still requires the notification to be included on any guilty plea forms and judgment and sentence forms provided to the defendant. Furthermore, this court has applied the analysis set forth by Calhoun and its progeny to post-2007 cases. See State v. G.T., 10-1469 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/15/11), 71 So.3d 394. As such, we find Calhoun applicable to the present case despite the amendments.
4 circumstances under which the defendant pled no contest warrant[ed] invalidation
of his plea.” Id.
Here, as in Williams, Defendant did not ask for his pleas to be
withdrawn because of the lack of notification of the sex offender registration
requirements. Appellate counsel raises the issue now only because this court
ordered him to brief the issue. Even though appellate counsel now alleges that
Defendant’s plea “lack[s] the reliability to be considered voluntary,” he does not
allege that Defendant would not have pled guilty had he known the length of time
he would be required to register as a sex offender. Additionally, Defendant does
not assert an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and he received a favorable
plea bargain wherein the State agreed to reduce two charges, dismiss three
aggravated rape charges, not file a habitual offender bill, and limit Defendant’s
sentences to specific ranges with sentences running concurrently. Before being
advised of his rights under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709,
Defendant indicated that he was represented by counsel and that he was satisfied
with the information, time, and advice his attorney had given him. Finally,
Defendant admitted to the acts of which he was accused. For these reasons, we
find that the totality of circumstances does not warrant invalidation of Defendant’s
guilty pleas. However, as there is no indication in the record as to whether
Defendant was aware of the time period to register as a sex offender, we remand
the matter to the district court with instructions to provide Defendant with
appropriate written notice of all requirements within ten days of the rendition of
this opinion, and to file written proof that Defendant received such notice in the
record. See id.
5 IV.
DISPOSITION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant’s guilty pleas and
sentences. In accordance with La.R.S. 15:543, this case is remanded with
instructions to provide Defendant with appropriate written notice within ten days
of the rendition of this opinion of the applicable time periods for sex offender
registration. The trial court is further instructed to file written proof that Defendant
received such notice in the record of the proceedings.
THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. RULE 2-16.3, UNIFORM RULES—COURTS OF APPEAL.