State of Louisiana v. Desmond Kemon Orphey

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: October 28, 2020
• Docket: KA-0020-0167
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

20-167

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

DESMOND KEMON ORPHEY

**********

APPEAL FROM THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 14775-17 HONORABLE CLAYTON DAVIS, DISTRICT JUDGE

ELIZABETH A. PICKETT JUDGE

Court composed of John D. Saunders, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and Van H. Kyzar, Judges.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

John Foster DeRosier District Attorney Fourteenth Judicial District Elizabeth B. Hollins Assistant District Attorney P. O. Box 3206 Lake Charles, LA 70602-3206 (337) 437-3400 COUNSEL FOR STATE-APPELLEE: State of Louisiana

Mary Constance Hanes Louisiana Appellate Project P. O. Box 4015 New Orleans, LA 70178-4015 (504) 866-6652 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Desmond Kemon Orphey PICKETT, Judge.

FACTS

Desmond Kemon Orphey was charged by indictment filed on August 3,

2017, with: 1) principal to armed robbery of Clinton Curtice with a firearm, a

violation of La.R.S. 14:24, La.R.S. 14:64, and La.R.S. 14:64.3; 2) conspiracy to

commit armed robbery of Clinton Curtice with a firearm, a violation of La.R.S.

14:26, La.R.S. 14:64, and La.R.S. 14:64.3; 3) conspiracy to commit armed robbery

of Joshua Touchet with a firearm, a violation of La.R.S. 14:26, La.R.S. 14:64, and

La.R.S. 14:64.3; and 4) principal to first degree murder of Joshua Touchet, a

violation of La.R.S. 14:24 and La.R.S. 14:30. An amended indictment was filed

on January 12, 2018, changing the charge in count four to second degree murder, a

violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. The offenses occurred at the Twelve Palms RV Park

on Broad Street in Lake Charles.

Trial by jury commenced on June 18, 2019. On June 19, 2019, the

defendant was found guilty by unanimous verdict on all four counts. He was

sentenced on August 14, 2019, to serve life imprisonment without benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for second degree murder; thirty years

at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on

each count of conspiracy to commit armed robbery with a firearm; and twenty-five

years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence

for principal to armed robbery with a firearm. The trial court ordered the sentences

be served consecutively.

A “Motion for Appeal” and “Designation of Record on Appeal” were filed

on August 23, 2019. The defendant is now before this court asserting his rights

were violated when the trial court removed a juror and replaced her with an

alternate over an objection by the defense. ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by

this court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record,

we find there is one error patent. The Uniform Commitment Order signed by the

trial judge does not indicate that the sentence for count one, principal to armed

robbery with a firearm, is to be served without benefits. The transcript of

sentencing and the minutes of the trial court both indicate that the sentence is to be

served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. We order

the trial court to file an amended commitment order correcting this error.

DISCUSSION

In his sole assignment of error, the defendant contends his rights were

violated when the trial court removed a juror and replaced her with an alternate

over his objection.

On the second day of trial, juror Jacqueline Sharpe notified the bailiff that

she knew someone who had entered the courtroom. She identified Ms. Orphey, the

defendant’s mother. Ms. Sharpe was addressed by the court as follows:

THE COURT:

Okay. How do you know them?

JUROR SHARPE:

Just the little short lady -- ....

-- she’s a cafeteria lunch lady that -- where I work at, the school I work in --

....

2 JUROR SHARPE:

-- Ms. Orphey.

All right. So is -- the fact that they are here, is that going to prevent you from doing your job?

It makes me uncomfortable, yes --

-- because I know her. I mean, she worked with me every day --

-- every day for the last two years.

So did you know the connection --

No. --

-- before we --

-- because there’s a lot of them. I asked. When -- when she first started working there, I used to work at Reynaud, the school --

3 JUROR SHARPE:

-- before they changed it to the alternative site, I asked her, “Did she know some of the Orpheys that I know,” and she said, “No. They were different families.”

Her side of the family is from Texas.

All right. So, you know, being uncomfortable is -- is one thing.

Uh-huh (yes).

And, you know, everyone is uncomfortable because it’s a terrible situation.

But is it going to prevent you from doing the job that you have to do in this case to -- to make a decision?

I’m not for sure. I mean, I might have to work with her again next year. It is the law but --

Do you know her relationship to the defendant?

No, sir.

You assumed there was no relationship, that it was a different set of --

4 JUROR SHARPE:

Correct --

--people?

-- a different set of people.

Because they kept saying his name different. I don’t -- when it was Reynaud, the kids didn’t look -- they grew up. And usually someone, when I -- when I see them in the street, they’ll -- they’ll remember me and then they’ll tell me who they are and what class they was in with me --

-- and then that’s how I remember them.

MR. MURRAY:

Ms. Sharpe, we believe that in following the law in this case and what we believe the evidence will show in the end and we’d ask you to return a verdict of guilty, knowing everything that we’ve talked to in voir dire and talked about in voir dire and that the ultimate punishment in this would be life imprisonment if he were found guilty as charged, would you be able to vote guilty knowing that he’d be going to prison for life and still be able to go and face that lady every day at work?

It would be hard, yes, sir. I’m going to tell you the God’s honest truth, it would. I would -- I would feel bad inside knowing that I was part of it. I would.

5 MR. MURRAY [Prosecutor]:

Would the thought of having to face her at work every day pop up in your mind in deciding guilt or innocence?

PROSPECTIVE [sic] JUROR SHARPE:

It shouldn’t, because I have to do what the law asks me to do. It’s just the simple fact that after -- afterwards, because I’m here today to do a job, and I will have to go with what I’m listening to from the lady with you and his lawyer, but as far as once I leave from here, once I -- it would -- it would be difficult then, you know.

MS. STAGG [Defense counsel]:

. . . I appreciate you’re saying it would be difficult, but I would think it is a difficult decision anyway, correct?

Correct.

MS. STAGG:

And I do appreciate you just said that you would do what you were required to do by law anyway?

And you’ve got the courage to do that?

The judge subsequently excused Ms. Sharpe, stating: “I’m going to excuse

her. I think it’s too close a relationship.” Defense counsel objected because she

felt Sharpe had been rehabilitated.

After a jury has been selected and trial has commenced, double jeopardy

attaches. It is at that point that “the accused has a right to have the particular jurors 6 selected to try him and decide his fate, save in cases of death, illness or any other

cause which renders a juror unfit or disqualified to perform this duty[.]” State v.

White, 244 La. 585, 620, 153 So.2d 401, 413 (1963). The defendant’s right to have

the original twelve jurors selected decide his fate . . . [is] not absolute.” State v.

Clay, 441 So.2d 1227, 1231 (La.App. 1 Cir.1973), writ denied, 446 So.2d 1213

(La.1984). “Alternate jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace

jurors who become unable to perform or disqualified from performing their

duties.” La.Code Crim.P. art. 789(A). “La.Code Crim.P. art. 789 permits

replacement of a juror with an alternate juror when the juror is physically unable to

serve, or when the juror is found to have become disqualified, or to have either the

real or potential for bias in the deliberations.” State v. Tennors, 05-538, p. 15

(La.App. 3 Cir. 2/15/06), 923 So.2d 823, 833. “We regard this right of the accused

to be a substantial one, the improper deprivation of which is prejudicial. Hence, . . .

harmless error, is inapplicable.” White, 153 So.2d at 413. See also Tennors, 923

So.2d at 838.

The defendant argues the trial court erred in removing and replacing Ms.

Sharpe because she was neither “unable to perform” nor “disqualified from

performing” her duties as a juror. The state responds that the defendant’s

argument that Ms. Sharpe made no statements that she was biased and the trial

court made no findings that she was not impartial is “technically correct.” The

state argues that the judge did remove the juror because her relationship with Ms.

Orphey, who was attending trial, was too close and contends “[t]his implicitly

finds that the juror may not be impartial and has the potential for bias.”

Whether the trial court erred in removing Juror Sharpe and replacing her

with an alternate juror is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. The trial

court has the discretion to utilize the service of a properly qualified and duly 7 selected alternate when it determines an empaneled juror is unable to serve for any

legal reason. State v. Fuller, 454 So.2d 119 (La.1984); State v. Spencer, 446 So.2d

1197; State v. Marshall, 410 So.2d 1116 (La.1982). As noted above, the trial court

has the discretion to remove the juror and replace him or her with an alternate if

the court finds the juror has become unqualified because he or she has either a real,

or potential for, bias in the deliberations. Tennors, 923 So.2d 823.

Juror Sharpe brought to the court’s attention that she knew someone who

had walked into the courtroom. She worked with the lady she identified. She

knew her by name. It is obvious from her dialogue with the court that when she

saw the lady she made the connection between the defendant and the woman who

worked at her school. When asked by the judge if knowing this lady was going to

prevent her from doing her job, her response was, “It make me uncomfortable,

yes.” When questioned further by the court as to whether this would prevent her

from doing her job, she responded that she was not sure. When questioned by the

attorneys, she acknowledged it should not keep her from deciding guilt or

innocence because the law required it, but expressed how difficult it would be,

both during deliberations and afterwards. She ultimately said she would do what

the law required.

The trial court is in the unique position of not only hearing the response of

the juror in answering the questions, but also being able to observe the manner in

which the answer is given, the tone of voice, and the juror’s overall demeanor.

The trial court listened to and evaluated Ms. Sharpe’s responses, both to its

questions and the attorneys’ questions. This situation is very similar to State v.

Clarkson, 11-933 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/7/12), 86 So.3d 804, where the juror did not

indicate that he had the ability to be fair and impartial, but indicated he would

make an effort to be. 8 In the matter before us, Juror Sharpe indicated she would do her best to

follow the law – as she knew she should – but it is clear her connection with a

family member of the defendant troubled her deeply. The trial court listened to her

responses, was able to observe her overall demeanor while responding to

questions, and determined there was a real potential for bias. We do not find the

trial court abused its discretion by removing Juror Sharpe and replacing her with a

duly qualified alternate. The defendant’s assignment of error lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

The defendant’s conviction is affirmed. The case is remanded for the trial

court to amend the commitment order to conform to the sentence imposed in open

court.