State of Louisiana v. Derrick Dewayne Glover

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: July 16, 2025
• Docket: 56,285-KA
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered July 16, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,285-KA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

DERRICK DEWAYNE GLOVER Appellant

Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 396,680

Honorable Donald E. Hathaway, Jr., Judge

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant Paula C. Marx

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney

GLENN G. CORTELLO JASON W. WALTMAN ALEX L. PORUBSKY CHEYENNE Y. WILSON Assistant District Attorneys

Before STEPHENS, HUNTER, and MARCOTTE, JJ. MARCOTTE, J.

This criminal appeal arises from the First Judicial District Court,

Parish of Caddo, the Honorable Donald E. Hathaway, Jr. presiding.

Defendant Derrick Dewayne Glover was convicted of one count of armed

robbery and sentenced to 45 years at hard labor without benefits. He now

appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction and

sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 21, 2023, Glover was charged by bill of information with

one count of armed robbery, in violation of La. R.S. 14:64. The state alleged

that he took an item of value belonging to or within the control of the victim,

Khadijah Sakin (“Sakin”), while armed with a knife. The date of the offense

was July 20, 2019. Glover pled not guilty. On June 5, 2024, the state filed a

“404(B) Motion and Notice,” stating that it intended to introduce testimony

that Glover pled guilty to two attempted armed robberies on July 9, 2009,

and on July 27, 2019. The state said in its filing only that it intended to

introduce the other crimes evidence “not only to establish intent, knowledge,

and absence of mistake or accident, but also to rebut defenses the defendant

raised at trial.”

Glover was tried on June 10-11, 2024. Prior to the start of trial, the

trial court held a hearing, pursuant to La. C.E. art. 404(B), on the

admissibility of the other crimes evidence. At the hearing, the state’s

argument consisted of the following:

The state is seeking to introduce testimony of Mr. Glover’s prior convictions. He is currently charged with armed robbery. He has two prior convictions for attempted armed robbery, one in Caddo Parish and one in Bossier Parish. I think it’s relevant prior conduct and prior bad acts and we’re seeking to introduce that information.

Counsel for Glover objected. The trial court asked to read the motion

and said, “The state’s 404(B) motion will be granted.” There was no further

argument on the matter, and the case proceeded to trial.

Sakin testified that on July 20, 2019, she was working at Shreveport

Cash Advance (“Cash Advance”) on Hearne Avenue in Shreveport,

Louisiana. She had worked there for about one year before the robbery.

The business granted loans and had several repeat customers. Sakin was

familiar with those customers’ names and faces. Sakin knew Glover, a

repeat customer, and identified him in court. She said that Glover was a

welder and drove a black Chrysler 300. Glover came to Cash Advance

twice on the date of the offense.

Sakin said that there was a button under her work desk that allowed

her to unlock the door for customers. From where her desk was located, she

was also able to see, via a mirror and window, anyone who walked up to the

building from the side or the back. The first time Glover entered the

business, he went inside and then left, saying he would return. Sakin said he

was wearing a white T-shirt, shorts, and Nike flip-flops/slides with socks.

The second time Glover came to Cash Advance, he parked his

Chrysler 300 in the back of the business. Sakin saw Glover walking toward

the door; his face was not obscured at that time. She pressed the button to

let him in. Glover entered the business, hopped over the counter, and

demanded money from her. Sakin said he was wearing the same clothes as

before and a welding mask. Glover was also holding a knife. Sakin gave

him the money from the register. He stabbed her in her left shoulder and 2 Sakin ran to the back of the business; Glover followed her. Glover then took

the safe from the back and fled the scene. Sakin said the only treatment she

received for her stab wound was a tetanus shot. A photograph of her wound

was admitted.

An investigating officer from the Shreveport Police Department

(“SPD”) went to Sabre Industries, where Glover worked, and collected his

welding mask. The mask was entered into evidence and matched the one

used by the assailant in the robbery. The surveillance video of the robbery

was entered into evidence and played for the jury. Glover gave a statement

to the police, in which he neither admitted nor denied that he committed the

robbery. He admitted that he went to Cash Advance on the morning of the

robbery and that he drove there in a Chrysler 300. Glover confirmed that the

welding mask was his. He also told police that he had money and gambling

problems.

Glover’s parole officer, Ayleen Cook (“Cook”), testified about his

two attempted armed robbery convictions, one of which occurred in Caddo

Parish and the other in Bossier Parish. The state questioned her about the

name of the offenses to which Glover pled guilty and the dates of his

offenses, but it did not elicit testimony from her about the details of the

attempted armed robberies. Defense counsel objected to Cook testifying

about Glover’s Bossier offense because he was not under her supervision for

that offense, and she did not have personal knowledge about that case. The

court overruled the objection. The bills of information, minutes, and

fingerprint attachment sheets for Glover’s attempted robbery convictions

were admitted. Defense counsel questioned Cook about the dangerous

3 weapons Glover used in his attempted armed robberies as listed on the bills

of information; they were a sawed-off shotgun and a firearm.

In its closing argument, the state referenced Glover’s prior convictions

and said that they were offered to establish motive, preparation, and lack of

mistake. The state noted that Glover committed the instant offense on July

20, 2019, and he committed the attempted armed robbery in Bossier Parish

on July 27, 2019. The state then said, “And defense counsel made a note

that … the first armed robbery was with a sawed-off shotgun and then the

Bossier robbery was with a firearm and not a knife, but Derrick Glover was

successful in this armed robbery. He had preparation. He had motive. It

was not a mistake.” No limiting instructions about the other crimes evidence

were included in the jury charges.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged. Glover filed a motion

for a new trial and a motion for a post-verdict judgment of acquittal. On

August 12, 2024, a sentencing hearing was held. The trial court denied both

of Glover’s post-trial motions. Glover said that he wanted to be sentenced

immediately. The court considered the sentencing factors found in La. C.

Cr. P. art. 894.1 and sentenced Glover to 45 years at hard labor without

benefits, to run consecutively to any other sentence. He was given credit for

time served. Glover was informed of his appellate and post-conviction relief

time constraints and that his offense was considered a crime of violence.

Glover now appeals.

DISCUSSION

In his assignment of error, Glover contends that the trial court erred in

allowing the state to present other crimes evidence because the evidence was

dissimilar to the crime for which he was tried, was highly prejudicial, 4 outweighed its probative value, and its admission violated his constitutional

rights.

Glover claims that the other crimes evidence admitted at his trial did

not reflect the same modus operandi as the instant crime and that the

attempted armed robbery he committed in Caddo Parish occurred in 2009.

He claims that, while his offense committed in Bossier Parish was close in

time to the instant offense, the facts of that crime were dissimilar to his

instant offense. In the instant offense the perpetrator wore a welding mask,

but the evidence submitted about the attempted armed robberies did not

provide details that he wore a welding mask or concealed his face. Glover

also contends that in the attempted armed robberies the weapons used were

firearms, but in the instant offense the perpetrator used a knife.

Glover argues that the evidence of his attempted armed robberies did

not assist the jury in finding the robber’s identification in this case. Glover

contends that presenting the other crimes evidence to the jury was highly

prejudicial and served to paint him as a criminal with a bad character.

Glover asks this court to vacate his conviction and sentence and remand his

case for a new trial.

Courts may not admit evidence of other crimes to show the defendant

as a person of bad character who has acted in conformity with his bad

character. La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1); State v. Taylor, 16-0124 (La. 12/1/16),

217 So. 3d 283; State v. Colby, 51,907 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/30/18), 244 So. 3d

1260, writ denied, 18-1256 (La. 3/25/19), 267 So. 3d 596. Evidence of other

crimes, wrongs, or bad acts committed by the defendant is generally

inadmissible because of the substantial risk of grave prejudice to the

defendant. Id. However, the state may introduce such evidence if it 5 establishes an independent and relevant reason such as proof of motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of

mistake or accident. La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1).

The defendant is entitled to notice and a hearing before trial if the

state intends to offer such evidence. State v. Taylor, supra. Even when

other crimes evidence is offered for a purpose allowed by Article 404 (B)(1),

the evidence is not admissible unless it tends to prove a material fact at issue

or to rebut a defendant’s defense. Id. The state cannot rely on a boilerplate

recitation of the grounds for admissibility as stated in La. C.E. art. 404(B).

Id. The state bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that the defendant committed the other crimes, wrongs, or acts.

State v. Colby, supra.

The district court, in its gatekeeping function, must determine the

independent relevancy of the evidence and balance the probative value of the

prior bad acts evidence against its prejudicial effects before the evidence can

be admitted. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 99

L. Ed. 2d 771 (1988); State v. Miner, 17-1586 (La. 1/4/18), 232 So. 3d 551.

A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of other crimes evidence

will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Taylor, supra;

State v. Galliano, 02-2849 (La. 1/10/03), 839 So. 2d 932; State v. Parker,

42,311 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/15/07), 963 So. 2d 497, writ denied, 07-2053 (La.

3/7/08), 977 So. 2d 896. Further, an erroneous introduction of other crimes

evidence is subject to harmless error review. State v. Colby, supra. The test

for determining harmless error is whether the reviewing court may conclude

the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. Casey, 99-0023

(La. 1/26/00), 775 So. 2d 1022, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S. Ct. 104, 6 148 L. Ed. 2d 62 (2000), or “whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in

this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508

U.S. 275, 279, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 124 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1993).

We have reviewed this record in its entirety and find that the trial

court abused its discretion in ruling that Glover’s guilty pleas to attempted

armed robbery were admissible evidence under La. C. E. art. 404(B). The

Louisiana Supreme Court stated that prosecutors may not rely on a

boilerplate recitation of the statute governing admissibility of other crimes

evidence. That is precisely what the state did at defendant’s 404(B) hearing.

The state said Glover’s attempted armed robberies were “relevant prior

conduct and prior bad acts,” solely reciting the language found in La. C. E.

art. 404(B) and without offering further argument linking the prior bad acts

to the instant offense.

Furthermore, the trial court failed in its gatekeeping function. The

court was required to make further inquiries other than to read the state’s

404(B) notice and issue its ruling. The fundamental question that the trial

court was required to ask regarding the admissibility of the evidence of

Glover’s prior bad acts was whether the evidence was relevant to fulfill

some independent purpose, apart from purely showing that defendant was a

bad person. The court had to balance the probative value of the other crimes

evidence against its prejudicial effects. The trial court did not fulfill that

duty, but rather it read the state’s 404(B) notice and ruled that the other

crimes evidence was admissible without providing analysis or its reasoning

for that ruling. We find that the trial court erred in ruling that Glover’s other

crimes evidence was admissible because it failed to conduct an adequate

404(B) hearing. 7 We turn next to whether the trial court’s error was harmless and

whether the jury’s verdict was unattributable to the admission of the other

crimes evidence. The Cash Advance surveillance video shows a man in a

welding mask jump over the counter where Sakin was sitting. The

perpetrator held a knife and was wearing a welding mask, a white shirt, grey

shorts, and black shoes with socks, as Sakin described. Sakin gave

eyewitness testimony that Glover was in the Cash Advance earlier that day

and was dressed the same as the robber. Sakin knew Glover as a repeat

Cash Advance customer, had seen him several times, knew his profession

and what car he drove, and identified him in court as the robber. Sakin also

stated that, as Glover approached the Cash Advance building, he was not

wearing a mask, and she pushed the button on her desk to unlock the door

and let him in because she recognized him. So, Sakin saw Glover’s

uncovered face, once earlier in the day at Cash Advance, and again,

moments before he committed the robbery.

Glover worked as a welder, and the police were able to obtain his

welding mask from his workplace, which matched the mask worn by the

robber. Glover admitted to visiting Cash Advance earlier in the day, and he

did not admit or deny that he committed the armed robbery in his statement

to SPD. Sakin’s familiarity with Glover and her testimony as the victim and

an eyewitness were enough to find him guilty of armed robbery. The jury’s

verdict was unattributable to the other crimes evidence the state had

admitted. We find that the admission of Glover’s other crimes evidence

without a proper 404(B) hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

and his conviction is sound.

8 Errors Patent

The record was reviewed for errors patent, and none were found.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s conviction and sentence are

affirmed.