Judgment rendered November 15, 2023. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 55,354-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
DEMETRIOUS MCCOY, SR. Appellant
Appealed from the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Bossier, Louisiana Trial Court No. 222,303
Honorable Douglas Stinson, Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Peggy J. Sullivan
DEMETRIOUS MCCOY, SR. Pro Se
J. SCHUYLER MARVIN Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
CODY ALLEN BOYD RICHARD RUSSELL RAY JOSEPH CHANCELLOR NERREN Assistant District Attorneys
Before ROBINSON, HUNTER, and ELLENDER, JJ. ELLENDER, J.
Demetrious McCoy, Sr., was convicted of second degree murder, La.
R.S. 14:30.1, and now appeals arguing insufficiency of the evidence, as well
as alleging the trial court erred by allowing other crimes evidence, denying
his motion to continue, and failing to grant his challenges for cause of
potential jurors. For the reasons expressed, we affirm.
FACTS
Hannah Sheffield was shot and killed in an apparent drive-by shooting
on the evening of April 10, 2021. The facts which led to McCoy’s arrest,
and ultimately his conviction for this crime, included multiple incidents
which took place in the weeks preceding the murder.
On the night of March 20, 2021, McCoy, a/k/a “Trill,” and Quinton
Pappillion were in a fight at a nightclub called the Hive in Shreveport when
Pappillion struck McCoy with a bottle and knocked him out cold. In the
early morning hours following this fight, around 2:00 a.m. on March 21,
2021, at Pappillion’s grandmother Annie Lynn’s home on 1417 Cynthia
Lane, Shaquan Hicks, who was staying there for the night, heard several
gunshots outside. Though Pappillion was not present at the time of the
shooting, he was sometimes there with his grandmother, and even listed
1417 Cynthia Lane as his address on his driver’s license.
Once Hicks awoke later that morning, she discovered a tire was low
on her car and, when she took it to a shop to be repaired, one of the
employees handed her a bullet which he had discovered in her tire. Hicks
then went back to Lynn’s house and reported this discovery to the Bossier
City Police Department (“BCPD”), who sent Officer Michael Blair to investigate. Ofc. Blair interviewed Hicks and examined the bullet, as well
as Hicks’s car and the surrounding area, discovering an apparent bullet hole
in the back taillight of Hicks’s car, leading directly to her tire. Hicks stated
she had no knowledge of when or how the bullet became lodged in her tire,
but that this tire frequently lost air. Ofc. Blair also observed markings on the
concrete around Hicks’s car that appeared to be made by gunshots, but found
no other bullet holes in the surrounding area. As for the bullet from the tire,
Ofc. Blair remarked that it appeared quite old and looked as though it had
skipped off the ground.
Ten days later, on March 31, 2021, Pappillion contacted the BCPD
and reported that a man he knew as “Trill” drove by his girlfriend’s
apartment, where he was staying at the time, and pulled a gun on him, but he
ducked to avoid being shot as the car drove away. When Officer Brandon
Bailey arrived, Pappillion claimed that he was outside getting ready to take
his son to school when “Trill,” who has a tattoo on his neck bearing this
name, drove by and pointed a pistol at him. Pappillion definitively stated he
has known “Trill” for years, but did not know his real name, and that “Trill”
was the same person he had recently knocked out in a fight at the Hive.
Pappillion was also adamant in his statement to Ofc. Bailey that it was
common knowledge “Trill” had fired shots at his grandmother’s house in the
early morning hours following their bar fight. Pappillion’s statement to Ofc.
Bailey was captured on his body camera, and clearly shows a white Toyota
Camry four-door sedan, with black rims, directly in front of the apartment
where Pappillion was staying. In the subsequent murder investigation, it
was discovered McCoy has a tattoo on his neck which reads “Trill.”
2 On the evening of April 10, 2021, McCoy was in the Barksdale
Annex1 neighborhood of Bossier City hanging out with Raymaad West and
Detroylous Abbot. As night fell, McCoy drove away by himself in a dark
blue 2020 Dodge Charger, with dark rims, which he had borrowed from his
sister earlier that day. Not long thereafter, West and Abbott both heard
gunshots and attempted to contact McCoy by phone, but he did not answer
or respond.
At 8:23 p.m. that evening, a 911 call came in to the BCPD regarding a
shooting at the intersection of McElroy St. and Evans St. in the Barksdale
Annex neighborhood. When officers arrived on the scene, a white 2003
Toyota Camry four-door sedan, with dark rims, was found crashed into a
nearby house. Hannah Sheffield was inside the car, already deceased, with
three gunshot wounds to her upper body. Officers recovered two .45-caliber
shell casings in the roadway at the corner of McElroy St. and Evans St. and,
based on the location of the casings, concluded the firearm that discharged
the casings was likely moving at the time it was fired.
Detective Briton Hampson of the BCPD was assigned as the lead
investigator. Two days after the shooting, Det. Hampson conducted a video
interview with McCoy, who admitted he was in a fight with Pappillion at the
Hive on March 20, and that he was in the Barksdale Annex neighborhood on
the evening of April 10 driving his sister’s dark blue Dodge Charger. Det.
Hampson obtained the license plate number of the Charger and ran it
through the License Plate Reader System (a camera system that takes photos
of every car’s license place as it passes through an intersection). At 8:23
1 The neighborhood is also sometimes commonly referred to as Jack’s Quarters. 3 p.m. on the day of the shooting, the License Plate Reader photographed the
dark blue Charger McCoy was driving heading north through the
intersection of Airline Dr. and Murphy St., two blocks from where the
shooting occurred. Det. Hampson was also able to obtain video surveillance
footage from a water tower located on McElroy St., less than a block away
from the location of the shooting. This footage first showed a white Camry,
with dark rims, going in one direction, then a dark-colored car, with dark
rims, traveling in the opposite direction at approximately 8:22 p.m. 2 During
the course of his investigation, Det. Hampson also visually inspected and
photographed the Charger, which he confirmed was dark blue with dark
rims. The investigation also revealed Pappillion drove a 2005 white Camry
four-door sedan, with dark rims, virtually identical to the vehicle driven by
Sheffield.
Two bullets, one of which was found and removed from Sheffield’s
body, along with two casings recovered from the scene, were sent to the
North Louisiana Crime Lab for further examination. Summer Johnson, an
expert in forensic firearm and ballistic examination at the crime lab,
determined the casings each belonged to the same .45-caliber gun. Johnson
stated she was unable to determine whether the bullets were also from this
same gun given their condition when she received them, flattened from
hitting a hard object. Johnson also examined the bullet found in Hicks’s tire
following the March 21 incident on Cynthia Lane. Johnson determined the
bullet recovered from Sheffield’s body and the bullet from the March 21
2 The time stamp on the video actually depicted the time as 8:07 but it was estimated to be approximately 15 min. behind that of real time. This was confirmed by both the Bossier City Water Department and Det. Hampson. 4 incident had similar class characteristics because their caliber and grooves
were consistent with each other, and each shared matching unique markings.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Following the investigation, McCoy was arrested and charged by bill
of indictment with the second degree murder of Hannah Sheffield. A Prieur
hearing was held on August 1, 2022, after which the trial court allowed
evidence of the March 20 bar fight, the shooting at Cynthia Lane in the early
morning hours of March 21, and the March 31 aggravated assault. Trial
began the next day but, before jury selection, McCoy orally moved for a
continuance based on Pappillion’s testimony in the Prieur hearing that a
now deceased person made a statement to him in a phone call possibly
confessing to Sheffield’s murder. The motion to continue was denied, but
Pappillion was allowed to testify about the statement. At the conclusion of
trial, the jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict convicting McCoy as
charged of second degree murder. McCoy then filed motions for judgment
of acquittal and new trial, which were both denied by the trial court. After
being sentenced to life imprisonment without benefits, he filed this appeal.
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first assignment of error, McCoy argues there was no direct
evidence or testimony adduced at trial which connected him to the shooting
of Sheffield, and that the circumstantial evidence presented was insufficient
to support his conviction of second degree murder.
McCoy claims the jury had to make several assumptions, without
sufficient evidence, in order to reach a guilty verdict. He also submits the
state attempted to link the shooting of Sheffield to the March 21 shooting at 5 Cynthia Lane by comparing the projectiles found at both scenes, but he
points out the ballistics expert could only determine the projectiles were
fired from the same caliber gun, not the same actual gun. He maintains no
eyewitness saw who fired any of the shots. McCoy also questions some of
the testimony adduced at trial. Pappillion claimed to be frequently
intoxicated for, as he put it, “the majority of 2021.” Pappillion testified that
because of his habitual impairment, he did not recall the altercations he had
with McCoy at the Hive, his belief that McCoy was responsible for the
shooting at Cynthia Lane, or the alleged aggravated assault by McCoy that
occurred on March 31 at Pappillion’s girlfriend’s house. McCoy concedes
the testimony of West and Abbot did confirm he was in the Barksdale Annex
neighborhood the night Sheffield was shot but, he asserts, West and Abbot
did not see him with a gun nor did they find him to be angry or upset.
Lastly, McCoy argues no credible evidence placed him at the scene of the
April 10 murder, or at the March 21 shooting near Pappillion’s
grandmother’s house, or at the March 31 aggravated assault of Pappillion;
and that the circumstantial evidence presented was insufficient to support a
finding of guilt.
The standard of appellate review for sufficiency of the evidence to
uphold a conviction is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.
Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124
S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004). This standard does not provide an
appellate court with a vehicle for substituting its appreciation of the evidence 6 for that of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So.
2d 517. The trier of fact makes credibility determinations and may accept or
reject the testimony of any witness. State v. Casey, 99-0023 (La. 1/26/00),
775 So. 2d 1022, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S. Ct. 104, 148 L. Ed. 2d
62 (2000). The appellate court does not assess credibility or reweigh the
evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442.
The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and
circumstantial evidence. State v. Braden, 55,275 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/23),
__ So. 3d __. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in
such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Id. When the direct
evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and
inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence must be
sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State
v. Sutton, 436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983); State v. Norman, 51,258 (La. App. 2
Cir. 5/17/17), 222 So. 3d 96, writ denied, 17-1152 (La. 4/20/18), 240 So. 3d
926.
Direct evidence provides proof of the existence of a fact, for example,
a witness’s testimony that he saw or heard something. State v. Lilly, 468 So.
2d 1154 (La. 1985); State v. Baker, 49,175 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/27/14), 148
So. 3d 217. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred
according to reason and common experience. State v. Broome, 49,004 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 4/9/14), 136 So. 3d 979, writ denied, 14-0990 (La. 1/16/15), 157
So. 3d 1127. If a case rests essentially upon circumstantial evidence, that 7 evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La. R.S.
15:438; Broome, supra; State v. Gipson, 45,121 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/14/10),
34 So. 3d 1090, writ denied, 10-1019 (La. 11/24/10), 50 So. 3d 827.
McCoy was convicted by a unanimous jury of second degree murder.
La. R.S. 14:30.1 provides, in pertinent part:
A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being:
1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.
Specific intent is the state of mind that exists when the circumstances
indicate the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences
to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1). As a state of mind,
specific intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the
circumstances of the offense and the defendant’s actions. State v. Allen,
41,548 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/15/06), 942 So. 2d 1244, writ denied, 07-0530
(La. 12/07/07), 969 So. 2d 619; State v. Coleman, 52,074 (La. App. 2 Cir.
11/14/18), 2 59 So. 3d 1203. All that is necessary is that the defendant form
the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm for an instant when
committing the crime. State v. Williamson, 27,871 (La. App. 2 Cir.
04/03/96), 671 So. 2d 1208, writ denied, 96-1143 (La. 10/04/96), 679 So. 2d
1380, State v. Coleman, supra. The determination of whether the requisite
intent is present in a criminal case is for the trier of fact. State v. Allen,
supra.
This record contains no evidence to suggest McCoy had the specific
intent to kill Sheffield; there is, however, sufficient evidence for the jury to
find that McCoy had the specific intent to kill Pappillion. The law allows
8 for McCoy’s specific intent to kill Pappillion to be transferred to the killing
of Sheffield. The doctrine of transferred intent provides:
When a person shoots at an intended victim with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and accidentally kills or inflicts great bodily harm upon another person, if the killing or inflicting of great bodily harm would have been unlawful against the victim actually intended to be shot, then it would be unlawful against the person actually shot even though that person was not the intended victim. State v. Brooks, 42,226 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/15/07), 962 So. 2d 1220; State v. Gilliam, 36,118 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/30/02), 827 So. 2d 508, writ denied sub nom. State ex rel. Gilliam v. State, 02-3090 (La. 11/14/03), 858 So. 2d 422.
The record is replete with evidence detailing several altercations
between McCoy and Pappillion, showing animosity between these men.
Although at trial Pappillion claimed he was impaired and did not remember,
his video recorded statement given to Ofc. Bailey shortly after McCoy
pointed a gun at him contradicted this claim. This video, which was played
for the jury, depicts Pappillion as being very detailed and specific about
what occurred between him and “Trill,” someone he claimed to have known
for years. Pappillion is quite lucid in the video and does not appear to be
impaired in any way.
The record supports McCoy and Pappillion were in a fight on March
20 at a local bar in Shreveport, which ended with Pappillion knocking
McCoy out with a bottle. In addition to Pappillion’s statement, McCoy
admitted to this fight in his videoed interview with Det. Hampson that was
played for the jury. The totality of the evidence supports that McCoy, in an
attempt at retaliation later that night, came by Pappillion’s grandmother’s
residence on Cynthia Lane, where Pappillion was sometimes known to be,
and fired multiple gunshots, one of which lodged into the tire of Hicks’s car
parked near the home. The evidence also suggests the same person who 9 fired shots on Cynthia Lane was likely the same person who shot Sheffield,
including Pappillion’s statement and the conclusion of the crime lab that the
bullet recovered at this incident and the one recovered from Sheffield’s body
had similar characteristics and share unique markings. Certainly, the jury
was presented with sufficient evidence to draw this conclusion.
The record also provides adequate details of the March 31 aggravated
assault of Pappillion to support McCoy was the perpetrator. This assault
occurred 11 days after the initial bar fight between these men and involved
McCoy pointing a gun at Pappillion. While Pappillion testified at trial he
did not remember this incident, the body camera footage of Ofc. Bailey
captures Pappillion definitively and emphatically telling Ofc. Bailey what
happened: a man he knew as “Trill,” with a neck tattoo bearing this name,
whom he had recently fought and knocked out, who he believed fired shots
at his grandmother’s house, and whom he saw clearly that day; drove by
where he was staying and pointed a gun at him. While Pappillion only knew
him as “Trill” and did not know his real name, McCoy has a distinctive and
unique “Trill” neck tattoo. Further, if McCoy did not already know it, he
would have discovered during the March 31 aggravated assault that
Pappillion drove a white Toyota Camry four-door sedan, with black rims, as
it was parked right in front of the apartment where Pappillion was staying
and is clearly visible on the body camera video of the responding officer.
All of these prior incidents provide evidence of McCoy’s motive and
intent to fire multiple shots on April 10 into a white Camry four-door sedan,
with black rims, nearly identical to the vehicle seen at Pappillion’s home ten
days before, a vehicle he was known to drive.
10 On the day of the murder, immediately prior to Sheffield’s tragic
death, McCoy was hanging out in the same neighborhood where the
shooting occurred. Significantly, two witnesses testified that McCoy was in
the Barksdale Annex neighborhood and drove away in his sister’s Charger,
and McCoy even admitted to officers in a video interview that he was indeed
there just minutes before the shooting. Further, these same witnesses
testified McCoy was driving a dark blue Dodge Charger, with dark rims,
borrowed from his sister, a fact admitted by McCoy during an interview. A
surveillance camera video shows both a white Toyota Camry four-door
sedan, with black rims, and a dark blue Dodge Charger, with dark rims,
driving into the neighborhood just minutes before the shooting occurred.
Additionally, the Charger was caught on a traffic camera minutes later
driving away from the neighborhood.
The jury was presented with sufficient evidence to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that McCoy had the requisite intent and motivation to kill
or inflict great bodily harm upon Pappillion after Pappillion knocked him out
in the bar fight. Pappillion got the best of McCoy at the Hive and McCoy
tried on multiple occasions to exact revenge by first shooting at a residence
known to be associated with Pappillion, and then later pointing a gun
directly at him. These incidents ultimately led up to the tragic death of
Sheffield, when McCoy fired shots into a vehicle he believed to be that of
Pappillion, a Camry that was nearly identical to the one driven by him.
In light of the multiple incidents involving McCoy and Pappillion,
after reviewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, and excluding every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, we
conclude there was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could find 11 beyond a reasonable doubt that McCoy had the specific intent to kill or
inflict great bodily harm upon Pappillion. Because of the transferred intent
doctrine, McCoy had the specific intent required to be found guilty of
second degree murder when he mistakenly shot and killed Sheffield.
This assignment of error is without merit.
Prieur Motion
Prior to trial, the trial court granted the state’s Prieur motion allowing
evidence of the March 20 bar fight, the shooting later that night at Cynthia
Lane, and the March 31 incident when Pappillion claimed someone he knew
as “Trill” pulled a gun on him.
McCoy argues the trial court erred in granting the state’s Prieur
motion and asserts the state could not establish at the hearing he was
responsible for, or involved in, these incidents. As such, McCoy maintains
no jury could have reached a verdict of guilty in his case without this
evidence, and thus his conviction should be set aside based on these errors.
La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1) provides in pertinent part:
[E]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident.
In State v. Taylor, 16-1124 (La. 12/1/16), 217 So. 3d 283, the
Louisiana Supreme Court expanded on the seminal case of State v. Prieur,
277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973), and addressed the admissibility of evidence of
other crimes, this time in light of the present form of La. C.E. art. 404(B).
The Taylor court concluded evidence of other crimes may be admissible if
the state establishes an independent and relevant reason for its admission
12 but, it noted, the state is still required to provide the defendant with written
notice that it intends to use evidence of prior crimes. The Taylor court
emphasized the evidence must also have substantial relevance independent
from a defendant’s criminal character, and if the evidence is relevant, it may
still be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, or waste of time, La. C.E. art. 403.
Ultimately the Taylor court held, when seeking to introduce evidence
pursuant to La. C.E. art. 404(B), the state only has to present sufficient
evidence to support a finding that the defendant committed the other crime,
wrong, or act.
This Court in State v. Floyd, 51,869 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/27/18), 250 So.
3d 1165, writ denied, 18-1292 (La. 2/25/19), 266 So. 3d 288, determined a
trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of other crimes evidence will not be
overturned absent an abuse of discretion. The introduction of inadmissible
other crimes evidence results in a trial error subject to a harmless error
analysis on appeal. Id. Further, an error in the admission of evidence of
other crimes is not harmless unless a reviewing court determines that the
verdict actually rendered was unattributable to the error. Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 124 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1993); State v.
Brown, 18-01999 (La. 9/30/21), 330 So. 3d 199, cert. denied, 142 S. Ct.
1702, 212 L. Ed. 2d 596 (2022); State v. Johnson, 94-1379 (La. 11/27/95),
664 So. 2d 94.
A hearing was held regarding the Prieur motion just prior to trial,
where Pappillion claimed essentially to remember nothing. However, the
body camera video footage of Brandon Bailey, the BPCD officer who 13 responded to the aggravated assault at Pappillion’s girlfriend’s residence on
March 31, was played in its entirety. As previously stated, this footage
captured Pappillion informing Ofc. Bailey a man he knew well, though only
as “Trill”, drove by his girlfriend’s apartment and pulled a gun on him.
Pappillion also claimed in the video that “Trill” was the person he got into a
fight with at the Hive, and who he believed fired shots near his
grandmother’s house on Cynthia Lane the night following the bar fight. The
footage captures a white Toyota Camry four-door sedan, with black rims,
parked at the residence. At the hearing, Det. Hampson also testified about
his findings from his investigation into the March 20, March 21, and March
31 incidents, as well as the April 10 murder, including references to the
bullets and the bullet casings found, the similarities of the automobiles, the
statements made, and the images caught on video.
Ultimately, the trial court granted the Prieur motion based on its
finding the state presented sufficient evidence that McCoy committed these
other crimes, wrongs, or acts. The trial court stated it found Pappillion’s
testimony regarding his lack of memory to be not credible, a finding that is
overwhelmingly supported by viewing the videoed statement Pappillion
gave to Ofc. Bailey where he was coherent, detailed, and emphatic about
what actually happened. The trial court summarized what was seen and
heard in the body camera video footage.
As to the shooting of the tire in the early morning hours at Cynthia
Lane on March 21, the trial court admitted the evidence was slightly more
circumstantial, but the fact the projectiles recovered from the scene were
similar to those recovered at the scene of the shooting of Sheffield, coupled
with Pappillion’s statement to Ofc. Bailey, helped support the conclusion 14 both were committed by McCoy. The trial court also noted the close
proximity in time separating the fight between McCoy and Pappillion at the
Hive, and the shooting on Cynthia Lane. Lastly, the trial court emphasized
it had concluded each incident was relevant as they showed McCoy had
intent and motive to shoot at a Toyota Camry four-door sedan, with dark
rims, a vehicle believed to be driven by Pappillion that was virtually
identical in appearance to the vehicle Sheffield was driving at the time of her
death.
The trial court allowed this evidence to be admitted based on its
determination that McCoy’s past criminal acts showed he was involved in
altercations with Pappillion on multiple occasions. The trial court
acknowledged that some of the evidence was circumstantial but, when
viewed as a whole, the evidence was sufficient to support McCoy was
involved in the March 20 bar fight, and committed both the March 21
shooting on Cynthia Lane and the March 31 aggravated assault of
Pappillion.
As we noted in Floyd, we cannot overturn the trial court’s ruling on
this admissibility issue without a clear showing of an abuse of discretion,
and we do not find that here. The state offered sufficient evidence of these
incidents for the purpose of showing McCoy’s motive and intent behind the
otherwise unexplained shooting of Hannah Sheffield, not to show McCoy’s
character. As intent and motive are two of the specific reasons provided in
Art. 404(B)(1) for admitting other crimes evidence, the trial court properly
accepted the offering. Further, the trial court independently reviewed all of
the evidence and concluded it was sufficient, relevant, and credible to show
McCoy’s intent and motive, an assessment which we agree is supported by 15 the record. As set forth by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Taylor, the state
only had to present sufficient evidence to support a finding that the
defendant committed the other crime, wrong, or act, a burden they carried in
the case. Lastly, the trial court concluded any prejudicial effect the evidence
might have did not outweigh its relevance.
We do not find the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the
evidence to be admitted of the March 20 bar fight, the shooting later that
evening on Cynthia Lane, or the March 31 aggravated assault.
This assignment of error lacks merit.
Motion to Continue
In his third assignment of error, McCoy argues his oral motion to
continue, which was made just prior to jury selection, should have been
granted by the trial court. McCoy claims he discovered just a few days prior
to trial, at the Prieur hearing, the existence of a possible confession by
someone else and that he was prejudiced by not being allowed to investigate
this further.
Upon a written motion at any time and after a contradictory hearing,
the trial court may grant a continuance, but only upon a showing that such a
motion is in the interest of justice. La. C. Cr. P. art. 707; State v. Butler,
53,360 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/22/20), 293 So. 3d 808, 821, writ denied, 20-
00798 (La. 11/10/20), 303 So. 3d 1039. A trial court has discretion to grant
a timely filed motion for continuance in any case if there is ground therefor.
La. C. Cr. P. art. 712.
Because the decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance rests
within the sound discretion of the trial court, a reviewing court will not
disturb the trial court’s determination absent a clear abuse of discretion. 16 State v. Butler, supra; State v. Brown, 52,501 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/16/19), 264
So. 3d 697, writ denied, 19-0297 (La. 6/3/19), 272 So. 3d 892. Generally, a
reviewing court will not reverse a conviction even on a showing of an
improper denial of a motion for a continuance, absent a showing of specific
prejudice. State v. Manning, 03-1982 (La. 10/19/04), 885 So. 2d 1044, cert.
denied, 544 U.S. 967, 125 S. Ct. 1745, 161 L. Ed. 2d 612 (2005); State v.
Saulsberry, 52,031 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/23/18), 247 So. 3d 1137, writ denied,
18-1067 (La. 11/5/18), 255 So. 3d 1053.
At the Prieur hearing, in spite of Pappillion testifying he was impaired
most of 2021 and did not remember anything, he claimed that he did
remember speaking with an individual named Kirk Jackson a couple of
months after the shooting of Sheffield. Pappillion claimed Jackson told him
“that’s my work,” and Pappillion said he believed Jackson was referring to
killing Sheffield. Pappillion admitted he rarely talked to Jackson, but did
say he has known him his whole life. Pappillion could not be absolutely
certain he was speaking to Jackson on the phone, and the person claiming to
be Jackson never actually said he had killed Sheffield. Pappillion
maintained he was likely impaired during the conversation from smoking
marijuana, but still remembered it. He also testified that Jackson’s
statement, “that’s my work,” could be interpreted as street talk for killing
Sheffield. By the time of trial, Jackson was deceased.
On the day of trial, before jury selection, McCoy orally moved to
continue, arguing he needed additional time to investigate Jackson’s
purported statement to Pappillion. The state pointed out Jackson had been
investigated by law enforcement, from a crime stoppers tip, during the
course of their investigation and his name was included in all discovery 17 provided to McCoy. Further, there was no evidence, other than Pappillion’s
questionable statement, that linked Jackson to the murder of Sheffield.
The trial court ultimately denied McCoy’s oral motion to continue
after summarizing Pappillion’s testimony about Jackson in the earlier Prieur
hearing, and emphasized Pappillion was not even certain Jackson was the
person who he spoke to on the phone. The trial court found Pappillion was
not credible and noted that McCoy had previously filed a motion for speedy
trial, which had been granted by the trial court.
After the motion to continue was denied, the issue of whether
Pappillion could testify about this alleged phone conversation he had with
Jackson arose. Following a limiting instruction by the trial court, Pappillion
was allowed to testify regarding the content of the statement made by
Jackson, but he was instructed not to provide his interpretation of what the
statement may have meant.
We first note that a written motion to continue was not filed, as is
required by Art. 707. As for the merits of whether the motion should have
been granted, the trial court had the discretion to deny the continuance and,
based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of the trial court’s
discretion. The motion was denied only after emphasizing Pappillion’s lack
of credibility and uncertainty about this possible phone call
statement/confession. McCoy asserted he needed more time to investigate
the possible confession of Jackson but, as shown above, Jackson was
investigated in this matter and was listed on discovery. McCoy had
knowledge of Jackson and ample time to conduct his own investigation prior
to trial. Significantly, the trial court allowed Pappillion to testify about the
statement made by Jackson to him, mitigating any potential prejudice to 18 McCoy in denying the continuance. The record shows Pappillion was
questioned in detail about this statement and, therefore, the jury was able to
weigh this evidence in reaching its verdict. We find the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion to continue.
Challenges for Cause
In his final assignment, McCoy argues the trial court erred in denying
all four of his challenges for cause. Each juror was ultimately stricken by
McCoy using his preemptory challenges.
La. C. Cr. P. art. 797 provides five grounds a defendant may use to
challenge a juror for cause:
(1) The juror lacks a qualification required by law;
(2) The juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality. An opinion or impression as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant shall not of itself be sufficient ground of challenge to a juror, if he declares, and the court is satisfied, that he can render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence;
(3) The relationship, whether by blood, marriage, employment, friendship, or enmity between the juror and the defendant, the person injured by the offense, the district attorney, or defense counsel, is such that it is reasonable to conclude that it would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict;
(4) The juror will not accept the law as given to him by the court; or
(5) The juror served on the grand jury that found the indictment, or on a petit jury that once tried the defendant for the same or any other offense.
A trial court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on challenges for cause
and its rulings will be reversed only when a review of the voir dire record as
a whole reveals an abuse of discretion. State v. Tucker, 13-1631 (La.
9/1/15), 181 So. 3d 590; State v. Colby, 51,907 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/30/18), 19 244 So. 3d 1260, 1281, writ denied, 18-1256 (La. 3/25/19), 267 So. 3d 596.
A trial court’s refusal to disqualify a prospective juror is not an abuse of
discretion or a reversible error if the perceived bias or lack of impartiality of
the prospective juror is properly remedied through rehabilitation. State v.
Mickelson, 12-2539 (La. 9/3/14), 149 So. 3d 178; State v. Howard, 98-0064
(La. 4/23/99), 751 So. 2d 783, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 974, 120 S. Ct. 420,
145 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1999). A prospective juror can be rehabilitated if the
court is satisfied that the juror can render an impartial verdict according to
the evidence and instructions given by the court. State v. Hust, 51,015 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 1/11/17), 214 So. 3d 174, writ denied, 17-0352 (La. 11/17/17),
229 So. 3d 928; State v. Colby, supra.
McCoy argues all four of his challenges for cause were erroneously
granted. Upon review, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion for
each challenged juror.
1. James Neal
Neal initially indicated he was not comfortable requiring the state to
prove McCoy guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. He stated, “the DA had
enough evidence to arrest him in the first place and he is here. I cannot help
but feel like he is not innocent.” When questioned about this statement,
Neal indicated he would try to set aside this presumption and view the
evidence fairly. Neal also indicated he had a negative experience with law
enforcement in the past and he had close personal friends that currently
worked in law enforcement. Despite this, Neal stated he would still weigh
all testimony equally. Lastly, Neal shared he did not want the responsibility
of possibly sending someone to life in prison; however, Neal went on to say
that he would still convict if the state met its burden of proof. 20 McCoy asserted Neal could not be impartial based on these
statements. The trial court denied the challenge and pointed out Neal
indicated he was comfortable finding someone not guilty and stated he could
reach a fair and impartial verdict.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in keeping Neal on the
panel. Neal made three statements which raised concern about his ability to
be fair and impartial; however, after each, Neal stated he would view the
evidence fairly, weigh the testimony equally, and ultimately convict if the
state met its burden of proof. Neal was properly rehabilitated; therefore, the
trial court did not error in denying this challenge for cause.
2. Charlotte Monk
Monk told the court she knew one of the assistant district attorneys
trying the case, but she would not let that affect how she viewed the case or
allow it to create any bias. Monk also indicated she was not comfortable
sitting on a jury in a murder case and did not know if she could view all of
the images presented impartially as she had two cousins who were brutally
murdered. In the end, she indicated she believed she could view the
evidence impartially and would try to reach a just verdict.
McCoy challenged Monk for cause and argued that because of her
statement regarding her family members and what she had been through, she
could not be impartial. The trial court articulated it did not get the
impression that just because Monk had cousins who were murdered, she
would hold that against McCoy. The trial court denied the challenge and
pointed to Monk’s statement that she would try to be fair and impartial.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of this
challenge for cause. Regarding her knowing the assistant district attorney, 21 Monk specially stated she would not allow the relationship to create any
bias. Monk also indicated she would try to reach a just verdict despite her
reservations about viewing certain images presented at trial. There is no
indication the trial court abused its discretion in finding Monk had been
rehabilitated.
3. James Lewing
Lewing, who has diminished hearing capabilities, stated twice during
initial questioning that he was having trouble hearing and the headset
provided by the court was staticky. McCoy lodged a challenge for cause
arguing Lewing’s hearing issues might lead to his missing important details
during trial. The court denied this challenge and opined it did not think
being hearing impaired was enough to challenge someone for cause. The
court also stated it would have the headset fixed, if required, before
testimony was taken.
Lewing was provided a headset by the court and the record supports
the trial court, on multiple occasions, went out of its way to ensure the
headset was working properly. We find no abuse of discretion in denying
this challenge for cause.
4. Susan Meyer
Meyer stated during questioning an employee of hers took off work in
order to attend Sheffield’s memorial and she knew one of the assistant
district attorneys trying the case; however, Meyer maintained she could set
this aside and it would not affect her decision in any way. The trial court
denied McCoy’s challenge for cause of Meyer reiterating Meyer’s statement
that she could make a fair and impartial decision.
22 Despite her employee’s connection to the case and her previous
relationship with the assistant district attorney, Meyer assured the court
neither one of these would affect her decision making. Because Meyer was
rehabilitated, we find no abuse of discretion in denying this challenge for
cause.
Considering the record of the entire voir dire, including each potential
juror’s answers, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
McCoy’s four challenges for cause. The trial court, in making its rulings,
was able to view each juror’s tone and demeanor while delivering their
responses. Thus, it was in the best position to determine if each potential
juror had been properly rehabilitated. We find nothing in the record to
suggest an abuse of this discretion. Accordingly, this assignment of error is
without merit.
Pro se brief
McCoy submitted an untimely pro se brief in which he reiterates the
insufficiency of the evidence claim made by his counsel, and also asserts
two new assignments of error. Both new assigned errors have been
thoroughly evaluated and considered by this court.3 We find, on the record
before us, that these pro se assignments lack merit and do not warrant any
further discussion.
3 In his first pro se assignment of error, McCoy argues he was afforded inadequate representation, specifically as it relates to his counsel’s failure to object to the state’s introduction of alleged hearsay evidence at the Prieur hearing. We find nothing in the record to support this assertion. Additionally, a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is more appropriate for post conviction relief. In his second pro se assignment, McCoy claims his ability to appeal has been impeded by his receiving the record late and given a short time period in which to file his brief. The record supports McCoy was transmitted a timely briefing notice and the record was transmitted to him.
23 CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed, Demetrious McCoy, Sr.’s conviction and
sentence for second degree murder are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.