State of Louisiana v. Demario Theus

CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedAugust 27, 2025
Docket56,371-KA
StatusPublished

This text of State of Louisiana v. Demario Theus (State of Louisiana v. Demario Theus) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Louisiana v. Demario Theus, (La. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

Judgment rendered August 27, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,371-KA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

DEMARIO THEUS Appellant

Appealed from the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Bossier, Louisiana Trial Court No. 235,287

Honorable Michael O. Craig, Judge

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Chad M. Ikerd

JOHN SCHUYLER MARVIN Counsel for Appellee District Attorney

C. CARTER LAWRENCE, JR. RICHARD R. RAY Assistant District Attorneys

****

Before STEPHENS, THOMPSON, and MARCOTTE, JJ. MARCOTTE, J.

This criminal appeal arises from the 26th Judicial District Court,

Parish of Bossier, the Honorable Michael E. Nerren presiding. Defendant

Demario Theus (“Theus”) pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon and was sentenced to 12 years at hard labor, with the first 5

years to be served without benefits. Defendant now appeals. For the

following reasons, we vacate Theus’ sentence and the trial court’s denial of

his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and the case is remanded with

instructions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Theus was charged by bill of information with possession of a firearm

or carrying of a concealed weapon by a convicted felon, in violation of La.

R.S. 14:95.1. The offense occurred on April 19, 2020.1 The bill listed

Theus’ predicate felony as Possession of a Schedule II Controlled

Dangerous Substance, for which he was convicted on May 16, 2016.

On June 27, 2022, Theus came before Judge Michael Nerren (“Judge

Nerren”), and following a colloquy, he pled guilty to possession of a firearm

by a convicted felon. The state said that, in return for his guilty plea, Theus

would be released pending sentencing and, if he was present for his

sentencing hearing on August 5, 2022, he would be sentenced to six years at

hard labor, and the state would dismiss several other charges against him.

His other charges were nol prossed at that time, and he was released on a

bond. Judge Nerren stated at the end of the hearing that he had known

1 Theus pled guilty to the offense, so the facts in this case are not fully developed. Review of the transcript of a hearing on a motion to suppress reveals that Theus was stopped for speeding, fled from officers, and was later apprehended and arrested. A search of his vehicle uncovered a handgun under the driver’s seat. Theus for a long time in and out of court. Theus failed to appear at his

sentencing hearing and Judge Nerren issued a bench warrant for his arrest.

Theus was apprehended sometime prior to January 26, 2024.

On May 14, 2024, Theus sent a handwritten letter to Jill Sessions, the

Clerk of Court for Bossier Parish. The letter did not include a heading, but

in it Theus stated that he would like to file a motion to withdraw his guilty

plea and a “motion to quash.” He argued that Judge Nerren had previously

served as his attorney and that “we have history,” which created a conflict of

interest. On May 30, 2024, at a hearing on defendant’s pro se motions,

Judge Nerren said that he considered Theus’ motion to quash as a motion to

recuse because he alleged a conflict of interest. The judge said a hearing

was required to determine the issue, and he had the clerk of court randomly

assign the case to another judge. Judge Michael O. Craig (“Judge Craig”)

was selected.

On July 15, 2024, a hearing was held before Judge Craig on Theus’

pro se motions. In that hearing, defense counsel incorrectly informed Judge

Craig that Judge Nerren had recused himself. Judge Craig denied Theus’

motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

On July 29, 2024, Theus filed a second pro se “Motion to Withdraw

Guilty Plea on Docket No. 235287,” which stated (verbatim), “I took the

plea under Judge Nerren whom later recused himself for Conflict of Interest.

Any Plea agreement him and I made should be voided. I have a New

Judge[,] DA[,] and Lawyer. I feel this is the right Vehicle to use.” No

ruling on that motion appears in the record.

On October 14, 2024, Judge Craig sentenced Theus to 12 years at hard

labor, with the first 5 years to be served without benefits. Theus was given 2 credit for time served. No fine was imposed. He was advised of his

appellate and post-conviction relief time delays. Theus filed a motion to

reconsider sentence arguing his sentence was excessive and unconstitutional.

Judge Craig denied the motion. Theus appeals.

DISCUSSION

In the first part of his assignment of error, Theus argues that his

sentence should be vacated because, while Judge Nerren presided over his

guilty plea, the judge referred his case to Judge Craig to determine whether

he should be recused. Defendant states that Judge Craig did not rule on the

recusal issue, and, therefore, he lacked the proper authority to sentence him.

In the second part of his assignment of error, defendant argues that his

trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to object to Judge

Craig’s jurisdiction to sentence him. Theus asks that his sentence be vacated

and his case remanded for a determination of the recusal issue and

resentencing.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 671 through 679

provide the procedure and authority for the recusal of judges in criminal

matters. A defendant must file a written motion stating the grounds for

recusal no later than 30 days after discovery of the facts constituting the

grounds upon which the motion is based. But, if the facts constituting the

grounds for recusal occur thereafter, or the party moving for recusal could

not, in the exercise of due diligence, have discovered such facts, the motion

to recuse shall be filed immediately after the facts occur or are discovered,

but prior to verdict or judgment. La. C. Cr. P. art. 674(A). We note that

Theus’ motion to quash/recuse was filed nearly two years after he

discovered that Judge Nerren may have represented him, making it untimely. 3 If the motion to recuse is not timely the judge may deny the motion

without referring the motion to another judge. La. C. Cr. P. art. 674(C).

Therefore, it was within Judge Nerren’s discretion to deny the motion or

assign it to another judge to rule on the recusal, and Judge Nerren chose to

refer the case to another judge for a recusal hearing. So, Judge Nerren did

not recuse himself in Theus’ case, and Judge Craig did not rule that Judge

Nerren should have been recused. The question becomes whether Judge

Craig had the authority to sentence Theus.

The first sentence of La. C. Cr. P. art. 673 states, “A judge has full

power and authority to act, even though a ground for recusal exists, until he

is recused, or a motion for his recusal is filed.” Therefore, Judge Nerren had

no authority to act in Theus’ case until the recusal issue was concluded. The

next sentence of La. C. Cr. P. art. 673 states, “The judge to whom the motion

to recuse is assigned shall have full power and authority to act in the cause

pending the disposition of the motion to recuse.” Here exists an irregular

situation in which the motion to recuse was filed after the guilty plea was

taken but before sentencing. The judge who took the plea did not recuse

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State of Louisiana v. Demario Theus, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-louisiana-v-demario-theus-lactapp-2025.