Judgment rendered August 27, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,412-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
DEANDRE TREYNELL GIBBS Appellant
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 401,843
Honorable Donald E. Hathaway, Jr., Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Paula C. Marx
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
ERIC M. WHITEHEAD STEPHEN FOLK-CRUTHIRDS Assistant District Attorneys
Before STONE, COX, and ROBINSON, JJ. COX, J.
Defendant, Deandre Treynell Gibbs (“Gibbs”), was charged by bill of
information with possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by
a convicted felon, in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1. Gibbs was sentenced to
15 years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of
sentence. For the following reasons, Gibbs’ sentence is affirmed.
FACTS
On August 23, 2024, Gibbs was charged by a bill of information with
a single count of possession or carrying a concealed weapon by a convicted
felon in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1. The bill alleged that on or about May
8, 2024, Gibbs “unlawfully possess[ed] a firearm or [carried] a concealed
weapon, to-wit: a firearm, after having been previously convicted of [La.
R.S.] 14:62 Simple burglary on July 29, 2014. . .”
On October 23, 2024, a hearing was held regarding the motion to
suppress filed by Gibbs on October 9, 2024. During the hearing, the State
established that on May 8, 2024, law enforcement was dispatched to 3212
Fulton Street in Shreveport in response to a call about a missing juvenile.
As officers approached the residence, they observed contraband. After
obtaining permission to search the property, officers discovered a .45 caliber
handgun behind a mirror. Gibbs admitted that the firearm belonged to him
and that he was a convicted felon. Gibbs’ motion to suppress was denied.
That same day, he pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon
in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1, and formal arraignment was waived.
On November 14, 2024, sentencing was held. In accordance with La.
C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, the trial court briefly noted its consideration of Gibbs’
personal history, including his education and family life. The trial court also orally noted Gibbs’ criminal history, highlighting that Gibbs was previously
convicted of simple burglary on July 29, 2014; resisting an officer with force
or violence in 2009; and two convictions for simple burglary. The trial court
then sentenced Gibbs to 15 years at hard labor without benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence, and waived fines and costs, noting that
Gibbs did not “have the capability of paying that fine or costs.”
The trial court also provided that it would file a detailed sentencing
memorandum in support of its ruling. The memorandum, provided in
pertinent part:
The Court is required to consider C. Cr. P. Art. 894.1(A), paragraphs 1, 2, 3. I find [1, 2, 3] to be/not to be applicable to this case:
(1) There is an undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or probation the defendant will commit another crime;
(2) The defendant is in need of correctional treatment or a custodial environment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; and
(3) A lesser sentence will deprecate the seriousness of the defendant’s crime.
The trial court highlighted two aggravating factors: 1) that Gibbs used a
dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense, and 2) that Gibbs had
prior convictions for resisting an officer with force or violence and had two
simple burglary convictions. On November 21, 2024, Gibbs filed a pro se
motion to withdraw his plea or reserve his right to appeal his pretrial motion
to quash. The following day, Gibbs filed his motion to reconsider sentence.
The motion was denied on December 3, 2024. Gibbs then filed a motion for
appeal on December 10, 2024.
2 DISUCCSION
By his two assignments on appeal, Gibbs argues that the trial court
failed to sentence him in compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, which
resulted in him receiving an excessive sentence of 15 years at hard labor.
Specifically, Gibbs argues that there were several mitigating factors
that the trial court should have considered, namely that: 1) the predicate
offense occurred in 2014; 2) Gibbs’ criminal history is mostly comprised of
non-violent offenses, save for a conviction for resisting an officer with force
or violence; and 3) there was no indication that Gibbs ever used the firearm
officers found in his possession. Moreover, Gibbs argues that the trial court
should have considered that he accepted full responsibility for his actions
and cooperated throughout. Gibbs also notes that while the sentencing range
for La. R.S. 14:95.1(B)(1) is five to 20 years, his criminal history does not
warrant a 15-year sentence, and this sentence is simply a needless infliction
of pain and suffering.
The law concerning excessive sentences is well-settled; claims are
reviewed by examining whether the trial court adequately considered the
guidelines established in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, and whether the sentence is
constitutionally excessive. State v. Vanhorn, 52,583 (La. App. 2 Cir.
4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 357, writ denied, 19-00745 (La. 11/19/19), 282 So. 3d
1065. A review of the sentencing guidelines does not require a listing of
every aggravating or mitigating circumstance, so long as the record reflects
that it adequately considered the guidelines of the article. Id. The important
elements which should be considered are the defendant’s personal history
(age, family ties, marital status, health, and employment record), prior
criminal record, seriousness of offense, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. 3 State v. Dowles, 54,483 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/25/22), 339 So. 3d 749. There is
no requirement that specific matters be given any particular weight at
sentencing. Id.
A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20 if it is grossly out of
proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a
purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. McKeever,
55,260 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/23), 371 So. 3d 1156. To constitute an
excessive sentence, a reviewing court must find that the penalty is so grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock the sense of justice
or that the sentence makes no reasonable contribution to acceptable penal
goals and, therefore, is nothing more than the needless imposition of pain
and suffering. State v. Griffin, 14-1214 (La. 10/14/15), 180 So. 3d 1262;
State v. Efferson, 52,306 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 259 So. 3d 1153, writ
denied, 18-2052 (La. 4/15/19), 267 So. 3d 1131.
The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences
within the statutory limits and such sentences should not be set aside as
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Judgment rendered August 27, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,412-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
DEANDRE TREYNELL GIBBS Appellant
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 401,843
Honorable Donald E. Hathaway, Jr., Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Paula C. Marx
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
ERIC M. WHITEHEAD STEPHEN FOLK-CRUTHIRDS Assistant District Attorneys
Before STONE, COX, and ROBINSON, JJ. COX, J.
Defendant, Deandre Treynell Gibbs (“Gibbs”), was charged by bill of
information with possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by
a convicted felon, in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1. Gibbs was sentenced to
15 years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of
sentence. For the following reasons, Gibbs’ sentence is affirmed.
FACTS
On August 23, 2024, Gibbs was charged by a bill of information with
a single count of possession or carrying a concealed weapon by a convicted
felon in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1. The bill alleged that on or about May
8, 2024, Gibbs “unlawfully possess[ed] a firearm or [carried] a concealed
weapon, to-wit: a firearm, after having been previously convicted of [La.
R.S.] 14:62 Simple burglary on July 29, 2014. . .”
On October 23, 2024, a hearing was held regarding the motion to
suppress filed by Gibbs on October 9, 2024. During the hearing, the State
established that on May 8, 2024, law enforcement was dispatched to 3212
Fulton Street in Shreveport in response to a call about a missing juvenile.
As officers approached the residence, they observed contraband. After
obtaining permission to search the property, officers discovered a .45 caliber
handgun behind a mirror. Gibbs admitted that the firearm belonged to him
and that he was a convicted felon. Gibbs’ motion to suppress was denied.
That same day, he pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon
in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1, and formal arraignment was waived.
On November 14, 2024, sentencing was held. In accordance with La.
C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, the trial court briefly noted its consideration of Gibbs’
personal history, including his education and family life. The trial court also orally noted Gibbs’ criminal history, highlighting that Gibbs was previously
convicted of simple burglary on July 29, 2014; resisting an officer with force
or violence in 2009; and two convictions for simple burglary. The trial court
then sentenced Gibbs to 15 years at hard labor without benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence, and waived fines and costs, noting that
Gibbs did not “have the capability of paying that fine or costs.”
The trial court also provided that it would file a detailed sentencing
memorandum in support of its ruling. The memorandum, provided in
pertinent part:
The Court is required to consider C. Cr. P. Art. 894.1(A), paragraphs 1, 2, 3. I find [1, 2, 3] to be/not to be applicable to this case:
(1) There is an undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or probation the defendant will commit another crime;
(2) The defendant is in need of correctional treatment or a custodial environment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; and
(3) A lesser sentence will deprecate the seriousness of the defendant’s crime.
The trial court highlighted two aggravating factors: 1) that Gibbs used a
dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense, and 2) that Gibbs had
prior convictions for resisting an officer with force or violence and had two
simple burglary convictions. On November 21, 2024, Gibbs filed a pro se
motion to withdraw his plea or reserve his right to appeal his pretrial motion
to quash. The following day, Gibbs filed his motion to reconsider sentence.
The motion was denied on December 3, 2024. Gibbs then filed a motion for
appeal on December 10, 2024.
2 DISUCCSION
By his two assignments on appeal, Gibbs argues that the trial court
failed to sentence him in compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, which
resulted in him receiving an excessive sentence of 15 years at hard labor.
Specifically, Gibbs argues that there were several mitigating factors
that the trial court should have considered, namely that: 1) the predicate
offense occurred in 2014; 2) Gibbs’ criminal history is mostly comprised of
non-violent offenses, save for a conviction for resisting an officer with force
or violence; and 3) there was no indication that Gibbs ever used the firearm
officers found in his possession. Moreover, Gibbs argues that the trial court
should have considered that he accepted full responsibility for his actions
and cooperated throughout. Gibbs also notes that while the sentencing range
for La. R.S. 14:95.1(B)(1) is five to 20 years, his criminal history does not
warrant a 15-year sentence, and this sentence is simply a needless infliction
of pain and suffering.
The law concerning excessive sentences is well-settled; claims are
reviewed by examining whether the trial court adequately considered the
guidelines established in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, and whether the sentence is
constitutionally excessive. State v. Vanhorn, 52,583 (La. App. 2 Cir.
4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 357, writ denied, 19-00745 (La. 11/19/19), 282 So. 3d
1065. A review of the sentencing guidelines does not require a listing of
every aggravating or mitigating circumstance, so long as the record reflects
that it adequately considered the guidelines of the article. Id. The important
elements which should be considered are the defendant’s personal history
(age, family ties, marital status, health, and employment record), prior
criminal record, seriousness of offense, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. 3 State v. Dowles, 54,483 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/25/22), 339 So. 3d 749. There is
no requirement that specific matters be given any particular weight at
sentencing. Id.
A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20 if it is grossly out of
proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a
purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. McKeever,
55,260 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/23), 371 So. 3d 1156. To constitute an
excessive sentence, a reviewing court must find that the penalty is so grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock the sense of justice
or that the sentence makes no reasonable contribution to acceptable penal
goals and, therefore, is nothing more than the needless imposition of pain
and suffering. State v. Griffin, 14-1214 (La. 10/14/15), 180 So. 3d 1262;
State v. Efferson, 52,306 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 259 So. 3d 1153, writ
denied, 18-2052 (La. 4/15/19), 267 So. 3d 1131.
The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences
within the statutory limits and such sentences should not be set aside as
excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v.
Griffin, supra; State v. Trotter, 54,496 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/22), 342 So. 3d
1116. On review, an appellate court does not determine whether another
sentence may have been more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused
its discretion. State v. McKeever, supra.
La. R.S. 14:95.1 provides that whoever is found guilty of possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not
less than 5 nor more than 20 years without the benefit of probation, parole,
or suspension of sentence and be fined not less than $1,000 nor more than
$5,000. Gibbs was sentenced to 15 years at hard labor, without benefit of 4 parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. In imposing the sentence, the
trial court considered Gibbs’ criminal record and reviewed the factors set
forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. Specifically, the trial court stated:
The Court has considered all of the factors enumerated in Code of Criminal Procedure Article 894.1(B), both mitigating and aggravating. The Court specifically finds the following aggravating and mitigating circumstances to apply: [a]s far as aggravating, the offender used a dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense; and also, other relevant aggravating circumstances, he has a conviction for resisting an officer with force or violence, he has been convicted of obscenity twice and simple burglary twice.
Mitigating factors, I considered all of them. The defendant’s criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm. He had marijuana. He had a firearm. I don’t think that applies. Acted under strong provocation, that does not apply. None of the mitigating factors applied.
The trial court further reviewed and considered Gibbs’ personal history,
including his age, employment history, and familial life. On the record, the
trial court was informed that Gibbs took responsibility for his actions, and
the trial court acknowledged this fact. The trial court also filed a sentencing
memorandum reflecting its considerations of all relevant factors, expressing
there was an undue risk Gibbs: (1) would commit another offense, (2) was in
need of correctional treatment, and (3) a lesser sentence would depreciate
the seriousness of this offense.
Given that the trial court not only verbalized its reasoning for
sentencing but also published its findings, we find that the trial court
adequately considered the art. 894.1 during sentencing. Moreover, Gibbs
received a midrange sentence for this offense, and we cannot say that his
sentence is either grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense or
that it shocks the sense of justice. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did
5 not abuse its discretion in imposing the 15-year sentence, and Gibbs’
sentence should be affirmed.
Errors Patent
Our review of the record has disclosed an error patent discoverable on
the face of the record. Specifically, we find that Gibbs’ sentence is illegally
lenient because the trial court failed to impose a fine pursuant to La. R.S.
14:95.1(B)(1), which mandates a fine of “not less than one thousand dollars
nor more than five thousand dollars.”
Defendants in criminal cases do not have a constitutional right or a
statutory right to an illegally lenient sentence. State v. Williams, 00-1725
(La. 11/28/01), 800 So. 2d 790; State v. Burns, 53,250 (La. App. 2 Cir.
1/15/20), 290 So. 3d 721. An illegally lenient sentence may be corrected at
any time by the court that imposed the sentence or by an appellate court on
review. La. C. Cr. P. art. 882(A). This correction may be made despite the
failure of either party to raise the issue. State v. Williams, supra.
This court, however, is not required to take such action. See State v.
Green, 54,267 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/9/22), 334 So. 3d 1107. Because the State
has not objected to the error, and Gibbs is not prejudiced by the failure to
impose the fine, we likewise decline to impose the fine.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Gibbs’ sentence is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.