State of Louisiana v. Dashone Gibson
Opinion
Judgment rendered August 27, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,411-KA
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
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STATE OF LOUISIANA Plaintiff-Appellee versus
DASHONE GIBSON Defendant-Appellant
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Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 383,463
Honorable John D. Mosely, Jr., Judge
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LOUISIANA APPELLANT PROJECT Counsel for By: Christopher Albert Aberle Defendant-Appellant
JAMES EDWARD STEWART, SR. Counsel for District Attorney Plaintiff-Appellee
JASMINE CARLETTE COOPER ALEXANDRA PORUBSKY Assistant District Attorneys
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Before STONE, HUNTER, and MARCOTTE, JJ.
HUNTER, J.
The defendant, Dashone Gibson, was charged by bill of information with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1. Following a trial, a unanimous jury found the defendant guilty as charged. He was sentenced to serve six years at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS
On June 11, 2021, two officers of the Louisiana State Police Department, Troopers Richard Lopez and Joseph Jones, were patrolling in a marked vehicle; they stopped at a red light at the intersection of Linwood Avenue and 75th Street in Shreveport, Louisiana. The defendant, Dashone Gibson, pulled up next to the officers in his vehicle. After observing the defendant operating his cell phone while driving, the officers decided to conduct a traffic stop.
Trooper Lopez approached the defendant’s vehicle and informed him he was stopped for suspicion of texting and driving. The defendant denied texting, but he admitted he had used his cellphone to answer a phone call using the Facebook application. During the interaction, Trooper Lopez observed what appeared to be a holstered handgun wedged between the front seat and the center console. The officer also noticed the defendant appeared to be nervous and was avoiding eye contact with him.
Based on the presence of the weapon and the defendant’s behavior, Trooper Lopez conducted a criminal background check and learned the defendant had a 2017 conviction for simple burglary in DeSoto Parish. Trooper Lopez advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and asked him if
he was the person convicted of simple burglary in 2017. The defendant initially admitted to the prior conviction, but he later expressed uncertainty about the conviction; he only recalled having “to pay a lot of stuff.”
Meanwhile, the defendant gave Trooper Jones consent to search his vehicle. During the search, the officers discovered the gun located between the front seat and the center console was, in fact, a BB gun. However, the officers searched the trunk of the vehicle and discovered a Mossberg 500 shotgun. The defendant admitted to being the owner of the shotgun, stating that he kept the gun for protection.1 The defendant was placed under arrest and was subsequently charged by bill of information with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1. Following the trial, a unanimous jury found the defendant guilty as charged of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court denied the defendant’s motions for new trial and post- verdict judgment of acquittal. The defendant was sentenced to serve six years at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, to run concurrently with any other sentence he may be serving. The defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence was denied.
The defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
The defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He argues the State failed show he was a convicted felon because the State did not prove
1 The officers also found 3.5 grams of marijuana in the center console of the vehicle.
he was the same person identified as “Dashone Gibson a/k/a Dashoone Gibson,” who was convicted for simple burglary in 2017 in DeSoto Parish.
The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731 (La. 1992); State v. Smith, 47,983 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/15/13), 116 So. 3d 884. This standard, now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a means to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the factfinder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517; State v. Steines, 51,698 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/15/17), 245 So. 3d 224, writ denied, 17-2174 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So. 3d 797.
The trier of fact makes credibility determinations and may accept or reject the testimony of any witness. State v. Casey, 99-0023 (La. 1/26/00), 775 So. 2d 1022, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S. Ct. 104, 148 L. Ed. 2d 62 (2000). The appellate court does not assess credibility or reweigh the evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442.
At the time of the commission of the offense, La. R.S. 14:95.1 provided:
It is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of *** a crime of violence as defined in R.S. 14:2(B) which is a felony or simple burglary *** to possess a firearm or carry a concealed weapon.
To convict a defendant of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the possession of a firearm; (2) a previous conviction of an enumerated felony; (3) absence of
the ten-year statutory period of limitation; and (4) general intent to commit the offense. State v. Thomas, 52,617 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/19), 272 So. 3d 999, writ denied, 19-01045 (La. 2/10/20), 292 So. 3d 61.
The burden is on the State to prove the existence of the prior felony convictions. In the area of establishing a defendant’s previous conviction identity, courts have recognized various methods that may be used to carry this burden of proof, such as testimony of witnesses, expert opinion as to the fingerprints of the accused when compared with those of the person previously convicted, photographs contained in a duly authenticated record, or evidence of identical driver’s license numbers, sex, race, and date of birth. State v. Westbrook, 392 So.2d 1043 (La. 1980); State v. Green, 51,784 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/18), 245 So. 3d 1105; State v. Jones, 41,429 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/06), 940 So. 2d 131, writ denied, 06-2769 (La. 9/14/07), 963 So. 2d 394. The mere fact that the defendant on trial and the person previously convicted have the same name does not constitute sufficient evidence of identity. State v. Watson, 40,059 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/21/05), 911 So. 2d 396; State v. Green, supra.
When the key issue is the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. Positive identification by one eyewitness or victim may suffice to support a conviction. State v. Grant, 55,722 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/28/24), 399 So. 3d 716; State v. Hughes, 05-0992 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So. 2d 1047. It is the factfinder who weighs the respective credibility of the witnesses, and this Court will generally not second-guess those determinations. Id.
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