Supreme Court of Louisiana FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #008
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 14th day of February, 2018, are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2017-KK-1451 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. DANNY P. BATTAGLIA (Parish of St. Mary)
The Louisiana Constitution gives the District Attorney “charge of every criminal prosecution by the state in his district, . . . .” La. Const. art. 5, § 26. Code of Criminal Procedure art. 680 provides mandatory grounds for recusal of the District Attorney. While the District Attorney contends that he acted within his discretion under Code of Criminal Procedure art. 681 to recuse himself voluntarily, we note that cases abound in which courts have found that “[a]n appearance of bias and prejudice is not sufficient to warrant the granting of a motion to recuse [the District Attorney].” See, e.g., State v. Ellis, 13-1401, pp. 26– 27 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/4/15), 161 So.3d 64, 80. To resolve the present case, we find it unnecessary to examine further any interplay between these two articles or to consider the extent of the District Attorney’s discretion to recuse himself voluntarily. There is no support for the district court’s determination that public confidence in the proceedings is risked under the circumstances here in which a former public defender, who had no involvement with Battaglia and whose conflict is speculative, is employed by the District Attorney but otherwise uninvolved in Battaglia’s Miller hearing. Therefore, we vacate the district court’s ruling granting the District Attorney’s motion to recuse and remand for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
WEIMER, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons. CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
Page 1 of 1 02/14/2018
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2017-KK-1451
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
DANNY P. BATTAGLIA
ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE PARISH OF ST. MARY
PER CURIAM
In 2016, attorney Craig Colwart, a public defender in the 16th JDC, was
hired as an assistant district attorney in the same district. His hiring precipitated
recusal by the District Attorney and his entire office from 86 prosecutions in which
Colwart was perceived to have a conflict. Among those recusals was from
participating in a hearing to determine parole eligibility for Danny Battaglia.
Codefendants Battaglia and Robert Thibodeaux had pleaded guilty to a murder
they committed together as juveniles in 1981. Battaglia filed a motion to correct an
illegal sentence seeking parole eligibility pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577
U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016).
Colwart represented Thibodeaux in an earlier post-conviction proceeding
and never represented Battaglia. Nonetheless, the District Attorney voluntarily
moved to recuse himself and his office from further proceedings in Battaglia’s
Miller hearing because Colwart “may have received information from
[Thibodeaux] concerning [Battaglia’s] involvement in the murder of the victim in this case.” After the district court granted the motion to recuse, the Attorney
General filed a motion to vacate that ruling. In response to this motion, the District
Attorney reiterated, “a conflict exists in this case since [Colwart] probably learned
the details of [Battaglia’s] participation in the murder from his discussion of the
case with [Thibodeaux].”
The district court denied the Attorney General’s motion to vacate after
conducting a hearing. At that hearing, the district court judge characterized the
conflict as follows: Colwart would have knowledge gleaned from his
representation of Thibodeaux regarding potential mitigating and aggravating
considerations pertinent to Battaglia’s Miller hearing and the elected District
Attorney who employs Colwart has an interest in the outcome of the Miller
hearing. The district court judge also expressed concern that the community might
have less confidence in proceedings in which a District Attorney’s office opposes
parole eligibility for the codefendant of a former client of one of the assistant
district attorneys.
After a five-judge panel of the court of appeal denied the Attorney General’s
writ application without comment, State v. Battaglia, 17-0526 (La. App. 5 Cir.
7/28/17) (unpub’d) (Theriot, J., dissents and would grant the writ), the Attorney
General applied to this court for supervisory review. After briefing and oral
argument, it is apparent that the Attorney General and the District Attorney now
agree on most of the issues. For example, the parties agree that, while Colwart
should be recused from participating in Battaglia’s Miller hearing, any conflict
Colwart may have is not imputed to the District Attorney or his other assistants.
Nonetheless, the District Attorney maintains that the district court did not err in
refusing to vacate the granting of the motion to recuse because participation in the
Miller hearing by one of his other assistants would create an appearance of
2 partiality that could erode public confidence in the fairness of the proceedings. We
disagree.
The Louisiana Constitution gives the District Attorney “charge of every
criminal prosecution by the state in his district, . . . .” La. Const. art. 5, § 26. Code
of Criminal Procedure art. 680 provides mandatory grounds for recusal of the
District Attorney. 1 While the District Attorney contends that he acted within his
discretion under Code of Criminal Procedure art. 681 to recuse himself
voluntarily, 2 we note that cases abound in which courts have found that “[a]n
appearance of bias and prejudice is not sufficient to warrant the granting of a
motion to recuse [the District Attorney].” See, e.g., State v. Ellis, 13-1401, pp. 26–
27 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/4/15), 161 So.3d 64, 80. To resolve the present case, we find
it unnecessary to examine further any interplay between these two articles or to
consider the extent of the District Attorney’s discretion to recuse himself
voluntarily. There is no support for the district court’s determination that public
confidence in the proceedings is risked under the circumstances here in which a
1 Article 680, pertaining to the grounds for recusation of a district attorney, provides:
A district attorney shall be recused when he:
(1) Has a personal interest in the cause or grand jury proceeding which is in conflict with fair and impartial administration of justice;
(2) Is related to the party accused or to the party injured, or to the spouse of the accused or party injured, or to a party who is a focus of a grand jury investigation, to such an extent that it may appreciably influence him in the performance of the duties of his office; or
(3) Has been employed or consulted in the case as attorney for the defendant before his election or appointment as district attorney. 2 Article 681, pertaining to the procedure for the recusation of a district attorney, provides:
A district attorney may recuse himself, whether a motion for his recusation has been filed or not, in any case in which a ground for recusation exists.
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Supreme Court of Louisiana FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #008
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 14th day of February, 2018, are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2017-KK-1451 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. DANNY P. BATTAGLIA (Parish of St. Mary)
The Louisiana Constitution gives the District Attorney “charge of every criminal prosecution by the state in his district, . . . .” La. Const. art. 5, § 26. Code of Criminal Procedure art. 680 provides mandatory grounds for recusal of the District Attorney. While the District Attorney contends that he acted within his discretion under Code of Criminal Procedure art. 681 to recuse himself voluntarily, we note that cases abound in which courts have found that “[a]n appearance of bias and prejudice is not sufficient to warrant the granting of a motion to recuse [the District Attorney].” See, e.g., State v. Ellis, 13-1401, pp. 26– 27 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/4/15), 161 So.3d 64, 80. To resolve the present case, we find it unnecessary to examine further any interplay between these two articles or to consider the extent of the District Attorney’s discretion to recuse himself voluntarily. There is no support for the district court’s determination that public confidence in the proceedings is risked under the circumstances here in which a former public defender, who had no involvement with Battaglia and whose conflict is speculative, is employed by the District Attorney but otherwise uninvolved in Battaglia’s Miller hearing. Therefore, we vacate the district court’s ruling granting the District Attorney’s motion to recuse and remand for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
WEIMER, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons. CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
Page 1 of 1 02/14/2018
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2017-KK-1451
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
DANNY P. BATTAGLIA
ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE PARISH OF ST. MARY
PER CURIAM
In 2016, attorney Craig Colwart, a public defender in the 16th JDC, was
hired as an assistant district attorney in the same district. His hiring precipitated
recusal by the District Attorney and his entire office from 86 prosecutions in which
Colwart was perceived to have a conflict. Among those recusals was from
participating in a hearing to determine parole eligibility for Danny Battaglia.
Codefendants Battaglia and Robert Thibodeaux had pleaded guilty to a murder
they committed together as juveniles in 1981. Battaglia filed a motion to correct an
illegal sentence seeking parole eligibility pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577
U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016).
Colwart represented Thibodeaux in an earlier post-conviction proceeding
and never represented Battaglia. Nonetheless, the District Attorney voluntarily
moved to recuse himself and his office from further proceedings in Battaglia’s
Miller hearing because Colwart “may have received information from
[Thibodeaux] concerning [Battaglia’s] involvement in the murder of the victim in this case.” After the district court granted the motion to recuse, the Attorney
General filed a motion to vacate that ruling. In response to this motion, the District
Attorney reiterated, “a conflict exists in this case since [Colwart] probably learned
the details of [Battaglia’s] participation in the murder from his discussion of the
case with [Thibodeaux].”
The district court denied the Attorney General’s motion to vacate after
conducting a hearing. At that hearing, the district court judge characterized the
conflict as follows: Colwart would have knowledge gleaned from his
representation of Thibodeaux regarding potential mitigating and aggravating
considerations pertinent to Battaglia’s Miller hearing and the elected District
Attorney who employs Colwart has an interest in the outcome of the Miller
hearing. The district court judge also expressed concern that the community might
have less confidence in proceedings in which a District Attorney’s office opposes
parole eligibility for the codefendant of a former client of one of the assistant
district attorneys.
After a five-judge panel of the court of appeal denied the Attorney General’s
writ application without comment, State v. Battaglia, 17-0526 (La. App. 5 Cir.
7/28/17) (unpub’d) (Theriot, J., dissents and would grant the writ), the Attorney
General applied to this court for supervisory review. After briefing and oral
argument, it is apparent that the Attorney General and the District Attorney now
agree on most of the issues. For example, the parties agree that, while Colwart
should be recused from participating in Battaglia’s Miller hearing, any conflict
Colwart may have is not imputed to the District Attorney or his other assistants.
Nonetheless, the District Attorney maintains that the district court did not err in
refusing to vacate the granting of the motion to recuse because participation in the
Miller hearing by one of his other assistants would create an appearance of
2 partiality that could erode public confidence in the fairness of the proceedings. We
disagree.
The Louisiana Constitution gives the District Attorney “charge of every
criminal prosecution by the state in his district, . . . .” La. Const. art. 5, § 26. Code
of Criminal Procedure art. 680 provides mandatory grounds for recusal of the
District Attorney. 1 While the District Attorney contends that he acted within his
discretion under Code of Criminal Procedure art. 681 to recuse himself
voluntarily, 2 we note that cases abound in which courts have found that “[a]n
appearance of bias and prejudice is not sufficient to warrant the granting of a
motion to recuse [the District Attorney].” See, e.g., State v. Ellis, 13-1401, pp. 26–
27 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/4/15), 161 So.3d 64, 80. To resolve the present case, we find
it unnecessary to examine further any interplay between these two articles or to
consider the extent of the District Attorney’s discretion to recuse himself
voluntarily. There is no support for the district court’s determination that public
confidence in the proceedings is risked under the circumstances here in which a
1 Article 680, pertaining to the grounds for recusation of a district attorney, provides:
A district attorney shall be recused when he:
(1) Has a personal interest in the cause or grand jury proceeding which is in conflict with fair and impartial administration of justice;
(2) Is related to the party accused or to the party injured, or to the spouse of the accused or party injured, or to a party who is a focus of a grand jury investigation, to such an extent that it may appreciably influence him in the performance of the duties of his office; or
(3) Has been employed or consulted in the case as attorney for the defendant before his election or appointment as district attorney. 2 Article 681, pertaining to the procedure for the recusation of a district attorney, provides:
A district attorney may recuse himself, whether a motion for his recusation has been filed or not, in any case in which a ground for recusation exists. A motion to recuse the district attorney shall be in writing and shall set forth the grounds therefor. The motion shall be filed in accordance with Article 521, and shall be tried in a contradictory hearing. If a ground for recusation is established the judge shall recuse the district attorney. 3 former public defender, who had no involvement with Battaglia and whose conflict
is speculative, is employed by the District Attorney but otherwise uninvolved in
Battaglia’s Miller hearing. Therefore, we vacate the district court’s ruling granting
the District Attorney’s motion to recuse and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
4 02/14/2018
ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE PARISH OF ST. MARY
WEIMER, J. additionally concurring.
I agree with the majority opinion, and write separately because I find that the
motions to recuse were filed in good faith out of concern for protecting the integrity
of the prosecution. Noteworthy is that there was a considered ruling by the district
court. This court’s decision provides an answer for this district attorney in this case. 02/14/2018
ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE PARISH OF ST. MARY
CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the district court erred in this case
in granting the District Attorney’s motion to recuse himself and his entire office
based on a conflict attributable only to one of his assistants (who is a recently hired
former public defender). However, I write separately to note that the Attorney
General alleges that the hiring of that assistant resulted in approximately 85 other
motions to recuse filed by the District Attorney and granted by the district court since
2016. In addition, the Attorney General alleges that the hiring of another assistant,
who was also a former public defender, resulted in the filing of another 261 motions
to recuse filed by the District Attorney and granted by the district court since 2016.
While those recusals are not pending before the court in this case, which is limited
to the District Attorney’s motion to recuse himself and his office from participation
in defendant’s Miller hearing, such a volume of recusals is of great concern. The
parties in this instance have agreed that attorney Colwart’s conflict is not attributable
to the District Attorney or his office generally. Furthermore, this Court has now
determined that public confidence in the proceedings is not imperiled under the
circumstances presented here. I am hopeful the Court’s action today will temper any
further need for recusals such as these. 1