Judgment rendered February 28, 2024. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 55,289-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
DANIEL RALPH HAIRE Appellant
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 374,478
Honorable Christopher T. Victory, Judge
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant By: Mary C. “Connie” Hanes
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
REBECCA A. EDWARDS KODIE K. SMITH VICTORIA T. WASHINGTON Assistant District Attorneys
Before STONE, HUNTER, and ELLENDER, JJ. ELLENDER, J.
Daniel Ralph Haire (“Haire”) was convicted by a unanimous jury of
manslaughter and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Following
his adjudication as a second felony offender, Haire was sentenced to a total
of 70 years at hard labor. He now appeals his convictions and sentences
alleging the trial court erred in both denying one of his challenges for cause
and in failing to properly instruct the jury, and that the sentences imposed
were unconstitutionally excessive.
FACTS
Haire, Rodney Nordby (“Nordby”), and Dillion Brown (“Brown”), all
residents of Caddo Parish, had been mutual friends and were well acquainted
with one another. On February 23, 2020, Haire, who had just recently been
released from jail following a conviction for possession of
methamphetamine, called the Shreveport Police Department to inform them
he was receiving harassing calls and threats. Officer Raheem Roque was
dispatched to Haire’s home where he lived with his parents in the
Broadmoor neighborhood. Haire told the officer he had received death
threats from both Nordby and Brown, but he did not want anyone arrested;
he just wanted it documented. Ofc. Roque examined Haire’s phone, but the
text messages with these individuals were only mutual conversations. Haire
claimed the death threats were from the phone calls, not text messages.
Though he did not inform the police on this day, Haire later told officers
Nordby had chased him in his car a few days prior and had tried to run him
off the road.
At some point during daylight hours of February 27, 2020, Haire
called Nordby and asked him to come to his house so they could talk and resolve their differences. Haire claimed his intention was for Nordby to
come over immediately so they could talk face to face, and he did not expect
Nordby to come over that night. Haire also claimed he instructed Nordby to
call when he arrived.
At some point after it became dark, Nordby apparently drove his
motorcycle near Haire’s home, parked it, and then walked into their
backyard. Haire claimed his family, including his parents, sister, and
nephew, had already gone to bed, but that he was still awake getting
something to eat in the kitchen. Haire said he spotted a dark figure through
the window moving about in the backyard, so he grabbed his father’s
crossbow for protection and turned off the lights to be able to see better. As
Haire continued to observe through the kitchen window, he realized that it
was Nordby in the backyard, who he believed was stealing items from the
carport. Haire later told officers Nordby was known to steal things from
their home, which had made his dad angry, and filled Haire with rage that
night. Haire also claimed Nordby was aware his parents didn’t want him in
their carport/backyard area.
After another minute or so of watching, Haire kicked open the door to
the carport and fired a shot with the crossbow at Nordby, who was holding a
cellphone in his hand. The bolt1 from the crossbow, which was equipped
with a broadhead typically outfitted with razor-sharp blades used to kill wild
animals, struck Nordby in the upper left side of the chest, exiting through the
middle of Nordby’s back. After being shot, Nordby ran inside the kitchen
1 Though a crossbow fires arrow-like projectiles much like a regular bow, crossbow projectiles are referred to as “bolts” due to their relatively small length as compared to a normal arrow. 2 and fell on the floor bleeding significantly. Haire said he applied pressure to
the wound, but claimed he did not call 911 because he was panicking and
knew he would go to jail. Nordby ultimately died there on the floor from the
wound.
Haire wrapped the body in bed sheets and a comforter, with black
floral stitching on it, before putting the body in a trash can and mopping up
the blood. Around 3 a.m. the next morning, Haire called Brown, who had a
truck, and told him he needed help taking his trash to a dumpster. Though
Brown did not know Nordby’s body was in the trash can, they loaded it into
the back of Brown’s truck and dropped the can into a dumpster behind a
nearby store. After a couple of hours, and while Haire and Brown were
hanging out at Brown’s house, Haire urged Brown to again help him move
what they had just put into the dumpster. While assisting Haire with this
move, Brown quickly realized what they were moving was a dead body
wrapped in a comforter. The pair then got back in Brown’s truck and Haire
gave Brown directions to the end of Wallace Lake Road, where they both
got out and threw Nordby’s body, wrapped in the comforter, into the
shallows of Wallace Lake. While there, Haire also threw the crossbow bolt,
used to kill Nordby, into the lake.
The next day, Haire and Brown visited three area pawn shops and
unsuccessfully attempted to pawn the crossbow. Haire and Brown also
secured the motorcycle that Nordby had driven to Haire’s house and gave it
to one of their friends, Daniel Young (“Young”), who repainted it and stored
it at Brown’s residence.
Two days after the shooting, on February 29, 2020, the Caddo Parish
Sherriff’s Office (“CPSO”) received a report of a suspicious bundle of 3 bedding located at the end of Wallace Lake Road. Officers responded to the
scene and found the body of Nordby wrapped in a comforter. Upon
inspection, Nordby was discovered to have a one-inch cut to his upper left
chest and a similar injury to his back. An autopsy was later performed,
which confirmed he died as a result of these wounds.
The ensuing CPSO investigation revealed Haire was one of Nordby’s
known associates. Detectives went to Haire’s residence, where Haire’s
father gave consent to enter and search the home. The twin beds in Haire’s
bedroom were missing their linens and comforters, but pillow shams in
Haire’s closet were found with the same black floral stitching as was on the
comforter found in Wallace Lake wrapped around Nordby’s body. A
crossbow bolt was also found in Haire’s room, mounted with a practice tip.
Trace amounts of blood were discovered on the floors in the home, which
officers determined had been mostly cleaned up with solutions.
While at the Haire household, the CPSO learned Brown was also a
known associate of Haire. On the night of February 29, 2020, detectives
went to Brown’s residence, where he lived with his grandparents a few
blocks from Haire, and received permission from Brown’s grandmother to
search the home. While conducting the search, they spotted a motorcycle in
a shed outside and, after obtaining a search warrant, found the motorcycle to
have been recently painted. Brown’s grandmother informed them Young
had been working on the motorcycle. She also told the detectives that
Brown, his girlfriend, and Haire had left earlier that night to go gambling at
the casinos. After receiving more information about the type of car they
were in, the vehicle was eventually located and stopped as it was returning
to the Brown residence. Haire was found in the backseat of the car by 4 himself, with a crossbow and a .22 rifle. The driver, Amy Willis, and
passengers, Brown and Haire, were all taken into custody.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Haire was charged by indictment with one count of second degree
murder and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.2 Trial
commenced on May 9, 2022, and the jury ultimately found Haire guilty of
the responsive verdict of manslaughter, and guilty, as charged, of possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon.
On May 19, 2022, the state filed an habitual offender bill of
information charging Haire as a second felony offender based on his
previous felony conviction for possession of marijuana-third offense, arising
from a guilty plea on December 8, 2014. A hearing was held on June 23,
2022, where Haire voluntarily pled guilty to being a second felony offender.
On July 14, 2022, Haire was sentenced to 70 years at hard labor,
without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. For his
conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, Haire was
sentenced to 15 years at hard labor, without the benefit of probation, parole,
or suspension of sentence, and a fine of $2,500. This sentence was set to run
concurrently with his 70-year sentence. Haire filed a motion to reconsider,
which was subsequently denied. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Challenge for Cause
In his first assignment of error, Haire claims the trial court erred in
denying his challenge for cause against potential juror Carlos Chenevert
2 Brown was charged with accessory after the fact to second degree murder, but was not tried together with Haire. 5 (“Chenevert”). Haire was forced to use a peremptory challenge against
Chenevert and ultimately exhausted all of his peremptory strikes. Haire
challenged Chenevert because he was a CPSO deputy, knew several of the
officers who had worked Haire’s case, had worked on other cases with the
prosecutor, and Chenevert’s wife was also a deputy.
La. C. Cr. P. art. 797 provides five grounds a defendant may use to
challenge a juror for cause:
(1) The juror lacks a qualification required by law;
(2) The juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality. An opinion or impression as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant shall not of itself be sufficient ground of challenge to a juror, if he declares, and the court is satisfied, that he can render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence;
(3) The relationship, whether by blood, marriage, employment, friendship, or enmity between the juror and the defendant, the person injured by the offense, the district attorney, or defense counsel, is such that it is reasonable to conclude that it would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict;
(4) The juror will not accept the law as given to him by the court; or
(5) The juror served on the grand jury that found the indictment, or on a petit jury that once tried the defendant for the same or any other offense.
A trial court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on challenges for cause
and its rulings will be reversed only when a review of the voir dire record as
a whole reveals an abuse of discretion. State v. Tucker, 13-1631 (La.
9/1/15), 181 So. 3d 590; State v. Colby, 51,907 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/30/18),
244 So. 3d 1260, writ denied, 18-1256 (La. 3/25/19), 267 So. 3d 596. A trial
court’s refusal to disqualify a prospective juror is not an abuse of discretion
or a reversible error if the perceived bias or lack of impartiality of the
prospective juror is properly remedied through rehabilitation. State v. 6 Mickelson, 12-2539 (La. 9/3/14), 149 So. 3d 178; State v. Howard, 98-0064
(La. 4/23/99), 751 So. 2d 783, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 974, 120 S. Ct. 420,
145 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1999). A prospective juror can be rehabilitated if the
court is satisfied that the juror can render an impartial verdict according to
the evidence and instructions given by the court. State v. Hust, 51,015 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 1/11/17), 214 So. 3d 174, writ denied, 17-0352 (La. 11/17/17),
229 So. 3d 928; State v. Colby, supra.
Haire argues his challenge for cause against Chenevert was
erroneously denied, and he was forced to use one of his preemptory
challenges. Prejudice is presumed when a trial court erroneously denies a
challenge for cause and the defendant ultimately exhausts his peremptory
challenges. State v. Kang, 02-2812 (La. 10/21/03), 859 So. 2d 649. This is
because an erroneous ruling depriving an accused of a peremptory challenge
violates his substantial rights and constitutes reversible error. Id.; State v.
Cross, 93-1189 (La. 6/30/95), 658 So. 2d 683. To obtain a reversal of his
conviction and sentence, therefore, a defendant must show that: (1) the trial
court erroneously denied a challenge for cause; and (2) he used all of his
peremptory challenges. State v. Divers, 94-0756 (La. 9/5/96), 681 So. 2d
320; State v. Coleman, 32,906 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/5/00), 756 So. 2d 1218,
1231, writ denied, 787 So. 2d 1010 (La. 2001).
Chenevert was an officer with the CPSO, the agency who investigated
Haire’s case, and was well acquainted with several of the investigating
officers set to testify. However, this alone does not make him unqualified to
serve as a juror. The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Ballard, 98-2198
(La. 10/19/99), 747 So. 2d 1077, eliminated the blanket rule that law
enforcement officers are incompetent jurors in criminal cases, stating: 7 Law enforcement officers are sworn to uphold the laws of the state, which laws include the provision of a fair trial to each and every defendant. If a law enforcement officer testifies under oath during voir dire that he can be a fair and impartial juror, the trial judge has the discretion to determine whether that officer is speaking the truth. The disqualification of all law enforcement officers from service on a jury disregards whether or not the judge, whose rulings on challenges for cause are given great deference in all other instances, accepts the officer as a fair and impartial juror. We find that such a disqualification amounts to an irrebuttable presumption of untrustworthiness in law enforcement officers and is an affront to police officers in this state.
See also State v. Deruise, 98-0541 (La. 4/3/01), 802 So. 2d 1224.
This court in State v. Coleman, supra, found a denial of a challenge
for cause used against a potential juror who was a Police Juror and
commissioned peace officer in the parish where the case was being tried, and
knew several of the deputies who worked the case, was not reversible error.
In doing so, this Court recognized a potential juror’s association with law
enforcement does not alone disqualify him, but such an association should
still be closely scrutinized by the trial court and the appellate court. Id.
In State v. Boyd, 11-1129 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/21/12), 104 So. 3d 642,
a case out of Orleans Parish, a challenge for cause was used against an
NOPD officer because he knew all the officers expected to testify at trial.
The officer, who worked in the compliance division of the department,
empathetically stated he could be fair and impartial despite his employment
status, an assertion he maintained during additional questioning by the trial
court. Id. The trial court ultimately denied (and the fourth circuit affirmed)
the challenge for cause noting that just because someone is a police officer
does not make him unsuitable as a juror. Id.
In State v. Harris, 18-800 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/5/19), 274 So. 3d 178,
writ denied, 19-01107 (La. 3/9/20), 294 So. 3d 486, the third circuit applied 8 Ballard to a Rapides Parish case and found the trial court properly denied a
challenge for cause used against a prospective juror who was a retired
Alexandria Police Department employee and, at the time of the subject trial,
a crime prevention officer. The officer knew every officer on the state’s
witness list, had a son who was a State Trooper, and multiple other family
members who worked in law enforcement in Rapides Parish; however, he
was questioned extensively regarding these connections and “made it
abundantly clear” he could be fair despite his employment situation. Id.
After reviewing his voir dire, the third circuit found no basis to justify a
challenge for cause against him. Id.
In the instant case, Chenevert repeatedly indicated he could be fair
and impartial, despite his connections to law enforcement. He maintained
this stance even when questioned about past incidents involving law
enforcement and his previous experience serving on a jury. Chenevert also
stated he would not give the testimony of any of the CPSO officers more
weight during trial, and said he would vote not guilty if the state did not
prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Lastly, Chenevert denied this
would cause any issues at work if he voted not guilty and essentially went
against some of his fellow officers.
After listening to and observing Chenevert as he gave these responses,
the trial court denied the challenge for cause and kept Chenevert on the jury
panel noting Chenevert did not say anything that would keep him from being
fair and impartial. Chenevert openly shared his employment status with the
CPSO and his relationships with many of their personnel before repeatedly
reassuring the trial court he could be fair and impartial. As stated in Ballard,
there is not a blanket rule that law enforcement officers are incapable of 9 serving as jurors in criminal cases. Thus, as a potential juror, Chenevert
could be rehabilitated if the trial court was satisfied he could render an
impartial verdict according to the evidence and instructions given by the
court. State v. Hust, supra. The jurisprudence is also clear, officers who are
thoroughly questioned regarding their employment status and relationships
can still serve as jurors in criminal cases despite their working for the same
agency that investigated the case or knowing many of the officers who are
expected to testify. See State v. Deruise, supra; State v. Boyd, supra; State
v. Harris, supra; State v. Coleman, supra.
Haire was thoroughly questioned by the trial court, denied having any
knowledge about the case, and consistently answered he would be fair and
impartial; thus, the trial court did not err in denying this challenge for cause.
Our review of the entire voir dire reveals no abuse of discretion.
This assignment of error lacks merit.
Jury Instructions
In his second assignment of error, Haire argues the trial court erred in
failing to give the jury a requested instruction. Prior to resting, defense
counsel stated he was filing an amendment to his previously submitted jury
instructions requesting additional charges be added to include (1) an
instruction on the law designating carports as dwellings, and (2) changing
the definition of justifiable homicide from that found in La. R.S. 14:20(A)(1)
to that found in La. R.S. 14:20(A)(4)(a), which addresses when a person is
unlawfully present in a dwelling. In support of this request, defense counsel
asserted the justifiable homicide instruction more closely fit the facts of the
case than the self-defense language already included in the instructions. The
state objected and argued there was no evidence Nordby was attempting to 10 unlawfully enter Haire’s residence that night as Haire had invited Nordby to
his home. The trial court agreed with the state and found the evidence did
not support an unlawful entry, so the requested instruction on justifiable
homicide was not included.
The jury was given the definition found in La. R.S. 14:20(A)(1),
which provides:
A homicide is justifiable:
(1) When committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger.
Haire argues the jury should have been allowed to weigh the testimony and
decide if it believed Nordby was not authorized to be in Haire’s carport, and
thus Haire was allowed to use deadly force to compel Nordby to leave.
Haire maintains his invitation to Nordby to come over to his house did not
include permission to walk inside or enter any structures. La. R.S.
14:20(A)(4)(a) provides:
A homicide is justifiable *** [w]hen committed by a person lawfully inside a dwelling *** when the conflict began, against a person who is attempting to make an unlawful entry into the dwelling *** or who has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling *** and the person committing the homicide reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent the entry or to compel the intruder to leave the dwelling[.]
The state points out Haire asked Nordby to come to his home and thereby
consented to his presence there, thus the requested instruction was not
supported by the evidence. The state also asserts Haire presented no
evidence he reasonably believed the use of deadly force was necessary, and
Haire’s self-defense assertion was contradicted by his actions following the
shooting. 11 A requested special charge shall be given by the court if it does not
require qualification, limitation, or explanation, and if it is wholly correct
and pertinent. La. C. Cr. P. art. 807. The charge, however, must be
supported by the evidence. State v. Perkins, 13-1917 (La. 9/3/14), 149 So.
3d 206; State v. Telford, 384 So. 2d 347 (La. 1980). Failure to give a
requested jury instruction constitutes reversible error only when there is a
miscarriage of justice, prejudice to substantial rights of the accused, or a
substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right. La. C. Cr. P. art.
921; State v. Perkins, supra; State v. Marse, 365 So. 2d 1319 (La. 1978).
Here, we find no miscarriage of justice, prejudice, or violations of rights, as
the requested instruction was not supported by the evidence.
As pointed out by the state, Haire called Nordby and invited him to
come to his home. Haire did not give Nordby a specific time to come over,
but only instructed him to call when he arrived. Though the record varies as
to how much time passed between the phone call and Nordby’s arrival, it is
clear some time passed and that it was nighttime when Nordby arrived.
Haire stated he assumed Nordby would come over while it was still daylight,
but this is nothing more than an assumption on Haire’s part as the record
reflects he did not specifically instruct Nordby to come over immediately.
Even assuming Nordby would no longer be considered an invitee, there is no
evidence to support Haire reasonably believed deadly force was necessary to
compel Nordby to leave the premises. Based on the record before us, Haire
did not present enough evidence to warrant a jury instruction for justifiable
homicide protecting a dwelling. The trial court was ultimately in the best
position to weigh the evidence and make this determination. Our review
reveals no miscarriage of justice, prejudice to the substantial rights of Haire, 12 or any substantial violations of constitutional or statutory rights. State v.
Perkins, supra. This assignment of error also lacks merit.
Excessive Sentence
In his final assignment of error, Haire argues his 70-year total
sentence is excessive. Haire submits the trial court considered only his
current offense and his criminal record. He further points out he was 24 at
the time of the offense, and is essentially receiving a life sentence.
A reviewing court applies a two-prong test to determine whether a
sentence is excessive. First, we examine the record to see if the trial court
used the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial court is not
required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance so long as the
record reflects adequate consideration of the guidelines of the article. State
v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. Boehm, 51,229 (La. App. 2 Cir.
4/5/17), 217 So. 3d 596. The court shall state for the record the
considerations taken into account and the factual basis therefor in imposing
sentence. La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 (C). The goal of Art. 894.1 is an
articulation of the factual basis for the sentence, not simply a mechanical
compliance with its provisions. State v. Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475 (La. 1982).
Our review confirms adequate compliance with Art. 894.1. Prior to
sentencing Haire, the trial court first discussed La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 and
noted its applicability as follows: (A)(1) – Haire has an extensive criminal
history replete with drug possession and battery charges, thus he presents an
undue risk that during a period of suspended sentence or probation, he will
commit another crime; (A)(2) – Haire is in need of correctional treatment
which may be provided to him while in prison; (A)(3) – The facts show
Haire killed Nordby without justification, thus a lesser sentence would 13 deprecate the seriousness of taking another’s life; (B)(1) – Haire’s conduct
during the commission of the offense manifested deliberate cruelty to the
victim; additionally, based on the facts, Haire was not in peril and, if he was
concerned about Nordby’s actions, he could have locked the door and called
the police; (B)(10) – Haire used a dangerous weapon in commission of the
offense; and (B)(21) – Haire has an extensive criminal history dating back to
2012, including convictions for various types of batteries, marijuana use, and
theft, and thus he has not learned from his prior behavior and this sentence
might encourage him to reflect on his actions. The trial court also pointed
out Haire was in possession of a .22 rile when he was arrested while being a
convicted felon, putting his friends who were with him, and the public in
general, in danger by his having access to a weapon. The trial court did
acknowledge Haire testified he felt threatened by Nordby but, the court
opined, it did not find his testimony concerning the threat compelling
enough to act as a mitigating factor under Art. 894.1.
In addition to the sentencing guidelines, the trial court also articulated
the following factors pertaining to Haire: (1) his long criminal history dating
back to 2012, including four prior felony convictions; (2) multiple battery
convictions; (3) his 29 different criminal charges, which show violent
tendencies; (4) his previous hard labor sentences; (5) his lack of remorse;
and (6) his criminal behavior indicates he has not understood the seriousness
of his offenses.
Based on these numerous references to Art. 894.1, the trial court’s
specific discussion and application of both sections (A) and (B) of the
article, and its articulation of six other pertinent factors it considered while
14 sentencing, it is clear the trial court properly and thoroughly took Art. 894.1
into account when sentencing Haire.
The second prong in reviewing a sentence is constitutional
excessiveness. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out
of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a
purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering, State v. Dorthey,
623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993). A sentence is considered grossly
disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light
of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Weaver,
01-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166. A trial court has wide discretion to
sentence within the statutory limits; absent a showing of manifest abuse of
that discretion, such a sentence will not be set aside as excessive. On
review, an appellate court does not determine whether another sentence may
have been more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its discretion.
State v. Fruge, 14-1172 (La. 10/14/15), 179 So. 3d 579. The sentencing
court is not limited to considering only prior convictions and may review all
evidence of prior criminal activity, including evidence that would otherwise
be inadmissible at trial, e.g., prior arrests, hearsay evidence of suspected
criminal acts, conviction records, and evidence of uncharged or nol prossed
offenses. State v. Washington, 414 So. 2d 313 (La. 1982); State v. Dale,
53,736 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 309 So. 3d 1031, and citations therein. A
trial judge is in the best position to consider the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances of a particular case, and, therefore, is given broad discretion
in sentencing. State v. Trotter, 54,496 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/22), 342 So. 3d
1116; State v. Bell, 53,712 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 310 So. 3d 307.
15 Haire was convicted of two felonies, manslaughter and possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon. For manslaughter, Haire was exposed to a
maximum of 40 years at hard labor, La. R.S. 14:31; and for possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, he was exposed to a maximum of 10 years at
hard labor, La. R.S. 14:95.1. However, Haire was also adjudicated a second
felony offender. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1) provides the following sentencing
ranges for second felony offenders:
(1) If the second felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one-third the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction.
Pursuant to this article, Haire faced up to 80 years at hard labor for
manslaughter and a maximum of 20 years for possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon.
Haire’s manslaughter conviction was a responsive verdict to his more
severe original charge of second degree murder. As stated by the Supreme
Court in State v. Lewis, 09-1404 (La. 10/22/10), 48 So. 3d 1073, and by this
court in State v. Gaines, 52,536 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/19), 266 So. 3d 948,
writ denied, 19-00773 (La. 9/17/19), 279 So. 3d 379, in considering the
nature of an offense for purposes of sentencing, both the trial court and the
reviewing court may assess whether the crime for which the defendant has
been convicted adequately describes his conduct when the conviction is for a
lesser included responsive verdict to the crime charged. Consequently, the
trial court here, as well as this Court, may consider whether Haire’s
conviction adequately reflects his conduct.
16 On the date of the incident, the record supports Haire looked out his
kitchen window and, though it was dark out, spotted Nordby in his backyard.
Haire was very familiar with Nordby and claimed he believed Nordby was
attempting to steal some of his family’s belongings, which he was alleged to
have done in the past. Despite observing him for several minutes from
within his home, Haire felt the need to arm himself with a crossbow as
Nordby remained in the backyard. Then, instead of opening the door and
talking to Nordby, who was unarmed, about what he was doing, or locking
the door and calling the police, Haire kicked open the door and immediately
fired a shot from the crossbow at Nordby, striking him in the upper chest and
killing him. By this own admission, Haire concedes he did not call the
police or medical services at this point as he was worried he might go to jail,
and instead unsuccessfully attempted to stop Nordby from bleeding. Haire’s
self-help efforts failed and he spent the next several hours removing
evidence of his crime from his home and disposing of Nordby’s body in a
nearby lake.
While the jury was free to return a verdict responsive to the charged
offense, the trial court was also justified in considering the actual conduct
established at trial in imposing sentence. Haire received a substantial benefit
by the jury’s returning a responsive verdict of manslaughter, even though the
facts suggest he could have been convicted of murder and, as a result, his
potential exposure was reduced down from mandatory life imprisonment
without benefits.
We recognize Haire’s 70-year sentence is essentially a life sentence.
However, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:574.4(A)(b)(ii), as it is presently written,
Haire could be eligible for parole after serving 65% of his 70-year sentence, 17 should he meet all the required parole considerations. If paroled when
eligible, Haire would be imprisoned for 45½ years of his 70-year sentence.
We also note, Haire has an extensive criminal history with multiple
battery convictions and four prior felony convictions, not including the two
felony convictions discussed in this opinion: (1) felony theft, on September
22, 2014; (2) possession of marijuana-third offense, on December 8, 2014;
(3) introduction of contraband into a penal institution, on January 21, 2016;
and (4) possession of schedule II CDS, methamphetamine, on August 30,
2018. As such, Haire could have potentially been adjudicated a sixth felony
habitual offender. Additionally, the instant crimes occurred only a few
weeks after Haire had been released from serving over a year in prison.
Based on these facts, we find Haire’s 70-year total sentence is not
constitutionally excessive, does not shock the sense of justice, nor is it a
needless infliction of pain and suffering. Haire’s final assignment of error
lacks merit.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed, we affirm Haire’s convictions and
sentences.
AFFIRMED.