NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
08-454
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
DAMON LEE HARMON
**********
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 5001-06 HONORABLE G. MICHAEL CANADAY, DISTRICT JUDGE
JOHN D. SAUNDERS JUDGE
Court composed of John D. Saunders, James T. Genovese, and Chris J. Roy, Sr.*, Judges.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
* Honorable Chris J. Roy, Sr., participated in this decision by appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court as Judge Pro Tempore. John Foster DeRosier District Attorney–14th Judicial District Court Carla S. Sigler Assistant District Attorney 1020 Ryan Street Lake Charles, LA 70601 (337) 437-3400 Counsel for Appellee: State of Louisiana
Paula Corley Marx Louisiana Appellate Project P. O. Box 80006 Lafayette, LA 70598-0006 (337) 991-9757 Counsel for Defendant/Appellant: Damon Lee Harmon SAUNDERS, Judge.
The Defendant, Damon Lee Harmon, was charged by bill of information filed
on February 23, 2006, with armed robbery with a firearm, in violation of La.R.S.
14:64.3. The Defendant entered a plea of not guilty on March 1, 2006.
Jury selection commenced on January 23, 2007, and the Defendant was found
guilty of armed robbery on January 26, 2007. On February 22, 2007, the Defendant
was sentenced to twenty-five years in the custody of the Louisiana Department of
Corrections, to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of
sentence. A Motion to Reconsider Sentence was filed on February 28, 2007, and
denied by the trial court on March 6, 2007. A second Motion to Reconsider Sentence
was filed on September 17, 2007, and denied on September 24, 2007.
A Motion and Order for Out of Time Appeal was filed on September 17, 2007,
and subsequently granted. The Defendant is now before this court asserting four
assignments of error. Therein, the Defendant contends that the State failed to provide
plausible race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges used on black jurors, that the
State failed to prove his identity as the perpetrator, that his sentence is excessive, and
that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel. The Defendant’s sentencing
claim will not be considered, as we vacated due to an error patent. Additionally, the
State gave plausible race-neutral reasons for the use of peremptory challenges and
proved the Defendant’s identity as the perpetrator. Finally, some of the Defendant’s
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are relegated to post-conviction relief, and
the remainder lack merit.
FACTS:
Ronald Fontenot testified that he was employed at the StepIn Exxon on
November 9, 2005. On that date, a man with a gun robbed the store. Fontenot described the man as a short, black man, who had a scar on his face. He also told
police the man wore a black hooded sweatshirt. Fontenot was subsequently shown
two photographic line-ups and was unable to identify anyone.
Fontenot further testified that the man who robbed the store returned on
December 23, 2005. At that time, Fontenot retrieved a gun he had brought to work
with him. Fontenot locked the door at the south end of the store, but the man escaped
through the door located at the north end of the store and got into a car with a female.
Fontenot followed the car the man entered, but subsequently returned to the store and
called 911. When police arrived at the store, Fontenot told them the man who had
previously robbed the store had just been there. The female with whom the man left
then returned to the store and told police the man that was with her was Damon
Thomas and gave the police his address.** Detective Gregory Single went to the
address given for Damon Thomas. Once there, he was told by the occupant of the
home that the person he was looking for may be Damon Harmon and was given a
second address.
On January 6, 2006, Fontenot identified the Defendant, Damon Harmon, in a
photographic line-up. After Fontenot identified the Defendant, Detective Single
prepared an arrest warrant for the Defendant and a search warrant for the residence
located at the second address. During the search, police found three hooded
sweatshirts similar to that described by Fontenot. Fontenot testified that the
sweatshirt marked as State’s Exhibit 8 looked like the exact sweatshirt the perpetrator
wore when he robbed the store.
** Jonathan Verette, a former employee of the Lake Charles Police Department, testified that he responded to the StepIn Exxon on December 23, 2005. He questioned the female that had returned to the store, but did not ask her name.
2 April Garrick, the Defendant’s fiancé, testified that she and the Defendant were
in Baton Rouge on November 9, 2005. The Defendant denied committing the offense
and testified that he was in Baton Rouge on November 9, 2005. The Defendant also
informed police that his cousin Marlin Harmon may have committed the offense.
Detective Single testified that he pulled Marlin’s criminal history and his
photograph. Detective Single further testified that the original suspect description
was a male five feet to five feet five inches tall, twenty to twenty-five years of age,
weighing one hundred twenty-five to one hundred fifty pounds. Marlin was listed as
being five feet six to seven inches tall, a bit heavier, and approximately ten years
older than the suspect. Detective Single then testified that he did not see a
resemblance between Marlin and the Defendant. Detective Single testified that the
Defendant weighed one hundred twenty to twenty-five pounds at the time of his arrest
and was five feet two inches tall.
Finally, at trial, Fontenot made an in-court identification of the Defendant as
the person who robbed him.
ERRORS PATENT:
In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by this
court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find
that there are two errors patent, one which requires the sentence to be vacated, and
the matter remanded to the trial court for resentencing.
There is an error in the bill of indictment. Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure Article 464 states:
The indictment shall be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. It shall state for each count the official or customary citation of the statute which the defendant is alleged to have violated. Error in the citation or
3 its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice.
The bill of indictment provides that the Defendant, around November 9, 2005,
committed armed robbery with a firearm “violating LSA R.S. 14:64.3, in that HE
WHILE ARMED WITH A DANGEROUS WEAPON, TO WIT: A FIREARM,
ROBBED RONALD FONTENOT . . . .”
The bill fails to include a citation for the charge of armed robbery, a violation
of La.R.S. 14:64. Nevertheless, the Defendant was clearly informed in the bill that
he was charged with armed robbery with a firearm of the named victim. Additionally,
there is nothing on the face of the record indicating this error misled the Defendant
to his prejudice, and neither the minutes nor the pleadings indicate the Defendant
alleges any prejudice prior to trial. Accordingly, we find this error to be harmless.
See State v. Poche, 05-1042 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/1/06), 924 So.2d 1225 and State v.
Roberts, 07-362 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/17/07), 947 So.2d 208, writ denied, 06-765 (La.
10/5/07), 964 So.2d 938.
Additionally, there is an error patent regarding the penalty imposed by the trial
court. At the time the Defendant committed the offense of armed robbery with use
of a firearm, La.R.S. 14:64.3(A) provided:
When the dangerous weapon used in the commission of the crime of armed robbery is a firearm, the offender shall be imprisoned for an additional period of five years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The additional penalty imposed pursuant to this Subsection shall be served consecutively to the sentence imposed under the provisions of R.S. 14:64.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court explained that the penalty for armed
robbery was ten to ninety-nine years at hard labor, and with the enhancement of
4 La.R.S. 14:64.3, an additional five years was to be added to the sentence that is
imposed. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as follows:
At this time the defendant has been found guilty of armed robbery involving a firearm, violations of 14:64 and 14:64.3.
At this time the defendant, . . . is hereby ordered to serve 25 years with the Department of Corrections. Said sentence is to be served without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentences [sic] or execution.
We find that the trial court failed to specify what portion, if any, of the
Defendant’s twenty-five year hard labor sentence, imposed for the conviction of
armed robbery with use of a firearm, included the enhanced penalty of La.R.S.
14:64.3.
Recently, this court addressed a similar issue in State v. McGinnis, 07-1419,
pp.8-9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/30/08), 981 So.2d 881, 888-89, explaining, in pertinent part:
The trial court did not specify what portion, if any, of the Defendant’s habitual offender fifty-year hard labor sentence, imposed for the conviction of armed robbery with use of a firearm, included the enhanced penalty of La.R.S. 14:64.3. . . .
...
In State v. King, 06-1903 (La.10/16/07), 969 So.2d 1228, the supreme court held that a defendant convicted of armed robbery and sentenced under the habitual offender law can be sentenced to an additional five years under La.R.S. 14:64.3, when the dangerous weapon used is a firearm.
In State v. White, 42,725 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/24/07), 968 So.2d 901, the defendant was convicted of two counts of armed robbery with a firearm, and sentenced to thirty years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on each count to run concurrently. On error patent review, the court noted that the trial court did not specify what portion, if any, of the defendant’s thirty-five year hard labor sentence without benefits was imposed under La.R.S. 14:64.3. The court found that the absence of a specification that the defendant’s sentences included a term under La.R.S. 14:64.3, rendered the defendant’s sentence indeterminate. Therefore, the court vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing according to law for
5 clarification of whether the defendant’s sentences included any additional punishment under La.R.S. 14:64.3.
This court finds that the absence of a specification that the Defendant’s habitual offender sentence included an enhanced term of imprisonment under La.R.S. 14:64.3 renders this sentence indeterminate. Therefore, this court hereby vacates the habitual offender sentence and remands for resentencing in accordance with La.R.S. 15:529.1 and 14:64.3. The trial court should clearly set forth the portion of the sentence enhanced under La.R.S. 14:64.3. Additionally, the court instructs the trial court that the portion of the sentence enhanced under La.R.S. 14:64.3 is not to be served at hard labor. See State v. Wardsworth, 04-1572 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/25/05), 904 So.2d 65.
Consequently, we find that the absence of a specification that the Defendant’s
twenty-five year sentence included an enhanced term of imprisonment under La.R.S.
14:64.3 renders his sentence indeterminate. Therefore, we will vacate the sentence
and remand the matter for resentencing in accordance with La.R.S. 14:64 and 14:64.3.
The trial court should clearly set forth the portion of the sentence enhanced under
La.R.S. 14:64.3. Additionally, we instruct the trial court that the portion of the
sentence enhanced under La.R.S. 14:64.3 is not to be served at hard labor. See
Wardsworth, 904 So.2d 65.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2:
In his second assignment of error, the Defendant contends that the State failed
to negate the probability of misidentification and, thus, failed to prove his identity as
the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt. As this assignment of error concerns the
sufficiency of the evidence, we will address this issue before the Defendant’s first
assignment of error. See State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731 (La.1992).
The Defendant does not dispute that an armed robbery occurred. However, he
asserts the evidence was insufficient to prove he committed the offense.
[W]hen the key issue is the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate
6 any reasonable probability of misidentification. State v. Weary, 03-3067 (La.4/24/06), 931 So.2d 297; State v. Neal, 00-0674 (La.6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649. Positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to support a conviction. Weary, 03-3067 at p. 18, 931 So.2d at 311; Neal, 00-0674 at p. 11, 796 So.2d at 658; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1311 (La.1988).
State v. Hughes, 05-992, pp. 5-6 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1047, 1051.
Moreover, “[i]dentification by a single witness may support a conviction
despite considerable alibi testimony. State in the Interest of Johnson, 461 So.2d 551
(La.App. 3 Cir.1984); State v. Brian, 502 So.2d 293 (La.App. 3 Cir.1987).” State v.
Henry, 95-428, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/4/95), 663 So.2d 309, 311, writ denied, 96-
681 (La. 5/16/97), 693 So.2d 793.
In brief to this court, the Defendant argues that the State failed to negate the
reasonable probability of misidentification. He asserts there was no physical
evidence linking him to the crime, as no money or weapon was recovered. The
“similar” hooded sweatshirt recovered by police from the Defendant’s residence
could be found in the closet of most young men and women and was not linked to the
crime. Additionally, surveillance cameras at the store were not working, no
fingerprint evidence was available, and the palm print that was found was unusable
for identification.*** Furthermore, the Defendant and Garrick testified that they were
on a trip on the date of the offense. The Defendant further asserts that he told police
that his cousin Marlin Harmon may have committed the offense and no photographic
line-up presented to Fontenot contained a photograph of Marlin.
The Defendant asserts that the totality of the circumstances must be considered
when determining whether there is a substantial likelihood of misidentification in
*** Fontenot testified that after Hurricane Rita, the store’s video surveillance equipment was not working properly. No fingerprints were recovered from the scene on the date of the robbery. However, a palm print was recovered. The print did not match that of the Defendant.
7 addition to a suggestive identification procedure. The Defendant asserts the
following factors must be considered: 1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal
at the time of the crime; 2) the witness’ degree of attention; 3) the accuracy of his
prior description of the criminal; 4) the level of certainty demonstrated at the
confrontation; and 5) the time between the crime and the confrontation. Based on
these factors, the Defendant asserts the likelihood of misidentification was present in
the case at bar.
We will not specifically address the five factors set forth by the Defendant in
his brief because the Defendant is not attacking the identification procedures used in
this case and does not specifically allege that the identification was suggestive.
Additionally, the Defendant did not file a motion to suppress the photographic
identification and did not object to either the photo-lineup when it was introduced at
trial or Fontenot’s in-court identification of him at trial.
However, we do find that the Defendant’s contention lacks merit. At the time
of the offense, Fontenot recognized the perpetrator as a past store customer. He was
certain of this fact and remembered helping the perpetrator select oil for his car.
Moreover, Fontenot recognized the scar on the perpetrator’s face and relayed this
information to police, recognized him several weeks later when he returned to the
store, identified the Defendant as the person who robbed the store, and also made an
in-court identification of the Defendant as the man who robbed the store.
Second, the Defendant relied on alibi testimony to assert insufficiency of the
evidence in this case. The Defendant and his girlfriend, Garrick, testified that he was
in Baton Rouge on the date of the offense. Thus, credibility is at issue.
Where conflicting testimony exists, calling for a determination of credibility of the witness is a matter of weight of the evidence and not
8 its sufficiency. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). Such a determination rests solely with the trier of fact who may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. State v. Nolan, 503 So.2d 1186 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 507 So.2d 226 (La.1987).
State v. Leger, 04-1467, p. 19 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/05), 907 So.2d 739, 754, writ
denied, 05-2263 (La. 4/17/06), 926 So.2d 509, cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 245
(2006) (quoting State v. Duncan, 93-1384, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/6/94), 635 So.2d
653, 657, writ denied, 94-1067 (La. 10/28/94), 644 So.2d 649).
“A determination of the weight to be given to a piece of evidence or to a
witness’ testimony is exclusively the province of the fact finder and, in a criminal
case, may not be reviewed on appeal. LSA-Const. Art. V, § 10(B) (1974).” State v.
Taylor, 94-1072, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/8/95), 651 So.2d 955, 959.
The jury’s verdict clearly indicates it chose to believe Fontenot’s testimony
over that of Garrick and the Defendant. That credibility determination should not be
second-guessed by this court. Accordingly, we find that the evidence presented by
the State, considered as a whole, and in a light most favorable to the prosecution, was
sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that the Defendant committed the offense
at issue herein.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1:
In his first assignment of error, the Defendant contends the trial court erred in
that the prosecutor failed to provide plausible race-neutral reasons for her peremptory
challenges to all black jurors in the venire.
The fifth circuit recently discussed the state of the law regarding Batson
challenges in State v. Cheatteam, 07-272, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/27/08), 986
So.2d 738, 743-44, as follows:
9 The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits purposeful discrimination on the basis of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In Batson, the United States Supreme Court established a three-step analysis to be applied when addressing a claim that peremptory challenges of a prospective juror were based on race. First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. Second, if the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to present a race- neutral explanation for striking the juror in question. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24. This second step “does not demand an explanation that is persuasive or even plausible,” as long as the reason is not inherently discriminatory, it suffices. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam). Third, the court must then determine whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1724. It is at this third step that implausible explanations offered by the prosecution “may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.” Purkett v. Elem, 115 S.Ct. at 1771. “[A] trial court’s ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous.” Snyder v. Louisiana, ---U.S. ----, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 1207, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008), citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1871, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991).
The Supreme Court later affirmed and applied the three-part test in Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2324, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005), and, most recently, in Snyder v. Louisiana, supra. In Miller-El, the Supreme Court emphasized the trial judge’s responsibility to assess the plausibility of the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral reason “in light of all evidence with a bearing on it.” Miller-El, 125 S.Ct. at 2331. The Supreme Court further stated:
A Batson challenge does not call for a mere exercise in thinking up any rational basis. If the stated reason does not hold up, its pretextual significance does not fade because a trial judge, or an appeals court, can imagine a reason that might not have been shown up as false.
Miller-El, 125 S.Ct. at 2332.
In its most recent case, Snyder v. Louisiana, supra, the Supreme Court again emphasized that the plausibility of the prosecutor’s explanation for a peremptory strike is to be carefully scrutinized by the trial judge under the third step of the Batson inquiry and noted that implausible reasons will fail a Batson challenge. In discussing the third step of the Batson inquiry in Snyder, the Supreme Court stressed the trial judge’s pivotal role in determining the plausibility of the state’s
10 race-neutral explanation. The Supreme Court explained that the third step requires the trial court to evaluate the prosecutor’s credibility by assessing “not only whether the prosecutor’s demeanor belies a discriminatory intent, but also whether the juror’s demeanor can credibly be said to have exhibited the basis for the strike attributed to the juror by the prosecutor.” Snyder v. Louisiana, ---U.S. ----, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 1208, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008).
Referencing its earlier decision in Miller-El, the Supreme Court again stressed that “all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted” in determining whether the explanation given for the strike is convincingly race-neutral. Snyder v. Louisiana, supra at 1208. When the record does not support the prosecutor’s proffered explanation or shows the proffered explanation to be implausible, there is an inference of discriminatory intent that sufficiently demonstrates a Batson violation. Id. at 1212.
The Defendant asserts the State did not give plausible race-neutral reasons for
the exclusion of three black jurors, Tommie White, Jr., Derrick Wheeler, and Betty
Rigmaiden. The State exercised peremptory challenges to excuse White, Wheeler,
and Rigmaiden.
During questioning of potential jurors, White was asked if he could think of
anything that would interfere with his service, and he responded, “I really wouldn’t
want to serve.” The State then mentioned that it was looking at White’s body
language. White subsequently stated that if selected he would do his duty as a juror
and return a verdict according to the evidence. However he stated that, “he would
prefer not to.”
Wheeler informed the trial court that on the previous day he forgot to inform
the parties that he went to high school with the Defendant’s cousin or aunt.
Additionally, the Defendant’s sister or aunt was his wife’s hairdresser. Wheeler
stated that he would feel uncomfortable making a decision in this case. Wheeler later
indicated that he thought the Defendant’s aunt worked at the Isle of Capri, where he
and his wife had both previously worked. Wheeler then stated he could return a
11 guilty verdict if the State did its job at trial. Wheeler subsequently indicated that he
would rather not serve on the jury, but agreed, if called upon to do so, he would do
it.
Rigmaiden indicated that in the past, a TV and VCR had been stolen from her
customized van. Rigmaiden further informed the State that her son had spent two
years in prison for drugs; however, that would not affect her ability to serve on the
jury, and any animosity she felt was directed toward her son. She further informed
the parties that her son-in-law worked in internal affairs, and her ex-son-in-law
worked for the sheriff’s department. Additionally, Rigmaiden’s sister worked at the
court of appeal. Rigmaiden stated that these things would not affect her in any way.
After the State used a peremptory strike against Rigmaiden, defense counsel
objected, stating there had only been two black persons on the jury, and the State
exercised peremptory challenges on both of them. Defense counsel asserted he
thought a Batson challenge was in order. The State then admitted that it had struck
three black jurors and stated that it did not mind articulating reasons for the
challenges. The State then informed the trial court of the following:
As to Mr. White, Mr. White’s body language demonstrated to me that I would have to work harder with him. I spent a lot of time questioning him about his reluctance to serve. He said that this was a very difficult decision for him to have to be in; he’d rather not be in that. I questioned him because I thought he was actually going to be a cause challenge for his inability to be able to make a decision in this case. When we talked about the severity of the crime, his body language demonstrated to me that I think he was trying to be honest with me, but he would not be capable of returning a verdict of guilty in an armed robbery case. He also never maintained eye contact with me, which caused me to not think that his motives were elicit or anything negative, just that he just couldn’t follow the law as given to him, and this circumstance, and would not be able to return a verdict of guilty.
12 As to Mr. Wheeler, I had great concerns when he talked about his difficulty because of the family members that he recognized outside of court. He brought all that information to the Court voluntarily. I actually really did like Mr. Wheeler as a potential juror because he talked about what’s right is right and what’s wrong is wrong, but then he also talked about the aunt of this defendant being the hairdresser for his wife and those connections to the family. He had gone to junior high school, I think, with another aunt. He talked about his knowledge of the family, how difficult it would be to return a verdict in a case where he knew all the players involved, and the State had grave concerns, given that working knowledge. The State is also aware that this defendant’s aunt works at the Isle of Capri, or at least she did at the time that she met with me a few months ago to discuss this case with me. . . . But if I recall correctly, he worked at the Isle of Capri for approximately six years, and so did his wife. When I asked him about whether or not he knew the defendant’s aunt that worked at the Isle of Capri, he mentioned, “Well, I don’t think she’s still there.” So I questioned what the relationship with this defendant’s family is, and I was very concerned that the State would not receive a fair trial with that kind of friend [sic], familiar type relationship Mr. Wheeler has with the family of this defendant.
As to Ms. Rigmaiden; I really like Ms. Rigmaiden. I think she’s a very sweet lady. I prosecuted her son, Mark Rigmaiden . . . . I’ve had contact with her daughters, especially, the daughter who is married to Corporal Franklin Fondel, with the Lake Charles Police Department, was concerned that she was not revealing that information. I think that she is aware of the fact that at least there was a black female prosecutor and the family was asking me for more of a break than I was willing to give. And I have concerns about whether or not that would surface and not give the State a fair trial in this case.
I would also like to state for the record that I am an African- American prosecutor. I would never strike someone solely because they are not jurors -- if you look at my history of juries, most of my juries -- jurors have been African-American people. I actually prefer them as jurors, not for race reasons, just because I think we, as a culture, are logically-thinking people, and we’re quite sick of crime in our neighborhoods.
Defense counsel argued that White said he “did not want to do this,” but he
“would do it if he had to.” Defense counsel further argued that White’s answer was
in line with that of other potential jurors, and body language did not seem like a
sufficient ground. As to Wheeler, defense counsel argued that he stated he knew
13 members of the Defendant’s family, and this may make him uncomfortable, but he
could “do this.” Defense counsel then asserted there was no indication that
Rigmaiden knew the prosecutor and did not demonstrate that she had any animosity
against the law. Defense counsel argued that the race-neutral reasons asserted by the
State were not sufficient.
The trial court stated that White “clearly indicated” he did not want to serve,
and it was apparent that he did not want to be a juror. Regarding Wheeler, the trial
court stated the following:
Mr. Wheeler is clearly the most obvious -- well, after he was -- overnight, he came back and had significant concerns. He seemed somewhat vague on the work relationship, but apparently -- and there was some discussion possibly with his wife with regard to the parties that he had seen, and there was some significant [sic] concerning him being in that position to have to make a decision, and he did not want to be present.
The trial court then stated that it felt Rigmaiden may have had animosity
toward the State because her son was prosecuted. Finally, the trial court then denied
defense counsel’s Batson challenge.
The Defendant argues that the State did not make a specific showing regarding
White’s body language and merely stated a conclusion. Therefore, the record did not
support the challenge as to White. In support of his argument, the Defendant cites
State v. Ball, 32,497 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/15/99), 748 So.2d 1239, writ denied, 00-385
(La. 10/6/00), 770 So.2d 360. The Defendant’s reliance on Ball is misguided.
Moreover, in State v. Rose, 606 So.2d 845, 850 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1992), the
second circuit stated that “[a] perceived lack of interest . . . is an acceptable, racially
neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge.” Based on Rose, we find that
14 the State’s reason for challenging White, asserting he was reluctant to serve, was
race-neutral.
Further, the trial court did not mention body language when making its ruling.
As such, we cannot presume that the trial court credited the State’s assertion
regarding White’s body language. See Snyder, 128 S.Ct. at 1209. Rather, it is clear
from the record that the trial court made a determination on the issue of
discriminatory intent regarding White based on all facts and circumstances presented,
and we cannot say that determination was clearly erroneous.
We also find that the State’s challenge to Wheeler was race-neutral. In State
v. Parker, 27,417 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/27/95), 661 So.2d 603, writ denied, 95-2576 (La.
2/16/6), 667 So.2d 1049, the second circuit found that jurors’ knowledge of the
family of the victim and the defendant was a well-established race-independent
ground for exercising a peremptory challenge. As such, we cannot find that the trial
court’s determination on the issue of discriminatory intent regarding Wheeler was
clearly erroneous.
Finally, we also find that the State’s challenge to Rigmaiden was race-neutral.
In State v. Scott, 04-1312, p. 6 (La. 1/19/06), 921 So.2d 904, 946, overruled on other
grounds by State v. Dunn, 07-878 (La. 1/25/08), 974 So.2d 658, the supreme court
stated:
This court has previously considered the fact that a family member is a convicted criminal a racially-neutral reason for excluding a prospective juror. See State v. Tilley, 99-0569, p. 4 (La.7/6/00), 767 So.2d 6, 18 (one venirewoman had two sons with felony convictions); State v. Lindsey, 543 So.2d 886 (La.1989). Federal courts have also approved as race-neutral challenges of prospective jurors whose family members have been in trouble with the law. See United States v. Yankton, 986 F.2d 1225, 1231 (8th Cir.1993) (venireman’s brother had criminal record).
15 As such, we cannot say, based on Scott, that the trial court’s determination on
the issue of discriminatory intent regarding Rigmaiden was clearly erroneous.
The Defendant asserts the responses of White, Wheeler, and Rigmaiden were
consistent with responses given by other prospective jurors, but points to no specific
potential jurors and has not made any specific references to the record regarding other
potential jurors. As such, we find that the Defendant has not proven his contention.
Finally, the Defendant asserts that the State’s removal of Rigmaiden was
explicit in its inclusion of race. The Defendant further asserts that Rigmaiden would
not have been excused but for her race, as the State noted its concern over the role of
a black female prosecutor. The Defendant contends that Rigmaiden was kept off the
jury because the State had a concern that she would consider the race of the
prosecutor an important factor in how a prior case was handled.
We do not interpret the State’s comments in the same manner the Defendant
did. Rather, we find that the assertion by the prosecutor indicated a concern that
Rigmaiden may determine she was the prosecutor who handled the case involving
Rigmaiden’s son. Accordingly, for the reasons asserted herein, we find that this
assignment of error lacks merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO 3:
In his third assignment of error, the Defendant contends the twenty-five year
sentence is excessive for this young first offender.
We have ruled that the Defendant’s sentence be vacated due to an error patent.
Thus, we will not address this Assignment of Error.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4:
16 In his fourth assignment of error, the Defendant contends he did not receive
effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, which
prevented him from receiving a fair trial.
The Defendant asserts the following claims of ineffective assistance of counsel:
1) a civil burden of proof was articulated by defense counsel to the jury during opening statements;
2) defense counsel did not submit a special jury instruction on the burden of proof regarding identification;
3) defense counsel did not object to the trial court’s jury instructions, which did not include the State’s burden of proof as it relates to identification/misidentification;
4) defense counsel failed to object to other crimes evidence regarding the Defendant’s use
5) defense counsel asked the Defendant if he was incarcerated at the time of trial;
6) there was no objection to the State soliciting booking information;
7) defense counsel asked the Defendant if he could have pled guilty to a lesser offense;
8) Garrick’s phone records were not subpoenaed;
9) no motion to suppress identification was filed and there was no objection to the introduction of the photographic line-up at trial;
10) defense counsel did not seek pre-trial testing of the palm print found at the store;
11) defense counsel did not seek a continuance when the State sought testing of the palm print at the beginning of trial, despite the Defendant’s having expressed his desire to have the testing done and his request for a new attorney;
12) defense counsel did not object to Detective Single’s opinion testimony regarding the Defendant’s resemblance to Marlin;
13) defense counsel did not conduct an investigation regarding Marlin or issue subpoenas for this possible defense;
17 14) defense counsel did not object when Fontenot testified that Garrick told him she believed the Defendant committed the offense; and
15) the Defendant’s lack of contact with defense counsel.
In State v. Matthis, 07-691, p. 7 (La. 11/2/07), 970 So.2d 505, 509, the supreme
court discussed ineffective assistance of counsel as follows:
[T]he standard for ineffective assistance of counsel set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), adopted by this Court in State v. Washington, 491 So.2d 1337, 1339 (La.1986), requires respondent to show not only that his trial attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms but also that counsel’s inadequate performance prejudiced him to the extent that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict suspect, i.e. that counsel’s errors undermined the proper functioning of the adversary process.
In State v. Duplichan, 06-852, p. 9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/06), 945 So.2d 170,
177, writ denied, 07-148 (La. 9/28/07), 964 So.2d 351, this court stated the following:
[T]his court often defers such claims to the post-conviction process, so the record can be developed in regard to the issue at hand. However, this court will address ineffective assistance claims on appeal, when the record is sufficient to analyze the claim. State v. Wommack, 00-137 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, writ denied, 00-2051 (La.9/21/01), 797 So.2d 62.
Opening Statement
During his opening statement, defense counsel told the jury that the Defendant
was presumed innocent until the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
he committed the offense. While defense counsel’s remarks were incorrect, the
Defendant cannot prove that he was prejudiced by defense counsel’s remarks. The
trial court, during its final instructions to the jury, stated that the Defendant was
presumed innocent until each element of the offense was proven beyond a reasonable
doubt and defined that term for the jury. Thus, the Defendant failed to meet his
burden of proof regarding this claim.
18 Jury Instruction
The Defendant contends defense counsel was ineffective for failing to submit
a special jury instruction regarding the burden of proof in cases concerning issues of
identification/misidentification and in failing to object to the trial court’s failure to
include such an instruction in the final jury instructions. We do not agree.
A review of the record indicates that defense counsel did not request a special
jury instruction regarding identity. However, in its instructions to the jury, the trial
court informed the jury that the State was required to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the “alleged offense was committed by Damon Lee Harmon, the person
named in the bill of information and on trial in this case.” This instruction did alert
the jury to the issue regarding identity.
Moreover, in brief to this court, the Defendant has not set forth the substance
of the special jury instruction that defense counsel should have requested.
Accordingly, as the Defendant has not sufficiently briefed this issue, we relegate this
claim to post-conviction relief.
Other Crimes Evidence
Fontenot testified that when the Defendant entered the store on December 23,
2005, the Defendant stated he was on “wet” on the day of the robbery. Fontenot
further testified that “wet” is a marijuana cigarette dipped in formaldehyde. Defense
counsel did not object to this testimony, and the Defendant argues this constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel.
The erroneous admission of other crimes evidence is subject to harmless-error
analysis. See State v. Blank, 04-204 (La. 4/11/07) 955 So.2d 90, cert. denied, __ U.S.
__, 128 S.Ct. 494 (2007).
19 We find that this evidence was harmless. Even if defense counsel’s failure to
object to the admission of other crimes evidence constituted deficient performance,
the record does not show that, but for defense counsel’s failure to object to this
evidence, the outcome of the Defendant’s trial would have been different. See
Assignment of Error No. 2. Therefore, the Defendant did not prove prejudice as
required by Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. Accordingly, the Defendant has failed to prove
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this issue.
Defendant’s Incarceration
During the Defendant’s testimony, defense counsel asked the Defendant if he
was incarcerated at that time. The Defendant asserts that such questioning amounts
to ineffective assistance of counsel.
We find that the record before the court is insufficient to rule on the
Defendant’s claim. Accordingly, this claim should be relegated to post-conviction
relief.
Booking Information
The Defendant asserts that defense counsel’s failure to object to the State’s
solicitation of booking information constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. In
support of this claim, the Defendant cites to record page 877. There is no testimony
on that page of the record. Thus, this issue was improperly briefed. As such, it is
regulated to post-conviction relief.
Plea Offer
During the Defendant’s testimony, defense counsel asked the Defendant if he
was aware that he could have pled guilty to a lesser offense and avoided going to
trial. The Defendant asserts this amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.
20 It is well settled that decisions relating to investigation, preparation, and strategy require an evidentiary hearing and cannot possibly be reviewed on appeal. Only in an evidentiary hearing in the district court, where the defendant could present evidence beyond that contained in the instant record, could these allegations be sufficiently investigated.
State v. Smith, 06-820, pp. 17-18 (La.App.1 Cir. 12/28/06), 952 So.2d 1, 12, writ
denied, 07-211 (La. 9/28/07), 964 So.2d 352 (citation omitted).
We find that defense counsel’s questioning may have amounted to trial
strategy. Thus, the record before the court is insufficient to rule on the Defendant’s
claim. Accordingly, this claim is relegated to post-conviction relief.
Phone Records
Garrick testified that Fontenot called her four times. However, her phone
records were not introduced at trial. The Defendant asserts defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to subpoena Garrick’s phone records. Decisions relating to
investigation and preparation require an evidentiary hearing. Thus, this claim is
relegated to post-conviction relief. See Smith, 952 So.2d 1.
Photographic Line-Up
The Defendant asserts defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
motion to suppress the photographic line-up and failing to object to the introduction
of the line-up at trial.
The record shows that defense counsel did not file a motion to suppress the
identification. “For purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the filing
of pretrial motions is squarely within the ambit of the attorney’s trial strategy, and
counsel is not required to engage in futility.” State v. Pendelton, 96-367, p. 23
(La.App. 5 Cir. 5/28/97), 696 So.2d 144, 156, writ denied, 97-1714 (La. 12/19/97),
706 So.2d 450 (citation omitted).
21 Again, the record before the court is insufficient to rule on the Defendant’s
claim. Accordingly, this claim is also relegated to post-conviction relief where an
evidentiary hearing can be had.
Palm Print
The Defendant asserts that defense counsel was ineffective because he did not
seek pre-trial testing of a palm print found at the store. The State had the palm print
at issue tested on the date testimony began. The print did not match that of the
Defendant. As the print did not match that of the Defendant, he cannot prove he was
prejudiced by said testing, or lack thereof.
Continuance
The Defendant asserts that defense counsel was ineffective in that he did not
seek a continuance when the State sought to have the palm print tested at the time
trial began, despite the Defendant’s having expressed his desire to have the testing
done and his request for a new attorney. The palm print at issue did not match that
of the Defendant; therefore, the Defendant cannot prove he was prejudiced by defense
counsel’s failure to request a continuance. Furthermore, the trial court indicated,
when discussing the possibility of the Defendant hiring new counsel, that, even if he
were to get new counsel, the matter would proceed to trial as scheduled.
Opinion Testimony Regarding Marlin
The Defendant asserts that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to Detective Single’s opinion testimony regarding the Defendant’s resemblance to
Marlin.
As we stated in the facts above, when the Defendant was questioned by police,
he informed Detective Single that his cousin, Marlin Harmon, may have committed
22 the offense. Detective Single testified that he reviewed Marlin’s criminal history and
his photograph. Detective Single further testified that the original suspect’s
description was a male, five feet to five feet five inches tall, twenty to twenty-five
years of age, weighing one hundred twenty-five to one hundred fifty pounds.
Detective Single testified that Marlin was listed as being five feet six to seven inches
tall, was a bit heavier than the suspect, and was approximately ten years older than
the suspect. Detective Single then testified that he did not see a resemblance between
Marlin and the Defendant.
In State v. Jefferson, 04-1960 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/21/05), 922 So.2d 577, writ
denied, 06-940 (La. 10/27/06), 939 So.2d 1276, the defendant argued that the trial
court erred in qualifying a detective as an expert in voice analysis. This argument
was based on the trial court’s overruling of defense counsel’s objection to the
detective identifying the voice of a witness when a 911 recording was played at trial.
The fourth circuit set forth the following:
La. C.E. art. 701 permits a lay witness to testify in the form of opinions or inferences as long as those opinions or inferences satisfy two requirements: (i) the opinions are rationally based on the perception of the witness, and (ii) they are helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
By way of example, in State v. Davis, 2000-0275 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/14/01), 781 So.2d 633, we found La. C.E. art. 701 applied to allow a cash management supervisor to identify a defendant’s handwriting. In that case, the defendant was charged with theft of cash payments received by him from patients during the course of his employment as a supervisor of bank transactions at LSU Medical Center (“LSU”). LSU’s cash management supervisor identified the defendant’s handwriting on a document admitted into evidence. On appeal, the defendant raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed to object to that handwriting identification testimony on the ground that the managing supervisor had not been qualified as an expert in handwriting analysis. Rejecting that claim, we cited La. C.E. art. 701. We reasoned that the managing supervisor’s identification of the defendant’s handwriting was rationally based upon
23 her personal observations of the defendant’s handwriting. We also noted that the defendant had admitted that the signature on the document was his.
Id. at 597.
In Jefferson, the detective testified that he was able to recognize the witness’
voice based on the time he spent with him. During his investigation of the shooting,
the detective had interviewed the witness at police headquarters in August 2001; that
interview was recorded. During the week of the trial, the detective located the
witness and had a lengthy meeting with him. The detective testified that at the
meeting he played the witness the tape from their August 2001 interview and the 911
tape of the witness’ call to police on the morning of the shooting. Although the
witness agreed to testify at trial, he failed to appear. The fourth circuit found that,
given the circumstances, the record supported the trial court’s apparent conclusion
that both of the requirements of La.Code Evid. art. 701 were satisfied.
Based on the fourth circuit’s decision in Jefferson, we find that Detective
Single’s testimony was admissible. Accordingly, defense counsel was not ineffective
for failing to object to that testimony.
Failure to Investigate Marlin
The Defendant asserts defense counsel did not conduct an investigation
regarding Marlin and did not issue subpoenas for a possible defense.
We find that decisions relating to investigation require an evidentiary hearing
and cannot possibly be reviewed on appeal. Thus, this claim is relegated to post-
conviction relief. See Smith, 952 So.2d 1.
Fontenot’s Testimony
24 The Defendant asserts defense counsel was ineffective in that he failed to
object to Fontenot’s testimony that Garrick said that she believed the Defendant
committed the offense.
Fontenot testified that a woman came into the store to discuss the robbery and
told him, “now I don’t know who to believe, because I was believing he didn’t do it,
but now I believe he did it.” Defense counsel did not object to this testimony.
The Defendant did not assert, in brief to this court, the basis for an objection
by defense counsel. Therefore, we find that this issue has not been properly briefed
and find that the record before the court is insufficient to rule on the Defendant’s
claim. As such, we regulate the issue to post-conviction relief.
Contact With Defense Counsel
The Defendant asserts defense counsel was ineffective due to his lack of
communication with the Defendant. On January 24, 2007, the Defendant addressed
the trial court. He stated that he had been incarcerated for thirteen months, and “I
ain’t never talked to nobody.” The Defendant then stated, “he come at me with a
plea” and said if the plea was not accepted, the trial would begin the next day. The
Defendant then informed the trial court that his family had obtained the money to hire
an attorney. The trial court subsequently informed the Defendant that if the attorney
could start selecting the jury that day, the hiring of a new attorney was fine.
Defense counsel was outside the courtroom when this occurred. Upon
returning to the court room, defense counsel discussed the matter of his representation
of the Defendant with the trial court, but was not asked if he had met with the
Defendant within the past thirteen months.
25 Accordingly, the record before the court is insufficient to rule on the
Defendant’s claim. Thus, we regulate this claim to post-conviction relief.
CONCLUSION:
The Defendant’s conviction is affirmed. However, the Defendant’s sentence
is vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing in accordance with La.R.S. 14:64
and 14:64.3. The trial court should clearly set forth the portion of the sentence
enhanced under La.R.S. 14:64.3. Additionally, we instruct the trial court that the
portion of the sentence enhanced under La.R.S. 14:64.3 is not to be served at hard
labor.
THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform Rules– Courts of
Appeal, Rule 2–16.3.