Judgment rendered February 25, 2026. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 922, La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,754-KA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
DAMION DARON SHERFIELD Appellant
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 387,699
Honorable Donald Edgar Hathaway, Jr., Judge
LOUISIANA APPEALS Counsel for Appellant & WRIT SERVICE By: Remy V. Starns Holli Ann Herrle-Castillo Michael Anthony Mitchell
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
TOMMY J. JOHNSON JASON WAYNE WALTMAN CHRISTOPHER BOWMAN Assistant District Attorneys
Before PITMAN, COX, and STEPHENS, JJ. COX, J.
This criminal appeal arises from the First Judicial District Court,
Caddo Parish, Louisiana. Defendant, Damion Daron Sherfield (“Sherfield”),
was convicted of second degree murder in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1, for
which he was sentenced to life without parole, probation, or suspension of
sentence. For the reasons assigned, Sherfield’s conviction is affirmed.
FACTS
Sherfield was indicted by a grand jury on May 26, 2022, for one count
of second degree murder of Roderick Walker (“Walker”). Trial commenced
on March 24, 2025, wherein the following pertinent evidence and testimony
was presented:
Tarek Abuzeid (“Abuzeid”) testified that he worked as a cashier at
Village Foods, a neighborhood grocery store, along with Walker, who was
asked to work as unofficial store security because people often stole items
from the store. Abuzeid stated that he was familiar with Sherfield because
Sherfield often went to the store. Abuzeid identified Sherfield in open court,
explaining that he had known Sherfield since he (Sherfield) was a child.
Abuzeid then testified that he and Walker were both working on February
15, 2022, when the shooting occurred. He explained that on the day of the
shooting, Walker went to the back of the store to retrieve his jacket before
leaving to pick his daughter up from school. At the same time Sherfield
entered the store, Walker then made his way out of the store. Abuzeid stated
that at some point, Sherfield left the store, and he continued working.
Abuzeid stated that he was checking out two customers when he heard
two loud pops, which he realized were gunshots. Abuzeid explained that
Walker came in the store holding his stomach, and stated, “T, I got hit.” Abuzeid stated that he did not know Walker had a gun until Walker fell on
the floor and pulled the weapon out of his pocket and placed it on the floor.
Abuzeid admitted that when the shooting occurred, he grabbed his own gun
and he put Walker’s gun in a file cabinet so no one else could take it.
The State then entered video surveillance from the store on the day of
the shooting, and Abuzeid clarified that while the store had surveillance, the
system did not have sound. In reviewing the surveillance footage, Abuzeid
identified Sherfield as he entered the store and Walker as he left. Abuzeid
noted that Walker’s hands were in his pockets, and a gun could be seen in
Sherfield’s pocket. Abuzeid then identified the moment Sherfield left the
store and noted that it appeared Sherfield seemed to speak with Walker.
Abuzeid testified that during that time, he was inside the store and could not
hear or see what happened outside.
In reviewing the exterior surveillance footage, Abuzeid explained that
Sherfield could be seen leaving the store, pulling out a gun, coming back
toward the store, and then raising the gun for approximately two seconds
before firing at Walker. Abuzeid stated that Sherfield then fled and went
into the parking lot of a church near the store. After reviewing the video,
Abuzeid maintained that in the moments leading up to the shooting, he never
heard yelling, arguments, or loud conversation, and that the day had been
normal until that moment.
Officer Juliann Stralow (“Officer Stralow”), of the Shreveport Police
Department (“SPD”), testified that she was dispatched to Village Foods on
February 15, 2022, following a shooting. Officer Stralow testified that when
she arrived, she saw the victim on the floor of the store with what appeared
to be a gunshot wound in his stomach. Officer Dominic Claiborne (“Officer 2 Claiborne”) testified that he was also dispatched to the scene and was
informed that the suspect was a light-skinned black man wearing a blue
jacket. Officer Claiborne stated he and other officers on the scene searched
the surrounding area but were unable to find the suspect or a discarded
firearm.
Corporal Shelia Taylor (“Cpl. Taylor”), a crime scene investigator for
SPD, testified that she photographed the area and saw spent shell casings
and one live round on the floor. She explained that a live round is a bullet
that has been expended from a semi-automatic firearm after the slide on the
gun was moved back. Cpl. Taylor then identified a photograph of a firearm
recovered from a file cabinet in the store, noting that it was a .380 ACP
Cobra Denali with a firearm magazine, which was placed there by the store
employee.
Phillip Stout (“Stout”), an expert in the field of forensic firearms
identification and examination, testified that as part of his examination, he
performed test shots of the recovered .380 Cobra handgun and the 9 mm
cartridge casings found at the scene. Stout determined that the handgun
could not have fired the 9 mm cartridge casings, and that while he was not
able to test the spent casings on another weapon, he determined that the
casings were all fired from the same weapon.
Dr. James Traylor (“Dr. Traylor”), tendered as an expert witness in
forensic pathology, testified that he performed Walker’s autopsy. He
determined that Walker’s cause of death was a gunshot wound located on
the left side of Walker’s chest. Dr. Traylor testified that he also performed a
toxicology report, which revealed Walker had methamphetamine and THC
3 in his system at the time of death, which he determined was likely ingested
shorty before the shooting occurred.
Detective Jeremy Blanchard (“Det. Blanchard”) testified that he
assisted in questioning Sherfield after the shooting. Det. Blanchard stated
that Sherfield turned himself in because he believed that Walker did not
deserve to be shot. Det. Blanchard stated that the interview was recorded,
and the video was played for the jury with the caveat that two portions of the
video would be muted. Det. Blanchard explained that during the interview,
Sherfield admitted that he shot Walker but expressed that he did not intend
to kill him; his emotions just got the best of him.
Finally, Corporal Ashley Thrift (“Cpl. Thrift”), lead investigator, first
identified Sherfield in open court. Cpl. Thrift then reviewed the store
surveillance video, noting Sherfield could be seen entering the store with his
hand on his pocket, as if clutching something. Cpl. Thrift then identified the
moment in which Sherfield could be seen removing a gun from his right
pocket and raising it for approximately two seconds before firing the gun
three times, racking the slide of the gun back as he did.
Cpl. Thrift stated that once shot, Walker fell on the ground, got up,
went inside the store, and ran down an aisle. She stated that at that time,
nothing was seen in Walker’s hand, and it was not likely that he would have
had enough time to put a gun back in his pocket from the time he fell and got
back up. However, she also admitted that Walker either spoke to or made a
gesture at Sherfield and that Walker was later seen putting a gun down on
the floor of the store. Cpl. Thrift stated that it did not appear that Walker
acted aggressively toward Sherfield.
4 Cpl. Thrift stated that during Sherfield’s interview, he stated he fired
because Walker gave him a “mad dog look” and mumbled something under
his breath, not that he saw Walker was armed. Cpl. Thrift stated that while
Sherfield claimed that he only intended to shoot Walker in the leg, in her
experience, to shoot someone in the chest, a person would have had to aim
for that area of the body.
The State rested and Sherfield’s counsel called Renita Sherfield
(“Renita”), Sherfield’s mother, to testify. Renita stated that on the day of the
shooting, she had taken Sherfield to get a haircut at the barbershop located
next to Village Foods. Renita stated that she waited in the car while
Sherfield went inside the barbershop. She stated that during that time, she
saw Walker continue to walk back and forth between the barbershop and
Village Foods. She stated that at one point, Walker looked in her car, and
because of his behavior, she asked Sherfield if he knew Walker.
Finally, Sherfield testified on his own behalf. Sherfield stated that on
the day of the shooting he went to get a haircut, but because there was a long
wait, he went to the store next door to talk with Abuzeid. He explained that
while in the store, he noticed Walker looking at him, and Walker had his
hand in his jacket pocket, which gave him the impression that Walker had a
gun in his pocket. Sherfield stated he eventually asked Walker why he was
watching him, to which Walker only mumbled something incoherent, and
then stated, “I’ll f*** you over.” Sherfield stated he felt threatened by
Walker’s statement and the way he acted.
On cross-examination, Sherfield clarified that he thought Walker
acted strangely because he was possibly on drugs but admitted he did not
relay that information to officers. Sherfield also admitted that he did not see 5 a gun in Walker’s hand but did see a bulge in Walker’s jacket pocket that
Walker appeared to grip. Sherfield reiterated that while he was not certain
whether Walker had a gun on his person, he believed that Walker did
because of the bulge in Walker’s jacket pocket, and the way Walker
appeared to be holding the object. Sherfield stated that when he fled the
scene, his gun fell out of his pocket, and he went to an abandoned home
where he put on clothes he found in the home. Sherfield stated he was
scared but turned himself in because he wanted to make things right.
At the close of testimony, the jury found Sherfield guilty as charged.
On March 31, 2025, defense counsel filed a motion for new trial and motion
for post verdict judgment of acquittal, which were both denied. Sherfield
was sentenced on April 9, 2025, to life imprisonment without benefit of
parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Sherfield presents one assignment of error for review:
whether the State presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find him guilty
of second degree murder rather than the responsive verdict of manslaughter.
Sherfield does not dispute that he shot Walker; rather, he argues that
Walker not only behaved strangely moments before the shooting, which put
Sherfield on alert, but that Walker had also threatened Sherfield, which led
to the shooting. Sherfield notes that before the shooting, Walker had paced
back and forth in front of the store and looked into Renita’s vehicle, which
concerned her. Sherfield further notes that Walker had stared at him while
his hands were in his pockets, which led Sherfield to believe that Walker
was on drugs and likely had a gun on his person. Sherfield argues that when
6 he approached, Walker mumbled something incoherent, and then threatened
Sherfield by stating, “I’ll f*** you over.”
Sherfield maintains that Walker’s erratic behavior, threatening
statement, and body language, which indicated Walker had a weapon,
collectively caused Sherfield to lose self-control and act within the heat of
the moment. Given this, Sherfield argues that this Court should amend his
conviction to manslaughter and vacate and remand his sentence.
The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence
claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.
Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124
S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004); State v. Grimble, 51,446 (La. App. 2
Cir. 7/5/17), 224 So. 3d 498.
This standard, now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821,
does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own
appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Dotie, 43,819
(La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/09), 1 So. 3d 833, writ denied, 09-0310 (La. 11/6/09),
21 So. 3d 297. The appellate court does not assess the credibility of
witnesses or reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661
So. 2d 442. A reviewing court accords great deference to a jury’s decision
to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v.
Eason, 43,788 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/25/09), 3 So. 3d 685, writ denied, 09-0725
(La. 12/11/09), 23 So. 3d 913.
7 Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the
resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the
witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.
State v. Alexander, 51,918 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/11/18), 247 So. 3d 981, writ
denied, 18-0805 (La. 2/11/19), 263 So. 3d 436. The trier of fact is charged
with making a credibility determination and may, within the bounds of
rationality, accept or reject the testimony of any witness in whole or in part.
The reviewing court may impinge on that discretion only to the extent
necessary to guarantee the fundamental due process of law. Id.
The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and
circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by
viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When
the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct
evidence and inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient
for a rational trier of fact to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Sutton,
436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983); State v. Hampton, 52,403 (La. App. 2 Cir.
11/14/18), 261 So. 3d 993, writ denied, 19-0287 (La. 4/29/19), 268 So. 3d
1029.
Circumstantial evidence is defined as evidence of facts or
circumstances from which one might infer or conclude the existence of other
connected facts. Hampton, supra. Direct evidence provides proof of the
existence of a fact, for example, a witness’s testimony that he saw or heard
something. Circumstantial evidence provides proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred 8 according to reason and common experience. State v. Lilly, 468 So. 2d 1154
(La. 1985); Hampton, supra.
Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the
offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S.
14:30.1(A)(1). La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1) states that manslaughter is:
A homicide which would be murder under ... Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender’s blood had actually cooled, or that an average person’s blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed[.]
A defendant who claims provocation as a means of reducing murder
to manslaughter bears the burden of proving these elements by a
preponderance of the evidence. State v. McGee, 51,977 (La. App. 2 Cir.
4/3/19), 316 So. 3d 1196, writ denied, 19-00761 (La. 11/19/19), 282 So. 3d
1066. Provocation and the time for cooling are questions for the jury to
determine according to the standard of the average or ordinary person. Id.,
citing State v. Leger, 05-0011 (La. 7/10/06), 936 So. 2d 108, cert. denied,
549 U.S. 1221, 127 S. Ct. 1279, 167 L. Ed. 2d 100 (2007).
“Sudden passion” and “heat of blood,” which distinguish
manslaughter from homicide, are not elements of the offense, but mitigatory
factors exhibiting a degree of culpability less than is present when the
homicide is committed without them. State v. Tompkins, 403 So. 2d 644
(La. 1981); State v. Arnold, 30,282 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/21/98), 706 So. 2d
578; State v. Armstrong, 32,279 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/22/99), 743 So. 2d 284,
writ denied, 99-3151 (La. 4/7/00), 759 So. 2d 92. A defendant who shows
by a preponderance of the evidence that these mitigatory factors are present
9 is entitled to the verdict of manslaughter. State v. Lombard, 486 So. 2d 106
(La. 1986). However, the defendant is not obligated to establish the factors
affirmatively; instead, the jury may infer them from the overall evidence
presented. State v. Jackson, 34,076 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/6/00), 774 So. 2d
1046. The reviewing court’s function is to determine whether a rational trier
of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, could
have found that the mitigatory factors were not established by a
preponderance of the evidence. State v. Lombard, supra.
Provocative acts held to rise to the level of mitigating conduct involve
physical threats or actions on the part of the victim. State v. Heard, 22-378
(La. App. 3 Cir. 11/23/22), 353 So. 3d 326, writ denied, 22-01829 (La.
4/18/23), 359 So. 3d 508. Mere words or gestures, however offensive or
insulting, will not reduce homicide from murder to manslaughter. State v.
Mitchell, 39,202 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/15/04), 889 So. 2d 1257, writ denied,
05-0132 (La. 4/29/05), 901 So. 2d 1063.
When a defendant raises self-defense as an issue, the burden is on the
State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not
perpetrated in self-defense. La. C. Cr. P. art. 390. In determining whether a
defendant had a reasonable belief that the killing was necessary, factors that
may be considered include the excitement and confusion of the situation, the
possibility of using force short of killing, and the defendant’s knowledge of
the assailant’s bad character. The question on a sufficiency of the evidence
review is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that the homicide was not committed in self-defense or in the defense
10 of others. State v. Lensey, 50,242 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 182 So. 3d
1059, writ denied, 15-2344 (La. 3/14/16), 189 So. 3d 1066.
Sherfield argues that the totality of Walker’s actions, i.e., giving
Sherfield a “mad dog look,” mumbling something incoherent, appearing to
hold onto a concealed object in his pocket, and stating, “I’ll f*** you up,”
was enough to deprive him of his self-control. However, the evidence in this
case reflects that in the moments leading up to the shooting, Sherfield and
Walker had not gotten into a physical fight or a verbal altercation. Instead,
the store employee testified that until the shooting, everything was normal.
Moreover, while Sherfield stated that Walker stated, “I’ll f*** you up,” he
did not threaten to shoot Sherfield, and his words, as seen in the store’s
video surveillance, were not accompanied by threatening gestures,
movements, or aggressive acts.
Instead, after Walker made this statement, Sherfield removed his own
gun from his pocket, waited only two seconds, and fired three times at
Walker before fleeing the scene. Sherfield asserts that he believed Walker
was armed because of the bulge in Walker’s jacket pocket. We note that
Sherfield admitted that this was only a belief and that at no point did he ever
see a gun on Walker’s person. While the store’s video surveillance revealed
Walker did have a gun in his pocket, the video makes clear that at no point
leading up to the shooting did Walker ever brandish the gun or remove it
from his pocket. Cpl. Thrift also testified that during Sherfield’s interview,
he stated he fired because Walker gave him a “mad dog look” and mumbled
something under his breath, not that he saw Walker was armed.
Given the totality of the evidence and testimony presented, we find
that any rational trier of fact could have found that the mitigating factors of 11 “sudden passion” and “heat of blood” were not established by a
preponderance of the evidence in this case. After a thorough review of the
record, we are not convinced that Walker’s actions and statements, without
more, were sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of their self-control or
cool reflection. Accordingly, we find that there was sufficient evidence for a
jury to find Sherfield guilty of second degree murder, rather than the
responsive verdict of manslaughter.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, Damon Sherfield’s conviction is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.