NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
NO. 2019 KA 1588
g STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
CURTIS L. HALL
Judgment Rendered. JUL 2 4 2020
Appealed from the 22nd Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of St. Tammany State of Louisiana Case No. 577425
The Honorable William H. Burris, Judge Presiding
Prentice L. White Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Baton Rouge, Louisiana Curtis L. Hall
Warren L. Montgomery Counsel for Appellee District Attorney State of Louisiana J. Bryant Clark, Jr.
Assistant District Attorney Covington, Louisiana
BEFORE: McDONALD, THERIOT, AND CHUTZ, JJ. THERIOT, J.
The defendant, Curtis L. Hall, was charged by bill of information with
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a violation of La. R. S. 14: 95. 1. He
pled not guilty. The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, a hearing was
held on the matter, and the motion to suppress was denied. Following a jury trial,
the defendant was found guilty as charged. The defendant filed a motion for
postverdict judgment of acquittal, which was denied. The State filed a habitual
offender bill of information.' In exchange for a " double bill" and an agreed upon
sentence, the defendant admitted to a prior conviction and stipulated as to his
identity. The trial court adjudicated the defendant a second -felony habitual
offender and sentenced him to twenty years imprisonment at hard labor without
benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant now
appeals, designating two assignments of error. We affirm the conviction, habitual
offender adjudication, and sentence.
FACTS
On June 10, 2016, Slidell Police Department Officer Bradley Peck
conducted a traffic stop on the defendant, who was blocking traffic flow in the
middle of an intersection in Slidell. The defendant was driving a Buick LaCrosse
rental vehicle.2 When the defendant pulled over, Officer Peck observed the driver
making furtive movements toward the center console area. When Officer Peck
approached the Buick, he noticed a strong odor of marijuana emanating from the
vehicle. The defendant did not have a driver' s license. The defendant was asked
to exit the vehicle. As he got out, the defendant tried to lock and shut the driver' s
The habitual offender bill of information indicated the defendant had prior convictions for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, crime against nature, distribution of cocaine, aggravated battery, and possession of cocaine. 2 At the pretrial motion to suppress hearing, the defendant testified that a lady who came to his house let him borrow her rental car. Jan Marie Homrich ( sometimes spelled " Homerich" in the record) rented the vehicle, using her boyfriend' s name and credit card, from Enterprise Rent-A- Car. Homrich was subpoenaed as a trial witness, but failed to appear for trial.
2 door, which Officer Peck prevented. Officer Peck detained the defendant and
placed him in the back of his unit. Officer Peck returned to the Buick and saw a
firearm between the driver' s side seat and the center console. Officer Peck
retrieved the semi- automatic pistol, which was loaded and had a round in the
chamber. Officer Peck confirmed the defendant was a convicted felon and arrested
him for possessing a firearm.
The defendant did not testify at trial.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court erred
in sentencing him without ruling on his motion for postverdict judgment of
acquittal.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 821( A) provides that "[ a]
motion for a post verdict judgment of acquittal must be made and disposed of
before sentence." Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 873 requires at
least a twenty-four hour delay between denial of such a post -trial motion and
sentencing unless the defendant expressly waives the required delay. State v.
Gardner, 2016- 0192 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 19/ 16), 204 So. 3d 265, 270. The record
before us indicates the defendant was found guilty on December 5, 2018. The
defendant' s motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal was filed on December
26, 2018 and denied by the trial court on January 4, 2019. The defendant was
sentenced on August 20, 2019.
This assignment of error is without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court
erred in denying the motion to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle.
3 Specifically, the defendant contends that Officer Peck did not have probable cause
to search the vehicle.'
Trial courts are vested with great discretion when ruling on a motion to
suppress. State v. Long, 2003- 2592 ( La. 9/ 9/ 04), 884 So. 2d 1176, 1179, cert.
denied, 544 U.S. 977, 125 S. Ct. 1860, 161 L.Ed.2d 728 ( 2005). When a trial court
denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be
reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court' s discretion, i.e., unless
such ruling is not supported by the evidence. See State v. Green, 94- 0887 ( La.
5/ 22/ 95), 655 So. 2d 272, 280- 81. However, a trial court' s legal findings are
subject to a de novo standard of review. See State v. Hunt, 2009- 1589 ( La.
12/ 1/ 09), 25 So. 3d 746, 751. Although not required to do so, an appellate court
may review testimony adduced at trial, in addition to the testimony adduced at the
suppression hearing, in determining the correctness of the trial court' s ruling on the
motion to suppress. State v. Leger, 2005- 0011 ( La. 7/ 10/ 06), 936 So. 2d 108, 122,
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1221, 127 S. Ct. 1279, 167 L.Ed.2d 100 ( 2007)
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, § 5,
of the Louisiana Constitution protect people against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Subject only to a few well- established exceptions, a search or seizure
conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is constitutionally
prohibited. Once a defendant makes an initial showing that a warrantless search or
seizure occurred, the burden of proof shifts to the State to affirmatively show it
was justified under one of the narrow exceptions to the rule requiring a search
warrant. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 703( D); State v. Johnson, 98- 0264 ( La. App.
1st Cir. 12/ 28/ 98), 728 So. 2d 885, 886. Evidence derived from an unreasonable
The defendant in brief labels this assignment of error as " Insufficiency of the Evidence Suppression of Illegally Obtained Evidence)." The defendant herein addresses only the pretrial ruling of the seizure of the gun and, as such, the evidentiary argument in this assignment of error is one of suppression, not sufficiency.
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
NO. 2019 KA 1588
g STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
CURTIS L. HALL
Judgment Rendered. JUL 2 4 2020
Appealed from the 22nd Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of St. Tammany State of Louisiana Case No. 577425
The Honorable William H. Burris, Judge Presiding
Prentice L. White Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Baton Rouge, Louisiana Curtis L. Hall
Warren L. Montgomery Counsel for Appellee District Attorney State of Louisiana J. Bryant Clark, Jr.
Assistant District Attorney Covington, Louisiana
BEFORE: McDONALD, THERIOT, AND CHUTZ, JJ. THERIOT, J.
The defendant, Curtis L. Hall, was charged by bill of information with
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a violation of La. R. S. 14: 95. 1. He
pled not guilty. The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, a hearing was
held on the matter, and the motion to suppress was denied. Following a jury trial,
the defendant was found guilty as charged. The defendant filed a motion for
postverdict judgment of acquittal, which was denied. The State filed a habitual
offender bill of information.' In exchange for a " double bill" and an agreed upon
sentence, the defendant admitted to a prior conviction and stipulated as to his
identity. The trial court adjudicated the defendant a second -felony habitual
offender and sentenced him to twenty years imprisonment at hard labor without
benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant now
appeals, designating two assignments of error. We affirm the conviction, habitual
offender adjudication, and sentence.
FACTS
On June 10, 2016, Slidell Police Department Officer Bradley Peck
conducted a traffic stop on the defendant, who was blocking traffic flow in the
middle of an intersection in Slidell. The defendant was driving a Buick LaCrosse
rental vehicle.2 When the defendant pulled over, Officer Peck observed the driver
making furtive movements toward the center console area. When Officer Peck
approached the Buick, he noticed a strong odor of marijuana emanating from the
vehicle. The defendant did not have a driver' s license. The defendant was asked
to exit the vehicle. As he got out, the defendant tried to lock and shut the driver' s
The habitual offender bill of information indicated the defendant had prior convictions for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, crime against nature, distribution of cocaine, aggravated battery, and possession of cocaine. 2 At the pretrial motion to suppress hearing, the defendant testified that a lady who came to his house let him borrow her rental car. Jan Marie Homrich ( sometimes spelled " Homerich" in the record) rented the vehicle, using her boyfriend' s name and credit card, from Enterprise Rent-A- Car. Homrich was subpoenaed as a trial witness, but failed to appear for trial.
2 door, which Officer Peck prevented. Officer Peck detained the defendant and
placed him in the back of his unit. Officer Peck returned to the Buick and saw a
firearm between the driver' s side seat and the center console. Officer Peck
retrieved the semi- automatic pistol, which was loaded and had a round in the
chamber. Officer Peck confirmed the defendant was a convicted felon and arrested
him for possessing a firearm.
The defendant did not testify at trial.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court erred
in sentencing him without ruling on his motion for postverdict judgment of
acquittal.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 821( A) provides that "[ a]
motion for a post verdict judgment of acquittal must be made and disposed of
before sentence." Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 873 requires at
least a twenty-four hour delay between denial of such a post -trial motion and
sentencing unless the defendant expressly waives the required delay. State v.
Gardner, 2016- 0192 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 19/ 16), 204 So. 3d 265, 270. The record
before us indicates the defendant was found guilty on December 5, 2018. The
defendant' s motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal was filed on December
26, 2018 and denied by the trial court on January 4, 2019. The defendant was
sentenced on August 20, 2019.
This assignment of error is without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court
erred in denying the motion to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle.
3 Specifically, the defendant contends that Officer Peck did not have probable cause
to search the vehicle.'
Trial courts are vested with great discretion when ruling on a motion to
suppress. State v. Long, 2003- 2592 ( La. 9/ 9/ 04), 884 So. 2d 1176, 1179, cert.
denied, 544 U.S. 977, 125 S. Ct. 1860, 161 L.Ed.2d 728 ( 2005). When a trial court
denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be
reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court' s discretion, i.e., unless
such ruling is not supported by the evidence. See State v. Green, 94- 0887 ( La.
5/ 22/ 95), 655 So. 2d 272, 280- 81. However, a trial court' s legal findings are
subject to a de novo standard of review. See State v. Hunt, 2009- 1589 ( La.
12/ 1/ 09), 25 So. 3d 746, 751. Although not required to do so, an appellate court
may review testimony adduced at trial, in addition to the testimony adduced at the
suppression hearing, in determining the correctness of the trial court' s ruling on the
motion to suppress. State v. Leger, 2005- 0011 ( La. 7/ 10/ 06), 936 So. 2d 108, 122,
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1221, 127 S. Ct. 1279, 167 L.Ed.2d 100 ( 2007)
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, § 5,
of the Louisiana Constitution protect people against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Subject only to a few well- established exceptions, a search or seizure
conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is constitutionally
prohibited. Once a defendant makes an initial showing that a warrantless search or
seizure occurred, the burden of proof shifts to the State to affirmatively show it
was justified under one of the narrow exceptions to the rule requiring a search
warrant. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 703( D); State v. Johnson, 98- 0264 ( La. App.
1st Cir. 12/ 28/ 98), 728 So. 2d 885, 886. Evidence derived from an unreasonable
The defendant in brief labels this assignment of error as " Insufficiency of the Evidence Suppression of Illegally Obtained Evidence)." The defendant herein addresses only the pretrial ruling of the seizure of the gun and, as such, the evidentiary argument in this assignment of error is one of suppression, not sufficiency.
M stop, i.e., seizure, will be excluded from trial. State v. Benjamin, 97- 3065 ( La.
12/ 1/ 98), 722 So. 2d 988, 989.
The defendant does not contest the validity of the traffic stop itself. The
defendant argues in brief that the gun was confiscated from the vehicle without
sufficient probable cause. While Officer Peck indicated there was a strong odor of
marijuana coming from the vehicle, the defendant avers there was no evidence of
marijuana on his person or in the vehicle other than Officer Peck' s self-serving
testimony. Thus, according to the defendant, the justification for the search was
suspect since the alleged scent of marijuana coming from the vehicle could not
have occurred as Officer Peck testified.
Officer Peck testified at the motion to suppress hearing that as he
approached the vehicle that the defendant was driving, he noticed a strong smell of
burnt marijuana coming from the vehicle. Officer Peck had previously been an
undercover narcotics agent and was familiar with the odor of burning marijuana.
At trial, Officer Peck testified he detected a very strong odor of burnt marijuana
when he approached the vehicle.
The detection of a strong odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle,
viewed objectively, provided Officer Peck with probable cause to search the
vehicle. See State v. Arnold, 2011- 0626 ( La. 4/ 27/ 11), 60 So. 3d 599, 600 ( per
curiam); State v. Mitchell, 2010- 334 ( La. App. 5th Cir. 10/ 26/ 10), 52 So. 3d 155,
160, writ denied, 2011- 0355 ( La. 12/ 2/ 11), 76 So. 3d 1170 ( noting that courts have
consistently held that the odor of marijuana provided officers with sufficient
probable cause to conduct warrantless searches of vehicles). Accordingly, had
Officer Peck searched the vehicle, the seizure of the gun from the vehicle would
have been proper pursuant to probable cause to believe that contraband was
present.
5 That marijuana was not found in the vehicle or on the defendant is of no
moment. The defendant could have earlier smoked marijuana or discarded it prior
to being stopped. Moreover, Officer Peck testified at the motion to suppress
hearing that after he had been transported to jail, the defendant was found to have a
plastic baggie on his person that had been ripped up and smelled very strongly of
marijuana.
At any rate, it appears from Officer Peck' s testimony that he never searched
the vehicle the defendant was driving. After detaining the defendant in the back of
his unit, Officer Peck testified that he walked back toward the vehicle with the
intention of searching it. The driver' s side door was open and before he made
entry into the vehicle to begin the search, Officer Peck saw the gun in the vehicle,
in between the front seat and the center console. Officer Peck specifically testified
at the motion to suppress hearing that he never searched the vehicle, but noticed
the handgun in plain view.
Police may seize evidence under the " plain view" doctrine when there is
prior justification for an intrusion into the protected area, and it is immediately
apparent, without close inspection, that the item seized is evidence or contraband.
See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136- 137, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2308, 110
L.Ed.2d 112 ( 1990); Leger, 936 So. 2d at 155. Officer Peck had the right to stand
outside of the vehicle. Based on his testimony, it is clear the firearm was obvious
to him and it was immediately apparent it was evidence or contraband.
Accordingly, the firearm was properly seized. See State v. Parker, 2010- 1038
La. App. 5th Cir. 6/ 14/ 11), 71 So. 3d 383, 389; State v. Barnes, 2012- 0615 ( La.
App. 1st Cir. 11/ 2/ 12), 2012 WL 5387692 at * 6 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2013-
0634 ( La. 8/ 30/ 13), 120 So. 3d 264.
0 Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court did not err or abuse its
discretion in denying the motion to suppress evidence. Accordingly, this
assignment of error is without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Curtis L. Hall' s conviction, habitual
offender adjudication, and sentence are affirmed. All costs of this appeal are
assessed to appellant, Curtis L. Hall.
CONVICTION, HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION, AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.